

REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY REVIEW
OF THE
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE MY LAI INCIDENT (U)

VOLUME III

EXHIBITS

BOOK I - DIRECTIVES

BOOKS 1 & 2 CONTAIN ALL DIRECTIVES ENTERED
INTO THE INQUIRY RECORD INCLUDING THOSE
DESIGNATED AS MISCELLANEOUS EXHIBITS.

14 MARCH 1970

PREFACE

Volume III comprises the supporting documents entered into the Inquiry Record as Exhibits. Categories are designated as:

D- Directives
R- Reports
M- Miscellaneous documents
Map- Maps
O- Overlays, sketches, drawings
S- Statements
P- Photographs
Administrative exhibits are numbered without a designation.

This material is arranged by category into separate books as follows:

Book 1 Directives
Book 2 Directives (continued)
Book 3 Reports
Book 4 Miscellaneous documents
Book 5 Miscellaneous documents
(continued), Overlays,
Statements and Administrative
Book 6 Photographs
Book 7 Aerial Photographs and
Maps

All directives are compiled in Books 1 and 2 including those designated as miscellaneous exhibits. Likewise, all reports are in Book 3.

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BOARDS, COMMISSIONS, AND COMMITTEES

PROCEDURE FOR INVESTIGATING OFFICERS AND BOARDS OF OFFICERS
CONDUCTING INVESTIGATIONS

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Section I. GENERAL

1. Scope. Investigating officers and boards of officers (which may consist of only one officer) are appointed by superior authority, usually under an Army regulation pertaining specifically to the matter requiring investigation. Generally, this regulation is supplemental to such specific regulations and, in addition, will govern in the investigation of matters not covered in specific regulations (e.g., whenever an officer is appointed

to investigate a complaint under UCMJ, Art. 138). In case of conflict between this regulation and a pertinent specific regulation, however, the latter will govern. This regulation is not applicable to investigation of court-martial charges. See *Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 32, and Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, chapter VII*. The promulgation of this regulation shall not invalidate any investigation or proceeding

*This regulation supersedes AR 15-6, 3 November 1960, including C 1, 27 October 1961.

initiated prior to the receipt of this regulation and conducted in conformity with the existing regulation.

2. Function. The primary purpose of any investigation, whether conducted by an investigating officer or by a board of officers, is to ascertain facts and to report them to the appointing authority as the basis for some appropriate action by him. It is the duty of any investigating officer or board to make a complete and impartial presentation of the evidence on both sides, and to make such findings and recommendations as may be appropriate and warranted by the facts. No person shall attempt to coerce, or by unlawful means influence, the actions of an investigating officer or board of officers in any matter whatsoever or the action of any superior authority acting upon the matter. The appointing authority will take whatever action he deems necessary to correct errors or irregularities in the proceedings of an investigating officer or board of officers. However, errors or irregularities which do not adversely affect the substantial rights of the individual(s) concerned or of the Government will not be deemed to render invalid the proceedings, or any action of the appointing authority, based thereon.

3. Appointment. *a. Orders.* Orders appointing an investigating officer or a board of officers will specify clearly the matter to be investigated and the scope of the findings required. If the appointment is made under a specific Army regulation, the regulation should be cited. If made for a purpose not covered specifically by regulations, the purpose should be stated in sufficient detail to apprise the investigating officer or board of officers thereof. When circumstances warrant, the investigation may be ordered orally to enable it to be commenced without delay. Such oral orders will be confirmed in writing.

b. Investigating officers. Only commissioned officers will be appointed as investigating officers, unless the specific statute or regulation under which the appointment is made authorizes otherwise. An investigating officer appointed to investigate the conduct, status, efficiency, fitness, character, pecuniary liability, or rights of another will be senior in rank to the person under investigation, except where such is impracticable because of military exigencies (but not because of mere inconvenience). If an investigating officer discovers during the course of an investigation that

the completion thereof requires investigating the conduct, status, efficiency, fitness, character, pecuniary liability, or rights of an officer senior to him, he will report this fact to the appointing authority, who will replace him with an officer senior to the officer under investigation, or appoint another officer, senior to the officer under investigation, to conduct a separate investigation of the matters pertaining to that officer.

c. Boards of officers.

- (1) Boards will consist of commissioned officers unless otherwise prescribed by specific statutes or regulations. The voting members of a board shall be senior in rank to all persons under investigation except where such is impracticable because of military exigencies (but not because of mere inconvenience). Appointing authorities may request assistance from higher headquarters to secure sufficient personnel senior in rank to all persons under investigation to carry out the intent of the previous sentence. Unless otherwise designated in the appointing order, the senior member present is president of the board. A commissioned or warrant officer may be designated as recorder by the orders appointing the board, and shall be without vote. Where a recorder is not designated in the appointing orders, the junior member of the board shall act as recorder, and shall have a vote.
- (2) A majority of the appointed members of a board will constitute a quorum and must be present at all its sessions. However, where a statute or regulation specifies the number (or a minimum number) of members of which a board will be comprised, the required number (or minimum number) will be present at all sessions. A large number of officers will not be appointed to a board of officers with the intention of using such of them (but less than a majority of such number) as are available at the time of the board's meeting. This does not preclude designation in the appointing order of one or more "alternate members," provided the appointing order specifies that an alternate member may

serve on the board only in the absence or unavailability of an appointed member, and the order in which alternate members are to be called for service by the president of the board. In any board proceedings, a member who has not been present at a prior session of the board (such as an absent or newly appointed member, or an alternate member called to serve as a member) may participate thereafter if that member has read or had read to him the record of the proceedings held during his absence or prior to his participation.

- (3) When a board of officers is convened to investigate a member of a Reserve component not on active duty or examine an applicant for appointment in a Reserve component, one member of the board will be a Regular Army officer and the remainder will be Reserve officers of the Army in an active reserve status or on active duty. When the appointing authority determines that a Regular Army officer is not available, an officer of a Reserve component, on active duty, may be substituted for the Regular Army officer.
- (4) When a board is convened to consider technical or professional qualifications of a member, or for appointment in a Reserve component, the active duty member of the board will be of the branch concerned if practicable. A Reserve component officer not on active duty, of the branch concerned, may be substituted when it has been determined that an officer on active duty is not available. When practicable, this member will possess the qualifications sought in the individual to be examined. For example, when an optometrist of the Medical Service Corps appears before the board, the Medical Service Corps member thereof should, if reasonably available, be an optometrist. When the branch cannot be determined prior to appearance of the applicant before the board, an officer with qualifications comparable to those in which the individual is to be examined, regardless

of branch, may be detailed to the board and appropriate explanation included as part of the board proceedings.

- (5) A member of the board serving only in an advisory capacity may be junior to any person being considered by the board.

4. Swearing of an investigating officer or member of board of officers. Unless the investigating officer or the board of officers is required to be sworn by the specific statute or regulation under which appointed, it is not necessary for the investigating officer or the members of the board of officers to be sworn.

5. Challenge of an investigating officer or member of boards of officers; membership of board. Investigating officers and members of boards of officers are not subject to peremptory challenge. The privilege of challenge for cause runs through the entire administrative and punitive system of the Army; where it appears clearly that a challenged investigating officer or a member of a board of officers cannot impartially participate in the investigation, action will be taken on the challenge by the appointing authority or the president, as appropriate. The president or the senior unchallenged member will rule on challenges made while the board is in session. If the challenge of a member of a board of officers is sustained, the remaining members will constitute the board, except that whenever, through such challenge, the number of members is reduced below the minimum required, additional members will be detailed by the appointing authority.

6. Duties and functions of investigating officer or recorder or junior member of board. *a. Prior to hearing.*

- (1) In every case in which the conduct, status, efficiency, character, fitness, pecuniary liability, or rights of any individual is to be investigated, such person will be afforded a hearing, and the investigating officer or the recorder or junior member of the board of officers if no recorder is designated (acting under the supervision of the president) will, at a reasonable time in advance of the hearing, deliver or dispatch by messenger or mail to the individual concerned, a written communication stating—

- (a) The date, hour, and exact place of convening.
- (b) The specific matter to be investigated.
- (c) The names of witnesses whose testimony is expected to be used.
- (d) That the investigating officer, or the recorder, or the junior member of the board will endeavor to arrange for the presence of any available witnesses desired by the individual concerned upon timely written request therefor.

A copy of this communication, bearing the certificate of the investigating officer or the recorder or the junior member of the board that it is a true copy and that the original was delivered or dispatched, will be read in evidence and the record will affirmatively show this action.

- (2) He will give timely oral or written notice to all concerned (including, when appropriate, members of the board) of the date, hour, and exact place of convening.
- (3) He will notify and arrange to have present at the hearing witnesses who are to testify in person (including witnesses desired by the individual concerned) and a reporter and interpreter if required.
- (4) He will obtain a suitable room for the hearing; see that it is in order; procure requisite stationery and other supplies; and take such other action as will make possible a prompt, full, and systematic presentation of the case.
- (5) He will insure that all records and documents referred with the case are furnished, when appropriate, to the members of the board and, subject to security requirements, to any named respondent or his counsel.

b. During hearing.

- (1) The recorder or junior member of the board will execute all orders of the board. The investigating officer or the recorder or junior member of the board will keep or superintend the keeping of the required record of proceedings (sec V).
- (2) At the initial session, the investigating officer or the recorder or junior member of the board will read the appointing order. At the beginning of each session, the investigating officer or the recorder

or junior member of the board will note for the record the presence or absence of members of the board, the individual concerned, and his counsel, if any.

- (3) The investigating officer, or when appropriate the recorder or junior member of the board, under the direction and supervision of the president, will so conduct the presentation of evidence and examination of witnesses (including those of the individual concerned if he is not represented by counsel at the investigation) as to make as complete and impartial a presentation of the evidence on both sides as is possible.

c. After hearing. The investigating officer or recorder or junior member of the board will prepare or superintend the preparation of the report of the proceedings as prescribed in section V.

7. Reporter; clerical assistance. The appointing authority will make available the necessary clerical assistance for investigating officers and boards of officers. An investigating officer is not authorized to employ a civilian contract reporter. A board of officers may only employ a civilian contract reporter if such a reporter is authorized under the regulations pursuant to which the board is convened. In no event will a civilian contract reporter be employed if an enlisted or Government civilian employee reporter is available.

8. Individual entitled to have counsel. An individual under investigation is entitled to have counsel, either military or civilian, and any military person requested by the individual under investigation will be appointed as counsel if reasonably available. A decision by the appointing authority as to availability is final. If the requested military counsel is unavailable, other military counsel will be provided, if requested. Unless the specific statute or regulation under which the investigating officer or board of officers is appointed so provides, an individual under investigation is not entitled as a matter of right to appointed counsel who is legally qualified. Government civilian employees may voluntarily act as counsel for another civilian employee or military member, if such services are rendered gratuitously, while on leave, or subsequent to

normal hours of employment, and do not conflict with regular duties. See 18 U.S.C. 205. Civilian counsel will not be provided at Government expense in any case. Civilian or military per-

sonnel under investigation will, to the extent permitted by security classification, be permitted to have their civilian counsel present at all open sessions.

Section II. CONDUCT OF INVESTIGATION

9. General. a. Obtaining evidence.

- (1) The investigation will be conducted so that whenever possible the highest quality of evidence obtainable and available will be considered, e.g.—
 - (a) Stipulations.
 - (b) Views and inspections.
 - (c) Sworn testimony by witnesses appearing before the investigating officer or the board.
 - (d) Depositions taken upon due notice to and, if feasible, in the presence of all parties.
 - (e) Affidavits.
 - (f) Original or properly identified copies of records and documents.
 - (g) Other writings and exhibits.
- (2) Usually, an investigation resolves itself into an inquiry concerning but a few essential facts. These facts should be established by substantial evidence and not by rumor (para 20).
- (3) Unless stipulated to by all parties, no evidence concerning the results, taking, or refusal of polygraph (lie detector) tests will be received in evidence or considered by an investigating officer or board of officers.

b. *Dates, places, persons, and events.* By whatever method evidence is obtained, investigating officers and boards are required to fix dates, places, persons, and events definitely and accurately to the best of their ability. The investigating officer or board should develop complete answers to the questions: What occurred? When did it occur? Where did it occur? How did it occur? Who were involved (and the extent of their involvement)? If property is involved, an exact description thereof and its value, should be included in the record. Diagrams and photos should be used when necessary. Exact descriptions of what occurred, including both the method and the reason for the occurrence, should be included. Reading of the Report of Proceedings by Investigating Officer (Board of Officers) (DA

Form 1574) by the investigating officer or the board before commencing the investigation or hearing will serve to eliminate errors.

10. **Rules of evidence.** As proceedings utilizing this regulation are administrative and not judicial in nature, an investigating officer or board of officers is not bound by the rules of evidence prescribed for trials by courts-martial or for court proceedings generally. Accordingly, subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, there will be admitted in evidence, without regard to technical rules of admissibility, any oral or written matter (including hearsay) which in the minds of reasonable men is relevant and material. All evidence shall be accorded such weight as is warranted under the circumstances. All questions of admissibility will be ruled upon in open session by the president, subject to objection by any member of the board, in which case the determination will be by majority vote of the members present. See paragraph 20 as to evidentiary basis for findings.

11. **Individual under investigation will be present at open sessions.** An individual whose conduct, efficiency, fitness, or pecuniary liability is under investigation and who has been notified pursuant to paragraph 6 will, except for good cause shown, be permitted to be present at all open sessions and to cross-examine adverse witnesses. However, whether or not he is present at all sessions, before the hearing is concluded the individual concerned should be given full opportunity by some appropriate method to rebut adverse allegations. The individual concerned, if suspected of an offense punishable by court-martial, shall not be interrogated or requested to make any statement without first being informed of the nature of the offense of which he is suspected, that he does not have to make any statement regarding the offense of which he is suspected, and that any statement made by him may be used as evidence against him in a trial by court-martial. See *Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 31(b)*.

12. **Witnesses to be sworn.** Investigating officers and the president or the recorder of boards of officers have power to administer oaths (see

UCMJ, Art. 136). Any person appearing before an investigating officer or a board as a witness should be sworn. In the absence of any law or regulation prescribing the form of oath to be taken by a witness, the following oath will be administered:

You swear (or affirm) that the evidence you shall give in the case now in hearing shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. So help you God.

13. Testimony of witnesses. *a. Rights of witnesses.* No witness shall be compelled to incriminate himself or to answer any question the answer to which might tend to incriminate him, or to make a statement or produce evidence if the statement or evidence is not material to the issue and might tend to degrade him (see UCMJ, Art. 31), or, in the case of witnesses not subject to the UCMJ, which would deprive him of his rights under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. However, the witness must state specifically that refusal to answer a question is based upon the immunity afforded by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 31, or the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. It is the proper province of the investigating officer or board, in each case, to decide whether the stated reason is well taken. Whenever it appears appropriate and advisable to do so, the rights of a witness will be explained to him. The procedure prescribed by the *Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951*, paragraph 150, may be utilized in such cases.

b. Personal appearance of witnesses. Personal appearance of a witness should always be obtained whenever possible in preference to use of his deposition, affidavit, or written statements. However, in the event a material witness resides or is on duty at a substantial distance from the installation at which the hearing is conducted, his evidence may be obtained by deposition, affidavit, or written statement. DA Form 19-24 (statement) should, if available, be used for written statements of witnesses. The commander having jurisdiction over the locality in which such a witness is residing or is found may be requested to have a deposition or affidavit taken. Where personal appearance is otherwise not feasible, evidence should be obtained by deposition or affidavit. If it is impracticable to obtain evidence by either method, it may be secured by correspondence between the investi-

gating officer or board and the witness. If evidence is secured by affidavits or written statements (including correspondence), the individual concerned should be given reasonable notice thereof and afforded an opportunity to meet adverse allegations. If depositions are taken, see *Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951*, paragraph 117, and appendix 18, for guidance. The use of oral or written stipulations in appropriate cases is also permissible. If stipulations are used, see *Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951*, paragraph 154b, for guidance.

14. Prejudicial allegations. When matters prejudicial to the conduct, status, efficiency, fitness, character, or rights of an individual arise and become an issue during the course of the investigation, the investigating officer or board shall make the individual concerned a party, and make known to him in writing, the precise nature of the prejudicial allegations. Additionally, he will be entitled to counsel as provided in paragraph 8, permitted to examine such allegations or evidence, and afforded an opportunity to answer such allegations by the testimony of any witness or witnesses he may desire heard in his own behalf, and by written statements, sworn to if practicable, of himself and others he may desire to submit. Failure to afford any of the above rights will be fully explained in the record of proceedings. If the person concerned is unavailable for good cause, such as absence from the command, the above requirements may be met by furnishing him a copy of the record of proceedings together with advice as to his right to present evidence. Subject to the rights of a witness as set forth in paragraph 13, the individual concerned may be called by the investigating officer or board and required to testify under oath upon any point involved concerning which he might be a material witness.

15. Pecuniary responsibility. The requirements in paragraph 14 also will be observed before arriving at a finding which fixes pecuniary responsibility on any individual who has not been fully apprised of the matter and afforded an opportunity to present his side of the case. Every report of proceedings which recommends that any individual be held pecuniarily responsible for loss of funds or lost, damaged, or destroyed property will contain a positive statement, immediately following the findings, that each individual found pecuniarily

responsible has been afforded an opportunity to examine all evidence considered by the investigating officer or board and to present evidence, including affidavits of other parties, in his own behalf. If it is impossible or impracticable to afford this opportunity to individuals held pecuniarily responsible, the report of proceedings will contain a full explanation as to why it is impossible or impracticable to do so.

16. Informal evidence. During hearings, the investigating officer or board should refrain from unnecessary informal conversations or comment upon subjects under investigation, and witnesses should not be allowed to make statements "off the record." It should be understood that the primary mission of the investigating officer or board is to present in the written record all pertinent facts and circumstances supported by the recorded evidence. Findings and recommendations must be supported by the facts contained in the record and not based upon personal knowledge not of record in the report of proceedings.

17. Written brief. The individual concerned

or his counsel may submit a written brief covering the whole or any portion or phase of the case under investigation and, except for good cause shown, a reasonable time will be afforded him in which to submit it. To assist in preparation of this brief, the individual concerned or his counsel will, upon request and subject to security requirements, be allowed to examine the report of proceedings prior to action by the convening authority.

18. Suggested procedure. The appendix contains a suggested procedure for investigating officers and boards of officers in cases in which the conduct, status, efficiency, fitness, character, rights, or pecuniary liability of persons is being investigated and in which a hearing is considered appropriate, if specific procedure is not prescribed by other regulations. So much of this procedure as is applicable may be used in cases where there appears to be no individual under investigation in the foregoing respects or where no hearing is held. Use of the suggested procedure is not mandatory. However, it may be used as a guide in the presentation of evidence by investigating officers and boards of officers in accordance with this regulation.

Section III. FINDINGS

19. General. A finding, in the sense that it is used in proceedings under this regulation, is a clear and concise statement of a fact evidenced in the record, or is a conclusion of the investigating officer or board which can be readily deduced from the evidence in the record.

20. Evidentiary basis. Each finding must be supported by substantial evidence, which is defined as such evidence as a reasonable mind can accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

21. Form. Where the regulation under which an investigating officer or board of officers functions

specifically provide the form of findings, such form will be followed. In the absence of specific provisions, the findings will be stated in such form as to give a coherent and clear recital of the facts as established by the evidence and the conclusions thereon of the investigating officer or board. If several findings are required, coherence and clarity will best be achieved by presenting separately the complete facts as to each item. If but one finding is required, the best exposition of facts ordinarily will be obtained by arranging their presentation in chronological order.

Section IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

22. General. *a.* In appropriate cases, whether or not prescribed by the regulation under which an investigating officer or board is functioning, recommendations should be made, even if of a negative nature, such as a statement that no further action is considered necessary. Recommendations must be appropriate to and warranted by the findings and, in general, should cover the

pecuniary, disciplinary, and corrective phases of the matter under investigation.

b. Investigating officers or boards must make their recommendations according to the best of their understanding of the rules and regulations for the government of the Army, of Army policies, and of the customs of the service, guided by their

concept of justice both to the Government and to the individual concerned.

23. Minority report. In case of a disagreement between members of a board of officers, a minority

report may be submitted, either as to the findings or to the recommendations, or to both. The reasons for the minority report must be stated clearly.

Section V. REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS

24. General. The report of the proceedings of an investigating officer or a board of officers will be prepared as prescribed in the regulation under which appointed. When the regulation does not provide the form or character of the report, the report will be prepared on DA Form 1574 (Report of Proceedings by Investigating Officer (Board of Officers)). Also, the following instructions are generally applicable:

a. The record will be clear and legible.

b. Erasures, interlineations, and other changes will be initialed by the investigating officer or by the recorder or another member of the board of officers.

c. Additional pages will be numbered at the bottom, and margins of 2½ inches will be left at the top, and 1 inch at the bottom and left side of each page.

d. Where testimony is not recorded verbatim, it should be summarized on DA Form 19-24 (statement) and signed by the witness. If the witness is unavailable or refuses to sign, such should be noted over the signature of the investigating officer, recorder, or junior board member. Unless the specific regulation governing the proceedings provides otherwise, the report of

proceedings of an investigating officer will be authenticated by his signature, and board reports will be authenticated by the signature of all the members of the board present at its deliberations and that of the recorder. If any one of the foregoing persons is unable to authenticate because of death, disability, or absence, the reason will be stated in the report.

e. Unless otherwise specified, the proceedings will be submitted in triplicate; the duplicate and triplicate copies, as well as the original, having appended thereto complete copies of all testimony and other exhibits.

25. Copies of reports. Except as prescribed in paragraphs 14, 15, and 17, an investigating officer or board of officers is not authorized to furnish reports of investigation or copies thereof to anyone other than the appointing authority or his duly designated representative. After deletion of classified portions, one copy shall be furnished to each individual concerned. The appointing authority may furnish reports of investigation or copies thereof to others whose official duties entitle them to such; otherwise, the furnishing of copies is governed by the provisions of AR 345-20 and other pertinent regulations.

APPENDIX

SUGGESTED PROCEDURE FOR INVESTIGATING OFFICERS AND BOARDS OF OFFICERS

Note. The following abbreviations are used in this suggested procedure:

PRES: President or senior member of a board of officers.

IO: Investigating officer.

RCDR: Recorder or junior member of a board of officers if no recorder is designated.

RESP: Respondent, i.e., individual concerned, against whom prejudicial matters are alleged or arise and become an issue.

Note. Prior to the opening hearing, the RCDR (IO) will perform the duties and functions provided in paragraph 6a.

PRES (IO): This hearing will come to order. (RESP), this is a board of officers (Investigation is) called to determine -----

PRES (IO): (RESP), you may, if you desire, employ civilian counsel at your own expense for this hearing. Do you have such counsel? You may request military counsel of your own choice, who will be furnished if reasonably available, or you may request that the appointing authority designate military counsel for you.

RESP: Yes (No).

Note. If RESP answers "yes," the hearing should be adjourned and the appointing authority should be requested to appoint counsel for RESP, preferably one of his own choosing. If RESP answers "no," the board (IO) may still feel obliged to report absence of counsel to the appointing authority if the issues are grave enough. If counsel is supplied, a proper entry of identification should appear here and a showing of any adjournments incident thereto.

Note. During the hearing, the RCDR (IO) will comply with the requirements of paragraph 6b.

Note. A commissioned or warrant officer appointed as recorder may not serve as recorder and at the same time sit as a voting member of a board of officers.

Note. A reporter and an interpreter, if used, will be sworn.

RCDR (IO): The reporter will be sworn.

RCDR (IO): You swear (or affirm) that you will faithfully perform the duties of reporter to this board. So help you God.

REPORTER: I do.

RCDR (IO): The interpreter will be sworn.

RCDR (IO): You swear (or affirm) that you will faithfully perform the duties of interpreter in the case now in hearing. So help you God.

INTERPRETER: I do.

RCDR (IO): The board is appointed (This investigation is directed) by paragraph ----, Special Orders No. ----, Headquarters, ----- dated -----, 19... (The order is then read aloud by the RCDR (IO).)

RCDR: The following members of the board are present:

PRESENT: -----

ABSENT: -----

Note. A majority of the members of a board of officers constitute a quorum and must be present at all sessions, except that a member who was previously absent, or who had been newly appointed to a board, may participate in the proceedings if the new member or absent member has read or had read to him such record of the proceedings held during his absence or prior to his participation.

Note. Reasons or authority for absence should be stated if known. All personnel of

the board, including the recorder and counsel, if any, should be accounted for as present or absent at each session.

RCDR: Request the appointing order to be attached to these proceedings and marked "Exhibit A."

PRES (IO): The appointing order will be attached to the board proceedings and marked as requested.

RCDR (IO): The general nature of the hearing is as follows:

Note. RCDR (IO) advises the RESP (and the board members) of the nature of the hearing under consideration.

PRES (IO): Does the respondent desire to challenge any member of the board (the investigating officer) for cause?

RESP (COUNSEL): No. (The respondent challenges ----- for cause on the ground -----.)

Note. If challenge for cause is made by RESP, the board or appointing authority, as appropriate, will consider the challenge. If a challenge is sustained and the remaining members of the board are less than the minimum required by law or regulations, the board should recess until additional members are detailed.

Note. Recorder swears board, if required. President then swears recorder, if required.

RCDR: The board will be sworn.

Note. All persons in the room stand up while the oath is administered to the board and to the recorder. Each board member raises his right hand as his name is called by the recorder in administering the following oath:

RCDR: You, Colonel -----, Lieutenant Colonel -----, etc.

Note. When the recorder has called all the members of the board by name, he continues—

RCDR: Do swear that you will faithfully perform all the duties incumbent upon you as a member of this board; that you will faithfully and impartially examine and inquire, according to the evidence, your conscience, and the laws and regulations provided, into the matter now before you without partiality, favor, affection, prejudice, or hope of reward; that you will find such facts as are supported by substantial evidence of record; that, in determination of those facts which are in dispute or are difficult of proof, you will use your professional knowledge and best judgment and common sense in weighing the evidence, considering the probability or improbability thereof, and with this in mind will regard as established facts those which are supported by evidence deemed most worthy of belief; and that you will make such findings and recommendations as are appropriate to, warranted by, and consistent with your findings, according to the best of your understanding of the rules and regulations for the government of the Army, Department of the Army policies, and the customs of the service, guided by your concept of justice, both to the Government and to individuals concerned. So help you God.

EACH MEMBER OF THE BOARD: I do.

Note. The board members lower their hands but remain standing while the oath is administered by the president to the recorder.

PRES: You, -----, do swear that you will faithfully perform the duties and functions of recorder (junior member) of this board. So help you God.

RCDR: I do.

Note. All personnel now resume their seats.

RCDR: Does any member of the board desire to be advised as to the law, regulations, or orders concerned in this hearing?

PRES: No readings are desired at this time (or statement of what is desired).

RCDR (IO): The recorder (investigating officer) and respondent have agreed to stipulate

Note. Prior to acceptance of the stipulation of the PRES (IO), by questions, should determine that RESP joins in the stipulation. *Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951*, paragraph 154b, will be observed so far as practicable.

PRES (IO): The stipulation is (not) accepted, and will be marked "Exhibits ..."

RCDR (IO): (RESP), you were notified of this hearing on 19...

Note. RCDR (IO) reads a copy of the letter of notification certified as a true copy and that the original was delivered or dispatched to RESP (para 6a(1)). At this time, RCDR offers in evidence a copy of the letter of notification and requests it be attached to the proceedings and marked "Exhibit ..."

PRES (IO): The copy of letter of notification will be attached to the proceedings and marked as requested.

PRES (IO): (RESP), you have the right to cross-examine all witnesses brought before this hearing. It is our desire to ascertain the truth of all matters, and we shall be glad to help you question any witnesses when such questioning might shed a true light on the facts of the case. Do you understand your right of cross-examination?

RESP: I do.

PRES (IO): (Recorder), you will (I will) now read all the documentary evidence to be considered in this matter, and the statements of any witnesses who are unable to appear in person.

Note. With reference to use and form of depositions, see Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 49, and Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, appendix 18; for principles governing the introduction of documentary evidence, see *Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951*, paragraphs 143 and 144. If it is impracticable to produce a witness to identify an unofficial paper or document, the board (IO) is authorized to dispense with formal proof of its authenticity, provided the board (IO) is satisfied that the paper or document is what it purports to be.

Note. The RCDR (IO) presents the evidence and examines the witnesses so as to make as complete and impartial presentation of the evidence on both sides as is possible.

RCDR (IO): The first witness to be called is.....

Note. The RCDR, under the direction and supervision of the president (IO), presents witnesses called by him in the order desired. He conducts direct examination of each witness. RESP or his counsel cross-examines each witness after completion of the direct examination. Members of the board question witnesses last, after direct and cross-examination.

Note. A witness, if in the military service, salutes the president (IO) when he enters the room, then raises his right hand and thereafter the RCDR (IO) administers the oath. A civilian witness enters the room uncovered, raises his right hand, and then the RCDR (IO) administers the oath. See *Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951*, paragraph 112.

Note. Whenever it appears appropriate and advisable to do so, the rights of a witness under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 31, or the 5th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, may be explained to him. See also *Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951*, paragraph 150.

RCDR (IO): You swear (or affirm) that the evidence you shall give in the case now in hearing shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. So help you God.

WITNESS: I do.

Note. The witness now takes his seat in the witness chair. The first two questions asked every witness are asked by the RCDR (IO) whether the witness be called by him (the board) or by the RESP.

RCDR (IO): State your full name and (rank (grade), service number, branch of service, organization and station) or (occupation and residence).

RCDR (IO): Do you know the respondent? If so, what is his name?

Note. If the witness states that he knows the RESP, normally he will be asked to point to the RESP if he sees him in the room.

Note. Questions should be propounded to develop the matter under consideration.

RCDR (IO): The recorder (investigating officer) has no further questions.

RESP (COUNSEL): The respondent has no (further) questions.

Note. If the RESP cross-examines the witness, the RCDR may conduct a redirect examination.

RCDR: Are there any questions by the board?

Note. Any board member wishing to question the witness first secures the permission of the president.

Note. If either the recorder or the RESP wishes to ask further questions of the witness after his examination has been turned over to the board, permission of the board should be secured. Such request should, in general, be granted, unless the interrogation is superfluous in scope.

Note. When questions are concluded, the PRES (IO) announces—

PRES (IO): The witness is excused.

Note. The proceedings should indicate that witnesses, other than RESP, withdrew.

Note. Unless expressly excused from further attendance during the hearing, all witnesses will remain subject to call or recall until the proceedings have been concluded. When a witness is recalled, the RCDR (IO) reminds such witness, after he has appeared—

RCDR (IO): You are reminded that you are still under oath.

