

BEFORE THE
MILITARY COMMISSION
convened by the
COMMANDING GENERAL,
United States Army Forces
Western Pacific

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

-vs-)

TOMOYUKI YAMASHITA)

) PUBLIC TRIAL
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)
)
)

High Commissioner's Residence,
Manila, P. I.
23 November 1945

Met, pursuant to adjournment, at 0830 hours.

MEMBERS OF MILITARY COMMISSION:

MAJOR GENERAL RUSSEL B. REYNOLDS, Presiding Officer
and Law Member

MAJOR GENERAL LEO DONOVAN

MAJOR GENERAL JAMES A. LESTER

BRIGADIER GENERAL MORRIS C. HANDWERK

BRIGADIER GENERAL EGBERT F. BULLENE

APPEARANCES:

(Same as heretofore noted)

REPORTED BY:

E. D. CONKLIN

L. H. WINTER

M. M. RACKLIN

I N D E X

WITNESSES

	<u>DIRECT</u>	<u>CROSS</u>	<u>REDIRECT</u>	<u>RECROSS</u>
Akira Muto		3082	3097	3108
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Hiroshi Hashimoto	3112	3131	3146	
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EXHIBITS

<u>DEFENSE EXHIBIT NO.</u>	<u>FOR IDENTIFICATION</u>	<u>IN EXHIBIT</u>
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P R O C E E D I N G S

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The Commission is in session.

You may proceed.

MAJOR KERR: Sir, all members of the Commission are present, the Accused and Defense Counsel are present.

AKIRA MUTO

called as a witness on behalf of the Defense, having been previously sworn, resumed the stand and further testified as follows through Interpreter Commander Bartlett, assisted by Major Pratt and Lieutenant Asano:

CROSS-EXAMINATION (Resumed)

CAPTAIN PACE: I believe there was a question before the Commission at the close of yesterday's session, which I will withdraw at this time.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Very well.

Q (By Captain Pace) Did you testify that when a commander desired prisoners of war to do work for them, they would put a request in for such prisoners of war?

A (Through Commander Bartlett) That is correct.

Q What information would the request give?

A I am not familiar with the precise details, but it is my understanding that the object of the work or purpose for which it was being done, the type of labor required, and the number of individuals required, would be set forth in the request.

Q And who approved or disapproved the request?

A The commander of the prisoner of war camp would make a study of the request, and then obtain from his superior approval, if he approved, for allotting the prisoners

to the work. However, I have had not a single experience in this matter.

Q You testified that that is how the prisoners of war happened to be on Palawan, didn't you?

A Yes.

Q Was that approved by the commander of the prisoner of war camp, and his superior?

A The sending of prisoners to the Island of Palawan appears to have been done a long time in the past, and I am not in a position to say exactly how it was done at that time.

Q How do you know what happened a long time in the past?

A I have heard about it later.

Q The commander at Palawan was still responsible to the PW commander who let him use those prisoners, wasn't he?

A Yes, he had a responsibility to the commander of the prisoner of war camp with respect to the prisoners that he had working for him.

Q Who was Yamashita's Deputy Commander?

COMMANDER BARTLETT: I cannot put that into words without more specification as to the purpose for which the deputy was appointed.

Q (By Captain Pace) Who was second in command of the 14th Area Army?

A (Through Commander Bartlett) This question appears to be based on American custom, and from a Japanese point of view it is a question to which I cannot give an answer.

Q Who was Yamashita's immediate subordinate?

A With respect to his headquarters, the Chief of Staff was second in command, but this condition changed with respect to units under the command.

Q What was the strength of the 14th Area Army on January 9, 1945?

COMMANDER BARTLETT: Will you repeat the question, please?

(Question read)

A (Through Commander Bartlett) On Luzon Island there were approximately 230,000. With respect to other sectors, that is to say, in the south, having no idea what losses they had incurred, I am unable to give an estimate as to their strength.

Q (By Captain Pace) Does your figure for Luzon include the 4th Air Army?

A It is with the 4th Air Army included.

Q When did you lose communication with Batan Island?

A Communications held up with Batan Island until April, after which we communicated through a unit stationed at Aparri.

Q Did you ever hear of the protest of the Spanish Government concerning the murder of Spanish civilians in Manila?

A There was a telegram telling about this that came from Tokyo.

Q As Chief of Staff, did Yamashita have you investigate that?

A I did.

Q When did you get the telegram?

A In Baguio, early in April.

Q And what did you do in your investigation?

A I sent a telegram to General Yokoyama, Commander of the Shimbu Group, instructing him to immediately investigate and send an urgent reply with respect to the complaints received from Tokyo.

Q What else did you do?

A At Baguio, there was nothing else that I could do about it.

Q Was there anything to prevent you from leaving Baguio?

COMMANDER BARTLETT: Will you read the question, please?

(Question read)

A (Through Commander Bartlett) At that time, in April, when the telegram arrived, American troops were extremely active in the vicinity of Baguio, and their arrival was expected at any minute. Communication between Baguio and Manila was entirely confined to radio.

Q What did Yokoyama reply to your message?

A The reply telegram had a meaning to the effect that while investigation had been made, Manila was already occupied by American troops and it was impossible to tell what the facts of the case were.

Q When did you get that reply?

A The reply came approximately one week after my telegram had been sent.

Q You are certain this happened in April, are you?

A According to my memory, it was April.

Q Did you know that Spain broke relations with Japan because of this incident?

A We heard this through the San Francisco radio newscast, and decided that this was something that must be investigated with great vigor and speed.

Q Did you listen regularly to the San Francisco news broadcasts?

A We could hear it frequently when the weather conditions were favorable.

Q Prior to American landings on Luzon, did you regard guerrilla activity as one of your most serious problems?

A Yes.

Q What instructions did Yamashita give concerning the control of guerrilla activity?

A I believe, according to my memory, it was about the middle of November; as a result of the Leyte campaign, General Yamashita stated that it would be necessary to break up the bands of armed guerrillas, and gave orders to that effect.

Q Did the subordinate commanders report to Yamashita the results of their efforts to wipe up the guerrillas?

A Receiving a report that American submarines were landing arms in the vicinity of Lamon Bay, an expedition was sent to take care of that situation, but without conclusive results. That was one report.

Immediately following the issuing of these orders in November, the units in Batangas were very busy preparing defense positions, and it appeared at that time there were not many guerrillas in that vicinity, and we received no

particular reports from that sector. I also received a report that a small band of guerrillas operating on the road between Manila and Lingayan had been disposed of.

Q Are those the only two reports that you received?

A I also received word of the mopping up of certain guerrillas in the vicinity of Fort McKinley.

Q How many other reports did you receive?

A I have no memory of any other reports.

Q For the entire period between November 1944 and April 1945?

A No; it is only a question of the end of last year, that is to say, November and December and part of January of this year.

Q All right. What reports did you receive after that?

A After arriving in Baguio we attacked Volckman's guerrillas and there conducted punitive expedition which amounted almost to a battle with organized troops.

Q What other reports did you receive?

A After the landing of American troops the American Army became the large, principal enemy and from that time on we received practically no reports concerning guerrillas.

Q Where did this battle take place near Baguio?

A About 20 or 30 kilometers north of Baguio and at San Fernando there was what might be termed almost a "pitched battle".

Q What day at San Fernando?

A As I remember it, it was between the middle and end of March.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The Commission interrupts. Will you establish whether he means San Fernando, La Union.

There is more than one such city.

Q (By Captain Pace) Was this in San Fernando, La Union Province?

A No. It was the San Fernando north of Lingayen Bay.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: That is San Fernando, La Union.

Let us fix the point.

Q (By Captain Pace) What Province is that in?

A I am not familiar with the provinces.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Then let us have him point it out on the map.

THE WITNESS (Indicating San Fernando, La Union).

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The witness is pointing to San

Fernando, La Union.

Q (By Captain Pace) In the Japanese Army is it customary to report the casualties inflicted upon the enemy to your higher headquarters?

A The units were accustomed to report casualties inflicted on the enemy.

Q Did you receive reports that your troops had killed over 60,000 Filipino guerrillas?

A How many did you say? No. I never heard anything like that.

Q What number did you hear they killed?

A I have never added up the total figures, and since the reports came in piecemeal I am not familiar with how many were reported.

Q Can you make an estimate?

A I am afraid I cannot make an estimate at this time.

Q What was to be done with persons who gave food and money to the guerrillas?

COMMANDER BARTLETT: Will you read the question?

(Question read)

A There had been no thought given to any handling of such persons; only for general disposition of guerrillas.

Q (By Captain Pace) What was to be done with men and women who were suspected of being guerrillas?

A The policy set forth to me by General Yamashita concerned only armed guerrillas and did not take into consideration any women and children.

Q What was to be done with persons suspected of being guerrillas?

A Nothing was ever said about any consideration of suspects. All instructions concerned guerrillas with arms.

Q Was anything ever said concerning women and children?

A Nothing was ever said about women and children in connection with guerrillas.

Q Were any orders ever issued concerning women and children in any connection?

A I have no memory of any orders saying to do this or to do that concerning women and children.

Q Were there any facilities in the Japanese Army for trying guerrillas?

A If in a punitive expedition any guerrillas were caught they would in due course be brought before a court martial.

Q When was Colonel Nagahama relieved?

A As I remember it, the recommendation was sent to Tokyo in the middle of December and the relief took effect as of the 1st of February of this year.

Q Are you positive that he wasn't relieved in March 1944?

A No. He was relieved on the 1st of February and left Baguio immediately.

Q February 1945; is that right?

A Yes.

Q What land areas did Count Terauchi's command cover after November 1 1944?

A Including the Philippines and extending west through Burma, all lands south of the Philippines.

Q Will you name them, please?

A Since I had no connection with many of those places

I cannot remember them all.

Q Did it include Burma?

A Yes.

Q Where did the 103rd Division come from?

A That was a division activated here.

Q Where did the 8th Division come from?

A I know where they originated in Japan but I am not familiar with their movements between the time they may have left Japan and the time they arrived here. I cannot say where they came from directly.

Q Didn't they fight in China?

A I don't seem to be able to recall.

Q Is Yokoyama a friend of yours?

A He is an old acquaintance but perhaps not enough to call him a friend.

Q After he came to the Philippines didn't you ever talk to him about where he had been?

A I never talked to him about anything in the past.

Q And he never told you that he had been fighting with the 8th Division in China; is that right?

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The Commission interrupts and remarks that the questioning does not seem to pertain to matters at issue. Are you bringing out something that really pertains to this case?

CAPTAIN PACE: Yes, sir. The testimony of this witness earlier was that the troops that Yokoyama took command of here were in an unsatisfactory state of training, raw troops sent from Japan, and that control, therefore, was very difficult.

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: Sir, I should like to correct counsel's last statement. He didn't say that all of the troops were untrained.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: I believe Defense is correct on that. His force consisted of large components of new replacements who were untrained. But you may proceed.

A I cannot remember.

Q (By Captain Pace) How many troops that you had here on January 9, 1945 were veterans of the China and Manchurian campaigns?

A I cannot give you any idea. I don't know.

Q Doesn't the Japanese Army make any attempt to determine the experience and combat training that their units have received?

A Each unit has its own records, of course. However, to say offhand exactly how many had had what experience with respect to all of the troops is something that I could not do. Of course, if I were to make a special study, that could be discovered.

Q Can you make an estimate of what percentage of the command had had combat training?

COMMANDER BARTLETT: Will you repeat that question?

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Prosecution must rephrase the question. "Combat training" could mean "preparation for combat" and you may have in mind "participation in combat".

CAPTAIN PACE: Yes, sir.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Let us be certain.

Q (By Captain Pace) Can you give an estimate as to what percentage of your command had been in combat?

A Those who had had combat experience I believe were 30 or 40 per cent.

Q Where had they had their experience?

A They were either from China or who had been to some southern area and had experience there. Troops from Manchuria had had practically no combat experience.

Q In the Japanese Army has a commanding officer authority to punish officers under him?

A Yes.

Q What punishment can he administer?

A First, that differs with respect to ranks. With respect to officers there is "heavy arrest", which means staying right in his quarters at all times; "light arrest" and "reprimand". With respect to noncommissioned officers and lower ranks, up to the maximum of 30 days garrison confinement.

Q Can officers in the Japanese Army be court-martialed?

A From the very beginning that was possible. That means "of course".

Q Did Iwabuchi have authority to punish the Naval land troops in Manila after February 3, 1945?

A Yes.

Q Did Yamashita have any fishing units under him?

A He did not have any directly under him, but there were such units in each area who were responsible to the local unit commanders.

Q Were these commanders part of Yamashita's army troops?

A There were two types of fishing units: some that were Army and some that were Navy.

Q What type of unit was the Army unit?

A Those units had for their mission, when American landing craft should approach, to attack them by colliding with them with small boats with explosive charges in them.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: There will be a recess for approximately ten minutes.

(Short recess)

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The Commission is in session.

You may proceed.

Q (By Captain Pace) Where was the first meeting that you attended with Yamashita where he met Ricarte?

A In the President's mansion.

Q President Quezon's mansion?

A It was the official residence of President Laurel.

Q Where was the second meeting held?

A At Fort McKinley.

Q Where was President Laurel's mansion located?

A I believe it was in the very center of the City of Manila.

Q Where was the third meeting held?

A The third time it was in Manila on the occasion of the opening meeting of the Philippine Patriotic League, at which time the General made his appearance in order to greet the meeting.

Q Where in Manila?

A I did not go at that time, and I do not know just where it was.

CAPTAIN PACE: The Prosecution has no further questions.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The Commission has questions.

EXAMINATION BY THE COMMISSION

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Did General Yamashita ever declare Manila to be an open city?

A The commander of the city, of the forces in the City of Manila, made an announcement in the city to that effect. That is the unit which later became the Kobayashi

group.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: He still hasn't answered the question.

A General Yamashita did not make such an announcement himself.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: With reference to the announcement made by the local commander in Manila, was this decision transmitted to the American troops?

COMMANDER BARTLETT: Will you read the question?

(Question read.)

THE WITNESS: No, not to the American troops.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Is there any question in the mind of the witness as to what we mean by the term "declaring Manila an open city"?

A What I said was not -- I did not understand it as the expression "open city." What I mean to convey is that General Yamashita did not desire to have fighting in the city.

COMMANDER BARTLETT: I find that the word used by the Japanese for "open city" is "open city" for want of a better word, and my attempt of the translation of it was probably misunderstood by the witness.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Ask the witness whether he understands the meaning of the term "open city" as it is defined and discussed in the Geneva Convention.

A I am not familiar with the details, but I believe I have a good knowledge of the general meaning of the term.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: In his judgment was the announce-

ment made by the local commander in Manila a direct declaration that Manila would be an open city within the meaning of the Geneva Convention?

THE WITNESS: It was different.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The Defense may proceed.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

Q (By Colonel Clarke) General Muto, why didn't General Yamashita declare Manila an open city?

A General Yamashita gave serious thought to the question of declaring Manila an open city, and the first reason that he did not do so was that in order to do so it would be necessary for him to make an announcement to that effect to the entire world; that he did not possess the authority to do so.

The second reason is that Manila, having been the principal supply base for the southern sector for three years contained an enormous amount of military supplies, that with the American landing, as imminent as it was, and with the transportation facilities available to the Japanese, it would have been impossible to render Manila a city not to be defended.

Since it appeared useless to advise Tokyo with respect to an impossibility, it was determined to evacuate Manila in a tactical manner, and having withdrawn as much of the supplies as possible, endeavor to keep the fighting out of the city.

EXAMINATION BY THE COMMISSION (Cont'd)

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The Commission finds it difficult to reconcile this statement with your preceding

statement that General Yamashita wished to avoid combat in Manila. Do you desire to discuss the matter?

A I would like to explain it, if it may be pointed out to me in what respect the two statements appear not to be consistent.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: In the one case the witness has testified that General Yamashita gave orders for the evacuation of the city, which the local troop commanders failed to execute. In the current discussion the witness is stating that General Yamashita could not declare the city an open city because of the supplies which he must protect and clear.

A I understand. What I wish to convey is this: That while General Yamashita wished to clear the city of Japanese troops and supplies there were in the city large numbers of air force and navy troops who were not subject to his command, and that if having made an announcement, a declaration of an open city, these troops were left in the city, then despite his announcement the facts of the case would have been that the city would be defended, and he preferred to try and make the city, in fact, an undefended city to the extent that he could without making any declaration to that effect.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Since General Yamashita considered the question of declaring Manila an open city, did he at that time give any consideration to the evacuation of the civilian population?

A There was also considered and a conclusion reached that it was impossible of accomplishment.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Why?

A At that time the efficiency of the railroad was very low. The number of motor transport vehicles available was very low, and weather permitting the city was subject to constant bombing by American air forces. In addition, if the Japanese army were to assume the responsibility of moving these people there would arise the problem of feeding them, and taking all these factors into consideration it was determined that the evacuation of the civilian population was an impossibility.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Did General Yamashita issue any orders to his local commanders in the Manila area which would have directed them to prevent civilians leaving the city who wished to do so?

A On the contrary he had made known his wishes that any civilians who desired to leave the city would be permitted to go gladly.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: In view of that statement why were they held in the city in such localities as the Intramuros?

A If such was done, then that was directly contrary to the expressed wishes of General Yamashita.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: You may proceed.

COLONEL CLARKE: Is that point cleared up, sir?

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Yes.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION (Cont'd)

Q (By Colonel Clarke) Was it true that civilians did not wish out of the city, but on the contrary came into the City of Manila?

A Apparently some of them wished to leave the city, and the same time others desired to come into the city. I cannot give you any idea of numbers, but there was such a movement going on.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The Commission interrupts. Since counsel has started to explore the point, we must have it clear. The way the question was phrased would be too broad over a long period of time, but the matter to which we are directing our attention involves the period of the defense of the City of Manila with American troops occupying parts of the residential areas. Now, it will be necessary to ask the witness whether there was any great demand by civilians to enter the city during the period of actual fighting.

Q (By Colonel Clarke) Were there any civilians that entered the City of Manila during the period about February, 1945?

A I was at Baguio at that time and I do not know of conditions which prevailed in February.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Very well. Proceed.

COLONEL CLARKE: I believe there was a question being answered by General Muto at the time the last question was asked.

Will you read the original question back?

I think it had to do with Manila not being declared an open city.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: If that is the question involved he has given a thorough discussion on it. Unless there is something else you want you may proceed.

COLONEL CLARKE: I did not know whether he was through with that question or not.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Well, you may explore and see.

COLONEL CLARKE: I think it has been entirely covered, sir.

Q (By Colonel Clarke) On cross examination yesterday, you were asked whether or not you were a participant in the young officers revolt in the Japanese Army. Do you know anything about that revolt?

A At that time I was a major and was no longer a young officer -- a lieutenant colonel, and was no longer a young officer. At that time there was a Marshal Muto, a very great man in Japan, and I am wondering whether that has not risen a little confusion between the Marshal and myself as General Muto.

Q Were you or were you not a participant in the revolt?

A No connection at all.

Q You were asked on cross-examination whether there were any troops in Cavite under General Yamashita in October, November and December, 1944. Your answer was that you do not remember if any troops were there; but, if any army troops were there, yes.

A Yes.

Q Were there any navy troops in Cavite at that time?

A Since Cavite was navy territory, there were naval troops there.

Q Were any naval troops in Cavite at that time under the command of General Yamashita?

A What months were those?

Q October, November and December, 1944.

A No.

Q You testified that Marshal Terauchi left Manila in November of 1944, is that correct?

A I said so yesterday, and there is no mistake about it.

Q At that time, did the command of Marshal Terauchi cease over the troops in this area?

A No; his command continued afterwards to include the Philippines.

Q When did the Southern Supreme Command cease to have any control over the troops in the Philippines?

A The 30th of August of this year.

Q Was General Yamashita's headquarters subordinate to the Supreme Southern Command until that date?

A Yes.

Q Yesterday you testified that you had not heard anything concerning a report that prisoners of war were starving to death?

A Yes.

Q And later you testified, in answer to the question as to whether or not you thought the rate of death in the army of starvation was about the same as the prisoner of war camps, that in your opinion the rate was higher in the Japanese army.

CAPTAIN PACE: What page, sir?

COLONEL CLARKE: 3076 and 3077.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: If you are going into that question, it will also be necessary to establish dates; because obviously, when the Japanese army withdrew into the hills they faced a different situation than they did prior to the defense of Manila. That is to say, they faced a different situation in March, April and later months, than they did in October, November, December and January. So if you are going into the question, you must do it by dates.

COLONEL CLARKE: There is an apparent inconsistency, and I was attempting to clear up the inconsistency. He said he didn't know of any starvation, and later he said the rate was higher.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: You are quite right, but in exploring it, since you have opened the subject, the Commission desires that it be established by dates: What was the condition from October 1 to January 1, for example, and what was the situation from February 1 to, say, April 30? Then we will be able to visualize what the situation really

was. Really the Commission is concerned with the matter only for the period prior to the liberation of American prisoners of war and civilian internees, which took place on February 3 or thereabouts.

COMMANDER BARTLETT: Will you read the last two questions, please?

(The last two questions were read by the reporter as hereinabove recorded.)

A (Through Commander Bartlett) Yes. With respect to that --

COLONEL CLARKE: Wait a minute. I want to ask him another question.

Q (By Colonel Clarke) Is your opinion based upon the proportionate rate of death between October 1944 and the surrender, in September 1945?

A (Through Commander Bartlett) I had never heard of deaths from starvation among the prisoners, but when the Counsel told me that there had been and asked me whether I thought there were -- how they compared with deaths in the Japanese army, I told him that I thought that the deaths in the Japanese army from starvation were probably greater.

COMMANDER BARTLETT: Will you read that answer, please?

(Answer read)

COMMANDER BARTLETT: I would like to change that word "Counsel" to "Prosecutor".

GENERAL REYNOLDS: That, indeed, was his testimony, but we want to know if it refers to the period prior to February 3.

COLONEL CLARKE: Yes, sir. I want to establish whether he meant the entire period at that time.

Q (By Colonel Clarke) Can you give us the proportion of deaths by starvation as between prisoners of war and Japanese soldiers, for the months of October, November and December 1944?

MAJOR KERR: If the Commission please, this witness stated yesterday that he did not know what deaths had occurred in the prisoner of war camps. I submit, therefore, that there is no foundation laid for that question at this time.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Well, in another part of his testimony he has compared the deaths in the Japanese army with the deaths in the prisoner of war camps; now we would like an answer to that question as to the dates.

Will you read the last question, please?

(Question read)

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Let him answer that question.

Q (Through Commander Bartlett) I, cannot give you an accurate statement, but I can give you my impression.

Q (By Colonel Clarke) And what will be the basis of your impression; what knowledge will you have upon which to base that impression?

A First I base it on my knowledge of conditions in the military hospitals serving the troops in the City of Manila, which were absolutely full of malnutrition cases. Also, at that time, in spite of the heat we were requiring a great deal of labor from such troops. And from that springs my opinion that probably the death rate was greater

among the Japanese soldiers than among prisoners of war.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: There will be a recess for approximately ten minutes.

(Short recess)

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The Commission is in session. You may proceed.

Q (By Colonel Clarke) In making your comparison as to the pro-rated deaths between the army and civilians, of starvation, you stated that you based your opinion, insofar as the military was concerned, on the hospital deaths?

A Yes.

Q Upon what information do you base your opinion as to the prisoners of war death?

A I used the information that I received here, with respect to deaths of prisoners of war.

COLONEL CLARKE: Shall we go into the January, February and March on that basis, sir?

GENERAL REYNOLDS: I doubt if it will be productive, but if you would like, you may do so.

Q (By Colonel Clarke) In speaking of the labor groups of prisoners on Palawan yesterday, you were asked a question as to whether or not the commanding officer on Palawan was responsible to the commander of the prisoners of war.