Note. The procedure in the case of a witness called by the board is the same as outlined above.

RCDR (IO): There is nothing further to offer relating to the matter under consideration.

RESP (COUNSEL): The respondent has no (has) opening statement.

Note. The RESP introduces his stipulations, witnesses, and documentary evidence, following the procedure indicated above for the RCDR (IO); the RCDR (IO) administers the oath to all witnesses and asks the first two formal questions.

Note. Whenever it appears appropriate and advisable to do so, the RESP may be advised of his rights under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 31.

Note. Should the RESP be called to the stand as a witness, the RCDR (IO) will administer the oath and ask the following preliminary questions, after which the procedure follows that of other witnesses.

RCDR (IO): State your name, rank (grade), service number, branch of service, organization, and station.

RESP: -----

RCDR (IO): Are you the respondent in this case?

RESP: Yes.

Note. When the RESP has concluded his case he announces—

RESP (COUNSEL): The respondent rests.

RCDR: There is no further evidence to offer in this hearing. Does the board wish to have any witnesses called or recalled?

PRES: It does (not).

RCDR: Opening argument is waived.

Note. The RCDR has the right to make the opening argument, and, if any argument is made on behalf of the RESP, the closing argument. Arguments are not required. If no oral arguments are made, RESP and RCDR continue—

RESP (COUNSEL): The respondent submits the case without comment.

RCDR: The recorder submits the case without comment.

PRES: Has the recorder anything further to offer?

RESP (COUNSEL): I have (not).

Note. Matters developed during the proceedings which are prejudicial to persons other than the RESP, if not within the scope of the investigation, will be reported promptly to the appointing authority for such action as he may deem appropriate. If such matters are within the scope of the order directing the investigation, like proceedings will be had as to such persons.

Note. When matters prejudicial to the character, standing, or efficiency or matters involving pecuniary liability of the RESP are originally alleged, or arise and become an issue during the course of the investigation, the board (IO) will make known to the RESP the precise nature of the prejudicial allegations, and if practicable permit him to examine such allegations or evidence, and afford him an opportunity to present his side of the case.

PRES: The hearing is adjourned.

Note. The conclusion of the hearing does not end the duties of the board (IO). It must then enter into closed session. (It is then the duty of the board (IO) to arrive at findings based upon the evidence heard, and make recommendations justified by that evidence. Thereafter, the RCDR (IO) is responsible for compiling the report of proceedings (para 24) and submitting properly authenticated copies thereof to the appointing authority (para 6c).)

[JAG]

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

HAROLD K. JOHNSON,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

Official:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

Distribution:

To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-9 requirements for Administration:

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MACV Planning Dir 9-67

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222

PLANNING DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 9-67

EXTRACTS

29 October 1967
(MACCOCL1)

PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR SENIOR COMMANDERS FOR THE PERIOD 1 NOV 67 - 30 APR 68 (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE. To provide planning guidance for the period 1 November 1967 - 30 April 1968, a period generally corresponding to the Northeast Monsoon Season. This season overlaps the end of the period covered in the MACV/RVNAF Combined Campaign Plan for 1967 - AB 142 and the beginning of the period to be covered in the Combined Campaign Plan for 1968 - AB 143.

2. (S) SITUATION.

a. Previous offensives have created a situation which is conducive to initiating an all-out offensive on all fronts -- political, military, economic, and psychological. RVN/US/FW forces have retained the initiative, spoiled enemy attempts to launch major offensives through the DMZ and in the western highlands, frustrated enemy efforts to disrupt pacification and election activities, expanded the areas of secure population, and made inroads against enemy infrastructure in several key areas. The establishment of a strong point obstacle system south of the DMZ was initiated and is progressing.

b. Pacification throughout RVN is expanding. Revolutionary Development Cadre groups and military and paramilitary forces in direct support are gradually, but persistently, becoming more effective.

c. The war has passed the point at which losses inflicted on the enemy exceed his current replacement input. Air interdiction of the enemy LOC in RVN and in the extended battlefield of North Vietnam and Laos are hampering enemy resupply efforts. Successive offensives into enemy base areas are reducing his unit effectiveness and morale. The Viet Cong capability to forage, to obtain recruits and support in-country is decreasing. Except along the DMZ where the war has developed a conventional character, the enemy is resorting increasingly to terrorist activity, and hit-and-run attacks.

3. (S) OBJECTIVES. The RVN/US/FW operational objectives for the period are:

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS EXCEPT DOCUMENT RELEASABLE
AS INDICATED IN PARAGRAPH 6 ONLY BY AUTHORITY
OF COMUSMACV DATE 29 OCT 67.

GROUP-4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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PAGE 1 OF 11 PAGES

AG-MD Control No. 001380

*This planning directive supersedes MACV Planning Directive 5-67 (S), 3 May 1967

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EXHIBIT D-53

(pages 1-8 only regraded)
Regraded CONFIDENTIAL, 7 Mar 70
Letter, Office IG, HQ USMACV

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a. Increase political, military, economic, and psychological pressures on the enemy in RVN and, to the extent authorized, in contiguous countries and waters.

b. Expand and accelerate the pacification program with emphasis on improved territorial security, increased military operation against enemy units or bases threatening pacification priority areas, intensified action against enemy infrastructure, and more selective and effective population and resources control.

c. Increase employment and improve effectiveness of RVN forces with emphasis on RF and PF elements.

d. Invade enemy base areas, destroy or capture enemy materials and facilities, and defeat enemy organized units.

e. Interdict enemy lines of communication both in and leading into RVN.

f. Open, secure, and use additional land and water lines of communication in RVN. The Combined Campaign Plan 1968, AB 143, will contain complete listing of all the priority LOC for the entire year; those listed herein are in consonance with that listing but include only those that should receive priority attention within the time frame of this plan. Those not included herein will receive attention during the remainder of 1968.

4. (S) CONCEPT.

a. As the containment forces prevent major incursions of the enemy from out-of-country sanctuaries the priority for offensive operations will shift, with the weather pattern changes, to the southern portions of II CTZ, all of III CTZ, and IV CTZ. A series of offensives will be conducted in selected areas. The priority for the GVN pacification program behind the protective shield of the US/FW/ARVN forces will be III CTZ/IV CTZ, II CTZ and I CTZ in that order. Economy of forces and maximum flexibility in force allocation between and within corps tactical zones, coupled with maintenance of a balanced responsive logistics support system, is required.

b. The overall strategy will contain three basic facets: (1) offensives to keep the enemy off-balance; (2) persistent neutralization of enemy base areas with methodical capture/destruction of his supplies and facilities; and (3) improved and expanded territorial security and other pacification programs. Application of all three aspects throughout RVN will be concurrent, although apportioning the weight of effort among them will vary from area to area. A common requirement is finding and fixing the enemy. Hence, tactics will stress long range patrolling in

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and around TAOR's and integrated operations by military, paramilitary, and National Police Forces in populated areas.

c. The key to the overall concept is sustained territorial security for the pacification program. The concerted efforts of the entire military-civil team are required to accelerate improved security conditions. A major effort will be made to implement measures to integrate all aspects of the anti-infrastructure campaign. Similarly, better more specifically targeted population and resources control must be developed and enforced. Planning, as a matter of priority, will provide for the opening and securing of land and water LOC to enhance inter-community contacts, increase friendly presence in the countryside, and permit uninterrupted flow of civil/commercial traffic.

d. Pressure will be applied on all segments of the enemy's external and internal support system to reduce the combat effectiveness of his organized forces and to keep him on the move and away from populated areas. Multi-brigade offensives will be launched against major base areas not previously invaded. Close-in enemy base areas will be neutralized between major offensives with priority against those base areas most seriously affecting pacification priority areas. Previously attacked base areas will be reentered to insure continued neutralization. However, US/Fw/RVN units must be prepared for the enemy to react with increased use of guerrilla and terrorist activities.

e. Improvement in the overall effectiveness of Vietnamese military, paramilitary, and National Police Forces (NPF) will be stressed. The planned RVNAF reorganization program is designed to provide the framework for enhanced effectiveness. Under this program ARVN and RF/PF units will continue to exert primary effort on territorial security aspects of pacification development. Concurrently, the tempo of offensive operations by ARVN, combined US/RVN and Fw/RVN forces will increase. Our objective, by the end of the period, is to turn over the internal security of selected areas to PF, NPF, and to some extent hamlet self-defense forces. US, Fw, and RVN units will provide outer security by offensives against enemy main force units and into enemy base areas. It is vital that during the RVNAF reorganization the tempo of ARVN operations not be allowed to decelerate and that improved integration be achieved rather than increased compartmentalization.

5. (S) TASKS.

a. Planning will provide for the following tasks common to two or more corps tactical zones:

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- (1) Intensify and accelerate activities designed to improve RVNAF unit effectiveness emphasizing AF and PF units. Primary consideration will be given to integrated training and operations.
- (2) Neutralize all enemy base areas in proximity to key population and economic centers and to vital communication arteries.
- (3) Destroy VC/NVA main force units with emphasis on aggressive and rapid pursuit.
- (4) Stress inter-headquarters arrangements for operations and pursuit across tactical boundaries.
- (5) Open, secure, rehabilitate/maintain, and make maximum use of surface LOC. Priority will be given to National Route 1 from Tay Ninh to Dong Ha, Route 20 from Highway 1 to Dalat, Route 4 from Saigon to Bac Lieu, and waterways from rice producing areas of the Mekong Delta to Saigon.
- (6) Employ long range reconnaissance and combat patrols day and night in ever increasing intensity to locate lucrative enemy formations and facilities, reducing the conduct of nonproductive large scale search and destroy operations.
- (7) Intensify efforts to disrupt and reduce enemy infiltration into and through SVN and to prevent enemy withdrawal into out-of-country sanctuaries in an effort to avoid friendly offensives.
- (8) Give increased priority to providing combat support resources for special operations.
- (9) Focus an expanded ARC LIGHT program on destruction of enemy base areas with increased emphasis on aggressive ground follow-up of F-52 strikes.
- (10) Develop and implement actions against increased enemy terrorism, attacks on pacification activities, and small-unit guerrilla actions which probably will be intensified as the main force war turns increasingly in favor of friendly forces.
- (11) Assist and/or reinforce RVNAF and other forces engaged in operations designed to eliminate the VC infrastructure.
- (12) Protect friendly installations and bases from enemy attacks by fire, by strengthening passive defense measures, and by an aggressive, offensively oriented defense, to include day and night ambushes and patrols out to and beyond rocket range from friendly bases.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(13) emphasize the continuing training of individuals and units during those periods when they are not actively engaged or are awaiting commitment.

b. CG, USARV, in coordination with other component and senior tactical commanders will:

(1) In coordination with ARVN, implement plans to construct, rehabilitate, and maintain roads in II, III, and IV CTZs; with priority to National Routes 1, 4, 5A, 8, 13, 15, 19, 20, and 26 providing funds are available.

(2) Be prepared to support employment of 1st Cav Div (AM) as a country-wide exploitation force.

(3) Expand logistical support in IV CTZ as additional US forces are deployed to the area.

(4) Integrate base development planning with scheduled arrival of new units and with planned redeployment of in-country forces.

(5) Support, where possible, GVN pacification efforts.

c. COMNAVFORV will:

(1) In coordination with Commander VNN, intensify MARKET TIME operations to interdict enemy seaborne infiltration and supply activity and to increase the coverage of southern I CTZ, northern II CTZ, and IV CTZ coastal areas.

(2) In coordination with Commander, VNN; SA, IV Corps; CG, II FFORCEV; and CG, III MAF, intensify and expand GAME WARDEN operations to improve control of inland waterways, with emphasis on night operations.

(3) In coordination with CG, III MAF, implement plans to construct, rehabilitate, and maintain roads in I CTZ with priority to National Route 1 from II CTZ boundary to Dong Ha and to Route 9 from Dong Ha to Cam Lo.

(4) In coordination with CG, III MAF, continue support of the construction of the strong point obstacle system.

(5) In coordination with Commander, VNN and CG, III MAF establish a Coastal Defense Group base at Sa Huynh in early CY 68.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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(6) In coordination with Commander, VNN and CG, II FFORCEV, conduct operations in RUSZ, as necessary, to secure main shipping channel.

(7) In coordination with Commander, VNN; CG, II FFORCEV; CG, III Corps; SA, IV CTZ; and CG, IV Corps; conduct riverine operations in III and IV CTZ with priority to IV CTZ.

(8) Support, where possible, GVN pacification efforts.

d. Commander, 7th Air Force, in coordination with Commander, VNAF will:

(1) Conduct interdiction operations and provide close air support of ground operations in consonance with the tasks and priorities delineated herein.

(2) Intensify air operations against enemy LOC and infiltration routes to RVN, with priority to those supporting enemy operations in the DMZ and in the western highlands.

(3) Execute out-of-country air-supported barrier plan.

(4) Provide tactical airlift in support of operations, including airborne operations, as required.

(5) Prepare to expand RANCH HAND operations.

e. CG, III MAF, in coordination with CG, I Corps will:

(1) Consolidate, provide for initial manning, and prepare for strengthening and expansion of strong point obstacle system south of the DMZ.

(2) Continue screening, surveillance, and spoiling operations in the area of the DMZ.

(3) Conduct continuous air and periodic ground operations into the A Shau Valley to prevent enemy use thereof.

(4) Maintain security in the coastal areas of I CTZ and provide for increasing protection and control of the populace and resources.

(5) Continue and expand operations in Quang Ngai, I CTZ pacification priority area, to include establishing a CIDG camp at Sa Huynh during CY 67.

(6) Prepare to position artillery in I CTZ so as to provide

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artillery fire into Laos with priority to support of BV 33.

(7) In coordination with COMNAVFORV, implement plans to construct, rehabilitate and maintain roads and LOC in I CTZ.

(8) Coordinate with CG, I FFORCEV on Operation YORK.

f. CG, I FFORCEV, in coordination with CG, II Corps will:

(1) Be prepared to conduct Operation PHOENIX and, in coordination with III MAF, Operation YORK.

(2) Disrupt enemy infiltration and prevent incursions by major enemy forces in the western Highlands.

(3) Expand security in the pacification priority areas of the coastal provinces of II CTZ (Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan and Binh Thuan).

(4) Coordinate with and support increased offensive operations by ROK forces against enemy main force and local force units in coastal area of II CTZ with emphasis on Phu Yen and southern Binh Dinh.

(5) In coordination with II FFORCEV, conduct operations to secure Highway 20 in II CTZ.

(6) Coordinate with CG, USARV to secure and maintain priority LOC in zone.

g. CG, II FFORCEV, in coordination with CG, III Corps; SA IV CTZ; and CG, IV Corps, as appropriate will:

(1) Prepare to receive additional forces to intensify offensive operations.

(2) Conduct Operation SANTA FE to destroy enemy bases and forces, improve the security, and provide protection to the produce of the area.

(3) Conduct Operation DODGE CITY, accompanied by extensive forest clearing effort, to destroy enemy forces and bases and deny further use of the area by the enemy.

(4) Conduct operation SAN ANGELO concurrent with DODGE CITY.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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(5) Conduct Operation YELLOWSTONE.

(6) Phase US forces out of Operation FALGAPAX by end of 67, but provide for periodic follow-on operations by US forces in Gia Dinh. Insure development and maintenance of territorial security capability of residual RVNAF forces.

(7) In coordination with COMNAVFORV, conduct ground and riverine operations in the RBSZ, as required, to secure main shipping channel to SAIGON.

(8) In coordination with CG, I FFORCEV, conduct operations to secure Highway 20 in III CTZ.

(9) Open Highway 23 from Xuyen Moc to Ham Tan, 5A from Saigon to III - IV CTZ boundary, and route 13 from Gia Dinh to An Loc.

(10) Coordinate with SA, IV CTZ to increase frequency and scope of combined ARVN and MRF operations in IV CTZ with priority of effort to Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, Kien Hoa, Vinh Long, and Vinh Binh.

(11) In coordination with COMNAVFORV, expand riverine operations into and peripheral to the priority areas of IV CTZ with emphasis on increasing GVN control over the national resources.

(12) Coordinate with CG, I FFORCEV to provide mutual support to Operation PHOENIX.

(13) Coordinate with CG, USARV to secure and maintain priority LOC in zone.

(14) Open and secure water LOC within III CTZ which will facilitate and enhance commerce with priority to those routes connecting III and IV CTZ.

(15) Conduct operations to further the pacification efforts in Gia Dinh, Phuoc Tuy, Hau Nghia, Binh Dong, Long An, Bien Hoa, the southern two districts of Tay Ninh, and Xuan Loc district of Long Khanh and Binh Tuy provinces.

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222

DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 20-4*

27 April 1967
(MACJA)

INSPECTIONS AND INVESTIGATIONS
WAR CRIMES

1. PURPOSE. To provide uniform procedures for the collection and perpetuation of evidence relative to war crimes incidents and to designate the agencies responsible for the conduct of investigations for alleged or apparent violations of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 For the Protection of War Victims.

2. SCOPE. This directive is applicable to all alleged or apparent war crimes violations of the subject Geneva Conventions, inflicted by hostile forces upon US military or civilian personnel assigned in Vietnam, or by US military personnel upon hostile military or civilian personnel.

3. DEFINITION.

a. War Crimes. War crimes are violations of the law of war (see DA Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, July 1956).

b. A "grave breach" of the Geneva Conventions constitutes a war crime. Some examples of "grave breaches" are as follows (when committed against persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any cause): Willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health.

c. Other war crimes are as follows: Making use of poisoned or otherwise forbidden arms or ammunition, treacherous request for quarter, maltreatment of dead bodies, firing on localities which are undefended and without military significance, abuse of or firing on the flag of truce, misuse of the Red Cross emblem, use of civilian clothing by troops to conceal their military character during battle, poisoning of wells or streams, pillage or purposeless destruction, improper use of privileged buildings for

*This directive supersedes MACV Directive 20-4 (O), 25 March 1966

MACV Dir 20-4
27 April 1967

military purposes, compelling prisoners of war to perform prohibited labor, killing spies or other persons who have committed hostile acts without trial, compelling civilians to perform prohibited labor, and violations of surrender terms.

4. COORDINATION. Investigations of alleged or apparent war crimes will be coordinated with the Staff Judge Advocate, USMACV.

5. RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. It is the responsibility of all military personnel having knowledge or receiving a report of an incident or of an act thought to be a war crime to make such incident known to his commanding officer as soon as practicable. Personnel performing investigative, intelligence, police, photographic, grave registration, or medical functions, as well as those in contact with the enemy, will, in the normal course of their duty, make every effort to detect the commission of war crimes and will report the essential facts to their commanding officer. Persons discovering war crimes will take all reasonable action under the circumstances to preserve physical evidence, to note identity of witnesses present, and to record (by photograph, sketch, or descriptive notes) the circumstances and surroundings.

b. Commanders and MACV staff sections receiving reports of probable war crimes will, in addition to any other required reports, report the facts as soon as practicable to the Staff Judge Advocate, USMACV, and will make pertinent collateral information available to the appointing authority and investigating officers.

c. The Staff Judge Advocate, USMACV, will:

(1) Immediately notify the appropriate appointing authority (see paragraph 5d, below) of the receipt of a report of an alleged or apparent war crime.

(2) Assist and advise the appointed investigating officer, in coordination with the Staff Judge Advocate or Legal Officer of the appointing authority.

(3) Receive and review completed and approved investigations from the appointing authority.

(4) Maintain a file on all alleged or apparent war crimes.

(5) Make appropriate recommendations to COMUSMACV concerning use of the evidence obtained and disposition of the report of investigation.

d. Appointing Authority:

(1) Will appoint an investigating officer and, if appropriate, designate a qualified criminal investigator or CIC agent as technical assistant. Upon receipt of notification of an alleged or apparent war crime concerning a member of his command, one of the following appointing authorities will, with all dispatch, appoint an investigating officer to prepare and transmit to him a report of investigation.

(a) Army. Officers who exercise General Court-martial jurisdiction (or their designees) are appointing authorities for cases involving personnel under their General Court-martial jurisdiction. The CG, Hq Det, US Army Element, USMACV (or his designee) is the appointing authority for cases involving US Army personnel assigned to USMACV and any other person believed to be a US serviceman but not sufficiently identified or otherwise provided for by another appointing authority. Commanders of brigades (or their designees), who have a Judge Advocate assigned to their staff, are appointing authorities for cases involving personnel of their brigades.

(b) Air Force. The Commander, Second Air Division, (or his designee) is the appointing authority in cases involving US Air Force personnel.

(c) Navy. Commander, US Naval Forces, Vietnam, (or his designee) is the appointing authority in cases involving US Naval or Marine Corps personnel, except naval or marine personnel attached to Marine Corps commands.

(d) Marine Corps. The CG, III Marine Amphibious Force (or his designee) is the appointing authority in cases involving US Marine Corps personnel and naval personnel attached to Marine Corps commands.

(e) Coast Guard. Commander, Coast Guard Squadron #1 (or his designee) is the appointing authority in cases involving US Coast Guard personnel.

(2) If two or more appointing authorities are concerned with the same incident, they will agree upon the appointment of one investigating officer, with such additional assistants as may be necessary, to make inquiry on behalf of all concerned.

MACV Dir 20-4
27 April 1967

(3) When the completed Report of Investigation (ROI) has been submitted to the appointing authority by the Investigating officer, the appointing authority will receive, review, and approve the report. Two copies of the ROI and physical evidence will be transmitted to COMUSMACV, ATTN: SJA.

e. The investigating officer, with technical assistance furnished by qualified criminal investigators or CIC agents, will:

(1) Promptly make inquiry to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged or apparent war crime, to include the following:

(a) Identity, organization, and status of victim.

(b) Nature of violation committed.

(c) Cause of injury or death and manner in which injury or death occurred.

(d) Time and place of commission.

(e) Identity of individuals or organizations suspected of commission of the act.

(f) Names, identification, addresses (or units) of witnesses or suspected witnesses.

(2) Collect all necessary evidence, statements, and exhibits, to include:

(a) Medical or autopsy reports.

(b) Photographic evidence, preferably taken at the scene of discovery, and properly identified as to time, place, subject, witnesses, and photographer.

(c) Statements of witnesses of any of the circumstances surrounding the incident and the discovery of evidence regarding the incident. Whenever practicable, statements should be under oath.

(d) Military reports, including after-action reports and those from intelligence sources, to identify suspected individuals and units.

MACV Dir 20-4
27 April 1967

(e) Physical evidence, such as weapons, clothing, bullets, shell casings, rope, etc., pertinent to the case.

(3) Without delay, prepare and submit his recommendations as to the disposition of the investigation report to the appointing authority.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



JOHN N. EWBank
Major General, USAF
Chief of Staff

F. G. MILLER
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222

[Handwritten initials and signature]

DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 20-4

18 May 1968
(MACJA)

INSPECTIONS AND INVESTIGATIONS
WAR CRIMES

1. PURPOSE. To provide uniform procedures for the collection and perpetuation of evidence relative to war crimes incidents and to designate the agencies responsible for the conduct of investigations for alleged or possible violations of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 For the Protection of War Victims.
2. APPLICABILITY. This directive is applicable to all alleged or possible war crimes violations of the subject Geneva Conventions, inflicted by hostile forces upon US military or civilian personnel assigned in Vietnam, or by US military personnel upon hostile military or civilian personnel.
3. DEFINITIONS.
 - a. War Crime. Every violation of the law of war is a war crime. (Chapter 8, DA Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, July 1956.)
 - b. Grave Breach. A grave breach of the Geneva Conventions is the most serious type of war crime. Examples of grave breaches are: willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, taking of hostages, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile power.
 - c. Other War Crimes. Examples are: making use of poisoned or otherwise forbidden arms or ammunition, treacherous request for quarter, maltreatment of dead bodies, firing on localities which are undefended and without military significance, abuse of or firing on the flag of truce, misuse of the Red Cross emblem, use of civilian clothing by troops to conceal their military character during battle, poisoning of wells or streams, pillage or purposeless destruction, improper use of privileged buildings for

*This directive supersedes MACV Directive 20-4 (O), 27 April 1967

military purposes, compelling prisoners of war to perform prohibited labor, killing spies or other persons who have committed hostile acts without trial, compelling civilians to perform prohibited labor, and violations of surrender terms.

4. COORDINATION. Investigations of alleged or possible war crimes will be coordinated with the Staff Judge Advocate, MACV.

5. RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. It is the responsibility of all military personnel having knowledge or receiving a report of an incident or of an act thought to be a war crime to make such incident known to his commanding officer as soon as practicable. Personnel performing investigative, intelligence, police, photographic, grave registration, or medical functions, as well as those in contact with the enemy, will, in the normal course of their duty, make every effort to detect the commission of war crimes and will report the essential facts to their commanding officer. Persons discovering war crimes will take all reasonable action under the circumstances to preserve physical evidence, to note identity of witnesses present, and to record (by photograph, sketch, or descriptive notes) the circumstances and surroundings.

b. Commanders and MACV staff sections receiving reports of probable war crimes will, in addition to any other required reports, report the facts as soon as practicable to the Staff Judge Advocate, MACV, and will make pertinent collateral information available to the appointing authority and investigating officers.

c. The Staff Judge Advocate, MACV will:

(1) Immediately notify the appropriate appointing authority (see paragraph 5d, below) of the receipt of a report of an alleged or possible war crime.

(2) Assist and advise the appointed investigating officer, in coordination with the Staff Judge Advocate or Legal Officer of the appointing authority.

(3) Receive and review completed and approved investigations from the appointing authority.

(4) Maintain a file on all war crime investigations.

(5) Make appropriate recommendations to COMUSMACV concerning use of the evidence obtained and disposition of the report of investigation.

d. Appointing Authority:

(1) Appoint an investigating officer and, if appropriate, designate a qualified criminal investigator as technical assistant. Upon receipt of notification of an alleged or possible war crime concerning a member of his command, one of the following appointing authorities will, with all dispatch, appoint an investigating officer to prepare and transmit to him a report of investigation.

(a) Army. Officers who exercise General Court-martial jurisdiction (or their designees) are appointing authorities for cases involving personnel under their General Court-martial jurisdiction. The CG, US Army Element, USMACV (or his designee) is the appointing authority for cases involving US Army personnel assigned to USMACV and any other person believed to be a US serviceman but not sufficiently identified or otherwise provided for by another appointing authority. Commanders of brigades (or their designees), who have a Judge Advocate assigned to their staff, are appointing authorities for cases involving personnel of their brigades.

(b) Air Force. The Commander, 7th Air Force, (or his designee) is the appointing authority in cases involving US Air Force personnel.

(c) Navy. Commander, US Naval Forces, Vietnam, (or his designee) is the appointing authority in cases involving US Naval or Marine Corps personnel, except naval or marine personnel attached to Marine Corps commands.

(d) Marine Corps. The CG, III Marine Amphibious Force (or his designee) is the appointing authority in cases involving US Marine Corps personnel and naval personnel attached to Marine Corps commands.

(e) Coast Guard. Commander, Coast Guard Squadron #1 (or his designee) is the appointing authority in cases involving US Coast Guard personnel.

(2) If two or more appointing authorities are concerned with the same incident, they will agree upon the appointment of one investigating officer, with such additional assistants as may be necessary, to make inquiry on behalf of all concerned.

(3) When the completed Report of Investigation (ROI) has been submitted to the appointing authority by the investigating officer, the appointing authority will receive, review, and, if appropriate, approve the report. Three copies of the ROI will be transmitted to COMUSMACV, ATTN: MACJA.

e. The investigating officer, with technical assistance furnished by qualified criminal investigators will:

(1) Promptly make inquiry to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged or apparent war crime, to include the following:

(a) Identity, organization, and status of victim.

(b) Nature of violation committed.

(c) Cause of injury or death and manner in which injury or death occurred.

(d) Time and place of commission.

(e) Identity of individuals or organizations suspected of commission of the act.

(f) Names, identification, addresses (or units) of witnesses or suspected witnesses.

(2) Collect all necessary evidence, statements, and exhibits, to include:

(a) Medical or autopsy reports.

(b) Photographic evidence, preferably taken at the scene of discovery, and properly identified as to time, place, subject, witnesses, and photographer.

(c) Statements of witnesses of any of the circumstances surrounding the incident and the discovery of evidence regarding the incident. Whenever practicable, statements should be under oath.

(d) Military reports, including after-action reports and those from intelligence sources, to identify suspected individuals and units.

(e) Physical evidence, such as weapons, clothing, bullets, shell casings, rope, etc., pertinent to the case.

(3) Without delay, prepare and submit his recommendations as to the disposition of the investigation report to the appointing authority.

SUPSO
= 1. 6. ~~REPORTS. Report by paragraph 5d, above, is exempt from reports control under the provisions of paragraph 39c, AR 335-15.~~

FOR THE COMMANDER:



WALTER T. KERWIN, JR.
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

SIDNEY GRITZ
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UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222

CHANGE 1
DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 20-4

7 October 1969
(MACJA)

INSPECTIONS AND INVESTIGATIONS

WAR CRIMES

Directive Number 20-4, this headquarters, 18 May 1968, is changed as follows:

1. Paragraph 6 is superseded as follows:

6. REPORTS. Reports required by paragraph 5d(3), above, are assigned reports control symbol MACJA-12 (RCS: MACJA-12).

2. This transmittal sheet is to be filed in front of the publication for reference purposes.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



ELIAS C. TOWNSEND
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

LOUIS J. PROST
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General

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UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222

DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 20-5

15 March 1968
(MACJA)

INSPECTIONS AND INVESTIGATIONS
PRISONERS OF WAR - DETERMINATION OF ELIGIBILITY

1. PURPOSE. To prescribe policies and procedures for determining whether personnel in the custody of the United States who have committed belligerent acts are entitled to prisoner of war status.

2. GENERAL.

a. Article 5 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW) requires that the protections of the Convention be extended to a person who has committed a belligerent act and whose entitlement to Prisoner of War (PW) status is in doubt until such time as his status has been determined by a competent tribunal.

b. This directive provides authority and establishes procedures for:

(1) The convening of GPW Article 5 tribunals.

(2) The convening of the MACV PW Rescreening Team.

c. Screening, classification and disposition of detainees will be in accordance with MACV Directive 381-46.

d. Evacuation, processing and accountability of PW will be in accordance with MACV Directive 190-3.

3. APPLICABILITY. This directive applies to prisoners of war, non-prisoners of war and doubtful cases who are captured by or are in the custody of United States forces.

4. DEFINITIONS.

a. The definitions and criteria for classification of detainees will be in accordance with Annex A, MACV Directive 381-46.

b. Doubtful cases: Persons who have committed a belligerent act and whose entitlement to status as a PW is in doubt.