(Translated to the witness by Commander Bartlett.)

Q You answered that the commanding officer on Palawan had a responsibility to the commander of the prisoners of war.

A The borrowing unit commander had complete responsibility for the prisoners, and in case anything should go wrong

there, his was the full responsibility. That is the answer I intended to give yesterday.

Q Was that the answer you gave yesterday?

A I believe that I will always give that answer to such a question.

Q Was that the answer you gave yesterday?

A I believe I gave the same answer yesterday that I gave today.

COLONEL CLARKE: The reason for this is, sir, that afterwards we were informed that the interpretation did not bring out the sense of his answer, sir.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: I think we can leave the point, because I don't think there is any question that in this case his answer of today and the answer of yesterday were identical as to their meaning. That is, we would accept the two answers as being identical.

The Commission, however, will interrupt to inquire of the witness whether the use of American prisoners of war on that Palawan Airfield was in accordance with the terms of the Geneva Convention for the use of prisoners of war. And add this statement: "In the opinion of the witness".

(Translated to the witness by Commander Bartlett.)

THE WITNESS: (Through Commander Bartlett) If the time when that project was started was a time when there was no likelihood of attacks by American aircraft then I believe it was a permissible use.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: We will then find it necessary to inquire as to his views on the matter at the time of the alleged massacre.

THE WITNESS: (Through Commander Bartlett) I believe that when conditions were as they then were, it was no longer an appropriate use for prisoners.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Proceed.

COLONEL CLARKE: That is all, sir.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Is there anything further from the Prosecution?

CAPTAIN PACE: We have three questions, sir.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Let us restrict it, please, to three.

CAPTAIN PACE: Yes, sir.

RE-CROSS EXAMINATION

Q (By Captain Pace) When did Yamashita learn that the Imperial Headquarters had directed that naval forces would be under the army for land combat?

A That was way before; in fact, when I was at Sumatra the same orders were given to us there. And when General Yamashita arrived here, he found those long-standing orders already here.

Q Were they in effect here when he arrived?

A Those orders had gone all over the South Sea Command.

Q When did Yamashita talk to Laurel about declaring Manila an open city?

COLONEL CLARKE: We don't believe that that was in the testimony at all, sir, that he talked to Laurel about declaring Manila an open city.

CAPTAIN PACE: It is a leading question, sir; I can make two questions out of it.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: We are restricting you to three

questions. In view of the objection by Counsel and the recollection of the Commission as to this testimony, the question will not be answered.

CAPTAIN PACE: I will rephrase it, then.

Q (By Captain Pace) Did Laurel talk to Yamashita about declaring Manila an open city?

A There was no such talk from President Laurel to General Yamashita.

Q Are you positive of that?

A As far as I am concerned, I am positive.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: How many questions now from the Defense?

COLONEL CLARKE: About one or two, sir.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: We will grant you two.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

Q (By Colonel Clarke) Were these orders concerning the transfer of command of naval land troops to the army a standing order from Tokyo?

A It is of the nature of a standing order.

Q When would that order become effective in operations?

A It would automatically take effect with the commencement of land operations.

COLONEL CLARKE: That is all, sir.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Unless this witness is recalled for some essential purpose by the Defense or Prosecution or Commission, he will be considered excused.

COLONEL CLARKE: I think we will put him on to complete the map.

(Witness excused.)

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: In connection with General Muto's testimony the Defense wishes at this time to invite the attention of the Commission to an excerpt from Prosecution's Exhibit 399 in evidence. This is a letter from the Liaison Committee for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy dated the 5th of this month and it is addressed to Colonel Munson, General Staff Corps, United States Army, G-2; subject: "Placing Naval units in the Philippines under the command of General YAMASHITA".

"1. The Liaison Committee (Tokyo) of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy is the official means of liaison between the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy and the armed forces of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

"2. The undersigned, Lieutenant General S. Arisue, IJA, is the Chairman of the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy".

There were two questions that were asked and the most pertinent at this time was the second question.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: While we are to consider the document, read both questions and both answers.

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: Yes, sir.

"3. A request has been received by the Liaison Committee through the office of Colonel Munson, GSC, G-2, for the original Japanese records answering the two following questions: 1. Did General YAMASHITA, Tomoyuki, command all Navy forces in Manila during January and February, 1945? 2. Did YAMASHITA'S command extend to actual control over Navy Forces in land action after commencement of hostilities in or near Manila? That the request included

a request for the answers to the two said questions in the event that the original Japanese records were unavailable.

"4. A search for original Japanese documents which might have borne on the two said questions has been made but none have been found. Many original Japanese records were destroyed prior to the cessation of hostilities.

"5. To the best of the knowledge and belief of the Liaison Committee the answer to the first question is, while not all of the Navy personnel on the land throughout the Philippines was under the command of General YAMASHITA during January and February, 1945, the Navy personnel on the land in the city of Manila during January and February, 1945, was under the command of General YAMASHITA.

"6. The answer to the second question (that is, as to control) is not known. It is known that General Yamashita was in or around Baguio during January and February, 1945, and that if there was any communication between him and the Japanese forces in or near the city of Manila during the period in question the communication was very poor.

"/s/ S. Arisue
/t/ S. Arisue,
Lieutenant General, IJA
Chairman "

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The comments of counsel are noted. The Commission should state that the reply to the second question must also be weighed against the testimony of the Japanese commanders who have discussed at some length the communication facilities available in Baguio and the Shimbu Group and the efficiency of the radio facilities even to dates. That is to say, the quality of radio communication had been discussed by the Commanding General of the Shimbu

Group period by period, starting in in January and continuing until well after the fall of Manila.

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: Yes, sir.

CAPTAIN REEL: Colonel Hiroshi Hashimoto.

HIROSHI HASHIMOTO

called as a witness on behalf of the Defense, being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows through Commander Bartlett, assisted by Major Pratt and Lieutenant Asano.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Q (By Captain Reel) What is your name?

A Hiroshi Hashimoto.

Q And your address?

A Tokyo City; Ushigome Ward; Benten Street, No. 44.

Q And your rank in the Japanese Army?

A I am a full Colonel.

Q And you are now a prisoner of war?

A Yes.

Q When did you come to the Philippine Islands?

A First day of November of last year.

Q And where did you come to in the Philippine Islands?

A I came by air to San Fernando.

Q And what was your mission here?

A I was enroute to the Island of Mindinao to join the staff of the 100th Division.

Q Did you ever get to Mindinao?

A I never did get away.

Q And why didn't you get to Mindinao?

A There was no air transport available to go there.

Q Did you assume a position here in Luzon?

A Yes.

Q And what was that position?

A On the staff of the Manila Defense.

Q And was that called the Kobayashi Corps?

A Yes.

Q Now, was this Kobayashi Corps made up of numerous divisions?

A Yes.

Q About how many men were in the Kobayashi Corps?

A There were at that time five battalions of infantry.

Q And where were they located?

A At Santa Mesa.

Q And that is when you first came here?

A Yes.

Q Now, at some time shortly after that were most of these troops transferred away from the City of Manila?

A They went to Wawa, which is on the east of Manila.

Q Now, were any of the Kobayashi Corps left in Manila?

A Yes.

Q About when were these troops transferred to Wawa?

A The transfer started about 10 January and was practically complete by 25 January.

Q These troops that were left in Manila, how many were there?

A About 1800 in the City of Manila.

Q And were these the so-called Noguchi Detachments?

A Yes.

Q And was there a Colonel Noguchi here in charge of

them?

A Yes.

Q Did you stay in Manila with the Noguchi Detachment?

A Yes.

Q All right. Now, before we come to that, do you know when the order was issued to move the bulk of the Kobayashi Corps out to Wawa?

A I think it was about the end of December.

Q And where did that order come from?

A That came from the Shobu Group.

Q Is the Shobu the 14th Army Group?

A Yes.

Q What was the mission of the 1800 men of the Noguchi Detachments who remained in Manila?

A First, the maintenance of order within the City of Manila; next, to guard military supplies remaining in the City of Manila, and to guard the large bridge across the Pasig River -- "bridge" or "bridges".

Q Where were these Noguchi troops placed within the City of Manila?

A Post Office; Water Works Office; Yokohama Specie Bank; Freight Depot; the City Office --

CAPTAIN REEL: The City Hall?

COMMANDER BARTLETT: The City Hall.

A (continuing) -- the Legislative Hall; Intramuros. That's all.

Q (By Captain Reel) Now, how big a detachment was in Intramuros?

A Approximately 100 men.

Q And where in Intramuros were they?

A Along the east edge of the Walled City.

Q And is that near the Manila Hotel?

A It is about 800 meters from the Manila Hotel.

Q Now, you have told us where the detachments were placed. Why were they placed in the spots that you have named?

A As I said before, their mission was to guard bridges, and they were placed in the vicinity of the bridges that they were to guard.

Q Were they also placed at locations where supplies were?

A Sentries were put around supply points.

Q Now, you stated that one part of the mission was to guard the supplies. Were the supplies being moved out of the City of Manila at that time?

A Yes.

Q And who was doing that moving?

A At the first part of the time the line of communications was doing that.

Q And "line of communications" is equally translated as "commissariat"; it is "hei-tan" on the chart?

COMMANDER BARTLETT: That is what it is.

Q (By Captain Reel) Did these Noguchi detachments have any instructions to destroy supplies?

A There were no orders, and it was not part of their mission.

Q They were simply to guard them while others were moving them out, is that correct?

A Yes.

Q And why wasn't any order given to destroy those supplies in the event the Americans should take Manila?

A This was started about the middle of November and

it has been anticipated that the transportation of these supplies would be completed before the arrival of the American troops.

Q When did your intelligence lead you to expect the Americans would arrive?

A As I understood it or estimated it it was expected after the 20th of February.

Q Now, in addition to these 1,800 Noguchi detachment, were there a large number of naval troops in the City of Manila?

A Yes.

Q And can you tell us, with reference to that map, if you wish, just where they were located? You might explain those red dots are not units.

A. There is an Escolta Street just north of the river, as I am indicating on the chart, and there were some troops there. There were a few in the Walled City, as I point to the south of the river.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Let me interrupt. Are these Army troops or Navy troops? The question dealt with Navy troops.

COMMANDER BARTLETT: I asked the witness the question: "Are all these troops you are speaking of Navy troops?" The answer is, "Yes."

THE WITNESS: Naval headquarters was the third house, or third building, to the south of the Legislature. The main force was dispersed along south of that, as I indicated. There were many naval troops in the neighborhood of Nichols Field. There were naval troops at

McKinley. In the neighborhood of San Juan there were naval troops.

Q Now, do you know how many naval troops there were in the places that you have pointed out?

A I cannot give you an accurate figure.

Q Well, an approximation, then.

A At Escolta there were one or two hundred; at the north of the Walled City, on the river bank, about two hundred; at San Juan, about a thousand or a few more. The rest of the naval forces were all south of that along the shore.

Q Is that in the Pasay region?

A Yes.

Q Now, can you tell us, roughly, how many naval troops there were altogether in the City of Manila?

A From 15,000 to possibly 20,000.

Q Were there naval troops in the Malate and Ermita areas?

A I don't know.

Q Were there naval troops in the area between the naval headquarters and Nichols Field?

A Yes.

Q Were there any of the Noguchi detachment in that southern part of the City between the naval headquarters and Nichols Field?

A No.

Q Now, when did you first hear of the Americans coming to Manila?

A The 3rd of February.

Q Before I explore that further I want to ask a question that deals with one that I asked before. Do you know where the naval storehouses were located?

A There were some at Escolta; there were also many supplies in the large building in which the naval headquarters were located south of the Legislature, as I said before.

Q Now, back to the 3rd of February, what occurred on the 3rd of February?

A At the Far Eastern University, the first contact between American and Japanese troops occurred.

Q And about what time of the day was that?

A 1830 to 1900 hours.

Q And where were you at that time?

A I was in my detachment headquarters at the post office.

Q Did someone bring you a report of this engagement?

A I heard about this contact when I went to the post office and contacted the unit involved by telephone.

Q Were there some troops of the Noguchi unit in that battle?

A There were about 50 troops from Noguchi at the Far Eastern University.

Q Were they guarding supplies at the Far Eastern University?

A Yes.

Q Now, what was your reaction when you heard of this engagement on the 3rd of February?

A I was extremely surprised at this arrival of the

troops and was frightened.

Q And why were you surprised?

A I had not expected American troops to arrive so quickly.

Q Did you report to the colonel, Colonel Noguchi, immediately after hearing this?

A Colonel Noguchi discovered, knew this at the same time that I did.

Q Now, what was your opinion at the time as to whether or not this constituted the beginning of a full-scale invasion of Manila by the American troops?

A It was my opinion at the time that this was a mere reconnaissance unit and Colonel Noguchi was of the same opinion.

Q Now, what did you do after reporting to Colonel Noguchi?

A I established a liaison with Colonel Kobayashi, the commander of the Kobayashi unit, who was, as I said before, at Wawa, outside the City of Manila. However, by reason of static and the extraneous noises, it was extremely difficult to hear or make myself heard over the telephone, and as a result on the following morning, the 4th, I went out to Colonel Kobayashi to apprise him of his situation.

Q Is that Colonel, or Major General?

A Major General.

Q And what time on the 4th of February did you leave Manila?

A It was very early in the morning of the 4th,

possibly one o'clock or two o'clock.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The Commission will recess until 1:30 this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 1135 hours, 23 November 1945, a recess was taken until 1330 hours, 23 November 1945.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The trial was resumed, pursuant to recess, at 1330 hours.)

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The Commission is in session.
You may proceed.

MAJOR KERR: Sir, all members of the Commission are present, the Accused and Defense Counsel are present.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Read back the last six questions and answers, please.

(The portion of the record referred to was read by the reporter as above recorded.)

CAPTAIN REEL: Sir, the guard officer in charge of prisoners has not yet brought the witness over from the stockade. We inquired about it and have been sending after him for the last 20 minutes.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: How far is it?

CAPTAIN REEL: From here to the stockade, sir? I think it is only about 100 yards.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Do you know, Major Kerr, whether the MPs have gone over after him?

MAJOR KERR: No, sir. This is the first word I have had of it. I didn't know he was not here.

CAPTAIN REEL: I think Captain Williams is out after him, sir.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The Commission will recess until the witness arrives.

(Short recess)

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Are you ready to proceed?

CAPTAIN REEL: Yes, sir.

HIROSHI HASHIMOTO

the witness on the stand at the time of recess, having been previously duly sworn, was examined and further testified as follows through Interpreter Asano, with the assistance of Commander Bartlett and Major Pratt:

DIRECT EXAMINATION (Resumed)

Q (By Captain Reel) Now, when you left Manila on the 4th of February, was there any fighting going on in Manila?

A (Through Interpreter Asano) I have heard that there was some fighting going on in the vicinity of Santo Tomas University on or about the 3rd of February.

Q Did you see any fighting?

A No, I haven't.

Q Did you report to General Kobayashi in Wawa?

A Yes, I did; I reported to him over the telephone.

Q And was that the first report he had received of the occurrences on the 3rd of February?

A Yes, it was the first report.

Q Now, did you stay at General Kobayashi's headquarters at Wawa after that?

A The first report over the telephone was unsatisfactory. Therefore, I personally went out to Major General Kobayashi's headquarters and stayed there ever since.

Q Now, was communication kept up between Colonel Kobayashi's headquarters and the City of Manila?

A The communication between Major General Kobayashi's headquarters and army headquarters in Manila was maintained. In the case of telephone, it was maintained until the night of the 3rd or the early morning of the 4th. However, the

wireless communication was maintained until on or about the 18th of February.

Q And between the time of your arrival at General Kobayashi's headquarters and the 18th of February, did you get reports of what was going on in Manila?

A We had been listening in to some of the communications that were sent to headquarters of Shimbun Shudan, and thus we learned what was going on in Manila.

Q Did you get or hear any reports of the killing of civilians in Manila?

A No, I never heard of such reports.

Q Did you get or hear any reports of rape in the City of Manila?

A No, I never did hear such a report.

Q Did you get or hear any reports of atrocities occurring in the City of Manila?

A No, I haven't heard of any such cases.

Q Now, when you say there was wireless communication, was that wireless telephone or Morse Code wireless?

A It was wireless code.

Q And to your knowledge, in the Japanese army was there such a thing as wireless telephone?

CAPTAIN REEL: That is, voice transmission; explain that it means "voice transmission".

A (Through Interpreter Asano) In the battle of Manila, a radio telephone wasn't being used.

Q (By Captain Reel) Now, approximately what time did it become apparent to you or your headquarters that there would be a battle in Manila?

INTERPRETER ASANO: Will you read that question, please?

(Question read)

A (Through Interpreter Asano) The battle of Manila became apparent on or about the 10th of February.

Q And what happened on or about the 10th of February that made that apparent?

A One reason that city fighting in Manila was apparent was because the American forces had crossed the river near San Juan and had penetrated the naval defense there.

(At this point the witness left the stand and proceeded to the map of Manila and vicinity and indicated thereon.)

THE WITNESS: (Through Interpreter Asano) And on about the 9th or 10th of February, I received a report from the unit stationed near Paco Station, stating that there was a pitched battle going on around that neighborhood.

Q Now, at any time was an attempt made by the Noguchi Units to get out of Manila?

A This unit attempted to withdraw from the City of Manila by way of Paco Station, and there engaged American forces, and pitched battle was ensued there; and that area was taken or lost on about two or three occasions.

Q So that the battle at the Paco Station resulted from the attempt of the Noguchi units to get out of Manila?

A That is what I estimate.

Q Now, did you get any reports from naval units?

A No, I haven't.

Q Now, on or about the 10th of February, did the

Kobayashi headquarters draw up plans to extricate the Noguchi units? If "extricate" is too long a word, then "to get them out of the city".

A Yes, we did plan to rescue or evacuate the Noguchi unit from the City of Manila, and the plan was submitted to the Shimbu Group headquarters.

Q When was this?

A On or about the 10th of February.

Q What was the plan?

A The number of men used for this plan was about 5,000 from the Shobu -- Shimbu Group. The plan was to attack from the direction of Caloocan, Nipo, Quezon Air Field, and Antipolo.

Q And at the time of this attack, were the Noguchi units to attempt to break out from the city in the same direction?

A We received a wire to the effect that the Noguchi unit will attempt escape offense on the 14th of February; therefore attempt at rescue from the outside began on the 14 of February.

Q What happened to this venture?

A Because resistance of American force confronting the Shimbu Group was so stiff, that this plan was not effective.

Q Now, was there any other purpose, other than rescuing the Noguchi units, in sending these 5,000 men towards the city from the east?

A This rescue plan had two purposes: The first was to break up the offensive preparation being made by the American

forces situated east of the Shimbu Group, and the secondary purpose was to rescue the Noguchi unit in the City of Manila.

Q Was it any part of the plan to try to retake the City of Manila?

A No, there was no plan included in retaking of Manila.

CAPTAIN REEL: "No plan included in retaking of Manila"; is that the entire translation?

INTERPRETER ASANO: Yes.

CAPTAIN REEL: Then I had better ask it again.

Q (By Captain Reel) Was it part of the plan that this force of 5,000 were to take Manila?

A No, it wasn't the plan to retake Manila.

Q Why not?

A We knew that the recapture of Manila was difficult and absurd, because we only possessed infantry and we did not have any artillery support.

Q And was it part of the general plan that there should be no occupation of Manila by the Japanese troops?

MAJOR KERR: If the Commission please, the Prosecution objects again to leading of the witness.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The objection is sustained. These important questions should be phrased in a more orthodox manner.

CAPTAIN REEL: The difficulty of interpretation, sir, requires leading sometimes. I will rephrase it.

Q (By Captain Reel) What was the Japanese plan relative to the defense or occupation of Manila?

A The purpose of the troops stationed in Manila were

to maintain order, guard bridges, and to guard the military supplies.

CAPTAIN REEL: I don't think that answers the question. I will ask it again.

Q (By Captain Reel) Does the witness know about a plan to evacuate Manila?

A (Through Interpreter Asano) It was our plan to evacuate the city completely after the supplies were evacuated.

Q And when you say "our plan there", you mean the Noguchi unit?

A No, that is the plan we received from the Shimbu group headquarters.

Q Was that plan ever changed so far as you know?

A No.

Q Now, this battle, the failure of the rescue mission, did that occur in the hills east of Manila?

A The rescue operation took place to the east of Montalban and U. P. University and to the north at Novaliches.

Q And that is outside of the City of Manila?

A Yes, it is.

Q Now, go back for a minute to December 1944 or January 1945, do you know anything about a proclamation that was posted in the City of Manila?

CAPTAIN REEL: Will you read that question back?

(Question read.)

THE WITNESS: Yes, there was a proclamation issued to the public in the City of Manila.

Q (By Captain Reel) Just posted on the walls in the city?

A Yes, the proclamation was posted in the conspicuous places in town and was also published in the newspapers.

Q In what languages?

A In the newspaper the proclamation was written in English, Japanese and Tagalog.

Q And the posters?

A The posters were written in English and Japanese.

Q And to the best of your recollection, what was the subject matter of these posters or proclamations?

A I don't remember very well, but I believe the context of the proclamation said something like this, to this effect, that Manila will now be a battlefield and that the inhabitants should carry on their daily routine.

Q Were any plans made relative to evacuation of civilians from Manila?

A No, we did not have any conclusive plan of evacuation of civilians of Manila. However, we expected congestion of traffic if anything of such nature took place. Therefore, we had drawn plans and stationed sentries as traffic controllers.

Q And were the sentries stationed to facilitate traffic out of Manila for people who wished to go?

A The plan to post sentries was to have them placed in a strategic point or at a strategic point so that they could instruct the civilians regarding the matter of evacuation.

Q Were signs put up advising the sentries of the proper roads out of the city?

A No, there was not.

Q Now, I think you testified that the Noguchi units had no orders to destroy buildings. I will ask you whether you know of a naval order to naval units to destroy buildings?

A I do not know.

CAPTAIN REEL: That is all.

CROSS EXAMINATION

Q (By Captain Hill) When did you become chief of staff for General Kobayashi?

A The latter part of March of this year.

Q Then you were not chief of staff during the time about which you have testified?

A It is so.

Q And during the period from November 1944, when you arrived here, until March 1945, you were merely in charge of Japanese civilians and the transportation of supplies in this area, is that not true?

A Yes, it is. When the battle started on the 4th of February I had to do something with operations of war.

Q I believe you testified in your direct examination that when you first learned of the Americans entering the City of Manila that you were in your headquarters in the post office, is that correct?

INTERPRETER ASANO: Will you please read the question?

(Question read.)

THE WITNESS: No, I stated that I reported to the post office.

Q (By Captain Hill) Where were you when you first learned of the Americans entering the city?

A The first news of American forces entering Manila was heard by me while I was eating supper at the Rainbow Cafe.

Q Isn't it a fact that when you first heard the news of the Americans entering Manila you were drunk in the

Rainbow Night Club in Manila?

A Absolutely not so.

Q Do you know this gentleman by the side of me here (indicating Mr. Bonuvar)?

A Yes, I do know him.

Q And has he interviewed you on two different occasions recently?

A Yes, he has.

Q Did this gentleman, Mr. Bonuvar, interview you on 11 October 1945?

A I met him sometime this year, but I am not sure of the date.

Q Well, on that day, on the 11th of October, didn't you state to Mr. Bonuvar that on the night of 3 February 1945, when you learned of the news of the Americans entering Manila, that you were drunk in the Rainbow Night Club?

A No, I did not.

Q Did you say to Mr. Bonuvar at that time that you were drinking in the Rainbow Night Club on the night of 3 February 1945?

A I was eating supper, that is all.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The Commission interrupts. The night life of the witness may constitute an interesting interlude, but does it have any bearing on this case?

CAPTAIN HILL: It goes to the credibility of this witness, whether he is telling the truth about any of these matters.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Very well, proceed.