*This directive supersedes MACV Directive 20-5, 21 September 1966 including Change 1, 16 December 1968

c. **Convening Authorities.** Commanders of those major subordinate units which may reasonably be expected to take prisoners and who are authorized to convene general courts-martial under Article 22 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

5. BACKGROUND.

a. The United States is a party to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. There are four separate Conventions. Number I is for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick of armed forces in the field (GWS). Number II is for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea (GWS Sea). Number III provides for treatment of prisoners of war (GPW). Number IV provides for the protection of civilians (GC). Each convention is reproduced in full in DA Pamphlet 27-1, AF Pamphlet 110-1-3 (Treaties Governing Land Warfare) and NWIP 10-2 (Law of Naval Warfare).

b. The United States considers the armed conflict presently existing in Vietnam to be international in character. Accordingly, all articles of all four Geneva Conventions are applicable.

c. Article 5, GPW, provides for the convening of tribunals by a detaining power. The sole purpose of a tribunal is to determine in doubtful cases, whether a detained person who has committed a belligerent act is entitled to status as a prisoner of war.

d. The responsibility for determining the status of persons captured by US forces rests with the United States. Before any detainee is released or transferred from United States custody, his status as prisoner of war or non-prisoner of war must be determined.

e. Some persons obviously are prisoners of war; e.g., NVA or Viet Cong regulars taken into custody on the battlefield while they are engaged in open combat. Others obviously are not prisoners of war; e.g., civilians who are detained as suspects, found to be friendly, and released; or returnees who received favored treatment under the Chieu Hoi program. In other cases entitlement to PW status may be doubtful. In doubtful cases the necessity for a determination of status by a tribunal may arise.

f. A detainee will be referred to an Article 5 tribunal only when:

- (1) He has committed a belligerent act, and
- (2) Either of the following conditions exist:

(a) There is doubt as to whether the detainee is entitled to PW status.

(b) A determination has been made that the status of the detainee is that of a non-prisoner of war and the detainee or someone in his behalf claims that he is entitled to PW status.

6. RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. All United States military and DOD civilian personnel who take or have custody of a detainee will:

(1) Comply with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions. Violation of the humane provisions of the Conventions is an offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Persons who commit violations of the Geneva Conventions may be subject to trial by court-martial. 7

(2) Afford to each detainee in their custody treatment consistent with that of a prisoner of war, unless or until it has been determined by competent authority in accordance with this directive that the detainee is not a prisoner of war.

b. Commanders of subordinate commands (defined in paragraph 2 of MACV Directive 310-2) will:

(1) Insure that personnel of their commands comply with paragraph 6a, above.

(2) Insure that before any detainee is released from US custody his status has been determined by competent authority.

(3) Insure that all prisoners of war and non-prisoners of war, in the custody of their forces, are evacuated, processed, and accounted for in accordance with MACV Directive 190-3.

(4) Insure that all detained persons in the custody of US forces, who are sick or wounded, are provided medical treatment and care required by their state of health.

(5) Insure that persons determined to be non-prisoners of war are segregated from prisoners of war prior to their transfer to Vietnamese authorities.

c. Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard units may transfer doubtful cases to the most convenient US Army or Marine GCM authority competent to convene tribunals under the provisions of this directive.

d. The Interrogating Officer will:

(1) Determine whether the status of a detained person is that of a prisoner of war, non-prisoner of war, or doubtful case. This determination will be recorded on the Detainee Report Form (see also MACV Directive 381-11).

(2) Refer the following cases to the appropriate Staff Judge Advocate or Staff Legal Officer:

(a) Doubtful cases.

(b) Cases in which he has made an initial determination that the status of the detainee is that of a civil defendant.

(3) In doubtful cases or in those cases in which he has made an initial determination that the status of a detained person is that of a civil defendant, forward the Detainee Report Form and a summary of the relevant facts upon which his decision was based (or a copy of the preliminary interrogation report) to the appropriate Staff Judge Advocate or Staff Legal Officer for review.

(4) Turn all prisoners of war and non-prisoners of war over to the proper authorities in accordance with MACV Directive 381-46.

e. Tribunals will:

(1) Consist of three or more officers. Where practicable, the members should be judge advocates or other military lawyers familiar with the Geneva Conventions. In any event, at least one member of the tribunal will be a judge advocate or other military lawyer familiar with the Geneva Convention. The senior member shall act as president of the tribunal.

(2) Follow the procedures set forth at Annex A of this directive and may make such additional rules of procedure consistent with the Geneva Conventions as are deemed necessary to insure a full and fair inquiry into matters before them.

(3) Apply the provisions of Article 4, GPW, and MACV Directive 381-46, in making a determination of entitlement or nonentitlement to prisoner of war status.

(4) Indicate its decision on a format similar to the model shown at Annex B.

f. Convening authorities will:

(1) Convene Article 5 tribunals when required by this directive. Annex C provides a sample format for convening tribunals. Officers from other commands or other services may be assigned to tribunals as members or counsel with the concurrence of the other commander concerned.

(2) Insure that tribunals are conducted promptly and that the procedures set forth at Annex A are followed.

(3) Insure that each tribunal decision is recorded serially and forwarded to COMUSMACV, ATTN: SJA. Annex D provides a format for the forwarding indorsement.

(4) Insure that there were no irregularities in the tribunal proceedings.

(5) Indicate in the forwarding indorsement the disposition of the detainee subsequent to the hearing.

(6) Have all persons who are determined to be civil defendants turned over to the proper Vietnamese authorities for possible trial and punishment under the laws of the Government of Vietnam. As civil defendants such persons are entitled to the protections of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.

g. The MACV Staff Judge Advocate will:

(1) Review all decisions of US tribunals appointed under this directive to insure that there were no irregularities in the proceedings. A determination by a tribunal that the detainee is entitled to PW status is final. In cases in which PW status has been denied, COMUSMACV, for good and sufficient reason, may order a rehearing or may administratively grant PW status.

(2) Forward all tribunal decisions to the USARV Provost Marshal.

(3) Provide legal guidance to subordinate commanders concerning the conduct of Article 5 tribunals.

h. The USARV Provost Marshal will:

(1) Maintain a permanent file of all tribunal decisions.

(2) Maintain a permanent file of Detainee Report Forms.

i. The Staff Judge Advocate or Staff Legal Officer (SLO) of units taking prisoners will:

(1) Provide legal guidance to interrogating officers concerning the determination of prisoner of war status.

(2) Review all cases in which the interrogating officer has made an initial determination that the status of a detainee is that of a civil defendant.

(a) If the SJA or SLO concurs in the interrogating officer's initial determination, he will indicate his concurrence on the Detainee Report Form and will attach a summary of the relevant facts upon which the decision was based to the Detainee Report Form.

(b) If the SJA or SLO disagrees with the interrogating officer's initial determination that the status of the detainee is that of a civil defendant, or the detainee or someone in his behalf claims that he is entitled to PW status, the SJA or SLO may accord the detainee PW status or refer the case to a tribunal, indicating his action on the Detainee Report Form.

(3) Review all doubtful cases.

(a) If the SJA or SLO concurs in the interrogating officer's determination that the detainee's status is doubtful, he will refer the case to a tribunal.

(b) If the SJA or SLO determines that the detainee should be given prisoner of war status he may accord PW status, indicating his action on the Detainee Report Form.

j. The MACV PW Rescreening Team will serve for the purposes, be composed as, and follow the procedures, set forth at Annex E of this directive.

7. REFERENCES.

a. DA FM 27-10.

b. DA Pamphlet 20-151.

c. DA Pamphlet 27-1.

d. NWIP 10-2.

6

e. AFP 110-1-3.

4J

- f. The Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug 49.
- g. The Uniform Code of Military Justice.
- h. Commentary on the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 Aug 49 by Jean S. Pictet.
- i. MACV Directive 190-3.
- j. MACV Directive 381-11.
- k. MACV Directive 381-46.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



WALTER T. KERWIN, JR.
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

NEIL N. SNYDER, JR.
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General

Annexes

- A. Tribunal Procedures
- B. Report of Tribunal Decision
- C. Appointment of Tribunal
- D. Action by Convening Authority
- E. MACV PW Rescreening Team
- F. PW Rescreening Report

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TRIBUNAL PROCEDURES

1. JURISDICTION. Military tribunals convened pursuant to MACV Directive 20-5 shall be limited in their deliberations to the determination of whether detained persons ordered to appear before it are entitled to prisoner of war status.

2. APPLICABLE LAW. In making its determination of entitlement or nonentitlement to prisoner of war status the tribunal should apply the following:

a. The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, with special attention given to Article 4 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW).

b. The definition of PW currently applicable in Vietnam contained in MACV Directive 381-46.

c. The Law of Land Warfare, FM 27-10, Paragraphs 60-83.

d. The Law of War as recognized by international law.

3. MEMBERSHIP. The tribunal shall consist of not less than 3 officers. When practicable, the members should be judge advocates or other military lawyers familiar with the Geneva Conventions. In any event, at least one member of the tribunal will be a judge advocate or other military lawyer familiar with the Geneva Conventions. The senior member shall act as president of the tribunal.

4. COUNSEL FOR THE TRIBUNAL. A judge advocate or other military lawyer shall be designated as counsel for the tribunal. Counsel is not a member of the tribunal and has no vote. He is responsible for the clerical and preliminary work of the hearing including advising the detainee of his rights. He arranges for the attendance of witnesses and assembles the documents for use by the tribunal. At the hearing he presents all evidence relevant to the issue and is responsible for preparing the report of the hearing.

5. QUORUM. The presence of three members appointed to the tribunal, one of whom must be a judge advocate or other military lawyer familiar with the Geneva Conventions, shall be necessary to constitute a quorum.

6. VOTING. All decisions of the tribunal shall be by majority vote. In the event the votes are evenly divided, the decision shall be in favor of PW status.

7. RIGHTS OF THE DETAINEE. The detainee shall be advised of and accorded the following fundamental rights considered to be essential to a fair hearing:

a. No person may be deprived of his status as a prisoner of war without having had an opportunity to present his case with the assistance of a qualified advocate or counsel.

b. The detainee shall be entitled to the services of a competent interpreter.

c. The detainee shall have the right to be present with his counsel at all open sessions of the tribunal.

8. COUNSEL FOR THE DETAINEE. Each detainee shall have the right to be represented by counsel. He may select anyone reasonably available, including a fellow detainee. If the detainee does not wish to make a selection or if the counsel requested is not reasonably available, the convening authority shall appoint a judge advocate or other military lawyer familiar with the Geneva Conventions as counsel for the detainee.

9. RIGHTS OF COUNSEL FOR THE DETAINEE.

a. Counsel shall have a period of at least one week before the hearing in order to prepare his case. This right may be waived by counsel.

b. Counsel shall be informed of the procedure to be followed by the tribunal at the hearing.

c. Counsel shall be afforded free access to visit the detainee and interview him in private.

d. Counsel shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to confer privately with essential witnesses, including prisoners of war.

e. Counsel shall have the right to call witnesses, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to present evidence in behalf of the detainee subject to such reasonable restrictions as the tribunal may impose.

f. Counsel may address the tribunal during the proceedings, make a final argument, and make a statement in behalf of the detainee.

10. RIGHT TO TESTIFY. The detainee may testify in his own behalf or remain silent at his option.

11. EVIDENCE.

a. The tribunal shall not be bound by the rules of evidence prescribed for trials by court-martial. It should consider any matter presented which is relevant to the issue whether written or oral, sworn or unsworn.

b. The tribunal may refuse to consider any oral or written matter presented if it is irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessarily repetitive or cumulative.

12. INTERPRETER.

a. Each detainee has the right to the services of a qualified interpreter throughout the proceedings and in his dealings with his counsel.

b. The attorney-client privilege also shall apply to the interpreter.

13. POWERS OF THE TRIBUNAL. The tribunal shall have the power to:

a. Order US military witnesses to appear and to request the appearance of civilian witnesses.

b. Question all witnesses including the detainee, should he choose to testify at the hearing.

c. Require the production of documents and real evidence.

d. Require of each witness an oath, affirmation, or such declaration as is customary in the country of the witness.

e. Appoint officers for carrying out any task designated by the tribunal, including the taking of evidence on commission.

f. To determine the mental and physical capacity of the detainee to participate in the hearing.

14. CONDUCT OF HEARING.

a. The president upon calling the tribunal to order should first read the order appointing the tribunal.

b. Counsel for the tribunal will cause a record to be made of the time, date, and place of the hearing, and the identity and qualifications of all participants.

- c. The president should then explain to the detainee his rights, the purpose of the hearing, and the possible consequences of the decision.
- d. Counsel for the tribunal will read the report of the interrogating officer summarizing the facts upon which the interrogating officer's decision was based.
- e. Witnesses expecting to be called will be excluded from the hearing except while testifying. An oath or affirmation will be administered by counsel for the tribunal.
- f. Counsel for the detainee may make or waive an opening statement.
- g. Counsel for the tribunal should then present all relevant evidence to which he has access through the testimony of witnesses, documents, or real evidence without regard to whether the evidence is favorable or unfavorable to the detainee.
- h. Counsel for the detainee and counsel for the tribunal may cross-examine witnesses or develop new matters as long as they are relevant to the issues before the tribunal.
- i. Counsel for the detainee may present witnesses, documents, affidavits, real evidence, and sworn or unsworn statements in behalf of the detainee.
- j. Either counsel may call witnesses in rebuttal or surrebuttal.
- k. At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence by both counsel the tribunal may recall witnesses or call additional witnesses.
- l. After all evidence is in and after closing oral argument has been made by both counsel, the hearing will be closed.
- m. The tribunal will deliberate in closed session. Only voting members will be present.
- n. In closed session the tribunal will make its determination of status. Its decision will be recorded using the format at Annex B of MACV Directive 20-5 as a guide and will be signed by all members.
- o. In open session the president will announce the decision of the tribunal.

15. POST HEARING PROCEDURES.

a. In cases in which the detainee has been determined to be entitled to PW status, a brief resume of the facts and circumstances upon which the decision was based will be appended to the decision. A copy of the order appointing the tribunal will be attached.

b. In cases in which the detainee has been determined not to be entitled to PW status, the following items will be attached to the decision:

(1) A copy of the order appointing the tribunal.

(2) A statement of the time and place of the hearing, persons present, and their qualifications.

(3) A summary of the testimony of all witnesses heard by the tribunal.

(4) Certified copies of all supporting documents upon which the decision was based.

(5) Drawings, photographs, or accurate descriptions of items of real evidence considered by the tribunal.

c. Counsel for the tribunal will assist in the preparation of the record of proceedings.

d. The original and 2 copies of the tribunal's decision and all supporting documents will be forwarded by the president to the convening authority within one week from the date of the announcement of the decision; the original will be forwarded by the convening authority to COMUSMACV, ATTN: SJA; one copy will be retained by the convening authority; one copy will be made available to the detainee or his counsel upon request.

REPORT OF TRIBUNAL DECISION

TRIBUNAL NO. _____

CASE NO. _____

(UNIT)

DATE _____

APO SAN FRANCISCO _____

In Re: _____

This tribunal, having been directed to make a determination as to the legal status of _____, captured by _____ at _____ on _____, has examined all available information and has determined that he (is) (is not) entitled to prisoner of war status.

Additional identifying information concerning the prisoner is as follows:

Date of Birth: _____ Unit, if known: _____

Place of Birth: _____ Mother's name: _____

ID No., if any: _____ Father's name: _____

Rank, if any: _____ Aliases, if any: _____

Signatures of Tribunal Members

(SAMPLE FORMAT)

APPOINTMENT OF TRIBUNAL

TC 350. Following Individuals Appointed:

MEMBERS:

Major A. B. Doe, 05100822, JAGC
Captain R. C. Shaw, 05218536, INF
LTJG R.S. Fuzz, 516924, USNR

COUNSEL FOR THE TRIBUNAL:

1LT R. A. Base, 05674421, JAGC

Apt to: Tribunal

Eff Date: ~~_____~~

Pd: Indefinite

Purpose: To determine in cases referred to it whether the individuals before it are entitled to treatment as prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions.

Auth: Paragraph 6, MACV Directive 20-5

Sp Instr: The tribunal will follow the procedures set forth in Annex A to MACV Directive 20-5 and will indicate its decision in the format shown in Annex B to MACV Directive 20-5 in each case that it considers.

(SAMPLE FORMAT)

**ACTION BY CONVENING AUTHORITY
(or his designated representative)**

The decision of the US tribunal in the above-entitled matter is transmitted.

(Remarks, if any, and available information as to the detainee's disposition following the hearing will be shown at this point.)

Signature

(SAMPLE FORMAT)

MACV PW RESCREENING TEAM

1. PURPOSE. To review the cases of PWs captured and classified by US forces whose entitlement to PW status is questioned by the GVN.

2. BACKGROUND. From time to time, MACV receives requests from the GVN, through the Joint General Staff, to review the cases of certain PW, captured and classified by US forces and held in Vietnamese PW camps, who may have been erroneously classified as PW. The MACV PW Rescreening Team is created to respond to these requests.

3. COMPOSITION. The MACV PW Rescreening Team will be composed of four officers. They will be one each from MACJ1, MACJ2, MACJA and the capturing unit.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. MACJ1 representative will have primary general staff supervision over the rescreening activities.

b. MACJ2 representative will be responsible for classification of those rescreened.

c. MACJA representative will advise and assist in the classification of those rescreened.

d. Capturing unit representative will provide advice and assistance to the rescreening team and provide all available capturing unit records and reports on the PW to be rescreened.

5. PROCEDURES.

a. Requests from GVN for PW rescreening will be received and coordinated by MACJ1. In the event that a roster of PW whose status is being questioned does not accompany the request for rescreening, MACJ1 will obtain such roster prior to the rescreening. Upon receipt of the roster, MACJ1 will furnish two copies of it to MACJ2.

b. Prior to the visit of the MACV PW Rescreening Team to the PW camp, a combined interrogation team, coordinated by MACJ2, will assure that sufficient records are available on each PW who is to be rescreened to enable a decision to be made in his case. The record on each PW to be rescreened must contain the report of an interrogation conducted by a US interrogator. For this purpose the initial Preliminary Interrogation Report (MACV Form 370) will suffice.

c. MACJ2 will notify MACJ1 when the records of the PW are in order and ready for rescreening. MACJ1 will then arrange for the rescreening and will notify the participants of the date.

d. Rescreening shall be accomplished at the PW camp where the PW and their records are located. Personnel from the capturing unit will be present during the rescreening, in order that the rescreening team might have the benefit of their advice and assistance, as well as the records and reports of the capturing unit and initial interrogators. It is considered desirable that appropriate RVNAF personnel be present during the rescreening to advise and assist the MACV PW Rescreening Team. Such personnel may assist in the rescreening, but it must be emphasized that the determination concerning the status of a US captured and classified PW is a unilateral decision made by US personnel.

e. The rescreening team will utilize all documents available in the rescreening of PW. Such documents will include, but not be limited to; the Preliminary Interrogation Report (MACV Form 370); other written records of interrogations; the Detainee Card (USARV Form 365); the Detainee Report Form (USARV Form 364); and PW camp records.

f. When considered necessary, the rescreening team will interview individual PW and conduct such interrogation as is deemed necessary.

g. After considering all available evidence, the rescreening team will make a determination whether each PW whose case has been studied should be continued in that status or reclassified as a civilian. Status will be changed from PW only when the evidence clearly indicates that to be appropriate.

h. Each case will be reviewed by the MACJA representative. Reclassification to non-PW status will not be accomplished without his concurrence. Any case about which the MACJA representative has doubts will be referred to an Article 5, GPW, tribunal in accordance with the provisions of this directive.

i. The case of any detainee who claims PW status, but who the rescreening team feels should be reclassified as a civilian, will be referred to an Article 5, GPW, tribunal in accordance with the provisions of this directive.

6. REPORTS. The rescreening team will submit a report of each rescreening utilizing the format contained at Annex F of this directive, which shall include as an inclosure thereto a complete roster of the PW rescreened and the determination made in each case.

DISPOSITION FORM

(AR 340-15)

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL MACJA	SUBJECT .PW Rescreening
---	--------------------------------

TO: MACJ1 FROM: MACV PW Rescreening Team DATE _____ CMT 1

1. During the period _____, the MACV PW Rescreening Team screened the records of _____ U.S. captured and classified PW at the RVNAF PW camp located at _____, _____ Corps.

2. Of the _____ PW rescreened:
- a. _____: Classification as PW not changed.
 - b. _____: Reclassified as civilian.

3. It is recommended that GVN (JGS) be informed that those reclassified as civilian may be transferred from the PW camp for further disposition in accordance with the laws of RVN.

4. Attached is a complete roster of the PW rescreened and the determination in each case.

MACJ2 Rep. _____

MACJ15 Rep. _____

MACJA Rep. _____

1 Incl
Roster

Copy furnished:
MACJA
MACJ2

Capturing Unit Rep. _____

(SAMPLE FORMAT)

Annex F

53

**HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222**

**DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 27-5**

**2 November 1967
(MACJA)**

**LEGAL SERVICES
WAR CRIMES AND OTHER PROHIBITED ACTS**

1. **PURPOSE.** To reaffirm the prohibition against commission of war crimes and related acts.

2. **BACKGROUND.** Over the years, there have evolved certain rules which civilized nations observe in the conduct of war. These rules are known as the law of war. They represent the principle that, even in wartime, there are rules governing behavior and prescribing the limits to which troops can go, collectively and individually, in prosecuting the war.

3. **DEFINITION.** A war crime is the technical expression for a violation of the law of war by any person or persons, military or civilian. Every violation of the law of war is a war crime.

4. **ILLUSTRATION.** The following are examples of war crimes and related improper acts. It is important to note that this list is not intended to include all such acts.

- a. Maltreatment or mutilation of dead bodies.
- b. Maltreatment of prisoners of war or detainees.
- c. Use of forbidden arms and ammunition.
- d. Abuse of or firing on the flag of truce.
- e. Improperly taking personal effects or money from prisoners of war or detainees.
- f. Killing spies or other persons who have committed hostile acts without trial.
- g. Torture or inhuman treatment of a prisoner of war or detainee.
- h. Depriving prisoners of war or detainees of the right of a fair trial.
- i. Looting or purposeless destruction.

EXHIBIT D-38

5. APPLICABILITY. This directive is applicable to all US military personnel and to US civilian personnel serving with or accompanying the armed forces in the field.

6. ACTION. Commission of any act enumerated in paragraph 4, above, or constituting a war crime is prohibited. Violation of this directive will be punishable in accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

7. REPORTS. This directive requires no report.

8. REFERENCES.

- a. Geneva Conventions of 1949.
- b. Hague Conventions of 1907.
- c. Uniform Code of Military Justice.
- d. FM 27-10.
- e. MACV Directive 20-4 (O).
- f. MACV Directive 190-3.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



WALTER T. KERWIN, JR.
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

NEIL N. SNYDER, JR.
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96243

DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 95-4*

28 June 1966
(MACJ3)

AVIATION
US AIR OPERATIONS IN RVN (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE.

a. To establish the procedures and responsibilities for command, control, and coordination of United States (US) military air operations in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

b. To publish the rules of engagement and restrictions for military air operations in RVN.

2. (U) DEFINITIONS.

a. Specified Strike Zones. Those areas approved by a province chief where strikes may be conducted without additional political clearance. Whenever possible, a FAC will support these strikes.

b. Close Air Support. Air action requested by the ground commander against hostile targets in close proximity to friendly forces and which requires integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of the ground forces. Due to the widespread intermingling of friendly forces and populations with enemy forces, GVN political and tactical approval of all strikes within RVN is required, therefore harassment and interdiction missions within country must be processed as close air support missions.

c. Joint Air Ground Operations System (JAGOS). A composite of integrated command and control systems which includes the MACV Command and Control System, the Army Air Ground System (AAGS), and the Air Force Tactical Air Control System (TACS).

*This directive supersedes MACV Directive 95-2, 20 December 1965, and MACV Directive 95-4, 6 February 1966

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

EXHIBIT D-4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3. (C) GENERAL.

a. The mission of all US military aviation forces in the Republic of Vietnam is to assist and provide air support for the counterinsurgency effort of the RVN Armed Forces (RVNAF) and the United States/Free World Military Assistance Forces (US/FWMAF).

b. All services operate through portions of the same air space and are frequently employed on joint and combined operations. Each possesses to some degree the capability to accomplish missions normally assigned to another service. Therefore, close cooperation and coordination are required to assure that efforts are complementary, integrated, and achieve the most effective results.

c. En route Air Traffic Control is a function of the Director of Civil Aviation. It is exercised through the Joint VN/US Air Coordination Committee which coordinates the use of civil and military communication and navigation facilities and personnel. Terminal Air Traffic Control is a function of the supported force commander as defined by MACV Directive 95-5, subject: Flight Facilities in the RVN, and MACV Directive 95-9, subject: Joint Airborne/Airmobile Airstrip Operations. Aircraft performing close air support are controlled as specified in appropriate service Air/Ground Operations directives.

d. All US military pilots providing air fire support will endeavor to eliminate incidents involving friendly forces, non-combatants, and damage to civilian property by adherence to the Procedures, Restrictions, and Rules of Engagement established by RVNAF and this headquarters (see Annex D). While these restraints and procedures are designed to minimize losses to friendly forces and non-combatants, the objective still remains to obtain the full productivity of US air capabilities without appreciably inhibiting responsiveness or flexibility.

e. In the event of a major emergency or disaster, COMUSMACV may direct the Commander, 7th Air Force, to assume operational control over certain designated US air resources. The responsibility for determining the existence of such an emergency rests with COMUSMACV and will not be delegated. Upon termination of the emergency condition, operational control over US air resources will revert to normal as specified in this directive.

4. (C) RESPONSIBILITIES.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

28 June 1966

a. Commander, 7th Air Force, in his capacity as MACV Air Force Component Commander, acts as coordinating authority for all US/FWMAF air operations and Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) activities in the MACV area of responsibility. For detailed responsibilities see paragraph 3, Annex A.

b. Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), will conduct offensive and defensive tactical air operations in accordance with the established Rules of Engagement and will augment daily the US Air Force effort with resources not required to support operations of prime concern to III MAF. For detailed responsibilities see paragraph 3, Annex B.

c. Commanding General, US Army Vietnam (USARV), will provide those US Army aviation resources necessary to support both US/FWMAF and ARVN ground operations and will exercise all functions of command, except those specifically withdrawn by COMUSMACV, of all US Army aviation units not assigned to US Divisions. For detailed responsibilities, see paragraph 3, Annex C.

d. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, will provide strike aircraft as directed by CINCPAC to operate in coordination with the JAGOS.

5. (C) OPERATIONAL PLANNING.

a. Joint operational planning for required aviation support will be conducted on a continuing basis at all levels of command down to and including battalion. Representatives of the ground commander (G2/3 Air or S2/3 Air), Air Liaison Officer, and Army aviation representative will participate in the tactical ground planning to assure efficient utilization of all air support and proper integration into the ground scheme of maneuver. USMC and 7th Fleet liaison officers will be provided to the JAGOS when aircraft of these services are participating in joint operations or providing close air support.

b. RVNAF advisors and US commanders of ground and Naval units will assure that planners consider the use of air support for all operations. Plans for movement of convoys and trains, ground reconnaissance patrols, security forces, and quick reaction forces will include provisions for obtaining or using air support. During the execution phase of operations, aerial fire support is especially appropriate to support efforts to maintain contact with the enemy. In the conduct of airmobile operations, air cover of lift elements and prestrikes on all landing zones will be used as required where there is a possibility of opposition.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

c. Requests for close air support will be processed through the Joint Air Ground Operations System (JAGOS) (for III MAF/I Corps/USAF relationship, see Annex B). Utilization of this system will insure that application of close air support is in accord with the ground commander's plan and will provide required responsiveness.

d. Army Aviation considerations: See Annex C, this directive.

e. Planning coordination of air support requirements will be achieved in the field through the Combat Support Coordination Center (see paragraph 6n).

f. Herbicide operations (Trail Dust) must be selective in nature and coordinated both politically and militarily. Requests must be initiated at province level (see paragraph 6m).

g. SKY SPOT should be utilized to maintain close air support or interdiction during times of reduced visibility or darkness (see Annex A, this directive).

h. Troop Airlift: See paragraphs 6d, 6e, 6f, and 6g.

6. (U) REFERENCES.

a. JCS Publication 1, Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage (JD).

b. JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

c. Letter of Agreement between DCS, VNAF, and MACV, MACJ311, HQ MACV, Serial 395, 5 February 1965, subject: Special Procedures for Tactical Operations Flights.

d. MACV Directive 55-2 (C), subject: Movement of Units (U).

e. MACV Directive 55-4, subject: Movement System in RVN.

f. MACV Directive 95-3 (C), subject: USA/USMC Aviation Support (U).

g. MACV Directive 95-5, subject: Flight Facilities in the Republic of Vietnam.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

h. MACV Directive 95-6 (U), subject: Joint and Combined Helicopter Operations (U).

i. MACV Directive 95-11 (C), subject: Joint Air Ground Operations System (JAGOS) (U).

j. MACV Directive 95-9, subject: Joint Airborne/Airmobile Air Strip Operation.

k. MACV Directive 381-1 (C), subject: Visual Aerial Surveillance (U).

l. MACV Directive 381- (C), subject: Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) (to be published).

m. MACV Directive 525-1 (C), subject: Herbicide Operations (U).

n. MACV Directive 525-12, subject: Combat Support Coordination Center.

o. MACV LOI governing operations of III MAF in RVN, 6 May 1965.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



W. B. ROSSON
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

E. D. BRYSON
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

4 Annexes

- A. 7th Air Force Operations
- B. III MAF Air Operations
- C. Army Aviation
- D. Restrictions and Rules of Engagement, RVN

MACV Dir 95-4
28 June 1966

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- 202 - MACAG-AO
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7th AIR FORCE OPERATIONS

1. (U) PURPOSE. To establish responsibilities of USAF for command, control, and coordination of military air operations in the Republic of Vietnam.
2. (U) GENERAL. Command and control of USAF strike aircraft and the coordination of USMC/USN/VNAF strike aircraft will be accomplished through the Tactical Air Control System.
3. (C) RESPONSIBILITIES. Commander, 7th Air Force, will:
 - a. Conduct offensive and defensive tactical air operations to include maintenance of air superiority, close air support, reconnaissance as requested by the ground commander or Corps Senior Advisor, search and rescue, air transport, and other supplemental air support as required.
 - b. Provide essential training of VNAF in offensive and defensive tactical air operations.
 - c. Provide tactical air support through SKY SPOT when darkness or inclement weather create such a requirement.
 - d. Provide meteorological support for air operations.
 - e. Establish, in conjunction with other US and RVN agencies, an Air Traffic Control System which provides normal processing and flight following.
 - f. Prepare joint instructions in conjunction with CG, USARV; CG, III MAF; and Commander, 7th Fleet, to assure integrated and coordinated air operations.
4. (C) OPERATIONAL PLANNING.
 - a. Immediate and preplanned requests for Close Air Support will be processed through the Joint Air Ground Operations System (JAGOS) as outlined in reference 61, basic directive. 7th Air Force will maintain tactical aircraft on ground alert to fulfill immediate air requests.
 - b. Coordination of air activities will take place at all levels of JAGOS to eliminate conflict between participating forces and to insure required support.