Q (By Captain Hill) Now, I will ask you if during

the month of December, 1944, in January 1945, if dynamite and other explosives, including gasoline, were not placed in various buildings in the City of Manila, to your knowledge?

A No, I haven't, except that I have heard that there was a plan to destroy the bridges.

Q I want to ask you if you did not, in your conversation with Mr. Bonuvar, on October 11th of this year state to him that buildings had been already loaded with dynamite and gasoline ready to be blown up?

A No.

Q I will ask you if you did not tell Mr. Bonuvar that that was done on orders of General Kobayashi?

A No.

Q And if you didn't further state to Mr. Bonuvar at that time that all of this was done by Colonel Suzaki as chief of staff to General Kobayashi, that he was directly in charge of placing dynamite and gasoline in the buildings?

A No.

Q You were in Singapore, were you not, in 1941, under Yamashita?

A Yes.

Q Does the fact that you served under Yamashita there influence you in any way in not telling this Commission the truth in this hearing?

CAPTAIN REEL: Sir, there is no evidence that this witness is not telling the truth. We object to that as most improper; that is a most improper question.

CAPTAIN HILL: I think it is perfectly proper, your

Honor. I am attacking the credibility of this witness, and our rebuttal testimony will set out everything that we are asking him here.

CAPTAIN REEL: It is a novel way of attacking the credibility of the witness here.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The Commission feels that the questions should not be asked which by their very nature would degrade the witness. You can get the same information in a more adroit manner.

CAPTAIN HILL: I will withdraw the question.

Q (By Captain Hill) Do you have any knowledge of atrocities being committed by the soldiers under Yamashita in the Singapore campaign?

CAPTAIN REEL: We object, sir; there is no charge here of anything like that. This case has to do with October 1944 and not Singapore or any other place.

CAPTAIN HILL: Well, it is a similar offense, your Honor.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The objection is sustained.

Q (By Captain Hill) Do you know whether or not the detachment of troops that you left here in Manila did actually destroy any of the buildings here in Manila?

A No, I do not know.

Q You have told the Commission that one of the missions of the troops or detachment of troops that you left here in Manila was to maintain order. Does that include as one of their duties the prevention of atrocities here in Manila?

A Of course that includes such matters.

Q When did you first find out the atrocities that had been committed by the Japanese soldiers and sailors here in Manila?

A I haven't heard anything regarding the matter yet.

Q Do you know what happened to General Kobayashi?

CAPTAIN REEL: Wasn't this last question answered? May we have it read back, please?

(Record read.)

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Let's rephrase the question or repeat the question, rather, and get a very carefully translated reply.

CAPTAIN REEL: We would like to ask the interpreter if he gave a full literal translation of all that the witness said.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The manner prescribed by the Commission will accomplish the same thing. Repeat the question, please.

(Question re-read.)

CAPTAIN REEL: I think it was the question before that that the witness gave the answer, and it was not all translated.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: I think that is the very question at issue.

COMMANDER BARTLETT: While the examiner was asking that question the witness volunteered some extraneous information. The interpreter said, "Let that go until you answer this question," and then repeated the question just read by the reporter. The answer was as given by the interpreter.

The extraneous matter was not translated.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Take the third question from the bottom of the list, the third question back and read that.

(Record read.)

CAPTAIN REEL: There was further information given by the witness to the answer to that question to the effect that "when we drew up that plan we didn't foresee there would be any atrocities."

GENERAL REYNOLDS: We would rather get that from the chief interpreter.

COMMANDER BARTLETT: The interpreters were all listening to the question.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Ask him the question again and get a new reply.

(Record read.)

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Incidentally, that is a perfect example of a sentence that is too long and grammatically disjointed, a question too long to go through and have the witness give the answer back by translation. Read the question again.

(Question re-read.)

THE WITNESS: At first our plan was to maintain order regarding the military supplies, bridges and so forth and maintain order that way, because there was a report that a number of guerrillas had entered the City of Manila.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Now, read the second from the last question back, please.

(Record read as requested.)

THE WITNESS: And I had distributed troops to protect the water and electric systems of the city also.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Now, read the next question, the last question.

(Question read as requested.)

THE WITNESS: I never did receive such a report.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: And now read the final question, if there was another question.

(Question read as requested.)

THE WITNESS: He is dead.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: In this series of replies the witness has introduced the subject of guerrillas. The Commission desires the Prosecution to explore what orders, if any, he received or issued or what actions he took, if any, to control this inflow of guerrilla activities.

Q (By Captain Hill) Did you receive any orders instructing you what to do with guerrillas that had entered Manila?

A Once I received an order to mop up the guerrillas.

Q When did you receive that order?

A I do not remember very well, but it must have been in the latter part of November or early December.

Q Of what year?

A Last year.

Q And from whom did you receive that order?

A That order came from General Yamashita.

Q And what did you do, if anything, relative to carrying out that order?

A By the order of Major General Kobayashi, which was

given to each unit, a detachment of each unit was ordered to assist the Kempei-tai or the Japanese military police in arresting the guerrillas.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: You may inquire now whether he actually undertook this "mopping-up" program and the methods employed.

CAPTAIN HILL: Yes, sir.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Including the meaning of the term "mopping-up."

Q (By Captain Hill) Did the Noguchi unit at that time take action towards the guerrillas and carry out the orders of Kobayashi?

A Yes, the order was carried out.

Q Tell the Commission what the Noguchi unit did in carrying out that order.

A At that time the Japanese military police detachments were located in four sectors of the city; north, south, east and west, and our troops were dispatched to reach these detachments to assist in arresting of the guerrillas, and our main duty was to be stationed as sentries on the outskirts of a certain area while the M. P.'s made the arrests and while our troops were stationed as sentries on the outer boundary of the area, the M. P.'s went inside and investigated and made arrests.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The Commission will recess for approximately ten minutes.

(Short recess.)

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The Commission is in session. You may proceed.

Q (By Captain Hill) Explain to the Commission the meaning of "mopping up" as used in connection with the guerrillas.

A (Through Lieutenant Asano) Guerrillas are person or persons that are armed and takes action against the Japanese Army.

Q What I want you to explain is the meaning of the words "mopping up".

A The main purpose is to capture the guerrilla and to obtain information. However, in most occasions we are -- The main purpose is to capture the guerrilla and obtain information. However, guerrillas are armed and this constitutes hostile action and in due course are shot.

Q Did the Noguchi units continue to work with the M. P.'s in Manila during January and February of 1945?

A Once we received the report that there were a group of guerrillas hiding around Fort McKinley and Japanese M. P. unit was ordered to suppress them. Therefore we assisted the M. P. units.

CAPTAIN HILL: Read the question back.

(Question read)

CAPTAIN HILL: I ask that that answer be stricken as not responsive.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The answer may be stricken from the record.

CAPTAIN HILL: Will you read the question again?

(Question again read)

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Pose the question again.

(Translated by Lieutenant Asano)

THE WITNESS (Through Lieutenant Asano): In the latter part of January we did assist the M. P.'s in Manila -- City of Manila. I wish to make a correction: It was in the latter part of December that our unit assisted the M. P. units in Manila City.

Q (By Captain Hill) Did they assist the M. P. units in January and February of '45?

A No.

Q Then the "mopping up" of the guerrillas was another mission of the Noguchi unit which you have not mentioned?

A No. It wasn't our mission.

Q Do you know the date of the proclamation which you testified about in your direct examination?

LIEUTENANT ASANO: Read the question.

(Question read)

A I believe it is on about the 5th or 6th of January of this year.

Q (By Captain Hill) When did the Japanese commence the construction of pillboxes and other means of defense within the City of Manila?

A When the air offense or air attack was started on Manila air-raid shelter was already constructed in this area and at the same time they were usable as fortification.

Q Did the Japanese construct pillboxes in various parts of the City of Manila?

A I don't think they have constructed many.

Q Did they construct other means of defense in the City

of Manila?

A No.

Q Were meetings held by staff officers of Kobayashi's command relative to the defense of Manila?

A Once or twice.

Q Were not regular weekly meetings held among the officers to discuss the defense of the City?

A No.

Q Referring again to a conversation or interview with Lieutenant Booth of the United States Army on October 16th, did you tell him that such weekly meetings were held in various neighborhoods among company commanders for the discussion and formation of defenses of the City?

A No, I haven't.

Q When did the Japanese lay the mines in the streets of Manila and at various other important points?

A In the latter January we made preparation to lay mine in the principal points of the main roads.

Q And when were dynamite and other explosives placed under the bridges across the Pasig River?

A On or about the 20th of January dynamite were placed on two of the bridges and the other bridges were left alone.

Q And wasn't this done upon the order of General Yamashita?

A Probably it is so.

Q Well, isn't it so?

A I do not remember exactly, but it could have been from General Yamashita's headquarters or from General Yokoyama's headquarters.

Q Referring again to the interview that you had with Lieutenant Booth of the United States Army on 16 October 1945, didn't you tell him that the order to destroy all of the bridges was given by Yamashita and didn't you answer that they were given by him?

LIEUTENANT ASANO: Will you read the question again?
(Question read)

A (Through Lieutenant Asano) I do not remember as to what I said then.

CAPTAIN HILL: That's all.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The Commission would like to inquire of the witness if he has any recollection of the number of guerrillas who were rounded up and shot while his unit was assisting the Kempei Tai.

(Translated by Lieutenant Asano)

THE WITNESS: I do not know. I have heard that hidden caches of weapons were confiscated.

CAPTAIN REEL: Will you read that answer? We couldn't understand it.

(Answer read)

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Apparently he does not understand the question. How many guerrillas were rounded up by his unit and the Kempei Tai in the City of Manila?

(Translated by Lieutenant Asano)

THE WITNESS: I do not know.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Ask him if it were ten thousand, approximately.

(Translated by Lieutenant Asano)

THE WITNESS: No.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Five thousand.

(Translated by Lieutenant Asano)

THE WITNESS: We assisted the campaign during a raid on a certain barrio near Fort McKinley and that was the only occasion we had anything to do with the Kempei Tai. So therefore I do not know much regarding the arrests.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Ask the reporter to hunt back and find his statement about guerrillas.

COMMANDER BARTLETT: There is more to that answer.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: What is it?

COMMANDER BARTLETT: There is more to that answer.

THE WITNESS (Through Lieutenant Asano): Our unit surrounded the barrio and the Kempei Tai went in there to search and arrest.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Ask the reporter to hunt back and find the statement of the witness about subduing guerrilla activity in Manila and his unit's connection with the Kempei Tai during that process.

CAPTAIN HILL: I think it was just prior to the recess, sir.

REPORTER CONKLIN: Mr. Racklin, one of the other reporters, sir, was reporting at that time. With your indulgence I shall call him, sir.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: We are seeking the place where the witness made the statement that numerous guerrillas had entered the City of Manila and that he had some connection with subduing them. We want to know what he said.

REPORTER RACKLIN: "Q Did you receive any orders instructing you what to do with guerrillas that had entered

Manila?

"A Once I received an order to mop up the guerrillas.

"Q When did you receive that order?

"A I do not remember very well, but it must have been in the latter part of November or early December.

"Q Of what year?

"A Last year.

"Q And from whom did you receive that order?

"A That order came from General Yamashita.

"Q And what did you do, if anything, relative to carrying out that order?

"A By the order of Major General Kobayashi, which was given to each unit, a detachment of each unit was ordered to assist the Kempei Tai or the Japanese military police in arresting the guerrillas.

"GENERAL REYNOLDS: You may inquire now whether he actually undertook this 'mopping-up' program and the methods employed, including the meaning of the term 'mopping-up'."

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Go ahead.

REPORTER RACKLIN: "Q Did the Noguchi unit at that time take action towards the guerrillas and carry out the orders of Kobayashi?

"A Yes, the order was carried out.

"Q Tell the Commission what the Noguchi unit did in carrying out that order.

"A At that time the Japanese military police detachments were located in four sectors of the city; north, south, east and west, and our troops were dispatched to each of these detachments to assist in arresting of the guer-

rillas, and our main duty was to be stationed as sentries on the outskirts of a certain area while the M.P.'s made the arrests and while our troops were stationed as sentries on the outer boundary of the area, the M.P.'s went inside and investigated and made arrests."

Then there was a recess.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Will you read his story that the only assistance rendered in connection with guerrillas was at Fort McKinley?

REPORTER CONKLIN: "Q Did the Noguchi units continue to work with the M.P.'s in Manila during January and February of 1945?"

"A Once we received the report that there were a group of guerrillas hiding around Fort McKinley and Japanese M. P. unit was ordered to suppress them. Therefore we assisted the M. P. units."

Then a motion to strike the answer as not responsive was made and the motion was granted.

"The Witness: In the latter part of January we did assist the M.P.'s in Manila -- City of Manila. I wish to make a correction: It was in the latter part of December that our unit assisted the M. P. units in Manila City.

"Q Did they assist the M. P. units in January and February of '45?"

"A No.

"Q Then the 'mopping up' of the guerrillas was another mission of the Noguchi unit which you have not mentioned?"

"A No. It wasn't our mission."

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Does the Prosecution intend to present the document from which you have been reading to the Commission?

CAPTAIN HILL: We intend in rebuttal, sir, to put on the witness stand the officers that had the interview with him and have them recite the substance of their interviews.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Does the Defense have further examination of this witness?

CAPTAIN REEL: Yes, sir.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

Q (By Captain Reel) Now, as I understand it, the duties of the Noguchi units relative to guerrillas except for the incident at Fort McKinley were simply to act as sentries; is that right?

MAJOR KERR: If the Commission please, this is redirect examination, and leading questions certainly are not called for -- particularly as leading as that one.

CAPTAIN REEL: Sir, it is perfectly proper on redirect when a matter has been brought out on cross to refer to that matter in so many words.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The testimony of this witness has been so confused that the Commission desires that it be approached by the simplest and most direct method.

CAPTAIN REEL: I will withdraw the question and rephrase it, sir.

Q (By Captain Reel) With the exception of the incident at Fort McKinley, was the duty of the Noguchi detachment, in so far as guerrillas were concerned, merely to act as sentries?

A Yes, our duty was security only.

CAPTAIN REEL: Can that be interpreted as "sentry," or "lookout"?

GENERAL REYNOLDS: It would have the same meaning. Let us go ahead. "Security," "sentry," "military lookout," in a military sense are similar terms.

Q (By Captain Reel) And during the months of January and February, 1945, you did not even have that function, is that correct?

A No, we did not have much to do with M. P.'s, because our principal duties were to guard the bridges and the supplies, and we didn't have much time to assist the M. P.'s.

Q Now, you spoke of an order from General Yamashita relative to guerrillas.

CAPTAIN REEL: Translate that, will you, because we had better break this question up.

(Translated to the witness by Interpreter Asano.)

Q (By Captain Reel, continuing) Reading from Prosecution's Exhibit 4, the captured order dated 11 October of the 14th Army group --

(Translated to the witness by Interpreter Asano.)

Q (Continuing) -- I will ask you if the order which will be read to you is not the order you saw.

CAPTAIN REEL: I will now read that; then I will

give it to you so you can translate it.

"In view of the special characteristics of the Philippine operations, subversive activities of the residents and attacks in our rear by airborne raiding forces must be considered. In order to avoid mistakes in conducting the operations, take precautions against armed guerrillas, subjugate them quickly, and put a stop to their activities."

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The Commission will recess for approximately ten minutes.

(Short recess.)

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The Commission is in session. The Interpreter may proceed.

CAPTAIN REEL: Sir, at the suggestion of the Chief Interpreter, I will ask the Interpreter to inform the witness that what he is about to read was translated originally from Japanese to English, and this is an attempt to reconstruct from English back to the original Japanese.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Very well.

(Translated to the witness by Commander Bartlett.)

THE WITNESS (through Interpreter Asano): Yes, I do understand.

Q (By Captain Reel) Was that the order to which you had reference?

A (Through Interpreter Asano) I think -- I believe that it was this order that I was referring to.

Q Now, relative to these mines and dynamite under

bridges, was it part of the mission of the Noguchi units to slow up the American advance in order to protect the supplies?

LIEUTENANT ASANO: Will you read the question, please?

(Question read.)

A (Through Interpreter Asano) At first we were under the impression that the Americans would land at Batangas, and if the enemy should approach the City from the direction of Batangas our intentions were to delay the American movements by blowing these bridges up.

Q (By Captain Reel) And that was part of the order that came down from higher headquarters, is that correct?

A Yes, it is.

Q Now, there has been some question about who that order came from. Let me ask this: Was the chain of command through which any order would issue, from General Yamashita to General Yokoyama, from General Yokoyama to General Kobayashi, from General Kobayashi down to your units?

CAPTAIN HILL: If the Commission please, every question that counsel has asked has been leading, very much so. I have tried to be as lenient as possible, but I don't like to have him put every single word into the witness' mouth.

CAPTAIN REEL: Sir, we appreciate the leniency of counsel for the Prosecution, but may I point out that on redirect examination, to shorten matters up and save time, it is perfectly proper to bring out what has been brought

out in cross in so many words.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: To settle this particular question, the Commission will assume that the answer will be "Yes," and you may proceed with another question. But you are cautioned to use shorter sentences, more direct sentences.

CAPTAIN REEL: Yes, sir. Just one more matter.

Q (By Captain Reel) The construction of air raid shelters, I think you testified was at the time of air raids, when the air raids started. Do you know when that was?

A I believe it was since November of last year.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: You just said you had one more question.

CAPTAIN REEL: One more matter; just one or two questions on the matter, sir. I don't believe I said "question." If I did, I will not ask further.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: We will permit you a little latitude.

CAPTAIN REEL: Thank you, sir.

Q (By Captain Reel) And was there any construction of pill boxes or air raid shelters after the plan to evacuate was put into effect?

LIEUTENANT ASANO: Will you read the question, please?

(Question read.)

A (Through Interpreter Asano) I believe they weren't being constructed at that time.

CAPTAIN REEL: That is all.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Does the Prosecution have anything

of real value to ask this witness?

CAPTAIN HILL: No questions, sir.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The witness is dismissed.

(Witness excused.)

CAPTAIN REEL: Sir, at this time we wish to offer in evidence a statement, which we do not have the original of, but the Prosecution has. It is a statement a copy of which was given to us by the Prosecution, and we have made photostatic copies of that copy.

(Photostatic copy of statement of Liese-Lotte Stamer de Perez was marked Defense Exhibit K for identification.)

CAPTAIN REEL: This, sir, is a statement marked Defense Exhibit K for identification, which was referred to earlier in this proceeding. The Commission will recollect that on one occasion a group of nine or ten statements were put into evidence by the Prosecution, and we asked the Prosecution whether or not they intended to put in this tenth or eleventh statement, that of Liese Lotte Stamer de Perez.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Are you in a position to state the page in the record where this occurred?

CAPTAIN REEL: I am not at the moment, sir, but I shall be glad to locate it.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Very well.

CAPTAIN REEL: At that time, the chief of Prosecution stated that he did not intend to offer it because it was purely cumulative. We now wish to offer it.

We call attention only to certain short parts of

this statement. On the page numbered 73, the fifth question and answer set, beginning:

"Q. Were the soldiers navy or army?

"A. Navy.

"Q. How do you know?

"A. Because a Japanese captain living near our home, here, told me that there were no more army men left in the city. In fact, I saw them moved out.

"Q. When did he tell you that?

"A. The 2nd or 3rd of February, 1945.

"Q. Who was this captain?

"A. Captain Yuwasaki.

"Q. Where was he living? 7

"A. In a house next to ours on 1502 Looban, Paco, Manila, P. I."

Then on the same page:

"Q. Did the Japanese accuse your husband or Domingo Alontaga or any of the other men of being guerrillas or saboteurs or anti-Japanese?

"A. My husband was not a guerrilla nor was Domingo nor did they engage in any anti-Japanese acts. I don't know about the other people but I did not see any anti-Japanese acts being committed by them. I have heard that there were some guerrillas living on our street and I have heard also from a Filipino whose name I don't know, that Colonel Martinez who was killed on the street was a leader of

guerrillas and had an underground office opposite his house."

The rest of the statement has to do with the particular atrocity which was taken up at the time.

There is one further thing; at the bottom of page 74 --

GENERAL REYNOLDS: You are giving the Commission too piecemeal an approach to this document. You started on the bottom of page 73 --

CAPTAIN REEL: Yes, sir.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: You read part of the answer.

CAPTAIN REEL: Yes, sir. Do you want me to read the whole answer?

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The whole answer, yes.

CAPTAIN REEL (reading): "But the Japanese who made us go to Padre Faura Street and Taft Avenue and the Japanese who were at that corner and killed my husband and the other men did not make any accusation. Later, I saw Juanito, Mrs. Jimenez houseboy who escaped. He told me that before the Japanese machine-gunned the men at the corner, the Japanese asked them whether they were guerrillas and the men answered no. Then the Japanese asked them, 'Do you want to die, or are you ready to die?' Juanito said that all answered no, but the Japanese machine-gunned them anyway. Juanito also told me that my husband was bayoneted to death while standing with the other men. Juanito said that he actual-

ly saw it although he did not want to tell me."

Then the sixth question and answer group down the page:

"Q Do you know why the Japanese killed those men?

"A I don't know but I presume that the whole street was condemned to death due to the fact that Colonel Martinez was the leader of the guerrillas and had his office in the house of Mrs. Jimenez where we stayed. It was an underground office of the guerrillas and Colonel Martinez should not have permitted us to stay there."

We offer that statement in evidence.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Are there comments by the Prosecution?

MAJOR KERR: If the Commission please, I would like to call the Commission's attention to the last question and answer on page 74:

"Q Did you see any guerrilla activities yourself?

"A No, I did not. But I presume from what that Filipino told me, there were guerrillas among the people on that street and perhaps because of that, the Japanese shot and killed many innocent people like my husband and Mr. Jimenez.

"Q Did the Japanese make any accusation against any of the men at the time of the shooting or before it?

"A. No."

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The document is accepted by the Commission for such probative value, if any, as it shall be held to possess.

(Defense Exhibit K for identification was received in evidence and so marked.)

GENERAL REYNOLDS: A properly certified copy should be prepared or furnished, to be included with the record in the case. This particular copy, a photostat, bears no signature.

CAPTAIN REEL: The original copy is in the hands of the Prosecution. The only copy we have, sir, is the copy they gave us.

MAJOR KERR: If we have the original, sir, of course we will be very glad to make it available to the Defense so they may have a properly certified copy made.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Very well.

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: At this point, we should like to invite the attention of the Commission to certain excerpts from the report of the XIVth Corps, which has already been introduced in evidence. Certain of these excerpts become pertinent at this time and have not yet been read to the Commission.

MAJOR KERR: If the Commission please, is it the Commission's desire at this time that we argue on the evidence which has been already introduced? If so, the Prosecution will no doubt have some comments to make in return, after the Defense has made its comments; and it would seem rather extraordinary at this time to go into

certain exhibits and proceed to comment upon them, rather than putting in new evidence.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: What is the purpose?

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: If the Commission please, it is not our intention and we did not state that we wish to argue at this point, but yesterday we introduced into evidence certain excerpts from the XIVth Corps Report and stated at that time that we would call such portions of them as being pertinent when they did become pertinent, rather than reading them then.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: All you propose to do now, then, is to refer to certain pages?

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: That is right.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Proceed.

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: Page 86 and page 87:

"The enemy strength in greater MANILA was estimated to be 18,000. Of this number three-fourths were supposed to be navy personnel, and one-fourth army. From various sources and from the nature of his resistance at the entrance of the city, it was deduced that within the city itself (1) there were few if any organized combat units (2) the enemy defense would be of a passive nature, (3) enemy communications were crippled, (4) most enemy weapons had been recovered from destroyed aircraft and sunken ships, and (5) there was no enemy reserve or mobile combat force. As it was later proven, the enemy expected the

American forces to approach from the South. Thus as the two divisions moved into the city from the North, Rear Admiral Mitsuji Iwafuchi, the overall defense commander, found his organized positions facing the wrong way, his poorly-equipped troops about half the strength of the American forces, his command deprived of communications, and his forces without hope of assistances from air or naval units. However, the stubborn resistance of the garrison did credit to his truculence as a fighter, and the ruthless destruction of property was a reflection of the tenacity of his efforts.