Annex A

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c. SKY SPOT Control Points (Radar Directed Bombing) will be submitted from friendly ground units to appropriate SKY SPOT unit to insure complete preplanning for air support. Special Forces camps and outposts of special political/strategic importance will insure that their control point coordinates have been catalogued by nearest SKY SPOT unit so that points can be verified by USAF photo reconnaissance.

d. In the event COMUSMACV declares a major emergency, 7th Air Force will assume operational control of certain air resources as designated by COMUSMACV.

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III MAF AIR OPERATIONS

1. (U) PURPOSE. To establish operating procedures and assign responsibilities for command, control, and coordination of US Marine Corps aviation operations in the Republic of Vietnam.

2. (C) GENERAL.

a. Marine Corps aviation resources are organic to III MAF and are commanded and directed in support of tactical operations as designated by CG, III MAF.

b. The Marine Corps Tactical Air Control System, a component of Marine aviation, will exercise positive control over all USMC aircraft in support of Marine Corps operations and over other aircraft as may be assigned in support of such operations. The Marine Corps Tactical Air Control System includes a Tactical Air Direction Center, Direct Air Support Centers, radar surveillance capability, and such terminal guidance facilities as necessary to facilitate the orderly and expeditious handling of tactical aircraft. This system will coordinate with the TACS operated by VNAF/USAF and will be prepared to supplement and integrate with the existing Air Defense Control System.

3. (C) RESPONSIBILITIES. Commanding General, III MAF, will:

a. Exercise operational control over all USMC aviation resources except as provided in paragraph 3e of the basic directive.

b. Conduct offensive and defensive tactical air operations, to include close air support, interdiction, reconnaissance, maintenance of air superiority, air transport, search and rescue, and other supplemental air support, as required.

c. Provide aircraft to support US 7th Fleet operations as directed by COMUSMACV or higher authority.

d. Establish joint and combined planning coordination measures required in connection with III MAF/USAF/RVNAF air operations in I Corps and make provision for apprising 7th Air Force (TACC) of future ground operations and possible USAF reinforcement requirements by the following means:

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- (1) Prepare in conjunction with the Commander, 7th Air Force, joint operating instructions to insure an integrated and coordinated joint effort.
 - (2) Identify to the Commander, 7th Air Force, for coordination and control through the TACS, those resources in excess of current requirement for support of III MAF operations so that such resources may be allocated in support of other forces or missions.
 - (3) Provide liaison with the Commander, 7th Air Force, to facilitate the coordination and control of USMC aviation assets committed in support of 7th Air Force requirements and for purpose of keeping 7th Air Force abreast of III MAF ground operations.
 - (4) Provide liaison with the I Corps Tactical Operations Center and I Corps Direct Air Support Center. This liaison effort will facilitate the timely passing of information on current and proposed military operations in order that available aviation assets may be most effectively utilized.
 - (5) In his capacity as I Corps Senior Advisor, insure that the I Corps Advisory Group establishes physical liaison with III MAF for the purpose of informing III MAF of impending and current I Corps operations and required air support.
- e. In the event COMUSMACV declares a major emergency, be prepared to transfer to Commander, 7th Air Force, operational control of air resources as designated by COMUSMACV.

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ARMY AVIATION

1. (U) PURPOSE. To establish operating procedures and assign responsibilities for command, control, and coordination of US Army aviation operations in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

2. (C) GENERAL.

a. US Army aviation resources not organic to combat units will normally be allocated to Senior Corps Advisors and US commanders for employment in support of ARVN/US/FWMAF operations. Aviation resources so allocated will be assigned, insofar as practicable, missions of direct support of ARVN divisions and US/FWMAF divisions, brigades, and regiments. Senior Advisors will establish an Army Aviation Element (AAE) within each ARVN Corps and Division Tactical Operations Center (TOC). US division or higher commanders will establish an AAE at their TOCs.

b. Aviation assets will be allocated as directed by COMUSMACV. US Army resources are subject to reallocation, recall, or diversion through the Army Aviation Division (AAD), Combat Operations Center (COC), to comply with priorities established by this headquarters.

c. US Army aviation resources assigned in general support and not allocated to support a specific ARVN Corps or US unit will remain under operational control of COMUSMACV. OV-1 units in this category are under the operational control of MACV J2. This control is exercised through HQ, USARV. Other resources in this category will be allocated by AAD, COC, MACV, in accordance with priorities established by this headquarters. When committed to operations, such resources exclusive of OV-1's will be under operational control or in support of the commander of the US unit, or the Senior US Advisor of the ARVN unit concerned until released by the US commander or advisor, or recalled by MACV through the AAD.

d. US/FWMAF units assigned to a CTZ or major US unit will request US Army aviation support through the respective TOC.

3. (C) RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. Commanding General, US Army Vietnam (USARV), will:

(1) Provide US Army aviation resources to support ground operations including airmobile operations, aerial reconnaissance and surveillance, fire support, search and rescue, air transport, and other supplemental air support, as required.

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(2) Exercise command, less operational control, of US Army Aviation resources and provide combat aviation support, as directed, to US/FWMAF/ARVN forces for the conduct of combat, logistical, or other counterinsurgency operations throughout the RVN.

(3) Provide qualified aviation personnel to operate Army Aviation Elements at corps and division TOC's.

(4) Provide US Army aviation support for Headquarters, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

(5) Establish and operate an Army Air Traffic Regulation and Identification System, coordinated with and responsive to the Air Traffic Control System.

(6) Prepare in conjunction with Commander, 7th Air Force, joint operating instructions to assure integrated and coordinated air operations.

b. US Commanders will:

(1) Exercise operational control over allocated US Army aviation resources.

(2) Exercise command over organic US Army aviation resources.

c. Corps Senior Advisors will:

(1) Exercise operational control over allocated US Army aviation resources.

(2) Within allocated resources, provide essential aviation support for ARVN military and paramilitary forces in zone of responsibility, including units of the General Reserve and Special Forces when committed.

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RESTRICTIONS AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, RVN

1. (U) PURPOSE. To define specific operational restrictions and rules of engagement for US aircraft in RVN.
2. (C) GENERAL.
 - a. All targets selected for an air strike will be approved by the Province Chief directly or through higher ARVN authority.
 - b. All pilots will endeavor to minimize non-combatant casualties and civilian property damage. A strike will not be executed where identification of friendly forces is in doubt.
 - c. All pilots will have a knowledge of the disposition of friendly forces and/or civilians prior to conducting a strike. This information may come from ground or air briefing.
 - d. For purposes of this directive, references to the Forward Air Controller (FAC) also encompass and apply to the Marine Tactical Air Coordinator Airborne (TACA).
 - e. USAF, USMC, and USN strike aircraft will normally be controlled by the following in the order of preference as listed:
 - *(1) US Air Force ALO/FAC or Marine TACA.
 - *(2) VNAF FAC/FAO.
 - (3) USAF MSQ-77 (SKY SPOT) or USMC TPQ-10.
 - f. In an emergency, when no qualified means of control is available, the following personnel may designate the target for strike aircraft:
 - (1) The commander of a ground unit or US advisor engaged with the Viet Cong.
 - (2) US pilot of an airplane or helicopter supporting a ground unit, who has radio contact with the ground unit involved and/or can identify friendly positions in relation to enemy positions.

*Under VFR conditions, when a USAR, USMC, or VNAF FAC is not available, a qualified Army Target Identifying Pilot (TIP) may designate the target to be struck and the flight leader of the strike aircraft will control the strike.

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(3) US pilot of an airplane or helicopter required to operate within the vicinity of a hostile village or hamlet for the purpose of conducting a medical evacuation or supply mission, and where enemy fire presents an immediate threat to the lives of the helicopter or transport crew.

g. Close Air Support missions that involve strikes on hamlets or villages must always be controlled by a FAC. If the attack on a village or hamlet is deemed necessary and is executed in conjunction with a ground operation involving movement of ground forces through the area, the attack may be made without warning; however, appropriate US-GVN-RVNAF approval is required, except in emergencies. If the attack on a village or hamlet is not in conjunction with any immediate ground operation, the inhabitants must be warned by leaflets and/or loudspeaker system prior to the attack and must be given sufficient time to evacuate the area.

3. (C) SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT TO INCLUDE INTERDICTION (DAY OR NIGHT).

a. ALO/FAC will:

- (1) Have thorough knowledge of the ground scheme of maneuver.
- (2) Make every effort to secure a VNAF observer to assist in directing an air strike. If a VNAF observer is not available, an ALO/FAC is authorized to direct the air strike.
- (3) Maintain reliable communications with ground unit and with strike aircraft.
- (4) Make positive identification and mark the target.
- (5) Insure that strike pilots are aware of friendly locations in relation to target, characteristics of target area, and local weather conditions.
- (6) Use 1:50,000 scale maps of target area, and photographs when available.

b. Strike Pilots will:

- (1) Always be under the control and have direct radio contact for a strike with a Forward Air Controller or designated control agency (airborne or ground).

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(2) Have visual contact with target or target marker except as noted in paragraph (6), below.

(3) Always ascertain the position of friendly troops (or civilians, when applicable).

(4) Ascertain local conditions regarding weather, target area, and surrounding terrain characteristics.

(5) Defend themselves against ground fire providing:

(a) Source of fire can be visually identified.

(b) The strike can be positively oriented against the source.

(c) The fire is of such intensity that counter-action is necessary.

(6) Strike at night only with flares, unless under control of TPQ-10 or MSQ-77.

4. (C) BORDER RESTRICTIONS FOR AIRCRAFT CONDUCTING ASSIGNED MISSIONS IN RVN.

a. Aircraft will not cross the demilitarized zone or Cambodian border unless specifically authorized by COMUSMACV.

b. All FACs operating in the vicinity of the border will have a 1:50,000 map of the target area. Maps, mosaics, and photos will be made available to the pilots.

c. Joint operations-intelligence facilities will be established and complete prestrike briefings and poststrike debriefings will be conducted for strikes within 5000 meters of the border, when practical.

d. Cambodian border restrictions which are additional to the above:

(1) Strike aircraft within 5000 meters of the Cambodian border will be under positive control of a Forward Air Controller or MSC 77/TPQ-10. The authority to waive this requirement is restricted to COMUSMACV or his designated representative.

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(2) All organizations responsible for planning or execution of missions within 5 km of the border will have posted in operations a 1:250,000 or larger scale map on which the Cambodian border is distinctly marked, on the RVN side, to the depth of 5 km.

(3) Aircraft supporting border outposts (fire support, reconnaissance, supply, and transportation) are allowed to operate as necessary in the outpost area, but will neither cross nor fire across the border.

(4) Appropriate radar stations will flight follow aircraft on missions within 5 km of the border within equipment capability.

5. (C) JETTISON.

- a. Munitions will be jettisoned only in designated jettison areas.
- b. During night or IFR conditions, aircraft will be under positive radar control while jettisoning.
- c. During day VFR, drops will be monitored by radar whenever possible.

6. (C) US ARMED HELICOPTERS.

- a. US Army and US Marine armed helicopters will be marked "US Army" or "US Marine," as appropriate, and may be manned with all-US crews at the unit commanders discretion.
- b. If the target involves non-combatants, such as in a hamlet or village, whenever possible an RVNAF observer will be aboard the helicopter and US-GVN-RVNAF approval to fire must be obtained unless the situation clearly presents an immediate threat to the lives of the crew.

7. (C) USAF C-123 AIRCRAFT (RANCH HAND). Ranch Hand aircraft flying Trail Dust missions in RVN for the purpose of crop destruction will be flown under "Farmgate" rules which require Vietnamese markings on the aircraft and a Vietnamese observer aboard.

8. (C) AIR RECONNAISSANCE AND AERIAL SURVEILLANCE MISSIONS.

- a. Operational restrictions placed upon reconnaissance aircraft near the RVN/Cambodian border, for the purpose of insuring that inadvertent

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MACV Dir 95-4
28 June 1966

overflights do not occur, preclude aerial reconnaissance over large areas within RVN where significant enemy activity is known to be taking place. In order to eliminate the immunity of such areas to observation and photography, these restrictions may be waived on a case-by-case basis.

b. Reconnaissance requests for coverage in areas which present a danger of an overflight or border violation will be forwarded through normal reconnaissance request channels to the TASE. Upon determination that a waiver is justified, the request will be executed. In the event of particularly sensitive complications, COMUSMACV will be the final determining authority.

c. US Army OV-1 aircraft may be armed with target marking ordnance while on surveillance missions.

9. (U) AIR TO AIR RESTRICTIONS. Commander, 7th Air Force, prescribes Rules of Engagement and Restrictions for air to air combat in RVN. These are published by that headquarters in Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) Operating Instructions (OI) No 55-33, 30 March 1966.

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222

CHANGE 2
DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 95-4

26 August 1967
(MACJ3)

AVIATION
US AIR OPERATIONS IN RVN (U)

Directive Number 95-4, this headquarters, dated 28 June 1966, is changed as follows:

* * * * *

Annex B

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3. (C) RESPONSIBILITIES: Commanding General, III MAF, will:

* * * * *

d. (Superseded) Establish joint and combined planning coordination measures required in connection with III MAF/USAF/RVNAF air operations in I Corps and in the DMZ south of a line running from the coast line west along the northern boundary of the DMZ to NS grid line XD 90; then south along the NS grid line XD 90 to the PMDL; then west along the PMDL to the Laotian border and make provision for apprising 7th Air Force (TACC) of future ground operations and possible USAF reinforcement requirements by the following means:

* * * * *

GROUP-4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Ch 2, MACV Dir 95-4
26 August 1967

FOR THE COMMANDER:



WALTER T. KERWIN, JR.
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

NEIL N. SNYDER, JR.
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

1 - Ea HQ MACV Staff	50 - Cdr, IV Corps Adv Gp
30 - CG, USARV	2 - SA, CMD
30 - CG, III MAF	2 - SA, Abn Bde
30 - CG, 1st Inf Div	2 - SA, RF/PF
30 - CG, I FFORCEV	150 - COMSEVENTHFLT
30 - CG, II FFORCEV	20 - FWMAO
30 - CG, 1st Air Cav Div	1 - SA, RW Scty Adv Det
150 - Cdr, 7AF	1 - CG, 5th Sp Forces
20 - Cdr, I Corps Adv Gp	25 - J3
20 - Cdr, II Corps Adv Gp	100 - AG-AOP
20 - Cdr, III Corps Adv Gp	5 - AG-AO

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222

CHANGE 1
DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 95-4

14 February 1967
(MACJ3)

AVIATION
US AIR OPERATIONS IN RVN (U)

Directive Number 95-4, this headquarters, dated 28 June 1966, is changed as follows:

* * * * *

Annex D

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2. (C) GENERAL.

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g. (Superseded) Close Air Support missions that involve strikes on hamlets or villages must always be controlled by a FAC.

(1) If the attack on a village or hamlet is deemed necessary and is executed in conjunction with a ground operation involving movement of ground forces through the area, the attack may be made without warning; however, appropriate US/GVN/RVNAF approval is required except in emergencies.

(2) If the attack on a village or hamlet is not in conjunction with any immediate ground operation, the inhabitants must be warned by leaflets and/or loudspeaker system prior to the attack and must be given sufficient time to evacuate the area. Once the inhabitants of a preplanned target area have been adequately warned that the area has been selected as a target and given sufficient time to evacuate, the hamlet/village may then be struck without further warning.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Ch 1, MACV Dir 95-4
14 February 1967

(3) Commanders initiating a request for attack of a hamlet/village are responsible for ensuring that US/GVN/RVNAF approval is obtained and, in the case of preplanned attack, that required warning is given prior to execution of the attack.

* * * * *

FOR THE COMMANDER:



W. B. ROSSON
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

F. G. MILLER
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

1 - Ea HQ MACV Staff	50 - Cdr, IV Corps Adv Gp
30 - CG, USARV	2 - SA, CMD
30 - CG, III MAF	2 - SA, Abn Bde
30 - CG, 1st Inf Div	2 - SA, RF/PF
30 - CG, I FFORCEV	150 - COMSEVENTHFLT
30 - CG, II FFORCEV	20 - FWMAO
30 - CG, 1st Air Cav Div	1 - SA, RW Scty Adv Det
150 - Cdr, 7AF	1 - CG, 5th Sp Forces
20 - Cdr, I Corps Adv Gp	25 - J3
20 - Cdr, II Corps Adv Gp	200 - AG-AOP
20 - Cdr, III Corps Adv Gp	10 - AG-AO

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222

DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 190-3

12 February 1968
(MACJ15)

MILITARY POLICE
ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR (PW)
(RCS: MACJ1-21, 33, 51)

1. PURPOSE. To establish policies, responsibilities and procedures for the handling of Prisoners of War (PW) captured by United States Military Forces or delivered to United States Military Forces by Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) in the Republic of Vietnam.

2. POLICY.

a. All personnel detained by US forces will be extended the full protection of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.

b. US captured PW will be retained in US channels until released to an ARVN PW camp, the Combined Military Interrogation Center (CMIC), or a Corps Interrogation Center (CIC).

c. Screening, classification, and disposition of detainees will be in accordance with MACV Directive 381-46.

d. Determination of eligibility of US detainees or PW whose PW status is doubtful or is questioned by GVN will be made in accordance with MACV Directive 28-5.

e. Article 13 of the Geneva Conventions relative to the treatment of Prisoners of War provides that they will be protected against public curiosity. This has been interpreted as including the taking of photographs of PW in which individual PW are identifiable. Accordingly, only photographs of PW in which individuals are not identifiable are permissible. Authorization for any photographs to be taken at a PW camp must first be cleared with MACJ1 and MACV Psychological Operations Directorate. Identification photographs for prisoners' records constitute an exception to the foregoing.

3. DEFINITIONS. Definitions applicable to PW operations are set forth in Annex A, MACV Directive 381-46.

EXHIBIT D-43

*This directive supercedes MACV Directive 190-3, 6 April 1967, including Changes 1 and 2 and COMUSMACV Msg 38823, DTG 281152, subject: Procedure for Accounting for US Captured PW (U). 79

4. RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. This headquarters is responsible for establishing joint policy for the Prisoner of War Program in Vietnam. Specific responsibilities include the following:

(1) ACofS for Personnel, J-1 (J15). Coordinates the US Prisoner of War Program to include integration with those of RVNAF and FWMAF to insure a unified program. Maintains records and statistics on all PW interned in Vietnam. Advises RVNAF DCSPER (J1/JGS and PM/JGS) through appropriate advisory channels, concerning the total RVNAF PW Program.

(2) ACofS for Intelligence, J-2. Coordinates and supervises US interrogation, exploitation and classification of detained personnel. Advises RVNAF J2/JGS regarding the exploitation of detained personnel. Coordinates integration of RVN, US and FWMAF exploitation effort.

(3) ACofS for Operations, J-3. Coordinates force development and requirements for US military units employed in PW operations. Advises RVNAF J3/JGS concerning J3 PW Program responsibilities. Coordinates integration of US, RVNAF and FWMAF force development and requirements for military units employed in PW operations.

(4) ACofS for Logistics, J-4. Coordinates and supervises logistical and transportation services for the PW program.

(5) Construction Directorate, MACDC. Advises RVNAF DCSLOG/JGS on PW base development responsibilities to include programming of PW camp construction and acquisition of real estate.

(6) Staff Judge Advocate, MACJA. Provides legal guidance concerning the conduct of the US forces PW Program.

(7) Surgeon, MACMD. Coordinates medical service support for PW in US PW evacuation channels. Advises RVNAF Surgeon General regarding medical service support for RVNAF PW. Coordinates integration of RVN, US and FWMAF medical support for PW.

b. CG, I FFORCEV and II FFORCEV are responsible for the processing, handling and evacuation of all persons detained by units under their operational control until released to one of the following:

(1) CG, USARV.

(2) Combined Military Interrogation Center.

(3) Corps Interrogation Center.

(4) ARVN PW Camp.

c. CG, USARV is responsible for:

(1) Administrative supervision of the US forces PW Program to include the following:

(a) Maintaining records of all PW captured by or released to US authorities.

(b) Maintaining records on all returnees, civil defendants and those innocent civilians captured by US forces and processed at brigade/division or higher level. System will establish records accountability for returnees, civil defendants and innocent civilians from the time of capture or detainment by US forces until released to GVN control.

(2) Operational supervision of the US forces PW program in Vietnam to include evacuation from US division/separate brigade PW collecting points in the I FFORCEV and II FFORCEV and IV Corps Tactical Zone of all US detainees or PW released to GVN control.

d. CG III MAF is responsible for the processing, handling and evacuation of all persons detained at collecting points or by units under III MAF operational control until released to one of the following:

(1) Combined Military Interrogation Center.

(2) Corps Interrogation Center.

(3) ARVN PW Camp.

e. COMNAVFORV and CG, 7th AF are responsible for evacuation of PW to the nearest USARV collecting point and for establishing component service procedures to include the maintenance of PW records. The CG, 7th AF is responsible for providing airlift for evacuation of PW as required.

f. Within RVNAF, prisoner of war responsibilities have been assigned as follows:

(1) DCSPER/JGS. Charged with joint supervision of the RVNAF PW Program to include the maintenance of accountability for PW in GVN custody.

(2) J1/JGS. Responsible to DCSPER for accountability of all PW in-country in GVN custody.

(3) Provost Marshal/RVNAF. Under supervision of ACofS, J-1, responsible for administration and operational supervision of RVNAF PW Program including PW camp operations. Maintains a central repository for all records of PW detained in ARVN Corps PW Camps.

g. FWMAF, by agreement, are responsible for processing and delivering PW to the GVN. US forces commanders are authorized, however, to accept custody of FWMAF captured PW taken in combined US/FWMAF operations. US forces commanders are also authorized to assist in the evacuation of FWMAF captured PW to PW camps without formally accepting responsibility for their custody under the GPW.

5. PROCEDURES.

a. US forces.

(1) In ARVN I CTZ, PW will be evacuated to the ARVN I Corps PW camp.

(2) In ARVN II CTZ, PW will be evacuated to one of the two ARVN II Corps PW camp.

(3) In ARVN III CTZ, PW will be evacuated to the ARVN III Corps PW camp.

(4) In ARVN IV CTZ, PW will be evacuated to the ARVN IV Corps PW camp.

(5) Wounded and seriously ill PW will be evacuated through US forces medical channels until such time as their medical condition will permit transfer to ARVN PW camp. The medical brigade, as designated by CG, USARV will coordinate the transfer of these PW with MACJ15 for transfer to the PW camp designated to receive wounded or seriously ill PW at least 24 hours in advance of the move to insure that the camp is properly notified.

(6) Personal effects of PW will be handled and accounted for as outlined in Chapter 2, Section 1, AR 633-50. Procedures will be established to insure that retained and impounded property is not lost or misappropriated.

b. RVNAF PW evacuation flow parallels the RVNAF intelligence system.

c. FWMAF will tag each PW prior to transfer to US custody. Normally US forces will accept only persons who have been designated as PW by the capturing force. FWMAF will complete and turn over to US forces the PW processing documents on all PW accepted. Those detainees who by necessity are turned over to US forces prior to the determination of their PW status will be processed through US channels in accordance with established procedures.

d. The MACV Military Police PW camp advisory team located at each ARVN PW camp will obtain two copies of ARVN Form QCa101 for each PW captured by US forces or FWMAF which US forces have evacuated to the camp. One copy of the ARVN Form QCa101 will be forwarded to MACJ15, ATTN: PW Branch and one copy will be maintained in the files of the US PW Advisory Team for PW accountability purposes. If a PW is transferred to another camp, the losing PW advisory team will forward their copy of the QCa101 to the receiving team.

e. US military police escort personnel will provide a USARV Form 364 (Detainee Report Form) to a member of the PW camp advisory staff for each PW delivered to the camp. US advisors will enter the PW interment serial number in item 15 and will forward the USARV Form 364 by registered mail to MACJ15, ATTN: PW Branch. After pertinent information has been extracted, MACJ15 will forward the form to the USARV Provost Marshal, ATTN: AVHPM-PW.

f. Visits to PW camps by other than personnel assigned a direct advisory role are prohibited unless prior clearance has been obtained from the Joint General Staff, RVNAF. Requests for permission to visit an ARVN PW camp will be submitted in writing to this Headquarters, ATTN: MACJ15 not later than ten days prior to the requested date of the visit. Request will contain the purpose of the visit, the composition of the party and the expected arrival and departure times.

g. Reports or observations made by US visitors during visits to ARVN PW camps which warrant command attention or corrective action will not be submitted to the ARVN PW camp commander or to any member of the US PW camp advisory team, but will be forwarded to this Headquarters, ATTN: MACJ15, for evaluation and transmittal to the Joint General Staff, ARVN.

h. When interrogation of US captured PW is conducted at the CMIC or a CIC, the following procedures will be utilized to insure accurate PW accountability.

(1) Upon receipt of a US captured PW, a GVN representative will sign Part V of the USARV Form 364 to indicate that the PW has been released from US custody.

(2) The USARV Form 364 will be retained in the possession of US personnel in the CMIC or CIC until the PW is evacuated to a PW camp.

(3) When the PW is evacuated to a PW camp a US member of the CMIC or CIC will enter the name of the camp in Part V of the USARV Form 364 and forward the form to MACJ15.

(4) MACJ15 will enter the internment serial number in item 15 and forward the form to the USARV Provost Marshal, ATTN: AVHPM-PW.

6. REPORTS.

a. Prisoner of War Report (RCS: MACJ1-21(R-1). CG, USARV will furnish a monthly report to MACJ1, ATTN: MACJ15 to include the number of:

- (1) Civil defendants.
- (2) Returnees.
- (3) Innocent civilians processed monthly by US forces.

b. Prisoner of War Incident Report (RCS: MACJ1-33(R-1)). Incidents pertaining to the PW such as unnatural death, serious injury, riots, attempted and successful escapes, not reported to this headquarters under provisions of MACV Directive 335-1 will be reported as outlined herein as a PW Incident Report (see Annex A). Reports will be made through appropriate channels by any agency or person having knowledge of the incident. Information copy of all PW Incident Reports will be transmitted by electrical means to this Headquarters, ATTN: MACJ15. An information copy of all PW Incident Reports which involve US captured PW will be forwarded by MACJ15 to the USARV Provost Marshal, ATTN: AVHPM-PW.

c. Decrease in PW camp population (RCS: MACJ1-51). PW transfers, releases or natural deaths will be reported by the US PW advisory team to MACJ15 immediately utilizing the most expeditious means of communication, giving facts and circumstances of the change and the total number involved. A written follow-up report will be submitted containing the following information as a minimum:

- (1) Name.
- (2) Internment serial number.
- (3) Date of loss.

(4) Reason for loss.

(5) In the case of a PW death due to unnatural or natural causes, one copy of the Vietnamese Death Certificate will be forwarded to MACJ15 as expeditiously as possible.

7. REFERENCES.

- a. JCS Publication 3, Chapter 8, Section VIII, "Prisoners of War."
- b. AR 633-50.
- c. DA Pamphlet 27-1.
- d. FM 27-10.
- e. FM 19-40.
- f. MACV Directive 20-5.
- g. MACV Directive 381-46.

h. Letter to CG, USARV; COMNAVFORV; CG, III MAF; and CG, 7th AF from COMUSMACV, 3 September 1966, subj: Handling and Accounting for Prisoners of War.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



WALTER T. KERWIN, JR.
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

NEIL N. SNYDER, JR.
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General

Annex

A. Information Required for Prisoner of War Incident Report.

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B.

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INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR PRISONER OF WAR INCIDENT REPORT

1. Type of incident.
2. Time and date of incident.
3. Location of incident (e. g., specific PW Collecting Point, PW Camp, or map grid coordinates).
4. Name, grade and organization of individual rendering report.
5. Name of person(s) involved, to include victims, subjects and witnesses, including information as to their:
 - a. Grade or title.
 - b. First name, middle initial, last name.
 - c. Service number/internment serial number.
 - d. Organization, force served or address.
 - e. Sex and date of birth.
 - f. If civilians are involved, indicate their status, i. e., DAC, etc., in place of service number.
6. A complete narrative summary of factual information concerning the incident. When indicated because of the nature of the incident, the extent of injuries to personnel and estimated value of damages or loss will be included.
7. Status and location of personnel involved.
8. Designation of the organization or agency, military and civilian, conducting the investigation.
9. Statement as to actual or anticipated reaction, by the civil populace, to the incident and news items relative to the incident.
10. Include a statement that the local GI or Adjutant (has) (has not) been notified of this incident.
11. Additional information, if applicable.

CORRECTED COPY

CI, MACV Dir 190-3

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222

CHANGE 1
DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 190-3

23 July 1968
(MACJ15)

MILITARY POLICE
ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR (PW)
(RCS: MACJ1-21, 33, 51)

Directive Number 190-3, this headquarters, 12 February 1968, is changed as follows:

* * * * *

5. PROCEDURES.

* * * * *

e. (Superseded) US military police escort personnel will provide a USARV Form 364 (Detainee Report Form) to a member of the PW Advisory staff for each PW delivered to the camp. US advisors will enter the PW internment serial number in item 15 and will forward the USARV Form 364 by registered mail to Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHPM-PW, APO 96375.

* * * * *

FOR THE COMMANDER:



WALTER T. KERWIN, JR.
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

SIDNEY GRITZ
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General

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 UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
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CHANGE 2
 DIRECTIVE
 NUMBER 190-3

23 August 1968
 (MACJ15)

MILITARY POLICE
ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR (PW)
(RCS: MACJ1-21, 33, 51)

Directive Number 190-3, this headquarters, 12 February 1968, is changed as follows:

* * * * *

2. POLICY.

* * * * *

e. (Superseded) Article 12, GPW, provides that prisoners of war will be protected against public curiosity. Article 14 requires that prisoners are entitled to respect for their persons and their honor. Showing the conditions in which prisoners live is permissible when it is intended by such photographs to reaffirm the rights of the prisoner as an individual and to show his treatment in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. That an individual PW may be identifiable as a result of such photographs does not, in itself, preclude the taking or publishing of the photograph. The following are examples of types of permissible photographs:

- (1) Healthful living quarters (Art. 25, 29).
- (2) Clean messes and adequate rations (Art. 26).
- (3) PW clothing suitable to the climate, clean and in good repair (Art. 27).
- (4) Camp canteens where PW may procure foodstuffs, soap, tobacco and ordinary articles of daily use (Art. 28).