"No doubt when peace comes the enemy will argue that it was American shells that destroyed MANILA, but such arguments can be refuted by unquestioned evidence. As the troops of the 37th Division approached the PASIG they were met on every side by the sound of explosions and falling buildings. That these demolitions were previously planted and installed is authenticated by captured Order No. 43 dated 3 February from the Imperial Naval Defense Command:" --

I may say, sir, that we have read this order before; I think we can dispense with the rest of it.

Now, on page 123 of the Report:

"At Fort Santiago, the fighting continued

all day in and around the ruined buildings, thick walls, ancient dungeons, and numerous tunnels and recesses which harbored enemy, and which one by one were turned into death-traps by hand grenades, flame throwers, and gasoline poured down into the holes and ignited. The Battalion took Fort Santiago very quickly but did not subdue it until nightfall."

And on page 157:

"The enemy's planning, as usual, was sound and detailed, and his organization of the ground was expert. His communications proved to be poor, contributing to a lack of coordination between commands and a sometimes woeful misconception of our situation and movements. Quantities of ammunition, weapons, equipment, vehicles and fuel destroyed or merely abandoned by the enemy in the path of our advance, contrasted with the shortages of these same items - most frequently of transportation and uniforms - in immediately adjacent areas, all was attributable to weak overall organization and the confusion caused by our rapid movements. Captured documents revealed ambitiously planned penetrations, demolition missions, and banzai charges - nearly all heroically termed 'suicide missions' - which time after time materialized only as inept and easily defeated efforts by disorganized

groups. The enemy's selection of the hours of darkness for nearly all of his local offensive actions failed to give him the advantage it had provided against unprepared troops earlier in the war and in jungle terrain of the South Sea Islands."

And from pages 226 to 227:

"However, as previously encountered enemy forces, the defenders of the approaches to the city of MANILA showed a marked tendency to withdraw. Information later obtained shows that these northern approaches to MANILA (PLARIDEL - CALUMPIT - MEYCAUYAN) were outposted by small detachments only. Although several captured Operations Orders of these units stated their mission was 'to destroy or annihilate the enemy,' events showed the execution of intelligence and delaying missions only, with the enemy withdrawing eastward after brief contact.

"It was determined that the bulk of the MANILA DEFENSE FORCE (otherwise known as the KOBAYASHI HEYDAN) withdrew from the City, prior to our entry, and occupied defensive positions in the SIERRA MADRE (MONTALBAN - MARIKINA - WAWA area). However, some elements of this force remained in the northern sector and on the southern outskirts of the City, and were engaged by our forces."

From pages 249 and 250 of the Report:

"The text of the broadcasts made 21 and 1 March follows:

"ATTENTION ALL OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY:

"Ever since our attack on the city of Manila you have fought bravely and you have fought well. You were ordered to engage us in the center of this city with the Walled City and this building as the core of your defense.

"You were ordered to hold us away from TAFT Avenue and the sea. You destroyed the bridges to hold us on the other side of the river but you failed. You were ordered to engage us to the front so that the Army could sweep down from the hills in an annihilating attack from our rear. You were promised that your Wild Eagles would blast our planes from the sky yet you see our little observation planes watching all your movements and telling our artillery where to shower you with shells. Your planes did not come on the 8th, the 11th, the 18th, and on the 24th. Could your leaders have lied to you to make you carry on the hopeless fight?

"Your Army was going to attack from NOVALICHES and then they were going to attack from MONTALBON and MARIGUINA. They did neither.

The Army was going to silence our artillery from the north yet each hour our artillery fires on you with ever increasing fury. Your comrades thought that they would find safety at Malabon, but instead they met death in the rice paddies there.

"Your life is yours to take or to keep as you desire, but is it true loyalty to the Emperor to throw away your life for a cause that is now hopeless?

"Fate has given you three choices:

"(1) You can commit suicide."

"(2) You can hold out a few hours and be blown to dust.

"(3) You may come to an honorable understanding with us and live to serve the new Japan when the war is over.

"If you surrender (come under the protection of) to us you will not be humiliated or disgraced. Our troops will not fire for 30 minutes during the time you may come in to us."

And finally, from page 262 of the Report:

"The SHIMBU SHUDAN (41st Army) controlled all the enemy forces in the MANILA area, except the MANILA NAVAL DEFENSE FORCE (See Inclosure #3). Its Commanding General, Lt. Gen. YOKOYAMA Shizuo, had formerly commanded the 8th Inf. Div."

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The comments of Defense are noted.

1ST LIEUTENANT LLOYD S. MILLEGAN

recalled as a witness on behalf of the Defense, having been previously duly sworn, was examined and testified further as follows:

MAJOR KERR: You have been sworn previously?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

MAJOR KERR: You have testified previously at this proceeding?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

MAJOR KERR: I will remind you that you are still under oath.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Q (By Captain Sandberg) Will you state your name, rank and organization again?

A Lloyd S. Millegan, 1st Lieutenant, O-1686259.

Q What is your present assignment?

A Executive Officer, Philippine Research and Information Section, Counter Intelligence Section, Headquarters AFPAC.

Q Does that section have custody of the documents pertaining to the Japanese occupation of Manila?

A Yes, sir.

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: Will you mark this as our next exhibit?

(Photostat of The Tribune of December 19, 1944, was marked Defense Exhibit L for identification.)

Q (By Captain Sandberg) I show you Defense Exhibit L and ask you if that is a true photostatic copy of the first

and second page of the Manila Tribune for Tuesday,
December 19, 1944?

A Yes, sir, it is.

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: The attention of the Commission
is invited to the article in the lower lefthand corner.

"Evacuate City, Guinto Reiterates.

"In view of the extreme uncertainty of the procurement
of foodstuffs, the evacuation of the City of Manila by the
people whose presence here is unnecessary is still timely,
Military Governor Leon G. Guinto reiterated Monday.

"The Governor stressed the point that the government
is exerting its best efforts to try to procure foodstuffs
from the provinces and bring them to Manila to relieve the
food situation in the Metropolitan area, but emphasized the
fact that their procurement and their shipment to Manila
depends on a number of circumstances which the government
has to surmount before it can succeed.

"Governor Guinto, therefore, is bringing home to
the people of Manila who need not stay here, if they have
adequate places to go, to leave the city for the provinces,
where foodstuffs, especially rice are selling cheap."

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The Commission inquires whether
Governor Guinto is a Japanese or a Filipino official?

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: I would state that he is a Filipino
designated as Military Governor of the city, I believe, by
the Japanese authorities.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Are you offering this?

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: I offer that in evidence.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The document is accepted by the

Commission subject to whatever probative value, if any,
it may be held to possess.

(Defense Exhibit L for
identification was received
in evidence.)

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: Will you mark this, please?

(Photostat of the Tribune of
November 15, 1944, was marked
Defense Exhibit M for
identification.)

Q (By Captain Sandberg) I show you Defense Exhibit
M and ask you if that is a copy of the Manila Tribune for
the 15th of November, 1944?

A Yes, sir.

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: The attention of the Commission
is invited to the overall headline: "Archbishop's Palace
Bombed!

"Foe Raiders Also Wreck Ermita Block.

"Guerrero Families Suffer from Latest Enemy Terror
Attack.

"United States planes raiding Manila on Tuesday
indiscriminately dropped bombs on the historic palace of the
Catholic Archbishop of Manila in Intramuros, which received
a direct hit; on the yard of the Apostolic Delegation; and
on a residential neighborhood in Ermita.

"A bomb dropped in the center of a group of Guerrero
residences on A. Mabini, Isaac Peral and Cortada streets,
reduced more than half of the block to ruins. At least ten
persons were believed to have been killed, among them Dr.
Luis Guerrero, Jr.

"The two houses occupied by Dr. Luis Guerrero and
his family, the house and pharmacy owned by Francisco Casas,

the houses of Jose Guerrero and Mons. Cesar Ma. Guerrero, auxiliary bishop of Manila, were completely demolished. The other houses including that of Dr. Alfredo L. Guerrero, directly behind this group of houses were partly damaged by the concussion of the bomb and by the fire which started immediately after.

"Entire Block Left in Ruins.

"The damaged homes formed more than one half of the block bounded by Isaac Peral, A. Mabini and Cortada streets, while the houses on Isaac Peral across from the Guerrero residence were also demolished by the concussion of the bomb and destroyed by fire. These houses formed one half of the next block formed by Isaac Peral, A. Mabini, Cortada and San Luis."

We will dispense with reading the rest and refer the Commission also to the photograph on the first page, captioned:

"Amid the Ruins. His Grace Michael J. O'Doherty, Archbishop of Manila, views the ruins of the historic palace on Arzobispo Street in Intramuros, seat of Catholicism in the Philippines for more than 300 years. The palace was wrecked by a bomb indiscriminately released by a U. S. raiding plane on Tuesday."

MAJOR KERR: The Prosecution objects to this offer of the exhibit on the grounds that it is wholly immaterial. The Prosecution is not claiming the Japanese destroyed or damaged this particular structure at this particular time, and I, therefore, fail to see the relevancy of this exhibit.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The document is considered to have probative value and is accepted by the Commission for such probative value as it may be held to possess.

(Defense Exhibit M for identification was received in evidence.)

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: I will ask to have this marked as the next exhibit.

(A photostat of "The Tribune" dated December 17, 1944, was marked Defense Exhibit N for identification.)

Q (By Captain Sandberg) I show you Defense Exhibit N and ask you if that is a photostatic reproduction of the first page of the Manila Tribune of December 17th, 1944?

A Yes, sir, it is.

MAJOR KERR: If the Commission please, in connection with the previous exhibit the Prosecution would like to point one item out before we proceed to the next proffered exhibit. On page 1 of the Tribune issue for November 15th, we call the Commission's attention to the following item under the heading "Compulsory labor service for all able-bodied citizens prescribed in new order.

"President Jose Laurel on Tuesday promulgated Executive Order No. 100 prescribing compulsory labor ser-

vice for the construction or repair of roads, bridges and other public works, including air fields, port works and other military establishments."

I believe that it is unnecessary to read the balance of that article.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The comments of the Prosecution are noted.

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: The attention of the Commission is invited to the article in the lower left-hand corner.

"U. S. Raiders exact toll on civilians.

"Enemy air raiders which attacked Manila for the third consecutive day on Saturday continued exacting toll among the civilian population. Scores were killed and wounded in Paranaque, Bagungdiwa, Mandaluyong, Bagumpanahon and other city districts.

"The total plane-flights for the day numbered 230 over the Manila area. Reports from other regions said that there were some planes over the Clark Field area and Lipa, Batangas.

"On the Escolta, one man was killed and six, including women and children, were wounded at about 11 a. m. on Saturday when a shell exploded right on the street.

"Splinters and shrapnels struck pedestrians crowding the busy street, but prompt action by the police and the Civilian Protection Service prevented panic. Damage to property was slight, however."

I believe it is unnecessary to read the balance.

MAJOR KERR: If the Commission please, the Prosecution objects to this proffered exhibit on the ground that

it is wholly irrelevant. Here again the material involved does not relate to any one of the instances alleged by the Prosecution to have been committed by the Accused.

We submit that it has no bearing whatsoever on this case.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The document is accepted by the Commission for such probative value, if any, as it may be held to possess.

(Defense Exhibit N for identification was received in evidence.)

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: Will you mark this as the next exhibit?

(A photostat of "The Tribune" dated January 11, 1945, was marked Defense Exhibit O for identification.)

Q (By Captain Sandberg) I show you Defense Exhibit O and ask you if it is a true photostatic copy of the first page of the Manila Tribune for Thursday, January 11, 1945?

A Yes, sir, it is.

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: The attention of the Commission is invited to the leading article, column 3:

"Foo Bombers kill scores in Intramuros.