(5) Medical facilities and medical care afforded PW (Art. 30, 31).

(6) Freedom of religious observance for PW (Art. 34).

(7) PW engaged in intellectual, educational and recreational (including sports) pursuits (Art. 38).

(8) PW gainfully employed in suitable working environments at work of the approved kind - that having no military character or purpose (Art. 50, 51).

(9) PW receiving pay for work performed (Art. 54, 62).

(10) When applicable, PW writing their families and receiving mail and parcels from their families or from the Red Cross (Art. 70, 71, 72).

f. (Added) Authorization for any photographs to be taken at a PW camp must first be cleared with MACJ1. Identification photographs for prisoners' records constitute an exception to the foregoing.

* * * * *

FOR THE COMMANDER:



CHARLES A. CORCORAN
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

SIDNEY GRITZ
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222

DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 335-1

22 November 1967
(MACJ15)

REPORTS
REPORTS OF SERIOUS CRIMES OR INCIDENTS (SIR)
(RCS: MACJ1-22)

1. PURPOSE. To establish uniform reporting procedures on all serious crimes or incidents occurring within RVN involving US forces personnel, or property. *of a police nature*

2. DEFINITIONS.

a. US Forces Personnel. US military personnel on active duty in Vietnam with the US Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, FWMAF; or GVN forces; US civilians employed by the US forces, US civilian employees of contractors engaged in US military contracts in Vietnam; dependents of such personnel; and VN and other national employees of the US forces in Vietnam when on duty status.

~~b. Serious Incidents. Any incident which may result in damaging public confidence in the US Armed Forces and which, because of the nature or personnel involved, may be reasonably expected to arouse public interest and cause continued or widespread adverse publicity. Crimes, offenses, and incidents to be reported include, but are not limited to:~~

(1) Deaths excluding combat deaths and deaths resulting from natural causes. Combat deaths are defined as individuals killed as a result of hostile action or friendly action.

(2) Voluntary or involuntary manslaughter or assault with intent to commit manslaughter.

(3) Rape or an assault with the intent to commit rape or other serious sex offenses.

(4) Burglary, robbery, arson; and *wrongful appropriation* misappropriation, fraud or extortion of major significance.

EXHIBIT D-8

*This directive supersedes MACV Directive 335-1, 4 October 1966

Significant
(5) [^]Blackmarketing, smuggling, and currency manipulations.

(6) Riot or mutiny.

(7) Involvements with military or civilian personnel of a foreign power in a criminal incident of immediate or potentially serious significance from a political, military, or public relations standpoint.

(8) Terrorist activities involving US personnel and/or US Government property.

(9) Other acts involving moral turpitude considered of sufficient importance to warrant the attention of COMUSMACV.

(10) Serious incidents involving detainees and prisoners of war for which the US has responsibility under the Geneva Conventions, including death, maltreatment, serious injury, riots and successful escapes (see paragraph 6b, MACV Directive 190-3).

~~(11) Any incident involving criminal acts or willful negligence, and which may result in unfavorable publicity or adverse reaction by the civil populace will be reported even though directly connected with tactical operations.~~

3. RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. Any agency or person having knowledge of a serious incident as defined in paragraph 2b, above, is responsible for reporting the fact to the nearest US forces headquarters or Provost Marshal.

b. When US Armed Forces criminal investigative agencies (OSI, NISO, CID) are requested to investigate a case reportable in accordance with this directive, they will determine immediately if an Serious Incident Report (SIR) has been made. If an SIR has not been made, the fact will be brought to the attention of the commander requesting the investigation.

c. The Commanding General, US Army, Vietnam, is responsible for reporting all serious incidents involving US Army personnel in Vietnam.

d. The Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam, is responsible for reporting all serious incidents involving US Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard personnel under his administrative control.

e. The Commander, Seventh Air Force, is responsible for reporting all serious incidents involving US Air Force personnel in Vietnam.

f. The Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, is responsible for reporting all serious incidents involving US Navy and Marine Corps personnel in Vietnam under his administrative control.

g. Area Coordinators are responsible for reporting all serious incidents involving persons not included in component commanders report.

4. REPORTING PROCEDURES.

~~a. Initial reports of serious crimes or incidents will be reported by component commanders in accordance with existing service directives. Information copies of all reports will be transmitted by the most expeditious means to this Headquarters, ATTN: MACJ15. Distribution to staff agencies and lateral organizations will be in accordance with established procedures.~~

~~b. Supplemental reports will not be forwarded to this headquarters unless specifically requested.~~

~~e. Annex A is furnished as a guide and suggested format for submission of serious incident reports. Modification is authorized to insure compatibility with component service reporting procedures.~~

5. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION. Reports submitted under the provisions of this directive will be classified according to content as prescribed by the current component service directives; however, as a minimum, they will be marked "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY."

6. REFERENCES.

a. AR 1-55.

b. *OPNAVINST 3100.4*

~~b. USARPAC Regulation 1-55.~~

c. AFR 55-30.

~~d. PACAF Regulation 125-3.~~

~~e. NWIP 10-1 (B).~~

~~f. CINCPAC INST 005440.1D/(S), CINCPAC Operation Reporting Guide (U), 27 November 1963 (NOTAL).~~

d. MCO 05740.2A.

~~g. Marine Corps Order 05740.2A, Reporting Information of Concern to National Authorities (U).~~

~~h.~~ ^e MACV Directive 335-12.

~~i.~~ ^f MACV Directive 190-3.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



WALTER T. KERWIN, JR.
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

NEIL N. SNYDER, JR.
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General

~~† Annex~~

~~Information Required for Serious Incident Report (SIR)~~

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INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR
SERIOUS INCIDENT REPORT (SIR)

1. Type of incident.
2. Time and date of incident.
3. Location of incident. Report the exact location, using identifiable landmarks, miles to the nearest town, city or village. Map grid coordinates will be used only when other means of identifying the location are impracticable, and then only when the map is completely identified.
4. Name, grade, and organization of individual rendering report.
5. Name of person(s) involved, to include victims, subjects and witnesses, including information as to their:
 - a. Grade or title.
 - b. First name, middle initial, last name.
 - c. Service number.
 - d. Organization or address.
 - e. Sex and date of birth.
 - f. If civilian, indicate their status, i.e., DAC, dependent, etc., in place of service number.
6. A complete narrative summary of factual information concerning the incident. When indicated because of the nature of the incident, the extent of injuries to personnel and estimated dollar value of damages or loss will be included.
7. Status and location of personnel involved.
8. Designation of the organization or offices, military and civilian, conducting the investigation.
9. Statement as to actual or anticipated reaction, by the civil populace, to the incident and news items relative to the incident.

10. Include a statement that the local G-2 or Intelligence Officer (has) (has not) been notified of this incident.

11. Additional information, if applicable.

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222

DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 335-12

29 November 1967
(MACCOC3)

REPORTS
SPOT REPORTS (RCS: MACJ3-21)

1. PURPOSE. To prescribe policy and procedures for expeditious reporting of significant information to the MACV Command Center.

2. GENERAL.

a. This headquarters requires timely information on significant events. Such information can be provided best by spot reports which follow a prescribed format and are submitted without delay. Incomplete information, with detailed information to follow, will suffice for the initial spot report.

b. Significant events include, but are not limited to the following examples.

(1) Enemy or friendly initiated contacts, actions or attacks on forces, lines of communications or facilities, including ambushes, attacks by fire and assaults which result in significant damage to installations or property, or result in a total of five or more killed, wounded, or missing. All US MIA will be reported. US WIA, when reported, will be reported as WIA (minor) or WIA (evacuated).

(2) All atrocities, terrorist attacks, or acts of sabotage directed against friendly personnel or installations.

(3) The capture ^{or rallying} of senior enemy officers (VC, NVA, irregular, or infrastructure); the detection of enemy infiltration operations; the sighting or discovery of significant arms, supply or support caches; or evidence the enemy is using new arms, equipment or tactics.

(4) The destruction of, major damage to, or loss of critical equipment (dredges, AVLP, etc.) or major end items (aircraft, armored personnel carriers, tanks, bulldozers and other heavy engineer equipment), including downed or missing aircraft.

*This directive supersedes MACV Directive 335-12, ~~27 September 1966~~ ^{29 November 1968}

across province boundaries and/or Corps boundaries

(5) Relocation of major friendly combat/combat support units (battalion size or larger), their arrival in-country, departure from country, initial participation in a battalion size or larger operation, a change of their OPCON, the termination of their participation in an operation, and the initiation or termination of a battalion sized or larger operation.

(6) All incidents, accidental or deliberate, including disasters resulting in major property destruction or loss to friendly personnel, or the killing, wounding or mistreating of friendly personnel by US, RVN, or Free World Forces.

(7) Incidents which could be detrimental to US/GVN relationship. Such incidents include, but are not limited to the following when caused by Americans:

(a) Injury, death, or mistreating of noncombatants or significant damage to Vietnamese property in the course of tactical operations.

(b) Riots or disorders and involvement in criminal incidents of a serious nature.

(c) Incidents, which because of their nature or the personnel involved, reasonably may be expected to arouse public interest, or which are of sufficient importance to receive widespread publicity.

(8) The violation of national borders, territorial waters, or airspace by friendly or hostile forces, including physical violation, violation by overflights, and violation by fire, naval or air attacks.

(9) Overt intervention by Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, or nuclear detonations (see MACV Directive 335-11 (C), for format).

(10) Incidents likely to result in immediate widespread coverage by news media. Examples are attempted coups, natural disasters, political protest demonstrations, and attacks on US personnel.

3. PROCEDURES.

a. Spot reports will be rendered by commanders listed in paragraph 4, below, using secure or nonsecure voice equipment, as appropriate, to the MACV Command Center. If voice circuits are not available, transmit

via the COC dedicated teletype system using a precedence of IMMEDIATE or higher. ^{As appropriate} If access to the COC dedicated teletype system is not available, use fastest means possible. Reports will follow format specified in Annex A and will be submitted without delay after an incident/event occurs or becomes known. It is not necessary that absolute proof of each item of information be obtained prior to reporting. However, those items not reasonably assured or confirmed should be annotated in the respective portion of the report as "reported" or "unconfirmed" (see Annex A for format and example). *Efforts to obtain proof of confirmation will not be a cause for delay in submitting a spot report.*

b. Major commands, corps advisory groups, and the Capital Military District listed in paragraph 4, below, will forward two copies of their current signal operations instructions to COMUSMACV, ATTN: MACCOC3. Superseding SOI will be forwarded so as to reach MACCOC3 at least 48 hours prior to their effective date. The appropriate KAC or similar voice code will be used when transmitting classified data by insecure voice circuits.

b. Spot reports transmitted by telephone to the MACV Command Center can be passed on the following circuits:

- ~~(1) Common user lines (2) through (7) - MACV 3891, 2092, or Saigon Long Distance #7.~~
- ~~(2) Team Chief - COC Drop 1, Saigon Long Distance 1.~~
- ~~(3) Operations Sergeant - COC Drop 2.~~
- ~~(4) III MAF/I CTZ Desk - COC Drop 3.~~
- ~~(5) I FFORCE V/II CTZ Desk - COC Drop 4.~~
- ~~(6) II FFORCE V/III CTZ Desk - COC Drop 5.~~
- ~~(7) IV CTZ Desk - COC Drop 6.~~
- ~~(8) Air/Navy Desk (7th AF/COMNAVFORV) - COC Drop 7, MACV 2878, TSN 4378, and Saigon Long Distance #5.~~
- ~~(9) J2 Desk - COC Drop 9, MACV 2971, and Saigon Long Distance #2.~~
- ~~(10) J4/TMA Desk - COC Drop 10, MACV 3173, and Saigon Long Distance #4.~~

~~(11) J6 Desk COC Drop 11, MACV 2076, and Saigon Long Distance #6.~~

4. RESPONSIBILITIES. The commanders and senior advisors listed below are responsible for providing spot reports to the MACV Command Center:

- a. CG, III MAF.
- b. CG, I FFORCE V.
- c. CG, II FFORCE V.
- d. SA, IV Corps.
- e. DCG, USARV.
- f. COMNAVFORV.
- g. CG, 7th Air Force.
- h. ~~SA, CMD. CG GMAC~~
- i. CO, 5th Special Forces Group.

5. REPORTS. ~~The Reports Control Symbol MACJ3-21 is assigned~~
~~this report.~~ *EXEMPT UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF Paragraph 39.0*
OF AR 335-15

FOR THE COMMANDER:



WALTER T. KERWIN, JR.
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

NEIL N. SNYDER, JR.
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General

2 Annexes

A. Spot Report Format.

B. Recurring Requirements. DELETED

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SPOT REPORT FORMAT

Reports will follow the sequence listed below. Each question will be answered as sufficient information becomes available.

- ORIGINATOR OF REPORT: (Organization), (rank/grade and name).
- WHERE DID INCIDENT OCCUR? In _____ Province (6-digit grid coord), _____ km (direction) of (major city or base).
- WHEN DID IT OCCUR? Use local (H) date-time-group.
- WHO WAS INVOLVED? Identify the participants.
- WHAT HAPPENED? Describe what occurred as observed or reported.
- HOW DID IT HAPPEN? Explain the cause of, or development of, what occurred. If not available for initial report, report as acquired.
- RESULTS OF INCIDENT? List casualties and equipment lost or captured, etc.
- (UPDATE OF RESULTS) (Update as information becomes available.)

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

1. The "HOW" may not be available initially. Do not wait. Report as information becomes available - do not wait for final data. Follow-up with interim and final reports.
2. Report the termination time as well as the time of initial contact on actions. Report time of dispatch and time of arrival of reaction force when utilized.
3. Report friendly equipment and weapons lost by type as well as enemy equipment and weapons (as specific equipment, individual or crew served weapons, etc.) captured.
4. On reports of incoming artillery and mortar rounds, state whether or not countermortar radar was used, whether or not counterbattery was

fired; include the time friendly air, artillery, or mortars commenced support, and results if known. Report incoming rounds by quantity, caliber, and type (if known). On all mining incidents include whether or not command detonated if known.

5. Report damage as: Destroyed, major, or minor. When reporting damaged or destroyed bridges, give information on bypass, ETR (estimated time of repair), whether or not bridging for repair is available locally, and follow-up with a final report when normal traffic is restored.

6. When reporting downed or missing aircraft include:

- a. Date-time-group of accidents/incidents.
- b. Type of aircraft (e.g., UH-1D, OH-13S), and unit to which assigned.
- c. Mission of aircraft.
- d. Location of incident.
- e. Cause of incident.
- f. Extent of damage - use "minor damage", "major damage", "destroyed".
- g. Whether area is secure or not.
- h. Whether air cover is present or not, and type of air cover.

SPOT REPORT EXAMPLE

Tiger TOC - this is Major Jones. Spot Report - prepare to copy. In Binh Dinh Province (BR801532), 8 km NW of Phu Cat, at 211832H the 1st Co, 1/41 Inf (ARVN) contacted an estimated company of NVA. Gunships and arty are supporting frd unit. Contact continues. Interim results: Friendly (ARVN - 2 KIA, 5 WIA, 2 indiv wpns lost; Enemy - 21 KIA, 2 detainees, 5 indiv wpns and 1 crew served wpn cptrd.

~~RECURRING REQUIREMENTS~~ DELETED

US, FWMF and ARVN operations will be reported no later than 0400H daily to the MACV Command Center. This report will include:

a. Operations with the equivalent of one or more battalions participating which are in progress during the reporting day giving:

- (1) Name of operation.
- (2) Units participating.
- (3) Starting Time.
- (4) Expected duration.
- (5) Type of operation.
- (6) Operational center of mass.

b. Final results and termination time of operations which ended during the previous 24 hour period.

c. Period results of continuing operations.

"It is reported, but unconfirmed, that the enemy used CS gas against frd unit."

3. Remove old pages 3 and 4, and insert new pages 3 and 4.
4. This transmittal sheet should be filed in the front of the publication for reference purposes.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



CHARLES A. CORCORAN
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

SIDNEY GRITZ
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General

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- 25 - MACJ3
- 5 - MACAG-AO

IMMEDIATE or higher, as appropriate. If access to the MACV Command Center dedicated teletype system is not available, use fastest means available. Reports will follow format specified at Annex A and will be submitted without delay after an incident/event occurs or becomes known. It is not necessary that proof of each item of information be obtained prior to reporting. Those items not assured or confirmed should be annotated in the respective portion of the report as "reported" or "unconfirmed," (see Annex A for format and example). Attempts to obtain proof or confirmation will not be a cause for delay in submitting a spot report.

b. Spot reports transmitted by telephone to the MACV Command Center, can be passed on the following circuits:

- (1) 0600 - 1900 MACV Command Center (Main) - AUTOSEVOCOM 3114/3115.
 - (a) Operations Chief - MACV (923) 2092/3891 or EAC 310.
 - (b) Operations Sgt - MACV (923) 2092/3891 or EAC 320.
 - (c) I CTZ Desk Officer - MACV (923) 2092/3891 or EAC 311.
 - (d) II CTZ Desk Officer - MACV (923) 2092/3891 or EAC 312.
 - (e) III CTZ Desk Officer - MACV (923) 2092/3891 or EAC 313.
 - (f) IV CTZ Desk Officer - MACV (923) 2092/3891 or EAC 314.
 - (g). Air/Navy Desk Officer - MACV (923) 2878 or EAC 330 or TSN (924) 4378.
 - (h) CMAC Desk Officer - MACV (923) 2878 or EAC 330 or TSN (924) 4378.
 - (i) J2 Desk Officer - MACV (923) 2971 or EAC 322.
 - (j) J4/TMA Desk Officer - MACV (923) 3173 or EAC 344.
 - (k) J6 Desk Officer - MACV (923) 2076 or EAC 336.
- (2) 1900 - 0600 MACV Command Center (Bunker)* - AUTOSEVOCOM 3112.
 - (a) Operations Chief - MACV (923) 2988.

*The MACV Command Center Bunker will be occupied during periods of increased alert in the Saigon area; the TOC's/COC's of commanders and senior advisors listed in paragraph 4, below, will be notified when this occurs.

- (b) Operations Sgt - MACV (923) 2988.
- (c) I CTZ Desk Officer - MACV (923) 2303 or EAC 311.
- (d) II CTZ Desk Officer - MACV (923) 2587 or EAC 312.
- (e) III CTZ Desk Officer - MACV (923) 2304 or EAC 313.
- (f) IV CTZ Desk Officer - MACV (923) 2689 or EAC 314.
- (g) Air/Navy Desk Officer - MACV (923) 2974 or EAC 330.
- (h) CMAC Desk Officer - MACV (923) 2974 or EAC 330.
- (i) J2 Desk Officer - MACV (923) 2242 or EAC 322.
- (j) J4/TMA Desk Officer - MACV (923) 2469 or EAC 344.
- (k) J6 Desk Officer - MACV (923) 2470 or EAC 336.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES. The commanders and senior advisors listed below are responsible for providing spot reports to the MACV Command Center:

- a. CG, III MAF
- b. CG, I FFORCEV
- c. CG, II FFORCEV
- d. SA, IV Corps
- e. DCG, USARV
- f. COMNAVFORV
- g. Cdr, 7th Air Force
- h. CG, CMAC
- i. CO, 5th Special Forces Group

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222

DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 381-46

27 December 1967
(MACJ26)

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
COMBINED SCREENING OF DETAINEES

1. PURPOSE. This directive provides policy guidance for the combined screening of detainees, and for the activation, as required, of Combined Tactical Screening Centers (CTSC).

2. GENERAL.

a. The forces that capture or detain suspect personnel are responsible for the prompt screening and classification of detainees.

b. Criteria for determination of status and classification of detainees is contained in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Annex A.

c. Disposition of detained personnel who have been classified will be made in accordance with paragraph 5 of Annex A.

d. Close coordination between the capturing forces, civil authorities, and military police units is essential to accomplish the screening, classification, and disposition of the detained personnel.

3. APPLICABILITY.

a. This directive applies to all US forces and FWMAF assigned, attached, or under operational control of MACV.

b. CTSC are to be activated on an "as needed" basis in conjunction with combined operations, to optimize the screening of detained persons. Deactivation will occur as soon as the tactical situation dictates and the requirement for the center no longer exists.

4. DISCUSSION. Classification of persons detained is the sole responsibility of the detaining US or FWMAF. All detainees must be classified into one of the following categories:

- a. Prisoners of War.
- b. Non-Prisoners of War.

EXHIBIT D-39

- (1) Civil Defendants.
- (2) Returnees.
- (3) Innocent Civilians.

5. CONCEPT.

a. The success of the combined screening is dependent upon close coordination and integrated planning among all participating and interested organizations. Maximum cooperation and the availability of essential data will aid in the immediate release of innocent civilians and proper treatment of returnees.

b. Combined screening of detainees will be conducted at the lowest echelon of command practical; normally, at the brigade or division Prisoner of War (PW) collecting points. Screening centers should be located near sector/sub-sector headquarters for ease of access to both military and civilian files.

c. The mission of the CTSC is to optimize the screening and classification of a large number of detained personnel to permit effective exploitation of knowledgeable sources for immediate tactical information and to expedite the proper disposition of PW's and Non-Prisoners of War.

6. RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. ACofS, J-2, will develop joint policy and guidance for the classification of detainees.

b. ACofS for CORDS will insure that its field activities coordinate with the operation of the CTSC.

c. CG, I FFORCEV, II FFORCEV, and III MAF will insure that units under their operational control have made adequate provisions for combined tactical screening of detainees prior to the start of operations.

d. Province and district chiefs will usually have the funds to provide for feeding of Non-Prisoners of War detainees. If local funds are not available, foodstuffs can be obtained through the local CORDS representative on an emergency basis.

7. ORGANIZATION OF THE COMBINED TACTICAL SCREENING CENTER (CTSC).

a. The CTSC will have joint representation from participating military units and civil authorities. Ideally, the deputy province chief and a representative from the operational unit should function as co-chairmen. As established in paragraphs 2a and 8b, final responsibility for determining the status of persons detained by US forces, rests with a representative of the US Armed Forces. In addition to participation by various staff elements of the operational unit, representatives at the CTSC should include the following: The National Police, Provincial/District Police, including the Special Branch, National Police Branch, Military Security Service (MSS) and Sector/Sub-Sector S2. Each element functioning in the CTSC will provide its own transportation, equipment, and supplies.

b. Exploitation of human sources, documents, materiel, and other intelligence requirements incident to the effective screening and classification of detainees will normally be accomplished by intelligence personnel of the participating elements.

c. Liaison with the Province/District office is necessary to gain advice on territorial matters which may be affected as a result of activation of a screening center.

8. SCREENING PROCEDURES.

a. The detaining unit will insure that the proper documentation is initiated and maintained on every individual detained. It is imperative that data reflect circumstances of capture and whether documents of weapons were found on the detainee.

b. Maximum use must be made of interrogators and interpreters to conduct initial screening and segregation at the lowest possible level. Participation in the initial screening by all agencies represented in the CTSC is encouraged. However, the sole responsibility for determining the status of persons detained by US forces rests with the representatives of the United States Armed Forces.

c. Detainees will be classified in accordance with the criteria established in Annex A. Every possible arrangement will be made to insure that it is a joint effort by the participants of the CTSC, that all possible information and facts have been gained from interrogation, and that all pertinent files and records have been checked.

d. To preclude rejection by the PW camp commanders of PW's of questionable status, evidence gathered to substantiate the determination that the detainee is entitled to PW status must be forwarded with the prisoner. Improperly documented PW's will not be evacuated to PW camps.

9. REPORTS. This directive requires no report.

10. REFERENCES.

- a. The Geneva Convention, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, of 12 August 1949.
- b. MACV Directive 20-5.
- c. MACV Directive 190-3.
- d. MACV Directive 381-11.
- e. USARV Regulation 190-2.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



WILLIAM E. BRYAN, JR.
Brigadier General, USAF
Acting Chief of Staff

NEIL N. SNYDER, JR.
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General

1 Annex

Classification and Disposition of Detainees

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B
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300 - AG-AOP
5 - AG-AO

CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION AND DISPOSITION OF DETAINEES

1. PURPOSE. To establish criteria for the classification of detainees which will facilitate rapid, precise screening, and proper disposition of detainees.

2. DEFINITIONS.

a. Detainees. Persons who have been detained but whose final status has not yet been determined. Such persons are entitled to humane treatment in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions.

b. Classification. The systematic assignment of a detainee in either the PW or Non-Prisoner of War category.

c. Prisoners of War. All detainees who qualify in accordance with paragraph 4a, below.

d. Non-Prisoners of War. All detainees who qualify in accordance with paragraph 4b, below.

3. CATEGORIES OF FORCES.

a. Viet Cong (VC) Main Force (MF). Those VC military units which are directly subordinate to Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), a Front, Viet Cong military region, or sub-region. Many of the VC units contain NVA personnel.

b. Viet Cong (VC) Local Force (LF). Those VC military units which are directly subordinate to a provincial or district party committee and which normally operate only within a specified VC province or district.

c. North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Unit. A unit formed, trained and designated by North Vietnam as an NVA unit, and composed completely or primarily of North Vietnamese.

d. Irregulars. Organized forces composed of guerrilla, self-defense, and secret self-defense elements subordinate to village and hamlet level VC organizations. These forces perform a wide variety of missions in support of VC activities, and provide a training and mobilization base for maneuver and combat support forces.

(1) Guerrillas. Full-time forces organized into squads and platoons which do not necessarily remain in their home village or hamlet. Typical missions for guerrillas include propaganda, protection of village party committees, terrorist, and sabotage activities.

(2) **Self-Defense Force.** A VC paramilitary structure responsible for the defense of hamlet and village in VC controlled areas. These forces do not leave their home area, and they perform their duties on a part-time basis. Duties consist of constructing fortifications, serving as hamlet guards, and defending home areas.

(3) **Secret Self-Defense Force.** A clandestine VC organization which performs the same general function in Government of Vietnam (GVN) controlled areas. Their operations involve intelligence collection, as well as sabotage and propaganda activities.

4. CLASSIFICATION OF DETAINEES.

a. Detainees will be classified PW's when determined to be qualified under one of the following categories:

(1) A member of one of the units listed in paragraph 3a, b, or c, above.

(2) A member of one of the units listed in paragraph 3d, above, who is captured while actually engaging in combat or a belligerent act under arms, other than an act of terrorism, sabotage, or spying.

(3) A member of one of the units listed in paragraph 3d, above who admits or for whom there is proof of his having participated or engaged in combat or a belligerent act under arms other than an act of terrorism, sabotage, or spying.

b. Detainees will be classified as Non-Prisoners of War when determined to be one of the following categories:

(1) **Civil Defendants.**

(a) A detainee who is not entitled to PW status but is subject to trial by GVN for offenses against GVN law.

(b) A detainee who is a member of one of the units listed in paragraph 3d, above, and who was detained while not engaged in actual combat or a belligerent act under arms, and there is no proof that the detainee ever participated in actual combat or belligerent act under arms.

(c) A detainee who is suspected of being a spy, saboteur, or terrorist.

(2) Returnees (Hoi Chanh). All persons regardless of past membership in any of the units listed in paragraph 3, above, who voluntarily submit to GVN control.

(3) Innocent Civilians. Persons not members of any units listed in paragraph 3, above, and not suspected of being civil defendants.

5. DISPOSITION OF CLASSIFIED DETAINEES.

a. Detainees who have been classified will be processed as follows:

(1) US captured PW's and those PW's turned over to the US by FWMAF will be retained in US Military channels until transferred to the ARVN PW Camp.

(2) Non-Prisoners of War who are suspected as civil defendants will be released to the appropriate GVN civil authorities.

(3) Non-Prisoners of War who qualify as returnees will be transferred to the appropriate Chieu Hoi Center.

(4) Non-Prisoners of War determined to be innocent civilians will be released and returned to the place of capture.

b. Responsibilities and procedures for evacuation and accounting for PW's are prescribed in MACV Directive 190-3 and USARV Regulation 190-2.

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96243

DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 525-3*

14 October 1966
(MACCOC12)

COMBAT OPERATIONS
MINIMIZING NONCOMBATANT BATTLE CASUALTIES

1. PURPOSE. This directive prescribes policy designed to minimize noncombatant battle casualties and the impact of those which may occur.

2. GENERAL.

a. The Government of Vietnam (GVN) is engaged in a fight for its survival against the communist Viet Cong (VC) supported and reinforced by the forces of the Democratic Republic Vietnam (DRV). It is the objective of the VC to seize control of the hamlets, villages and towns by a combination of military action, terrorism, political action and subversion. It is the objective of the GVN to resist this process and where it has occurred, to reverse it. This means that the battle for Vietnam flows backward and forward across the homes and fields of the hapless rice farmer and the small town inhabitant. Whether, at any one time, he lives in a VC or a GVN controlled hamlet depends to a large extent upon factors and forces beyond his control. Eventually, of course, the GVN plans to regain control over all of the hamlets and all of the people.

b. The use of unnecessary force leading to noncombatant battle casualties in areas temporarily controlled by the VC will embitter the population, drive them into the arms of the VC, and make the long range goal of pacification more difficult and more costly.

c. The circumstances described above call for the exercise of restraint not normally required of soldiers on the battlefield. Commanders at all echelons must strike a balance between the force necessary to accomplish their missions with due regard to the safety of their commands, and the high importance of reducing to a minimum the casualties inflicted on the noncombatant populace.

d. The VC exploit fully incidents of noncombatant casualties and destruction of property by RVNAF, US combat forces, and other Free World military forces. Their objectives are to foster resentment against GVN and the United States, and to effect the permanent alienation of the people from the government.

*This directive supersedes MACV Directive 525-3 (O), 7 September 1965 - including Change 1, 25 October 1965.

MACV Dir 525-3
14 October 1966

3. APPLICATION.

a. **US Forces.** Commanders at every echelon are directed to plan and conduct operations in accordance with the following guidelines:

(1) Commanders will consider both the military and psychological objective of each operation. Prestrikes in populated areas, reconnaissance by fire into hamlets, and poorly selected harassing and interdiction fires are examples of military measures which will be counterproductive in the long run.

(2) Commanders will maintain and conduct a thorough and continuing program to emphasize both the short and long range importance of minimizing noncombatant casualties. Troop indoctrination briefings will be held before each operation. They will include the location of noncombatants and other friendly forces, measures to prevent mutual interference, safety precautions for fire control support, rules of engagement, identification and recognition signals, emergency procedures and other appropriate matters.

(3) The proper selection of landing zones, the careful planning and execution of air strikes, and the proper employment of artillery and armed helicopters will prevent unnecessary damage to lives and property of noncombatants.

(4) Forward air controllers and armed helicopter commanders will be briefed on areas to be avoided because of the presence of friendly or potentially friendly population. Such information must be sought from US advisors and local officials at province and district level.

(5) With due regard to security and success of the mission, whenever possible the people will be warned by leaflets and broadcasts of impending air strikes or operations. Blame for military action in the area would be shifted to the VC.

(6) A civic action plan should be developed to support each operation even if the area has been controlled by the VC.

(7) Specified strike zones should be configured to exclude populated areas except those in accepted VC bases.

(8) Operations should be planned in coordination with province and district chiefs with due regard to security of plans. A liaison officer from US combat forces conducting operations in a particular province should be positioned at the sector headquarters for coordination. The sector advisors must perform this function in the absence of other liaison.

MACV Dir 525-3
14 October 1966

(9) Assignment to US combat forces of qualified RVNAF liaison officers from appropriate RVNAF commanders is essential and should be arranged between US commanders and advisors for each significant operation. These liaison officers through their knowledge of the area of operation and the population can assist in identification of friend from foe and can help to insure close coordination with all Vietnamese forces. In this connection, the participation of Vietnamese forces in operations should be encouraged so that the war does not appear to be a US action against the Vietnamese people. Regional and Popular Force participation should be sought at US battalion or even company level so that they may assist in the search of private dwellings, obtain information, and contribute to the desired effect of the cooperative war effort.

(10) Established rules of good military conduct and discipline must be enforced.

(11) It is absolutely essential that US forces establish the reputation of being able to move at will throughout SVN and to defeat any VC force encountered. This reputation for invincibility will produce innumerable psychological benefits and hasten the end of the war. On the other hand, these same forces must demonstrate constantly their concern for the safety of noncombatants -- their compassion for the injured -- their willingness to aid and assist the sick, the hungry and the dispossessed.

b. US Advisors. US advisors will make every effort to convince Vietnamese counterparts of the necessity for preservation of the lives and property of noncombatants. Counterparts must be encouraged to promulgate and implement parallel instruction.

4. IMPLEMENTATION. Implementing instructions and SOPs concerning this directive, fire control support and safety precautions will be issued by major commanders and senior advisors. Commanders will insure distribution to the lowest echelons and to other services as required. Annex A provides additional guidance for incorporation in the instructions.

5. REFERENCES.

- a. MACV Directive 95-4 (C), subject: Air Operations in RVN (U).
- b. Letter, COMUSMACV, subject: Minimizing Non-Combatant Casualties, to SA and US Commanders, dated 7 July 1965.
- c. Letter, COMUSMACV, subject: Conduct of Artillery and Nava. Gunfire (U), dated 7 November 1965.

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MACV Dir 525-3
14 October 1966

FOR THE COMMANDER:



W. B. ROSSON
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

E. D. BRYSON
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

1 Annex
Utilization of PsyWar/Civil Affairs Resources

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UTILIZATION OF PSYWAR/CIVIL AFFAIRS RESOURCES

1 Commanders will utilize G5/S5 and Psywar staff officers to:

a. Assure that, where feasible, each operational plan contains a Psywar/CA Annex and that all concerned are familiar with its provisions. Fragmentary orders should include reference to SOPs on minimization of non-combatant battle casualties.

b. Whenever possible, utilize appropriate leaflets, airborne loudspeakers, ground loudspeakers and/or face-to-face teams to separate non-combatants from the Viet Cong (VC).

c. Utilizing appropriate psywar techniques, explain to the people that the GVN and the US understand that in many cases villages and hamlets are unfortunately under temporary VC domination; that this condition will not prevail for long; and that in due course the GVN will restore law and order. In the meantime, the populace should shun the VC and protect themselves against battle damage.

d. Where feasible, follow each operation with a Psywar/CA team to explain to the population what happened and how to avoid future noncombatant casualties.

e. Following each operation wherein noncombatant casualties and/or property damage have occurred, coordinate with the province chief concerned on prompt indemnification of those affected. Consideration also should be given at this time to appropriate civic action measures.

2. Civic Action: As the situation dictates, operation plans will provide for utilization of all available assets, to include a program for dispensing of medical supplies; transportation and distribution of emergency rations; medical evacuation of injured or sick regardless of suspected or known political affiliation; and light engineering work within the capabilities of tactical units.

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MACV Dir 525-9

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222

DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 525-9*

10 April 1967
(MACJ46)

COMBAT OPERATIONS
CONTROL, DISPOSITION, AND SAFEGUARDING
OF VIETNAMESE PROPERTY, CAPTURED MATERIEL
AND FOOD SUPPLIES (U)

1. (C) PURPOSE. To establish policies and procedures for:

a. Control, disposition and safeguarding of private property and food supplies during combat operations.

b. Control and disposition of captured materiel and supplies.

2. (C) GENERAL.

a. Public and private property and food supplies.

(1) When performing combat operations in VC controlled areas, US and other Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) will take all practicable measures to minimize the destruction of public and private property. These forces also must provide for control, disposition, and safeguarding of such property. People who have lived under VC control are not necessarily hostile, and might not have chosen to be under VC control. To treat them indiscriminately as the enemy, to destroy their property or to deny them essential resources is incompatible with long-term Government of Vietnam (GVN), US, and FWMAF objectives to extend GVN influence throughout South Vietnam.

(2) Continuing command emphasis will be directed to the protection of private property and supplies, especially food stocks, to ensure that the population is not deprived of its property and means of livelihood.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

EXHIBIT D-40

*This directive supersedes MACV Directive 525-9 (C), 4 October 1966

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10 April 1967

Unnecessary destruction of property will embitter the population by creating additional hardships, give credence to VC propaganda directed against GVN/US/FWMAF and make the attainment of long range goals more difficult and costly.

b. Captured materiel and supplies.

(1) Captured materiel and supplies will be handled in a manner which will preclude their further use by the enemy. Actions will be taken to permit advantageous use of such materiel and supplies in support of the overall war effort. Captured enemy medical stores or materiel will not be destroyed intentionally. MACV Directive 381-24 contains procedures for the exploitation of enemy materiel captured by US forces. Enemy materiel captured by FWMAF will be processed in accordance with their current working arrangements.

(2) Rice is a basic and vital commodity in the economy of Vietnam. It is essential that rice uncovered during combat operations not be abandoned or destroyed except as a last resort. Every effort will be made to move the rice to a secure area.

3. (C) RESPONSIBILITIES. Major US subordinate commanders, Free World Military Assistance Force commanders and corps senior advisors will initiate action to implement these instructions.

a. Private property and supplies. US/FWMAF commanders and US military advisors with RVNAF will make every effort to minimize the destruction of private property and will develop appropriate procedures to ensure that the population is not deprived of its property and means of livelihood.

b. Captured materiel and supplies. US/FWMAF commanders and US military advisors will ensure that appropriate action is taken to secure captured materiel and supplies to preclude their further use by the enemy. Where possible, the materiel and supplies will be exploited for intelligence purposes and/or used to support GVN/US/FWMAF efforts and objectives. Component logistics advisors and MACV sector advisors are responsible for providing liaison between US/FWMAF tactical units and appropriate GVN officials in the control and disposition of captured supplies.

4. (C) POLICY. The following policy is established for US/FWMAF:

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a. Private property and supplies.

(1) Disposition of private property and supplies is the responsibility of GVN officials.

(2) Civilian dwellings or private property, including livestock, will not be destroyed except as an unavoids consequence of combat actions.

(3) The destruction of dwellings and livestock of noncombatants as a denial measure is to be left to GVN authorities or RVNAF units. Requests by Vietnamese authorities for employment of US forces in the deliberate destruction of noncombatants property or supplies as a denial measure will be referred to this headquarters for the personal decision of COMUSMACV or, in his absence, DEPCOMUSMACV.

(4) US advisors at all levels will encourage their counterparts to avoid unnecessary destruction of private property. Appropriate psychological operations and civic action projects will be planned to demonstrate GVN/US/FWMAF concern for the people's welfare.

b. Captured materiel and supplies.

(1) Captured materiel and supplies are to be considered a valuable asset that will be extracted whenever possible. Evacuation will be effected through logistic channels utilizing retrograde transportation to the maximum extent. Such materiel and supplies will be destroyed as a last resort only.

(2) Tactical commanders will include in operations plans provisions for security and immediate release to RVNAF of all captured food supplies. Where feasible, these provisions will be coordinated with the appropriate RVNAF CTZ/DTA Commander. When a food cache is captured, the US tactical commander will report it to the responsible RVNAF Commander. Reports will include information pertaining to type, quantity, location, and tactical considerations to include security requirements. Captured food caches will be extracted by RVNAF whenever possible and redistributed using RVNAF resources and transportation to the maximum extent practicable. Major US tactical commanders will make the final decision to destroy significant food caches only after determining that extraction is not feasible.

(3) Captured rice should be disposed of by RVNAF in the following sequence of priority:

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10 April 1967

(a) To meet RVNAF ration requirements where their supplies are deficient.

(b) To meet emergency needs in the province/sector or district/subsector area to help meet critical needs of war victims and refugees.

(c) To appropriate GVN officials, who will provide a receipt for the rice and dispose of it in accordance with current GVN directives.

(d) Extracted and transported to the nearest secure storage area for determination of ultimate disposition.

(4) In accordance with the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field (GWS), captured or abandoned enemy medical stores or material shall not be destroyed intentionally. This prohibition includes medical items which are determined or suspected to be contaminated, outdated or unidentified. Specific procedures pertinent to captured medical supplies are contained in paragraph 5b, below.

5. (C) PROCEDURES.

a. Captured materiel and supplies will be handled by the most secure and economical means available. In the event extraction of captured supplies is determined to be feasible but requires resources beyond those available in the area, the tactical commander will forward a request for assistance through command channels. Requests for assistance to move materiel and supplies will contain the following items of required information:

(1) Type and amount of supplies.

(2) Location(s).

(3) Transportation and manpower requirements for extraction.

(4) Tactical situation, to include security forces required for an extraction operation.

(5) Other factors which might affect the operation, i. e., attitude of local populace and GVN officials.

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b. Captured medical supplies are subject to the following:

(1) Limitation on Use. Captured enemy medical supplies have great potential for harm due to unknown enemy standards of quality and doubtful enemy capability for adequate quality control of items in field medical stores. They may be used for the care and treatment of wounded or sick enemy personnel, but only when such use is under the supervision of enemy medical personnel. They shall not be used by US medical personnel except in an emergency due to nonavailability of US medical item(s) of the type required. Similarly, release of captured medical supplies to local GVN officials or other relief agencies in the field is expressly prohibited except in cases of urgent humanitarian need. Such release may be made only when US supplies of the type and quantity required are not available. Release will be limited to types and quantities of items required to meet the existing medical emergency as determined by the US military surgeon in the incident area. Such release will be reported in the next SITREP to include types and quantities of items, date of release, name and location of recipients and intended purpose for which released.

(2) Disposition. If not required for treatment of enemy personnel pursuant to paragraph 5b(1), above, all captured medical supplies shall be extracted by capturing units through component command established channels to the Combined Materiel Exploitation Center (CMEC), Building 614, Tan Son Nhut Air Base. These supplies, when excess to CMEC requirements, will be turned into collection centers established by USARV. If all available means have been exhausted and extraction remains impractical, captured medical supplies shall be left intact and in place as required by the Geneva Convention (GWS). Date, location and best estimate of quantities left in place will be reported in the next SITREP.

c. US/FWMAF commanders, with the assistance of US advisors, will coordinate with appropriate GVN officials to establish procedures for:

(1) Informing GVN officials of captured supplies and achieving appropriate coordinated action.

(2) Handling, transportation and disposition of captured supplies.

(3) An accounting or other receipt system to be followed when private ownership of captured supplies is claimed.

(4) Establishing required security in support of extraction operations.

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10 April 1967

6. (U) REPORTS.

a. When a food cache is captured, the US tactical commander will report it to the responsible RVNAF Commander. Reports will include information pertaining to type, quantity, location, and tactical considerations to include security requirements. This report is exempt under paragraph 39af, AR 335-15.

b. Release of captured medical supplies to local GVN officials or other relief agencies in the field will be reported in the next SITREP to include types and quantities of items, date of release, name and location of recipients and intended purpose for which released. This as-required report control symbol (RCS: MACCOC-03) is applicable to reports submitted under this directive.

c. If all available means have been exhausted and extraction of all captured medical supplies remains impractical, captured medical supplies shall be left intact and in place as required by the Geneva Convention (GWS). Date, location and best estimate of quantities left in place will be reported in the next SITREP. This as-required reports control symbol (RCS: MACCOC-03) is applicable to reports submitted under this directive.

7. (U) REFERENCES.

a. Joint Directive 2-65 (S), subject: US Agency Field Relationships (U) (being revised for publication as a joint OCO/MACV Directive).

b. MACV Directive 525-7 (C), subject: Economic Warfare (U).

c. MACV Directive 525-17, subject: Civil Affairs.

d. MACV Directive 515-2, subject: Military Civic Action.

e. MACV Directive 381-24, subject: Exploitation of Captured Materiel.

f. Republic of Vietnam Decree Law 20/64, 15 August 1964, subject: The Armed Forces: The Power to Requisition.

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MACV Dir 525-
10 April 1967

FOR THE COMMANDER:



W. B. ROSSON
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

F. G. MILLER
Colonel, USA
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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222

CHANGE 1
DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 525-9

23 July 1967
(MACJ46)

COMBAT OPERATIONS
CONTROL, DISPOSITION, AND SAFEGUARDING
OF VIETNAMESE PROPERTY, CAPTURED MATERIEL
AND FOOD SUPPLIES (U)

Directive Number 525-9, this headquarters, dated 10 April 1967, is changed as follows:

- * * * * *
- 5. (C) PROCEDURES.
- * * * * *
- b.
- * * * * *

(2) (Superseded) Disposition. If not required for treatment of enemy personnel pursuant to paragraph 5b(1), above, all captured medical supplies shall be extracted by capturing units through component command established channels to the Combined Materiel Exploitation Center (CMEC), Building 614, Tan Son Nhut Air Base. These supplies, when in excess to CMEC requirements, will be turned into collection centers established by USARV. If all available means have been exhausted and extraction remains impractical, captured medical supplies shall be left intact and in place as required by the Geneva Convention (GWS). Date, location and best estimate of quantities left in place will be reported in the next SITREP. USARV collection centers will dispose of captured enemy medical material as follows:

(a) Drugs, biologicals, official reagents, and surgical sutures: All standard and nonstandard FSC Class 6505 type items and 6515 surgical sutures will be destroyed as unserviceable in accordance with paragraph B40, Chapter XV or DSAM 4160.1 (AR 755-20), Defense Disposal Manual.

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Ch 1, MACV Dir 525-9
23 July 1967

(b) Other Captured Medical Material: Other items of captured medical material will be classified as to condition and disposition made under the same criteria as used for comparable US medical material with the following exceptions:

1. Disposition of servicable items will be by issue through the RVNAF Provost Marshal General to ARVN PW camps for use by enemy medical personnel in the care and treatment of enemy sick and wounded. USARV will coordinate procedures with the Provost Marshal General, RVNAF, in order to effect issues of serviceable medical items to the PW camps. Captured medical items will not be introduced in the RVNAF supply systems.

2. All sterile type medical items such as sterile surgical dressings, which are otherwise considered serviceable will be issued to PW camps as nonsterile items.

* * * * *

FOR THE COMMANDER:



WALTER T. KERWIN, JR.
Major General, USA
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*MACV DIR 525-18
8-2-1A
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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222

Superseded by dated 12 Oct 61
1525-13
21 January 1968
(MACCOC12)
(ROE)

DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 525-18

COMBAT OPERATIONS
CONDUCT OF ARTILLERY/MORTAR AND NAVAL GUNFIRE (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE. To provide guidance concerning the control of artillery and naval gunfire support provided by US/FWMA Forces. The terms artillery and artillery fire as used in this directive include mortars and mortar fire.

2. (U) GENERAL.

RETAIN FOR
HISTORICAL PURPOSES
X REF
civil
laws

a. The nature of operations and of the battle in Vietnam, and the frequent conduct of combined operations involving US, FW, and RVN forces require that special emphasis be placed on procedures for the control of artillery and naval gunfire.

b. Restrictive controls should be held to the minimum necessary to insure that:

(1) Friendly forces and civilians are not endangered.

(2) Property of friendly forces, RVN and friendly civilians is not destroyed or damaged.

(3) National and operational boundaries are not violated.

c. Care and attention must be exercised continuously in the application of all artillery gunnery techniques. The full range of artillery gunnery techniques which insure accuracy should be applied to the maximum extent permitted by the situation. The application of these techniques and the exercise of sound judgement on the part of all personnel involved in solving the artillery problem provide the best assurance against endangering friendly forces and civilians or destroying or damaging RVN, friendly forces and friendly civilians' property.

GROUP-4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

EXHIBIT D-3

*This directive supersedes MACV Directive 525-18 (C), 19 October 1966 including Changes 1 and 2

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MACV Dir 525-18

d. This directive will serve as a basis for the preparation by senior US tactical commanders and Senior Advisor, IV Corps of standard operating procedures for the conduct of artillery and naval gunfire.

3. (U) RESPONSIBILITY.

a. Senior US tactical commanders and Senior Advisor, IV Corps:

(1) In coordination with appropriate senior RVNAF commanders, develop procedures for the effective control and coordination of artillery and naval gunfire support based upon established artillery and naval gunfire procedures as modified by guidance contained herein.

(2) In coordination with appropriate senior RVNAF commanders, develop positive target clearance procedures to include a system of double checks to preclude error or misunderstanding.

4. (C) CONDUCT OF FIRE.

a. Procedures applicable to the control of naval gunfire are contained in Operation Order 320A-67 (GUN 12), Commander Task Group 70.8, dated 2 June 1967. This document has the force of a USMACV Directive. Additional copies of this document may be obtained from Headquarters, MACV, ATTN: MACCOC12.

b. Specified strike zones.

(1) Specified strike zones must be approved by GVN/RVNAF as appropriate.

(2) Unobserved fire may be directed against all targets and target areas located within specified strike zones.

c. Uninhabited areas outside specified strike zones.

(1) Fire may be directed against VC/NVA forces in conduct in accordance with normal artillery procedures.

(2) Unobserved fires may be directed at targets and target areas, other than VC/NVA forces in contact, only after Province Chief, District Chief, Sector Commander, or Subsector Commander approval as appropriate.

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(3) Observed fire may be directed against targets of opportunity which are clearly identified as hostile without obtaining Province Chief, District Chief, Sector Commander, or Subsector Commander approval.

(4) Appropriate Province Chief, District Chief, Sector Commander, or Subsector Commander approval is required before directing fire on targets of opportunity not clearly identified as hostile.

d. Villages and Hamlets.

(1) Fire missions directed against known or suspected VC/NVA targets in villages and hamlets occupied by noncombatants will be conducted as follows:

(a) All such fire missions will be controlled by an observer and will be executed only after Province Chief or District Chief approval as appropriate.

(b) Villages and hamlets not associated with maneuver of ground forces will not be fired upon without prior warning by leaflets and/or speaker systems or by other appropriate means, even though fire is received from them.

(c) Villages and hamlets may be attacked without prior warning if the attack is in conjunction with a ground operation involving maneuver of ground forces through the area, and if in the judgement of the ground commander, his mission would be jeopardized by such warning.

(d) The use of incendiary type ammunition will be avoided unless absolutely necessary in the accomplishment of the commander's mission.

e. RVN/Cambodian Border area.

(1) Fire missions within 2000 meters of the RVN/Cambodian border will be observed except under circumstances where fires are in defense of friendly forces and observation of such fires is not possible. These requirements are in addition to applicable control procedures stated elsewhere in this directive.

(2) Fire missions with intended target areas more than 2000 meters from the RVN/Cambodian border may be unobserved, subject to applicable control procedures stated elsewhere in this directive.

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MACV Dir 525-18

(3) Fire missions will not be conducted where dispersion could result in fire being placed on or over the RVN/Cambodian border.

(4) Commanders will review and comply with the provision of MACV Rules of Engagement when planning for operations near the Cambodian/RVN border.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



WALTER T. KERWIN, JR.
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

NEIL N. SNYDER, JR.
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222

DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 612-1

16 March 1968
(MACAG)

PERSONNEL PROCESSING
PROCESSING OF NEW ARRIVALS

1. PURPOSE. To establish inprocessing requirements for all military and civilian personnel arriving in Vietnam.

2. GENERAL. All new arrivals will receive initial processing and briefings. The primary objective of the briefing is to insure that all personnel understand why they are in Vietnam, the importance of each individual's contribution to the defeat of the enemy and the significance of every American's personal conduct in the Republic of Vietnam.

a. Officers in the grade of O7 and above will pay an office call on COMUSMACV, mission considerations permitting. The sponsoring agency will arrange the office call with the Protocol Branch of SJS.

b. Officers in grade O6 and above and civilians in the grade of GS-15 and above will be invited to attend a Mission Council Senior Briefing. This two day program is held approximately once every two months.

c. Personnel below grade O6 or GS-15 will attend programs prescribed by component or uniservice commands of one to three day duration, exclusive of job orientation.

3. RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. The ACofS, J-1, MACV will exercise staff supervision over the inprocessing programs.

b. Component and separate uniservice commanders will develop procedures to process all new arrivals assigned to their organizations from within their own resources. Copies of implementing plans and/or directives and changes will be furnished this Headquarters, ATTN: MACJ1.

c. CG, USARV will provide the following support to assist in processing personnel assigned to this headquarters and the advisory effort:

(1) Transportation for movement of personnel to the MACV Personnel Processing Center.

EXHIBIT D-41

*This directive supersedes MACV Directive 612-1, 9 August 1966

(2) Transient billets for all incoming personnel when the capacity of the MACV Personnel Processing Center (Koelper Hotel) is exceeded.

(3) Temporary or permanent quarters for all personnel assigned within the Saigon/Cholon/Tan Son Nhut area immediately upon the completion of processing.

4. BRIEFINGS.

a. Briefings should be comprehensive and audience oriented. Use of demonstrations, practical exercises and discussions where appropriate is encouraged.

b. Handouts will be used to insure retention of important information including, but not limited to:

- (1) Nine Rules.
- (2) The Enemy in Your Hands.
- (3) Standing Orders, Rogers Rangers.
- (4) Standards of Conduct.
- (5) Stars & Stripes Semiannual Orientation Edition.
- (6) Guidance for Commanders in Vietnam (officers only).

FOR THE COMMANDER:



WALTER T. KERWIN, JR.
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff


NEIL N. SNYDER, JR.
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General

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
AB 143



KẾ-HOẠCH HỖN-HỢP QUÂN SỰ
COMBINED CAMPAIGN PLAN

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
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1968



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- A - INTELLIGENCE
TINH-BAO
- B - MILITARY SUPPORT FOR PACIFICATION
YEM-TRO QUAN-SU XDNT
- C - REFUGEE SUPPORT
TY NAN CONG-SAN
- D - AREAS REQUIRING SPECIAL SECURITY
CAC KHU-VUC CAN ĐAC BIET BAO VE
- E - RESTORATION AND PROTECTION OF RAIL, ROAD, AND WATER LOC'S
TAI THIET VA BAO-VE CAC TRUC GIAO-THONG THUY BO VA THIET LO
- F - RESOURCES DENIAL
BAO-VE TAI-NGUYEN
- G - CIVILIAN DETAINEES
NHUNG NGUOI TAM GIU
- H - PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
CHIEN-TRANH CHINH-TRI
- I - CHIEU HOI
CHIEU-HOI
- J - ATTACK ON VC INFRASTRUCTURE
TIEU DIET HA TANG CO-SO VC
- K - EMPLOYMENT OF CIVILIAN IRREGULAR DEFENSE GROUP
XU-DUNG DSCD
- L - NEUTRALIZATION OF VC/NVA BASE AREAS
TE-LIET HOA CAN CU VCMN/VCMB
- M - PROCEDURES FOR COORDINATION OF RVNAF AND US/FWMAF
OPERATIONS
PHUONG THUC PHOI HOP HANH QUAN GIUA QLVNCH VA HOA-KY/
QVTGTD
- N - LOGISTICS
TIEP-VAN
- O - COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS
TRUYEN-TIN - DIEN-TU
- P - PUBLIC AFFAIRS ~~(To be published)~~ ^{CH-1}
THONG-TIN (phổ biến sau)
- Q - QUARTERLY REVIEW ~~(To be published)~~ ^{CH-1}
DUYET XET (phổ biến sau)
- R - DEFINITIONS
DINH-NGHIA
- S - INSPECTOR GENERAL ~~(To be published)~~ ^{CH-1}
THANH-TRA (phổ biến sau)
- T - DISTRIBUTION
PHO-BIEN

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5. This Combined Campaign Plan is for planning on receipt and for execution on 1 January 1968. Recommended changes to this plan will be submitted through RVNAF channels to JGS and through US/FWMAF channels to MACV.

6. RVNAF and US Component Commands, ARVN Corps and US Force Commands will develop semi-annual combined campaign plans to support this Combined Campaign Plan. These plans will be designed to accomplish the objectives, tasks and goals, stated in this campaign plan and to support achievement of the goals in established provincial pacification plans. Specific goals to be accomplished during each quarter will be stated in the supporting campaign plans. RVNAF Components, and ARVN Corps will submit supporting semi-annual plans to RVNAF, JGS for combined review by 15 December 1967 and 15 June 1968. US Components, III MAF, I FFORCEV and II FFORCEV, and Senior Advisor IV CTZ will submit supporting semi-annual plans to MACV for combined review by 15 December 1967 and 15 June 1968.

7. Concurrently with development of military campaign plans, RVN Corps and Province echelons will develop pacification plans in accordance with this Combined Campaign Plan and directives issued by the Ministry of Revolutionary Development. See Annex B (Military Support of Pacification).

8. RVNAF and US Components, ARVN Corps, III MAF, I FFORCEV, II FFORCEV and SA, IV Corps will submit quarterly summaries covering the status of implementation of this plan, progress made, problems encountered and recommendations

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for improvement. Summaries are to be rendered as of 31 March, 30 June, 30 September and 31 December and submitted so as to arrive RVNAF, JGS/MACV not later than the fifteenth day following the as of date.

5. (U) LOGISTICS: Annex N (Logistics).


6. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. Command.

(1) Command of all military forces remains vested in the commander designated by the government making the contributions.

(2) Operational control of US/FWMAF is as mutually agreed upon by the representatives of the governments involved.

b. Signal. Annex O (Communications - Electronics).



CAO VAN VIEN
General, ARVN
Chief, JGS, RVNAF



W. C. WESTMORELAND
General, USA
COMUSMACV

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Inclosures: 1--Map, RVN - Area for Priority of Military

Offensive Operations

2--Map, RVN - 1968 Pacification Priority Provinces

3--Map, RVN - RVN and VC Provincial, CTZ and

Military Region Boundaries

Annexes: A--Intelligence

B--Military Support for Pacification

C--Refugee Support

D--Areas Requiring Special Security

E--Restoration and Protection of Rail, Road, and

Water LOC's

F--Resources Denial

G--Civilian Detainees

H--Psychological Operations

I--Chieu Hoi

J--Attack on VC Infrastructure

K--Employment of Civilian Irregular Defense Group

L--Neutralization of VC/NVA Base Areas

M--Procedures for Coordination of RVNAF and

US/FWMAF Operations

N--Logistics

O--Communications - Electronics

P--Public Affairs ~~(To be published)~~ CH-1

Q--Quarterly Review ~~(To be published)~~ CH-2

R--Definitions

S--Inspector General ~~(To be published)~~ CH-1

T--Distribution

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Appendix 2 (Concept on Use of Forces) to Annex B (Military Support for Pacification) to Combined Campaign Plan, 1968, AB 143

1. (U) PURPOSE: This appendix outlines the concept on the use of forces in pacification to include ARVN regular forces, US/FWMAF, and certain GVN provincial military forces and civilian elements. This appendix is intended as a guide for RVNAF and US/FWMAF commanders to determine specific pacification tasks for their subordinate echelons. Terms are defined in Annex R, Definitions.

2. (C) ARVN REGULAR FORCES: Tasks in support of pacification activities to provide territorial security

a. In support of RD:

(1) Conduct clearing operations.

(2) Conduct security operations.

(3) Conduct PSYOP with emphasis upon RD and Chieu Hoi themes.

(4) Conduct military civic action in accordance with the coordinated provincial civic action program to help with the support of the people to the government with emphasis on the proper behavior and discipline of the troops.

(5) Assist sector commanders in the recruiting and training of RF and PF.

(6) Provide elements for reserve/reaction forces in support of military forces in areas undergoing RD.

b. By conducting security operations for previously pacified areas, LOC, national resources, and government centers.

c. Assist GVN intelligence elements in their operations against the VC infrastructure.

3. (C) REGIONAL FORCES. Tasks in support of pacification activities to provide territorial security.

a. In support of RD:

(1) Conduct clearing operations, within capabilities, in conjunction with ARVN regular forces and/or US/FWMAF.

(2) Conduct security operations.

(3) Provide local security for population and GVN civil elements in hamlet and village areas where PF are inadequate for this task.

(4) Assist GVN Cadre elements to perform economic and social development projects.

(5) Assist in the recruiting and training of PF.

(6) Provide elements for reserve/reaction forces.

(7) Assist other GVN elements conducting PSYOP with emphasis on RD and Chieu Hoi themes.

b. By securing LOC for military, economic and political efforts.

c. Assist other GVN intelligence agencies in their operations against the VC infrastructure.

d. Assist the National Police in population control, resources denial, and/or to maintain law and order.

e. Assist GVN civil cadre elements to organize and train people's self-defence forces.

B-2-2

4. (C) POPULAR FORCES. Tasks in support of pacification activities to provide territorial security.

a. In support of RD:

(1) Provide local security for the population and GVN civil cadre elements in hamlet areas.

(2) Assist RF to provide local security.

(3) Assist GVN civil cadre elements to perform economic and social development projects.

(4) Conduct security operations.

(5) Assist other GVN elements conducting PSYOP with emphasis on RD and Chieu Hoi themes.

b. By securing LOC for military, economic and political efforts.

c. Assist the National Police in population control, resource denial and/or to maintain law and order.

d. Assist GVN civil cadre elements to organize and train people's self-defense forces.

e. Provide local security until relieved by NP or other authorized police force.