"Whole family wiped out -- civilians hard hit.

"Stalking over Manila on Tuesday night, enemy raiders bombed Intramuros, killing scores of Filipino civilians and blasting buildings and residences.

"One bomb scored a direct hit on the residence of Dr. Gavino Pobre, former city councilor, on Solana street near Cabildo. Practically the entire Pobre family was reported wiped out.

"The building occupied by the Philippine Constabulary

Academy No. 2 nearby was also hit.

"The search for victims among the debris was started at daylight Wednesday and continued until the afternoon. Scores, it is believed, were killed.

"More Casualties.

"More casualties were reported Wednesday when the enemy continued their attacks on the city, bombing several points and strafing civilian centers. Many persons were wounded. They were treated at the different hospitals and clinics. At least three persons were wounded on Mulawen Boulevard Wednesday morning by splinters and shrapnels.

"On the Manila north road through Meycawayan, Bulacan, more casualties were registered when enemy planes swooped down and strafed people on the road, most of whom were on their way to nearby towns to procure rice and foodstuffs.

"Sleepless Night

"City residents passed a sleepless night as the raiders kept up their operations until very late. Total blackout was strictly enforced and the authorities enjoined city residents to abide by blackout regulations strictly for their own safety and for the general safety of the other citizens.

"The Intramuros raid caused one of the greatest number of casualties. The blasted area is on the block between Magalianes and Solana streets. Fire started following the explosion.

"One bomb fell in front of the San Francisco church, century-old Catholic temple in Intramuros.

"Many among the wounded were taken to the City Hall where they were given first aid treatment. The more seriously wounded were treated at the Philippine General Hospital and other institutions."

The Defense offers Exhibit O into evidence.

MAJOR KERR: The same objection.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The objection is not sustained, and the document is accepted by the Commission for such probative value as it may be held to possess.

(Defense Exhibit O for identification was received in evidence.)

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: Will you mark this as the next Defense exhibit?

(A photostat of "The Tribune" dated November 14, 1944, was marked Defense Exhibit P for identification.)

Q (By Captain Sandberg) I show you Defense Exhibit P and ask you if it represents pages 1 and 2 of the Manila Tribune for November 14th, 1944?

A Yes, sir, it does.

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: The attention of the Commission is invited to the lead article in the first column:

"Enemy Terror Tactics Hit New High as Raiders Bomb, Strafe Residential Sections.

"Hundreds of Filipinos Believed Killed or Wounded in Manila Raid -- Many Houses Wrecked -- San Nicolas, Intramuros Suffer.

"Enemy terror bombing tactics hit a new high in Manila yesterday as formations of raiding planes indis-

criminally strafed and dropped bombs on residential sections of the city, causing death or injury to hundreds of Filipino civilians and heavy damage to Filipino property.

"Hardest hit in the Monday raid were the districts of San Nicolas, Intramuros, Pandacan, Santa Ana, Paco and Sampaloc. The downtown section had its first bombing scare as low-flying enemy planes roared over the business center.

"The hospitals were filled with the wounded.

"Police reports until last night were incomplete, but it is believed that hundreds were either killed or wounded."

I believe it is unnecessary to read the rest.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Any comments by the Prosecution?

MAJOR KERR: The Prosecution objects for the same reasons as previously stated.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The objection is not sustained. The document is accepted for such probative value, if any, as it may be held to possess.

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: Will you mark this as the next exhibit?

(A photostat of "The Tribune" dated October 4, 1944, was marked Defense Exhibit Q for identification.)

Q (By Captain Sandberg) I show you Defense Exhibit Q and ask you if it is a true photostatic copy of the Manila Tribune for Wednesday, October 4th, 1944?

A Yes, it is.

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: The attention of the Commission is invited to the article on the third column just under the chart:

"Evacuees Grow in Number Daily.

"Driven by the ever-worsening food situation in the city and attracted by the coming harvest in the provinces, groups of evacuees have continued to increase in number, according to records available at the special transportation service of the Bureau of Public Welfare.

"For the month of September around 800 provincial folk were dispatched to the provinces by the welfare bureau free of charge on the railroad. This number was but a small part of the total number of migrating provincianos who in their eagerness to reach home are resorting to all kinds of transportation: by bull cart, push cart, by trucks and even by hiking on easy stages.

"There are to date more than 1,000 prospective evacuees who are awaiting their turn to be shipped by the welfare bureau; and there are seven times more than this number whose applications are still pending. Majority of the later applicants are willing to pay for their own passage and are only seeking the help of the bureau to secure them railroad tickets. This shows the eagerness, it was observed, of the people to go to the provinces.

"As the rates of transportation fare, especially on trucks are considered beyond the reach of the evacuees, most of whom are indigent and laid-off employes, they are planning to appeal to the proper authorities to make the necessary representations to the truck owners and operators to lower their prices at reasonable level."

Attention is also invited to the lead article on the right-hand side:

"Rice Order Seeks People's Welfare," describing
the rice situation in October, 1944.

The Defense offers this document in evidence.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Any comments by the Prosecution?

MAJOR KERR: None.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The document is accepted by the Commission for any probative value that it may be held to possess.

(Defense Exhibit Q for identification was received in evidence.)

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: Will you mark this as our next exhibit?

(Defense Exhibit R was marked for identification.)

Q (By Captain Sandberg) I show you Defense Exhibit R and ask you if it is a true photostatic representation of pages 1 and 4 of the Manila Tribune for October 21, 1944.

A Yes, sir, it is.

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: Attention of the Commission is invited to the article in the first column entitled "Rice Supply Committee Organized.

"Eight Filipinos, Two Japanese Named Members.

"For the purpose of studying and devising ways and means of insuring an adequate supply of rice and corn in order to alleviate the present economic distress and to avoid the recurrence of the present acute shortage of these cereals, President P. Laurel, through Administrative Order No. 28, on October 13 created a joint committee composed of eight Filipinos and two Japanese."

I believe it is unnecessary to read the balance of that.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The document is accepted by the Commission for such probative value, if any, as it shall be held to possess.

(Defense Exhibit R for identification was received in evidence.)

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: Will you mark this as our next exhibit?

(Photographic copy of "The Tribune" dated January 21, 1945 was marked Defense Exhibit S for identification.)

Q (By Captain Sandberg) I show you Defense Exhibit S and ask you if it is a true photostatic representation of the Manila Tribune for Sunday, January 21, 1945.

A Yes, sir, it is.

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: The attention of the Commission is invited to the article in the lower lefthand corner:

"City Trying to Help, But Family Heads Must Procure Own Food.

"The obligation to bring in foodstuffs to feed himself and his family is a matter for the family head to handle directly, because of the extreme difficulty of carrying prime commodities from the provinces as a result of the invasion of Luzon by the American troops.

"This was explained by Military Governor Leon G. Guinto in a speech he delivered at Plaza Moriones on Friday afternoon. The Governor is conducting a speaking tour in the interest of peace and order in the metropolitan area.

"While he had said that the city government is helpless in solving the city's food problem in the face of the increasing danger to the city because of the invasion, Governor Guinto, nevertheless, is trying to help by inviting the rice producers and dealers and other prime commodity merchants to try to bring foodstuffs into Manila.

If they could do so, he said, the dealers should ask reasonable prices or exchange their commodities with goods the city residents may have."

I believe it is unnecessary to read the balance.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The document is accepted by the Commission for such probative value, if any, as it may be held to possess.

(Defense Exhibit S for identification was received in evidence.)

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: Will you mark this as the Defense's next exhibit?

(Photostat of the Tribune of January 1, 1945, was marked Defense Exhibit T for identification.)

Q (By Captain Sandberg) I show you Defense Exhibit T marked for identification and ask you if that represents a true photostatic reproduction of the Manila Tribune for Monday, January 1st, 1945?

A Yes, sir, it does.

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: The Commission's attention is invited to the article in the lower lefthand corner:

"Evacuation of City in Full Swing.

"The evacuation of the City of Manila will be carried out to the fullest extent until only about one third of the people remain in the city, and composed mainly of the essential elements, it is indicated at the City Hall.

"Military Governor Leon G. Guinto calls on every Manilan to take heed of the advice to evacuate the city without delay, considering only, if nothing at all, the question of personal safety. The earlier the people act accordingly, it is stressed, the better for all concerned, especially women and children.

"It has been noted in the last few days, it is pointed out, however, that many people of Manila have taken the advice and left the city at once. Finding no means of transportation, the people, in many cases, walk their way to the provinces. Long caravans of men and women, young and old, are daily seen trekking their way either to southern or northern Luzon, carrying their baggage and belongings either

on their backs or on their shoulders.

"Better Life Outside.

"The provincial folk who will remain in the provinces and the people of Manila who evacuate Manila for the provinces, it is assured, will not regret having made that choice. It is impressed upon them that what they sorely lack in Manila, they will surely find in plenty in the rural sections of the country where food is available at much lower cost.

"Thus, it is affirmed, it can be clearly seen and understood by even the simple-minded people that life in the provinces at this time is much rosier than in Manila where the specter of starvation is hovering in many homes."

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: We will ask to introduce this document into evidence.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The document is accepted by the Commission for such probative value as it may be held to possess.

(Defense Exhibit T for identification was received in evidence.)

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: Will you mark this for identification?

(Photostat of the Tribune of January 4, 1945, was marked Defense Exhibit U for identification.)

Q (By Captain Sandberg) I show you Defense Exhibit U marked for identification and ask you if that is a true photostatic reproduction of the Manila Tribune for Thursday, January 4th, 1945?

A Yes, sir, it is.

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: The attention of the Commission

is invited to the article in the lower righthand corner:

"Many People of Manila Leaving in Response to Governor's Orders.

"In response to the urgent call of Military Governor Leon G. Guinto, many families of Manila have left for the province and many more are packing up their things preparatory to evacuating the city.

"These people are leaving for the provinces for only by doing so will they feel in themselves the sense of personal security from the scarcity of foodstuffs and bullets. Those who have decided to precede the others in the evacuation of Manila did so in order to avoid congestion.

"The scarcity of foodstuffs in Manila and the mounting cost of living here, it is pointed out, continue to be serious. While private transportation is virtually paralyzed, it is said, the supply of food in Manila will remain acute, and if this situation persists, as all indications seem to indicate it will, the people of Manila will certain face starvation.

"Go to the provinces and go there at once," is the Governor's insistent advice for the Manila people."

We offer this document into evidence.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The document is accepted by the Commission for such probative value, if any, as it shall be deemed to possess.

(Defense Exhibit U for identification was received in evidence.)

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: Your witness.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

Q (By Major Kerr) Do you know who published the Manila Tribune during the time of the Japanese occupation?

A I believe the publisher was a Filipino.

Q Isn't it a fact that the publication was dominated and controlled by the Japanese propaganda organization?

A The Manila Tribune started operating in January of 1942 and continued through the first few days of February 1945. It was staffed by Filipinos. There were Japanese advisors there during the whole period of publication.

Q Do you know whether or not it was actually controlled and its news columns censored by the Japanese representatives?

A There were Japanese advisors there that went over the news.

Q Does the CIC regard the Manila Tribune for that period of time as a reliable source of information?

A Sir, I studied the Manila Tribune from 1942 through and have used them on various studies which the CIC has compiled. I found as to actual events, that the actual events taking place, that they are reliable for that period. We have confirmed that from other sources.

Q The stories of the actual events, however, are colored, are they not, by the Japanese point of view?

A I assume it is the general point of view of the whole newspaper during the Japanese occupation.

Q That is the general point of view would be strictly pro-Japanese, is that correct?

A It could hardly be otherwise during the Japanese occupation. We took that into consideration when we used it.

The actual events, however, are true.

MAJOR KERR: That is all.

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: Thank you, that is all.

(Witness excused.)

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Do you have anything else ready for today?

CAPTAIN REEL: No, nothing in particular. We have other witnesses but we will put them on tomorrow.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: The Commission will recess until 8:30 tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 1630 hours, 23 November 1945, the trial was adjourned until 0830 hours, 24 November 1945.)

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