5. (C) REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE GROUPS AND OTHER ORGANIZED TEAMS. Tasks to establish political, economic and sociological programs:

a. Supply intelligence on the VC infrastructure and other local VC forces to military and police forces.

b. Establish initial hamlet government administration by election, if possible, or appointment, as required. Similarly, and where possible, establish initial village government administration.

- c. Organize and train an effective hamlet self-defense force.
- d. Organize an effective plan for hamlet defense and establish an alarm system to warn the hamlet populace of VC attack.
- e. Assist military forces to establish signal communications between hamlet/village and district.
- f. Survey, classify, and complete a census of the hamlet population. Determine and record the grievances and aspirations of the hamlet populace.
- g. Conduct PSYOP with emphasis on RD/Chieu Hoi themes.
- h. Initiate and, where possible, complete economic and social development projects to satisfy as much as possible the more critical grievances and involve the people in the projects. Emphasize self-help by the hamlet/village populace.
- i. Initiate and maintain a program to eliminate the presence of corrupt officials and other tyrants. Emphasize the need for the people to forget their personal conflicts and work together in harmony to achieve community development goals.
- j. Assist the hamlet/village populace to establish through a democratic elective process a permanent hamlet/village government system.
- k. Continue Task h above in conjunction with GVN technical cadre with priority to more permanent programs that will conform to the aspirations of the people and;

(1) Eliminate illiteracy and raise educational achievement.

(2) Provide satisfactory sanitary conditions and eliminate disease.

(3) Accomplish land reform as directed by GVN.

(4) Create agricultural associations to assist local peasant farmers harvest and market crops.

(5) Provide an adequate road network.

6. (C) NATIONAL POLICE FORCES. Tasks in support of pacification activities to provide internal security:

a. Develop and maintain informant nets and other intelligence nets.

b. Supply intelligence to military forces.

c. Participate with military forces in operations to destroy VC guerrillas and infrastructure.

d. Assume custody of and interrogate VC suspects.

e. Prevent VC infrastructure reorganization.

f. Initiate and maintain population and resources control.

g. Maintain law and order.

h. Assist, by virtue of their police activities, military forces to provide territorial security.

i. Conduct operations, in coordination with military forces, to destroy VC guerrillas and infrastructure.

j. Prevent and control riots and sabotage of public security.

k. Relieve military forces, when capable, by providing security for the population and GVN cadre elements.

B-2-5

1. Conduct coordinated PSYOP with emphasis on RD and Chieu Hoi themes.

7. (C) US/FWMAF Tasks in direct support of Pacification Activities:

a. Conduct combined and unilateral operations to clear VC/NVA main forces from provincial priority areas and other critical areas in accordance with established provincial pacification plans.

b. Conduct combined operations in conjunction with ARVN and/or provincial military forces and police elements to destroy VC guerrillas and infrastructure in specified hamlet or village areas in accordance with established provincial plans.

c. Conduct population control and resources denial operations on the rivers and coastal areas to prevent infiltration of military contraband from outside RVN, to prevent smuggling, to interdict and destroy the enemy's internal water LOC.

d. Conduct military civic action in accordance with the coordinated provincial civic action program to help win support of the people to GVN with emphasis on proper behavior and discipline of troops.

e. Assist sector commanders in the training of RF and PF.

f. Conduct PSYOPS with emphasis on RD and Chieu Hoi themes.

g. Related task is to conduct combined and unilateral offensive search and destroy operations against VC/NVA main forces to prevent their incursion into areas undergoing pacification.

B-2-6

Annex C (Refugee Support) to Combined Campaign Plan, 1968,

AB 143

1. (U) SITUATION:

a. General. This annex describes the concept of the refugee program and defines the functions of RVNAF and US/FWMAF Commanders in supporting the program.

b. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence).

c. Assumptions. Paragraph 1, basic plan.

2. (U) MISSION:

To furnish advisory and operational support for GVN refugee relief programs which provide for reception, screening and initial care of the refugee, psychological and political reorientation, and return to normal life as rapidly as possible.

3. (U) EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operation.

(1) The GVN Special Commissariat for Refugees (SCR), assisted by US advisors, has overall responsibility for the refugee program. In each province, the province chief is responsible to plan, coordinate and implement the refugee program providing hospitable and fair treatment of refugees regardless of their political or religious affiliations or ethnic background. When cared for properly, refugees can become supporters of the GVN, causing the VC to lose a source of manpower, supplies, intelligence and funds.

(2) The refugee program has four basic aspects:

(a) Reception, care and screening of refugees at temporary refugee centers.

(b) Psychological and political orientation,

C-1

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particularly in the temporary centers, and continuing in the resettlement phase. A strong effort will be made to win the refugees' support for the GVN and to exploit their contacts in enemy dominated areas to promote additional or continuing defections under the Chieu Hoi program and to provide intelligence on VC infrastructure and activities.

(c) Provision of vocational training for refugees and encouragement in forming cooperatives and cottage industry, particularly in resettlement sites.

(d) Reestablishment of refugees through return to their villages or through resettlement in new locations.

(3) GVN policy provides for emergency care for 30 days, which may be extended an addition 30 days if required. Prior to the end of this time, the refugee should have been able to return to his original home, or if military operations or other factors preclude return to his original home, he should have been resettled in another hamlet or area which is secure and affords an opportunity for him to become self-supporting. If this is not possible, the period of emergency relief can be extended by the SCR for one year, depending upon the local situation.

(4) Some refugees leave VC dominated areas voluntarily; others are generated by military operations. Persons in VC dominated areas should not be encouraged to come to GVN controlled areas as refugees except in conjunction with ongoing military or pacification operations and when the GVN is capable of caring for such refugees when they arrive in the GVN controlled area.

C-2

b. Principles:

(1) The role of the military in support of the refugee program consists of the following functions:

(a) Including in military plans specifications for the care, control, and disposition of probable refugees who may result from, or affect, military operations. Within security restriction appropriate GVN and US-MACV/CORDS officials should be informed of these plans prior to the operation in order to provide for the pre-positioning of relief supplies and to make preparations to institute the necessary refugee relief programs.

(b) Attaching military personnel from US Civil Affairs companies to tactical units or assigning them to province senior advisors in provinces where the refugee problem is substantial. Such personnel, under the operational control of the province senior advisor, will be employed as units to support ongoing GVN refugee programs. The US tactical commander, or province senior advisor, as appropriate, will provide for emergency assistance to refugees during the early stages of evacuation projects, using Civil Affairs personnel. RVNAF Civil Affairs personnel supporting the refugee program will be operationally controlled by the responsible ARVN tactical commander or the province chief, as appropriate.

(c) Providing security to refugee centers and hamlets where necessary.

(d) Planning and implementing psychological operations designed to win the support of refugee for the GVN and to gain refugee assistance in the Chieu Hoi program. Coming mainly from VC contested or controlled areas, and retaining strong

ties with their former hamlets, refugees can be instrumental in causing defections through the Chieu Hoi program and in furnishing intelligence. Military operation plans that affect refugees will have a psychological operations annex. The PSYOPS annex will be in consonance with the National Psychological Operations Plan (see Appendix 2 (National PSYOP Plan) to Annex H (Psychological Operations)) and will cover at least the following points: psychological objectives, target audiences, themes (including themes to be emphasized and themes to be avoided), and PSYOPS tasks in support of the refugee program for all organizations covered by the basic plan.

(e) Scheduling civic action projects aimed at improving refugee facilities, medical care, and engaging in other activities designed to improve the environment of the refugees.

(f) Assisting the National Police in gathering intelligence through the systematic screening and interrogation of refugees.

(g) Assisting in the training of refugees to contribute to local defense in refugee centers and hamlets.

(h) Providing emergency logistic support, particularly during the early stages of refugee movement.

4. (U) TASKS:

a. CG I, II, III, and IV Corps and CTZ, within their respective tactical zones, in coordination with GVN and US refugee officials, will:

(1) Emphasize to all subordinate commands the value of the refugee to the GVN pacification program and the necessity for fair, timely handling and support of refugees regardless of

C-4

their political or religious affiliations or ethnic background.

(2) Make provisions in operation plans and directives at all echelons for the handling of refugees so that they are cared for properly and do not interfere with military operations, and for their early turnover to GVN civil refugee officials. Plans should provide for emergency backup support in transportation, food, shelter, medical care, and safety as well as supporting psychological operations.

(3) Provide assistance to province and district officials, if requested, to expedite the establishment and development of temporary refugee centers and resettlement sites in secure areas. This assistance will include, but it is not limited to:

(a) Employing appropriate military units to assist in site preparation, construction of facilities, and the transport of supplies, commodities and personnel.

(b) Detailing military forces to maintain security in areas of refugee concentration, and training refugees to assist in providing camp security.

(c) Assigning trained interrogators to assist the National Police in screening refugees for intelligence purposes.

(4) Employ psywar units to augment civil efforts in presenting a strong program of psychological and political orientation designed to persuade the refugee to support the GVN and to cooperate in the Chieu Hoi program.

(5) Encourage civic action programs by appropriate military units to assist in the construction of classrooms, market places, roads and other projects designed to improve

C-5

existing facilities and to improve the refugees' environment. Such civic action must be coordinated at the province level to insure that projects undertaken support the overall pacification program in the province. See Appendix 3 (Civic Action) to Annex H (Psychological Operations).

(6) Support and encourage vocational training for refugees where possible. Furnish technical support and advice, where feasible, to expedite the formation of cooperatives and cottage industries, particularly in resettlement centers. Encourage local employment of refugees so that refugee skills and training may be fully utilized.

b. CG III MAF, I FFORCEV, and II FFORCEV and SA IV Corps, within their respective tactical zones, in coordination with GVN civil refugee officials, and as mutually agreed between each US/FWMAF Commander and his counterpart ARVN Corps Commander, will:

(1) Emphasize to all subordinate commands the value of the refugee to the GVN pacification program and the necessity for fair, timely handling and support of refugees regardless of their political or religious affiliations or ethnic background.

(2) Make provision in operation plans and directives at all echelons for the handling of refugees so that they are cared for properly and do not interfere with military operations, and for their early turnover to GVN civil refugee officials. Plans should provide for emergency backup support in transportation, food, shelter, medical care, and safety, as well as supporting psychological operations.

(3) Provide assistance to province and district

officials, if requested, to expedite the establishment and development of temporary refugee centers and resettlement sites in secure areas. This assistance will include, but is not limited to:

(a) Employing appropriate military units to assist in site preparation, construction of facilities, and the transport of supplies, commodities and personnel.

(b) Detailing military units to maintain security in areas of refugee concentration, and training refugees to assist in providing security in these areas.

(4) Encourage civic action programs by appropriate military units to assist in the construction of classrooms, market places, roads, and other projects designed to improve existing facilities and to improve the environment of refugees. Such civic action must be coordinated at the province level to ensure that projects undertaken support the overall pacification program in the province. See Appendix 3 (Civic Action) to Annex H (Psychological Operations).

(5) Support and encourage vocational training for refugees where possible. Furnish technical support and advice where feasible to expedite the formation of cooperative and cottage industries, particularly in resettlement sites. Encourage local employment of refugees so that refugee skills and training may be fully utilized.

5. (U) LOGISTICS:

a. The GVN Special Commissariat for Refugees, has primary responsibility for providing logistic support to the refugee program. Stocks of commodities and equipment are

maintained at GVN supply points throughout the RVN to expedite issues to refugees.

b. US advisors, in coordination with the SCR, assist in the procurement, storage and distribution of supplies and equipment to insure the availability of sufficient quantities to meet on-going and anticipated refugee program requirements.

c. Major GVN/US/FWMAF commanders will provide logistical support when civil resources are not adequate. This support will include, but not be limited to, providing: rapid and safe evacuation of civilian refugees by any means of transportation available, food, shelter, and medical attention. See Annex N (Logistics).

6. (U) COMMAND AND COORDINATION:

a. The ARVN Corps Commander, assisted by US advisors, is responsible to provide advisory and operational support for the GVN refugee relief program. The GVN/US/FWMAF tactical commander whose forces generate refugees, will provide security and care for such refugees until such time as GVN civil officials can take charge.

b. The GVN Special Commissariat for Refugees has overall responsibility for the refugee program, and coordinates with and seeks support from the Corps and Division Commanders and Province Chiefs, as required, to ensure adequate care for all refugees.

c. US advisors will assist their counterparts in ensuring accomplishment of the objectives of each phase of the refugee program from reception to resettlement.

Annex F (Resources Denial) to Combined Campaign Plan 1968,
AB 143

1. (U) SITUATION:

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence).
- b. Friendly Forces. Basic plan.
- c. Background.

(1) During recent years the VC have organized an effective logistic system to supply their forces by infiltrating essential supplies into the RVN and by obtaining a greater part of their critical logistical requirements from the RVN economy. A positive means to defeat the enemy, in addition to search and destroy operations, is to neutralize his logistical organization.

(2) In 1967, resources denial measures achieved few significant results. Many authorities did not know how to apply selective denial measures so as to assist economic development in the countryside and raise the living standards of the people. Checkpoints were operated only on relatively secure national roads and waterways. We must improve the resources denial program in 1968, adopting the principle of refining the program to the point where it does not hurt the RVN economy more than it hurts the enemy.

2. (U) MISSION: To protect the manpower and material resources of the RVN and to deny vital resources to the enemy.

3. (C) EXECUTION:

- a. Concept.

(1) Resources denial is an element of economic warfare undertaken to deny enemy access to and exploitation of

manpower and material resources of the RVN by providing the necessary security measures to protect and control the population and to control the production, storage, movement and use of resources considered vital to the war effort. The principal resources denial activities are as follows:

(a) Preventing the VC from stealing and exploiting farmers' crops in order to carry on the war.

(b) Controlling the movement of military use supplies, medicines, foodstuffs, etc., to the VC from government controlled areas.

(c) Destroying VC finance and economy organizations and other VC economic organizations and ventures which are self-sufficient.

(d) Creating a status of continuous insecurity along enemy LOC.

(2) The scope of this program is limited to those measures undertaken within the boundaries of the RVN including its inland and coastal waters. Resources denial operations will be concentrated on: population control; weapons, ammunitions and other military equipment; medicines, drugs and chemical components for explosives. However, denial of foodstuffs will be confined to and intensified in the areas of tactical military operations, along borders and boundaries, around enemy base areas and those areas where enemy units are known to be located; but not in secure areas. Measures undertaken to interdict enemy LOC's and neutralize or destroy enemy base areas inside of the

RVN are covered elsewhere in this plan. See Annex L (Neutralization of VC/NVA Base Areas).

(3) Intelligence efforts should be directed to collecting and exploiting information which identifies items critical to the enemy war effort, strong and weak points of the enemy financial and logistic structures and enemy plans and operations designed to disrupt the RVN economy.

b. Planning and Execution.

(1) Planning Phase. Before planning resources denial measures, province and district chiefs must carefully research enemy operations and capabilities and assess friendly economic resources and capabilities in each village and district. Province and district authorities must personally develop and execute the plan to exploit their knowledge of the local situation.

(2) Execution Phase. Province and district chiefs must continually evaluate their local areas to determine boundaries of secure and insecure areas so as to implement selective denial measures in their areas.

(a) Secure Areas. In secure areas, control measures will not be imposed on bulk foodstuffs. Emphasis should be rather on protection of rice movement to town and cities. A minimum number of checkpoints (mostly mobile) will be operated to check cargo on vehicles enroute to insecure areas. Stringent measures should continue to be applied to population control, military use supplies, medical and chemical supplies.

(b) Insecure Areas. Within insecure areas the sale, purchase and movement of military use supplies and foodstuffs will be controlled. Plans should be made to protect commodities against VC capture during shipment. Positive population control measures will be conducted. In regard to VC base areas, civil and military authorities in the province will determine the off-limit perimeters of each base area and ensure that the local population is well informed of these.

c. Tasks. ARVN Corps Commanders, in coordination with US/FWMAF commanders and appropriate GVN civil authorities, within their areas of responsibility, will employ forces at their disposal to accomplish the following general tasks:

(1) Plans will be developed and executed by Corps, Divisions and Sectors, in coordination with the VNN and appropriate GVN civil agencies, to provide for:

(a) Operation of resources control checkpoints.

See Appendix 1 (Checkpoints).

(b) Protection of rice. See Appendix 2 (Rice Protection).

(c) Control of waterways. See Appendix 4 (Control of Waterways). US/FWMAF and US civil agencies will assist in the development, evaluation, and execution of these plans as required.

(2) In planning and conducting resources denial activities, psychological operations which encourage popular support for and involvement of the people will be given a high priority. Every military plan for resources denial will include a supporting psychological operations annex which will adhere to guidance set

forth in the National Psychological Operations Plan. See Appendices 2 (National PSYOP Plan) and 7 (PSYOP in Support of Population and Resources Control) to Annex H (Psychological Operations).

(3) Carry out resources denial measures in contested areas, assisted by the National Police, and assist the National Police in carrying out similar measures in secure areas.

(4) Conduct checkpoint operations, assisted by the National Police, in contested areas, and assist the National Police in conducting checkpoint operations in secure areas.

(5) Conduct operations to seize and/or destroy enemy storage logistics and arms manufacturing locations. See Annex L (Neutralization of VC/NVA Base Areas). Extract and/or destroy captured supplies and equipment in accordance with procedures detailed in Appendix 5 (Control, Disposition and Safeguarding of Vietnamese Property, Captured Material and Food Supplies).

(6) Interdict VC/NVA LOC's through air, sea, riverine, ground and artillery operations. Priorities for interdiction of VC/NVA LOC's will be established based on Annex A (Intelligence).

(7) Conduct herbicide operations to destroy enemy crops and to uncover enemy LOC's and storage sites.

(8) Conduct operations to eliminate VC tax collection points.

4. (U) COMMAND AND COORDINATION:

a. At the national level, the Interministerial Resources Control Council will guide the development, coordination, implementation and review of GVN economic warfare policy.

b. The Corps commander will task subordinate division and sector commanders to prepare appropriate resources denial plans and will monitor and evaluate development and execution of these plans to ensure adequacy, consistency and coordination.

c. MACV advisors will assist their counterparts in preparing appropriate resources denial plans and in monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of the execution of these plans.

d. In accordance with GVN decree number 844-TTP/VP/M, 26 October 1964, the Corps commander will ensure that a Resources Control Committee, comprised of representatives of the appropriate GVN/US military and civil agencies, is operating effectively at the Corps level and in each province to coordinate resources control activities.

e. National Police, when available, will be responsible for the conduct of search and seizure of personnel and property.

f. Coordination procedures are contained in Annex M (Procedures for Coordination of RVNAF and US/FWMAF Operations).

Appendices: 1--Checkpoints

2--Rice Protection

3--Use of Herbicides

4--Control of Waterways

5--Control, Disposition and Safeguarding of Vietnamese Property, Captured Material and Food Supplies

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Appendix 5 (Control, Disposition and Safeguarding of Vietnamese Property, Captured Material and Food Supplies) to Annex F (Resources Denial) to Combined Campaign Plan, 1968, AB 143

1. (U) PURPOSE: This appendix outlines policy and procedures for:

a. Control, disposition, and safeguarding of private property and food supplies during combat operations.

b. Control and disposition of captured material and supplies.

2. (U) REFERENCES:

a. JGS Memo Number 0359/TTM/ITHQ/HQ, 7 February 1967, subject: Utilization of Food Supplies Seized During Operations.

b. MACV Directive 525-9 (C), subject: Combat Operations Control, Disposition, and Safeguarding of Vietnamese Property, Captured Material and Food Supplies.

3. (C) GENERAL:

a. In VC controlled areas, RVNAF, US and other FWMAF must take all practicable measures to minimize the destruction of both public and private property.

(1) Disposition of private property and supplies is the responsibility of GVN officials.

(2) The destruction of dwellings and livestock as a denial measure is the responsibility of GVN authorities or RVNAF units. Requests by Vietnamese authorities for employment of US forces in the deliberate destruction of non-combatant's property as a denial measure will be referred to Headquarters MACV for the personal decision of COMUSMACV.

b. Captured material and supplies are to be considered a valuable asset that will be extracted if at all possible. Newly

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introduced items with unusual modifications will be evacuated through intelligence channels. US tactical commanders will include in operations plans provisions for security and immediate release to RVNAF of all captured food supplies. RVNAF will preposition rice bags in all CTZs to be used in extracting bulk stores of captured rice. RVNAF will use captured rice to supplement their food rations, if required, and distribute the excess to needy people to promote their support for RVNAF and the GVN. Among needy people, refugees and war victims must be given first priority in receiving captured rice in accordance with RVNAF, JGS Directives. Captured food caches will be extracted and distributed using RVNAF resources and transportation to the maximum extent practicable. Major US tactical commanders will make the final decision to destroy significant food caches captured by US forces only after determining that extraction is not feasible.

c. Captured medical supplies may not be destroyed or used by US medical personnel except in an emergency due to non-availability of US medical items of the type required. Release of captured medical supplies to local GVN officials or other relief agencies in the field is expressly prohibited except in cases of urgent humanitarian need. If not required for treatment of enemy personnel, all captured medical supplies will be extracted by capturing units through component command established channels or left intact and in place.

4. (C) TASKS:

a. CG, I, II, III, and IV Corps and CTZ, within their respective areas of responsibility will:

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(1) Insure that RVNAF units minimize destruction of property.

(2) Develop procedures, in coordination with US/FWMAF commanders, for the extraction of captured supplies to preclude their further use by the enemy.

(3) Establish procedures for distributing captured rice to refugees, war victims and other needy people.

(4) Insure that operations are planned and conducted with proper regard for psychological considerations. See Annex H (Psychological Operations).

b. CG, I FFORCEV, II FFORCEV, and III MAF, and SA, IV Corps and CTZ, in coordination with other FWMAF commanders, will:

(1) Insure that US/FWMAF units minimize destruction of property.

(2) Extract and dispose of captured supplies in accordance with paragraph 3b and c above.

(3) Insure that operations are planned and conducted with proper regard for psychological considerations. See Annex H (Psychological Operations).

Annex G (Civilian Detainees) to Combined Campaign Plan, 1968,
AB 143

1. (C) SITUATION:

a. Enemy Situation. Annex A (Intelligence).

b. Large numbers of civilians suspected of aiding or abetting the enemy are picked up in military and combined military/civil operations. Some are members of the VC infrastructure. Processing and accounting for these detainees is a growing burden on RVNAF, US/FWMAF, GVN and US civilian authorities. As the war has intensified, the number of detainees has increased at a rapid rate. This increase has caused serious overcrowding at collection points, temporary detention camps, and GVN police compounds. Screening and classification of detainees is slow; and often, due to overcrowded conditions, personnel are released without appropriate identification or determination of status.

2. (U) MISSION: To provide prompt, thorough, and effective screening, segregation, and disposition of suspected enemy civilian personnel captured or detained by RVNAF and US/FWMAF.

3. (U) EXECUTION:

a. Concept. Screening of captured or detained suspected enemy civilian personnel will be accomplished to gain maximum intelligence and to minimize the detention of innocent civilians. Screening procedures must be thorough and effective to preclude rescreening once detainees are confirmed as PW and interned in a PW camp. Detainees are persons who have been detained but whose final status as to PW, returnee (Hoi Chanh), civil defendant or innocent, has not been determined. Procedures for handling refugees are contained in Annex C (Refugee Support) and US and GVN directives previously issued; procedures for handling

returnees are contained in Annex I (Chieu Hoi) and US and GVN directives previously issued; and instructions on processing PW are contained in detailed MACV and JGS directives previously issued. It is important that enemy combat effectives, returnees, and refugees are processed in accordance with appropriate procedures; that civil defendants are referred to proper judicial agencies for trial; and that doubtful cases are turned over to the Provincial Security Committee (which is headed by the Province Chief) for appropriate disposition. Screening procedures should be designed to:

- (1) Classify personnel rapidly so that interrogation of selected individuals can commence as soon after capture or detention as possible.
- (2) Provide a means for tactical units rapidly to extract exploitable information from detainees.
- (3) Preclude the introduction of innocent people into the already saturated judicial and penal system of RVN.
- (4) Insure that only those detainees who are eligible for PW status are interned in PW camps.
- (5) Conduct screening of captured personnel and detainees at the lowest echelon of command practicable.
- (6) Locate screening points, where practicable, near sector or subsector headquarters to take maximum advantage of National Police, MSS, and other intelligence files at those headquarters.
- (7) Make maximum use of the Combined US/FWMAF Interrogation System.

b. CG I, II, III, and IV ARVN Corps, in coordination with

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the National Police and local GVN security officials, will insure that:

(1) Tactical screening centers are established whenever there is an operation conducted by RVNAF units. Combined tactical screening centers will be established whenever there is an operation conducted by US/FWMAF units or by RVNAF/US/FWMAF units. Establishment of tactical or combined tactical screening centers will be included in advance operational planning. The mission of the tactical or combined tactical screening center is to provide integration of RVNAF and/or US/FWMAF and appropriate GVN civil security personnel for screening of all persons detained by RVNAF/US/FWMAF. A tactical or combined tactical screening center will have joint representation from participating units and civil authorities. Ideally the Deputy Province Chief for Security and a representative from the operational unit will function as co-chairmen. In addition to participation by various staff elements of the operational units, the MSS, Provincial/District National Police, including the Special Branch, and the Sector/Subsector S2, will have representation in the center.

(2) Military intelligence interrogators screen all civilians apprehended by military units. Detailed screening procedures are contained in Appendix 1 (Detailed Screening Procedures). Joint civil/military interrogation teams, including Police Special Branch personnel, will be established where feasible.

(3) Military intelligence interrogators attach high priority to identification and release of innocent civilians soon

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after capture. This will be accomplished after information of immediate operational intelligence value has been obtained and immediate appropriate action taken thereon. Innocent civilians will be returned to their villages or transferred to refugee camps, as appropriate. Where feasible, innocent civilians will be positively identified, photographed, and fingerprinted by the National Police prior to release to facilitate identification and processing if they are again detained.

(4) Adequate temporary facilities are constructed to effect complete segregation of PWs, innocent civilians, and civilian detainees as soon as their status is determined.

(5) All doubtful cases, suspected members of the VC infrastructure, or other civilians suspected of aiding the enemy, but who do not qualify as prisoners of war, are transferred to civilian authorities for ultimate determination of status and further processing.

(6) All military units effect the physical transfer of civilian detainees to civilian detention facilities at the province and district according to specific instructions provided by the GVN Province or District Chief. The province and district chiefs will provide transportation, within their capabilities, for civilian detainees to detention centers. Transportation required beyond province/district capability will be provided by RVNAF/US/FWMAF.

(7) Military intelligence interrogators transfer to the Police Special Branch all information appropriate or pertinent to the case of each detainee transferred to civilian authority.

(8) The GVN Province Chief provides adequate

detention facilities for civilian detainees, security of these facilities, further screening, and ultimate determination of status, including legal proceedings.

(9) Unit commanders in the field provide additional support upon request of the Province Chief, within individual unit capabilities. Such support will include commodities as well as temporary deployment of joint civil/military interrogation teams to screen and determine status of suspects.

c. CG I FFORCEV, II FFORCEV, III MAF and SA IV Corps in coordination with RVNAF Commanders, and proper civilian authorities, where appropriate, will insure that those tasks outlined in paragraph b. above are accomplished and/or supported to the maximum extent possible. US units will utilize the combined tactical screening of detainees concept outlined in this Annex and appropriate MACV directives.

4. (U) LOGISTICS:

a. Care and feeding of detainees while in custody of military forces is the responsibility of such military forces.

b. Logistic support of detainees while in military custody will be provided in accordance with Annex N (Logistics).

c. Care and feeding of detainees in custody of civil authority is the responsibility of that authority, normally the province or district chief. In an emergency, US province or district advisors may be able to provide assistance in the form of foodstuffs to the province or district.

Appendixes: 1--Detailed Screening Procedures.

Appendix 1 (Detailed Screening Procedures) to Annex G (Civilian Detainees) to Combined Campaign Plan, 1968, AB 143

1. At the time of capture, each detainee will be tagged, and a Detainee Card (USARV Form 365 for US units) filled out as completely as possible. Of extreme importance is data reflecting circumstance of capture, and information as to whether documents or weapons are found on the detainee.
2. A Detainee Report Form (USARV 364 for US units) will be completed to reflect facts concerning the activities performed by the detainee. This is important because a major factor for determination of status is the act being performed by the detainee at the time of capture.
3. A blacklist furnished by counter-intelligence elements, DOICC, PIC, PSB, etc., supplemented by the provincial and district police knowledge of the area and its inhabitants, is essential for confirming the identity of individuals, and for determining the veracity of source statements. The name of the detainee will be checked against the blacklist. If it appears on the list, a notation to that effect will be entered on the Detainee Report Form (Item 15, Remarks, USARV Form 364 for US units). The fact that a suspect was picked up in a VC-controlled area does not in itself justify the classification of a detainee as a PW. Therefore, every bit of information that tends to substantiate the correct status of the detainee must be entered on the forms.
4. Trace metal detector kits should be used as appropriate. Positive readings will be recorded on the Detainee Report Form.
5. Returnees and informants will be used to identify detainees.
6. Military Intelligence (MI) interrogators will be alert at all

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times to detect detainees who possess immediately exploitable info concerning enemy plans, positions and supply caches. It is vital that such information be obtained as a matter of priority as soon as possible after capture.

7. Upon completion of MI interrogation, the normal processes of population control are initiated. Biographic data is recorded, and fingerprints are taken and compared with those on the individual's ID card. The detainee is then photographed. A copy of the photograph should be placed on file in the PSB, and in the PIC and DOICC, when present. If there is no reason to suspect the detainee as a VC, he is interviewed by the National Police Special Branch. Using the blacklist and the results of the MI interrogation, information is solicited pertaining to the detainee's knowledge of VC activities and personalities in his village or hamlet. This endeavor must be conducted in such a manner as to gain the confidence and good will of the individual; thus he or she must be treated with politeness and dignity.
8. If the detainee is still suspected after the completion of the above, National Police interrogators continue attempts either to obtain additional incriminating evidence or conclude that there is insufficient cause to hold the detainee further. An individual dossier will be prepared for everyone who is interrogated as suspect. When time/distance factors permit, district police files will be checked to determine any previous record of apprehension. The dossiers, or at least a copy of all information contained therein, will be transferred to the district police when the screening center is relocated. In the case of a detainee classified as PW, a copy of the Preliminary Interrogation

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Report (PIR) will be sent with the PW to the Corps PW Camp where he is to be interned.

9. Segregation of detainees is an important aspect of the operation. Detainees are to be grouped in holding areas as follows:
 - a. Apparent PWs.
 - b. Known VC identified by blacklists.
 - c. Suspected civil defendants.
 - d. Innocents.
10. Dispersion of these holding areas should be sufficient to preclude normal voice communication between areas. The holding areas should be screened by canvas or matting to deny visual observation of one area from another.
11. To forestall rejection by PW camp commanders of PW of questionable status, every attempt will be made to substantiate any evidence leading to the judgment by the interrogator that the detainee is entitled to PW status. Factors to be considered are: membership in Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Armed Forces; capture while performing an overt hostile act in combat; capture while carrying weapons, documents or individual papers that provide clues as to the PW status of the individual; wearing of uniforms and distinctive insignia; admission by the detainee himself, confirmatory statements by witnesses and colleagues of the detainee; and positive readings through the use of metal detector kits, or other scientific devices.
12. Compassion will be shown to the aged, women and young. Every attempt will be made early in the screening process to segregate the obviously innocent individuals and to release them locally as soon as practicable.

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13. Consideration will be given to detainees who have cooperated in providing information concerning the enemy so that they may be accorded returnee status.

14. Intermediate commands will consistently review and monitor the classification procedures of subordinate units and take timely action to minimize arbitrary classifications or miscarriages of justice.

15. Improperly documented PW will not be evacuated to PW camps. Every effort will be made to resolve conflicting views between US and RVN interrogators prior to the transfer to and internment of PW in the Corps PW camp.

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Annex H (Psychological Operations) to Combined Campaign Plan, 1968, AB 143

1. (C) SITUATION:

a. General. Guidance contained herein is applicable to all psychological operations (to include civic action) in support of RVNAF/US/FWMAF and appropriate GVN/US/FW agencies directly or indirectly engaged in combating enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnam. This includes psychological operations conducted in conjunction with other political and military GVN/US agencies and FWMAF in support of programs covered in the appendixes to this annex.

b. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence).

c. Friendly Forces.

(1) GVN/US Diplomatic Mission. Provides policy guidance concerning national aims and policies. Psychological operations units will be responsive to requests from GVN/US Mission for support.

(2) US 7th Psychological Operations Group. As directed by CINCUSARPAC, provides back-up psychological operations support requested through COMUSMACV by GVN/US/FWMAF agencies.

(3) Republic of Korea, Australian, New Zealand, Thai and Philippine forces. Conduct psychological operations, to include civic action programs, in coordination with GVN and US forces.

d. Assumptions. See basic plan.

2. (C) MISSION: RVNAF and US/FWMAF conduct psychological warfare operations against NVN and VC/NVA personnel and civilians under the influence of the Viet Cong. RVNAF and US/FWMAF conduct psychological operations, including military

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civic action, in conjunction with military offensive and in support of pacification and nation-building objectives.

3. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operations.

(1) Psychological operations will be conducted in accordance with the National Psychological Operations Plan at Appendix 2. Civic action objectives are stated in Appendix 3 (Civic Action).

(2) Strategic and tactical psychological operations will be conducted in support of RVNAF/US/FWMAF.

(a) Strategic psychological operations will be planned by JGS/MACV and executed by the commands and agencies designated.

(b) Tactical psychological operations are conducted by RVNAF/US/FWMAF Commanders utilizing organic, attached and supporting psychological assets, operating within the framework of the objectives contained in Appendix 2 (National PSYOP Plan) and that additional guidance issued by MACV Psychological Operations Directorate/RVNAF, General Political Warfare Department. Emphasis will be given to timely response to tactical situations and identification and exploitation of psychological opportunities.

(c) Psychological operations are conducted by RVNAF/US/FWMAF Commanders to support pacification in accordance with Annex B (Military Support for Pacification).

(3) Civic action, as part of overall psychological operations, will be emphasized in its complementary role with pacification. Through civic action programs RVNAF/US/FWMAF gain the support and involvement of the people in the efforts of

the Government of Vietnam to control the country and build a nation.

b. RVNAF/US Force Commanders.

(1) Conduct tactical psychological operations in support of RVNAF/US combat operations in Vietnam with military psychological operations forces available.

(2) Assist FWMAF Commanders in conducting psychological operations by attaching psychological operations teams when requested.

(3) Provide for utilization of all available assets for military civic action commensurate with the tactical situation. As a minimum, this will consist of emergency assistance, such as medical treatment of noncombatant casualties during combat operations, and a planned, coordinated civic action program to consolidate existing secure areas. Coordination with appropriate local officials will be effected to assure that such activities support pacification and nation building objectives.

c. Commanders, U.S. 7th AF/VNAF. Conduct military civic action and airborne psychological operations throughout Vietnam and provide propaganda delivery means as directed. Coordinate psychological operations aircraft support for each CTZ through operation of a joint 7th USAF/VNAF Tactical Air Coordination Center and DASCs.

d. COMNAVFORV/VN Navy. Conduct river and coastal waterborne psychological operations, including civic action, throughout Vietnam and provide propaganda delivery means as directed. Coordination with appropriate local officials will be effected to assure that such activities support RD and nation

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building objectives.

e. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Psychological operations support will be rendered in the following priority:

(a) Strategic psychological warfare, including Chieu Hoi.

(b) Psychological warfare in support of tactical operations.

(c) Other psychological operations in support of province/sector requirements.

(2) To obtain psychological operations support, beyond the capability of psychological operations resources under their OPCON, commanders will process requests through the CTZ Propaganda Support Centers (PSC) to the PSYWAR Coordination Center (PCC) of the RVNAF General Political Warfare Department.

(3) Psychological operations will be coordinated with the province psychological operations committees (whenever feasible) in order to achieve common goals. Planning for psychological operations support at all priority levels will take into account the needs of pacification and nation building.

(4) Integration of civic action and pacification will be accomplished in coordination with the provincial committees. This provides a means for US/FWMAF to collaborate with RVNAF and the province chiefs in joint projects which assist in extending GVN control throughout the Republic of Vietnam.

(5) Psychological operations and civic action plans (including MEDCAP) within each sector, subsector or autonomous city, except in unusual circumstances, will be coordinated with

appropriate GVN/US/FWMAF Commanders and agencies.

(6) All commanders will include PSYOP annexes in operational plans which involve contact with the enemy forces and civilian population.

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:

a. Logistics.

(1) ARVN/US psychological operations battalions are responsible for support of subordinate units for mission - type equipment and expendable supplies.

(2) Supplies to support the military civic action program are available from International Voluntary Agencies, private donations and, in emergencies, from military stocks.

b. Personnel.

(1) Local nationals will be employed as required to provide or supplement linguistic capabilities and sociological knowledge.

(2) Hoi Chanh (Chieu Hoi returnee) will be used in psychological operations as required to exploit their knowledge of the situation or special aptitudes.

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. Command relations remain as currently established.

b. The overall coordinating authority for the direction of military psychological operations is retained by CPWD/MACPD, who issue operational instruction in conformance with GVN policy, and U.S. Mission PSYOP policy promulgated by JUSPAO as required.

c. Signal. See Annex O (Communications and Electronics).

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Appendixes: 1--Troop Morale.

2--National PSYOP Plan.

3--Civic Action.

4--Anti-Communist Refugee.

5--Chieu Hoi, Open Arms.

6--Military PSYOP Support of Pacification.

7--PSYOP in Support of Population and Resources
Control.

*Appendix I (Troop Morale Action) to Annex H (Psychological Operations) to Combined Campaign Plan, 1968, AB 143

1. (C) GENERAL:

a. The activities of troop morale action include: troop information and education, providing for the well-being of the troops and fostering those activities which contribute to improving the morale of enlisted men. If troop morale actions are executed precisely, the enlisted ranks should exhibit good discipline and conduct, a friendly attitude towards the civilian population and the will to win in combat. These should result in winning the support and respect of the people and instill fear among the ranks of the Viet Cong.

b. Since this is a war without a defined front line, it becomes more important that we mingle with the people anywhere and at any time. Our capabilities, as in the fields of transportation and technology, meet only a small portion of the PSYWAR requirements in the total effort. The significant way to achieve the ultimate goal is to have our soldiers reflect constantly the highest levels of good discipline and conduct, exhibit a genuine interest in the welfare of the people and be sufficiently informed to explain clearly the policies of the Government of Vietnam.

c. In summary, the most important aspects of PSYWAR are the military behavior, discipline and attitude of the individual enlisted man. Therefore, the activities of the Troop Morale Program become a decisive factor within the broad scope of POLWAR.

2. (U) MISSIONS:

*Appendix I has been prepared by RVNAF specifically for RVNAF, but has general application to US/FWMAF under appropriate directives.

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a. Inform and educate the enlisted ranks, provide for their well-being and foster morale building activities to attain a high level of response in relation to behavior, discipline, interest in the people and a will to win in combat.

b. Educate the enlisted man so that he may explain clearly and simply the policies of the Government of Vietnam.

3. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Concept.

(1) All commanders must actively concern themselves with the aspirations and problems of enlisted men subordinate to them. They must carefully provide for the welfare of enlisted men and their families to instill confidence in the command structure and the POLWAR cadre who provide information and education.

(2) All commanders should encourage enlisted men to actively contribute constructive ideas to enhance the unit's accomplishment of the mission so that the enlisted ranks gain confidence in their own capabilities and at the same time acquire a spirit of joint responsibility with their comrades-in-arms and their commanders.

(3) Commanders must use their powers of promotion and appointment judiciously and wisely.

(4) Commanders should enthusiastically use the media of leadership activities in the task of ideological development to consolidate and develop high standards among enlisted men in respect to their conduct and behavior.

b. Objectives of information and education and improvement of enlisted morale.

(1) Enlisted men should believe they are fighting for

their own future as well as that of their children and their fellow countrymen.

(2) Enlisted men should foster a hatred for the Viet Cong, realizing the enemy is cruel, warlike and is betraying the Fatherland as well as the people.

(3) Enlisted men should understand that their military and political activities are now winning, and will ultimately defeat the aggressive scheme of the Viet Cong.

(4) Enlisted men should understand that the Pacification Program is the most effective means of winning over the Viet Cong and will lead eventually to agricultural prosperity.

(5) Enlisted men should realize they have a dual responsibility. They are both fighters and political representatives of their government. Their devotion to both of these roles will win over the Viet Cong in both war and peace with the result they and their children will enjoy peace in freedom and prosperity.

(6) Enlisted men should exhibit a friendly attitude towards allied forces.

(7) Enlisted men should develop a competitive spirit by continually improving their unit, recording their feats at arms and participating in pacification.

c. Vital Activities.

(1) Develop and provide momentum to guidance and command activities launched in combat units and staff and logistical agencies.

(2) Announce and sustain the "fair play" policy on rights, promotions, appointments and individual opinion.

(3) Closely coordinate all POLWAR efforts with those

of the Adjutant General and directors of Logistics and Training so as to obtain maximum results in strengthening the mental and physical preparedness of enlisted men.

(4) Prepare, publish and distribute pocket books which feature simple and clear questions and answers on subjects relative to TI&E objectives. Concurrently, make maximum use of communications media as newspapers, television, radio and Army motion pictures to communicate information relative to these objectives.

(5) Organize contests at the unit level promoting feats at arms, unit preparedness and participation in pacification programs with suitable recognition and reward for those who achieve outstanding results.

Annex J (Attack on VC Infrastructure) to Combined Campaign Plan, 1968, AB 143

1. (C) SITUATION: Despite progress in pacification programs and in the military effort, the VC infrastructure remains largely intact throughout Vietnam. Although many agencies are engaged in the effort, a more effective, sustained attack on the infrastructure can be waged. This can be accomplished by specific delineation of responsibility, improved coordination, and more concentrated employment of existing US and GVN programs and resources for collection, collation and timely exploitation of intelligence on the VC infrastructure.

Techniques, procedures and functions as related to screening, processing and handling VC civilian detainees, as well as the controls and guidelines designed to insure timely dissemination and exploitation of intelligence and operational information, need to be systematically standardized and improved. In addition, it is essential that centralized reporting systems, keyed to support intelligence collection, operational planning, management and evaluation, be developed.

2. (C) MISSION: Identify, locate, harass, disrupt, neutralize and eliminate the VC infrastructure.

3. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Concept. Attack on the VC infrastructure must be a fully integrated and coordinated effort involving:

(1) Collection, collation and dissemination of intelligence information concerning key VC infrastructure personalities, organizations, functions and modus operandi.

(2) Prompt exploitation of intelligence for further intelligence collection or for positive action against the

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infrastructure.

(3) Prompt and controlled screening, interrogation, judicial processing, detention, or other appropriate disposition of detainees. See Annex G (Civilian Detainees).

(4) Integration of anti-infrastructure operations with pacification and military operations, as appropriate, and optimum utilization of propaganda and psychological operations resources and techniques.

b. RVNAF and US/FWMAF.

(1) Units will participate in operations in direct support of provincial RD activities, and operations against the VC infrastructure as defined in Annex R (Definitions). Operations will be of a combined nature coordinated where practicable with those GVN units, such as Police Special Branch (PSB), Province Reconnaissance Units (PRU), and National Police Field Force (NPFF), who are assigned the specific mission of eliminating the VC infrastructure. Coordination will take place at the province/district level. Military units will, for example, secure and cordon a target area and provide protection to PSB, Military Security Service (MSS), or NPFF screening and search teams. Operations of this nature will be supported to the maximum extent by collated intelligence on the VC infrastructure previously acquired by all agencies.

(2) Information and intelligence pertaining to the VC infrastructure collected by intelligence agencies or acquired through action or reaction operations will be immediately disseminated to interested agencies and will be forwarded without delay to District Operations and Intelligence Coordinating

J-2

Centers for information and possible further action, and/or to the Province Intelligence Coordinating Committee (PICC), or the permanent office of the PICC, and to the Provincial Interrogation Center (PIC).

(3) Provincial Reconnaissance Units will conduct special operations to collect or exploit intelligence against the VC infrastructure and, where appropriate, will participate in or support coordinated operations of other forces against the infrastructure.

c. RVN National Police.

(1) The Police Special Branch, supported by the Province Interrogation Center (PIC), is responsible for collecting, collating, and evaluating intelligence pertaining to the VC infrastructure.

(2) The NPFF, acting as the action arm of the National Police is responsible for elimination of the VC infrastructure in districts, villages and hamlets through overt police operations. NPFF will participate in operations mounted by RVNAF and US/FWMAF units and operations generated by province and district coordinating centers. Once this main task has been discharged, the NPFF has the primary responsibility of preventing VC resurgence and the ultimate mission of safeguarding the extension of other NP presence into the rural area.

d. Hoi Chanh capabilities will be used to the maximum extent in support of the attack on infrastructure, both to induce VC to return to the GVN side and to support intelligence and reaction activities. Personnel of military intelligence, national police and other agencies who are concerned with the exploitation

of Hoi Chanh, are cautioned that such actions will not be prosecuted in such a manner as to compromise the spirit or intent of the National (GVN) Open Arms Program. The status of Hoi Chanh as a distinct and separate category, unlike PW, will be carefully upheld. Selected Hoi Chanh will be used as interrogators, guides and in other suitable roles for which they are individually qualified, such as interrogation of refugees from their own general area to obtain information on the VC infrastructure in that area.

e. All units, agencies and activities engaged in the attack on the VC infrastructure will, as appropriate and in accordance with prescribed procedures, insure rapid and effective screening of detainees, identification of VC suspects, and early release of innocent persons. See Annex G (Civilian Detainees). VC suspects will be transported promptly to the appropriate interrogation activity for timely intelligence exploitation and further processing and/or detention. Before release, civilians will be fingerprinted and photographed by the National Police, or supporting elements, in order to provide positive identification of individuals and to establish their presence at a known time and location.

4. (C) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:

a. Logistics. The PSB, NPFF and PRU forces will be furnished required logistical support (to include transportation which is beyond their own capability) by RVNAF/US/FWMAF when operating with such forces.

b. Personnel.

(1) In addition to employing all available resources,

J-4

special emphasis will be placed on interrogation of PW, civil detainees, and Hoi Chanh for the acquisition of intelligence on the VC infrastructure and the identification of VC infrastructure personnel.

(2) Intelligence coordination centers will develop techniques and procedures to categorize information on all PW, civil detainees, and Hoi Chanh.

5. (C) COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. Military command relations remain as currently established.

b. Command of police forces will remain in the police chain of command.

c. Overall coordinating authority within USMACV for the direction of the infrastructure attack is retained by Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS.

d. Signal, See Annex O (Communications and Electronics).

Annex L (Neutralization of VC/NVA Base Areas) to Combined Campaign Plan 1968, AB 143

1. (U) SITUATION:

a. General. This annex contains guidance for the systematic neutralization of VC/NVA base areas.

b. Enemy Forces: Annex A (Intelligence).

c. Friendly Forces: See basic plan.

d. Assumptions: See basic plan.

2. (C) MISSION: RVNAF and US/FWMAF develop plans for and conduct operations to locate and systematically neutralize VC/NVA base areas.

3. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Concept.

(1) The systematic neutralization of VC/NVA base areas will directly support the objectives of the campaign plan. Primarily, the destruction of the enemy's command, control, and logistics facilities will contribute to his eventual defeat. The neutralization of these bases also will require the enemy to place greater demands on the people of RVN for financial, logistical, and manpower support. As these demands increase, the people will become increasingly disillusioned and more susceptible to friendly psychological operations. This will support the objective of assisting GVN to extend control throughout RVN.

(2) Priority of effort will be directed to the neutralization of those bases which directly affect the selected priority areas, key population and economic centers, and vital communication arteries.

(3) Maximum use will be made of B-52 bomber strikes and other Air Force and Naval firepower, with rapid follow-up

L-1

by ground forces to complete the neutralization. For those bases where complete neutralization and permanent denial to the enemy is not possible, repeated air strikes with random pattern ground operations will be conducted to create insecurity, disrupt command channels, and deter stationing and movement of VC/NVA forces in these bases.

(4) Base areas determined to be habitual safe havens for the enemy will be selected for total destruction when warranted. Jungle growth which provides the cover and concealment necessary for these areas to be of value to the enemy will be destroyed when feasible by cutting, clearing or other appropriate measures.

(5) Several base areas may be clustered in the same general area; even though one may be considered more important than the others, it is desirable to neutralize the entire cluster. Otherwise, the enemy can shift operations to other nearby bases and continue operating within the same general geographical area.

(6) At Appendix 1 is a list of the identified base areas in relative order of priority based on the estimated value of the base to the enemy.

(7) At Appendix 2 is a schematic map indicating the approximate locations of base areas.

(8) The priority for neutralization or destruction of base areas within each corps tactical zone is determined by the III MAF Commander, I FFORCEV Commander, or II FFORCEV Commander in coordination with the respective ARVN Corps Commander, and the ARVN 4th Corps Commander in coordination with the Senior Advisor IV Corps and is subject to periodic revision during the

L-2

campaign. The priority for neutralization is based on the estimated effect the continued use of the base would have on friendly operations and the estimated value of the base to the enemy.

(9) Base area goals for CY68 are 80% of the identified base areas in RVN neutralized on a continuing basis by the end of the year. Plans developed by components, Corps headquarters, III MAF and FFORCEV headquarters for base area neutralization or destruction will establish quarterly goals. Progress of accomplishment will be reported during quarterly reviews.

b. CG, III MAF, CG, I FFORCEV, CG, II FFORCEV and CG, IV ARVN Corps in coordination with appropriate counterpart and adjacent commanders when appropriate, will:

(1) Conduct sustained ground and air operations to neutralize base areas having highest priority for neutralization.

(2) Conduct repeated air attacks in other base areas with coordinated ground operations as feasible.

(3) Assist adjacent commanders in the neutralization of base areas adjacent to the CTZ boundary.

c. CG, I ARVN Corps, CG, II ARVN Corps, and CG, III ARVN Corps will assist appropriate counterparts in the neutralization of base areas affecting selected priority areas for pacification.

d. Senior Advisor, IV Corps will provide support to IV ARVN Corps as available.

e. Commander VNN and COMNAVFORV will support base area neutralization operations as appropriate.

f. Commander, VNAF in coordination with CG, 7th Air Force will provide close air support to ground and amphibious

operations for base area neutralization.

g. CG, 7th Air Force, in coordination with Commander, VNAF will:

- (1) Provide close air support to base area neutralization operations.
- (2) Provide tactical airlift support to base area neutralization operations as required.
- (3) Conduct continuous harassing and destructive air offensive operations against enemy base areas.

h. Coordinating instructions. Commanders will:

- (1) Recommend newly discovered base areas, as determined by hard intelligence, be added to Appendix 1 (Priority Listing of Base Areas).
- (2) Recommend adjustment of priorities assigned existing base areas.
- (3) Coordinate with other services, as appropriate, plans for base area operations with the objective of applying maximum combat power for neutralization of enemy base areas.

4. (U) LOGISTICS: Annex N (Logistics).

5. (U) COMMAND SIGNAL:

- a. Command. See basic plan.
- b. Signal. Annex O (Communications and Electronics).

Appendixes: 1--Priority Listing of Base Areas

2--Map - Location of Base Areas

commander of the force assigned the TAOR.

d. Tactical Areas of Interest (TAOI). An area including, but not necessarily limited to, the Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR) in which the designated US/FWMAF commander is knowledgeable of the location, activities and operations of all GVN forces and installations, CIDG camps and RD areas in order to achieve, through mutual cooperation and coordination, the maximum effect of the combined friendly forces and fire power. The TAOI differs from the TAOR in that, US/FWMAF commanders are not charged with primary tactical responsibility nor are they expected to conduct tactical operations on a continuing basis in the TAOI.

e. Combined Operation. An operation conducted by elements of two or more nations operating together or in close coordination.

f. Clearing Operations. An operation to clear an area permanently of organized VC/NVA main forces, including the provincial battalions, in order to eliminate the immediate threat of overt enemy interference with revolutionary development activities that are to follow.

g. Search and Destroy Operation. An offensive operation conducted for the purpose of seeking out and destroying enemy forces, installations, resources and base areas. These operations are oriented on the enemy inside or outside a TAOR.

h. Security Operation. Operations whose purpose is to protect friendly political, economic, and military resources and installations, such as district capitals or populated areas, to

5. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:

a. Reports of major incidents involving two or more countries will be transmitted immediately to MACV Inspector General.

b. Transportation. The Inspector General Advisor at each echelon will support his counterpart by coordinating air transportation, where necessary; and the counterpart will support the inspector general advisor by coordinating ground transportation, where necessary.

PHO BIEN	SO BAN	BAN SO
Vùng 1 Chiến-Thuật	5	2 - 6
Khu 11 Chiến-Thuật	3	7 - 9
Khu 12 Chiến-Thuật	3	10 - 12
Biệt Khu Quảng-Đa	1	13
Vung 2 Chiến-Thuật	5	14 - 18
Khu 22 Chiến-Thuật	3	19 - 21
Khu 23 Chiến-Thuật	3	22 - 24
Biệt Khu 24	1	25
Vung 3 Chiến-Thuật	5	26 - 30
Khu 31 Chiến-Thuật	3	31 - 33
Khu 32 Chiến-Thuật	3	34 - 36
Khu 33 Chiến-Thuật	3	37 - 39
Biệt Khu Thủ-Đô	1	40
Vung 4 Chiến-Thuật	5	41 - 45
Khu 41 Chiến-Thuật	3	46 - 48
Khu 42 Chiến-Thuật	3	49 - 51
Khu Chiến-Thuật Tiền Giang	3	52 - 54
BTL Không Quân	2	55 - 56
Không-đoạn 23	1	57
Không-đoạn 33	1	58
Không-đoạn 41	1	59
Không-đoạn 62	1	60
Không-đoạn 74	1	61
BTL Hải Quân	2	62 - 63
Vung 1 Duyên-hải	1	64
Vung 2 Duyên-hải	1	65
Vung 3 Duyên-hải	1	66
Vung 4 Duyên-hải	1	67
Vung 3 Sông ngòi	1	68
Vung 4 Sông ngòi	1	69
BTL/Lực-Lượng Đặc-Biệt	2	70 - 71
Sư-đoạn Nhảy du	1	72
Lữ-đoạn Thủy Quân Lục-Chiến	1	73
BCH/Biệt-Động-Quân	1	74
BCH Thiết-giáp	1	75
BCH Pháo-Binh	1	76
UBĐH/QVTGTD	2	77 - 78
Nha Tổng Thanh Tra Quân Lực	2	79 - 80
Tổng Cục Quân-Huấn	2	81 - 82
Tổng-cục Tiếp-vận	2	83 - 84
Cục Công-binh	1	85
Cục Truyền-Tin	1	86
BCH 1 Tiếp-vận	1	87
BCH 2 Tiếp-vận	1	88
BCH 3 Tiếp-vận	1	89
BCH 4 Tiếp-vận	1	90
BCH 5 Tiếp-vận	1	91
Tổng cục C. T. C. T.	4	92 - 95
Phòng 1/TTM	1	96
Phòng 2/TTM	2	97 - 98
Phòng 5/TTM	1	99
Phòng 6/TTM	2	100 - 101

PHO BIEN	SO BAN	BAN SO
Phòng TQT/TTM	1	102
TTHQ/TTM	1	103
Phòng 3 /TTM (BĐ)	2	104 - 105
Phòng 3/TTM (HQ)	1	106
Phòng 3/TTM (TC)	1	107
Phòng 3/TTM((TH)	1	108
V. P Phủ Tổng Thông	1	109
V. P Phủ Phó Tổng Thông	1	110
V. P Phủ Thủ Tướng	1	111
Bộ Quốc-phong	3	112 - 114
Bộ Xây dựng	4	115 - 118
Bộ Chiêu-hồi	1	119
Phủ Đặc Ủy TUTB	1	120
V. P/ĐT/TTMT	1	121
V. P/TT/TTMP	3	122 - 124
V. P/TT/TMT/LQ	1	125
V. P/Phụ Ta HQ	1	126
Lưu - Hồ sơ	25	1 - từ 127 đến 150

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
FOREWORD

GUIDANCE FOR COMMANDERS IN VIETNAM

EXTRACTS

This MACV command policy book has been assembled to inform senior commanders and key staff officers of my command policy. It is not intended to be all inclusive; rather, it stresses what I consider to be some of the most important areas of concern in our conduct of the struggle against the enemy and in our associations with allied forces and with the people and government of the Republic of Vietnam.

It is expected that actions undertaken by all elements of MACV will accord with the policy set forth herein, and that modification of this policy will be recommended when need therefor arises.


W. C. WESTMORELAND
General, United States Army
Commanding

EXTRACTS

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
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SECTION I
POCKET GUIDANCE REFERENCES

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NINE RULES

FOR PERSONNEL OF US MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM


The Vietnamese have paid a heavy price in suffering for their long fight against the communists. We military men are in Vietnam now because their government has asked us to help its soldiers and people in winning their struggle. The Viet Cong will attempt to turn the Vietnamese people against you. You can defeat them at every turn by the strength, understanding, and generosity you display with the people. Here are nine simple rules:

DISTRIBUTION — 1 to each member of the United States Armed Forces in Vietnam

NINE RULES

- 1** Remember we are guests here: We make no demands and seek no special treatment.
- 2** Join with the people! Understand their life, use phrases from their language and honor their customs and laws.
- 3** Treat women with politeness and respect.
- 4** Make personal friends among the soldiers and common people.
- 5** Always give the Vietnamese the right of way.
- 6** Be alert to security and ready to react with your military skill.
- 7** Don't attract attention by loud, rude or unusual behavior.
- 8** Avoid separating yourself from the people by a display of wealth or privilege.
- 9** Above all else you are members of the U S Military Forces on a difficult mission, responsible for all your official and personal actions. Reflect honor upon yourself and the United States of America.

GUIDANCE FOR COMMANDERS IN VIETNAM
BY
GENERAL W. C. WESTMORELAND, COMUSMACV

- 
1. Make the welfare of your men your primary concern with special attention to mess, mail, and medical care.
 2. Give priority emphasis to matter of intelligence, counter-intelligence, and timely and accurate reporting.
 3. Gear your command for sustained operations: keep constant pressure on the enemy.
 4. React rapidly with all force available to opportunities to destroy the enemy; disrupt enemy bases, capturing or destroying his supply caches.
 5. Open up methodically and use roads, waterways, and the railroad; be alert and prepared to ambush the ambusher.
 6. Harass enemy lines of communication by raids and ambushes.
 7. Use your firepower with care and discrimination, particularly in populated areas.
 8. Capitalize on psywar opportunities.
 9. Assist in "revolutionary development" with emphasis on priority areas and on civic action wherever feasible.
 10. Encourage and help Vietnamese military and paramilitary units; involve them in your operations at every opportunity.
 11. Be smarter and more skillful than the enemy; stimulate professionalism, alertness and tactical ingenuity; seize every opportunity to enhance training of men and units.
 12. Keep your officers and men well informed, aware of the nine rules for personnel of MACV and mindful of the techniques of communist insurgency and the role of free world forces in Vietnam.
 13. Maintain an alert "open door" policy on complaints and a sensitivity to detection and correction of malpractices.
 14. Recognize bravery and outstanding work.
 15. Inspect frequently units two echelons below your level to insure compliance with the foregoing.

WCU
W. C. W.

22/7/68



CODE OF CONDUCT

FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES

GTA 21-50 June 1958

DISTRIBUTION—ACTIVE ARMY, NG & USAR:
1 per each officer, warrant officer, and enlisted person.

CODE OF CONDUCT

For Members of the Armed Forces of the United States

- 1** I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.
- 2** I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command I will never surrender my men while they still have the means to resist.
- 3** If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.
- 4** If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information or take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way.
- 5** When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to give only name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.
- 6** I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.

1 October 1964

COMBAT FUNDAMENTALS FOR ADVISORS

The goal of the United States Government in Vietnam is to assist the Government of the Republic of Vietnam in its fight for freedom. Together we will win the struggle against the Viet Cong.

In the prosecution of the war, American advisors are called upon to appraise the situation and to give sound advice. This advice must be based on an objective analysis grounded on fundamental military knowledge. Attached are combat precepts as they apply to the war in Vietnam, which are recommended for your study and use. The effectiveness of your advisory efforts will be in direct proportion to the application of combat fundamentals, knowledge, past experience and common sense.

W C Westmoreland
W C WESTMORELAND
General, United States Army
Commanding

AMBUSH

A favorite tactic of the VC is the ambush. By use of the ambush the VC seek to offset their overall inferiority in manpower and weaponry through surprise and concentration of force at one location. Recognizing this typical guerrilla maneuver, anti-ambush thinking and planning should become second nature to every U.S. Advisor in Vietnam.

The combat fundamentals for Advisors which follows in this publication are applicable in general to all military operations -- but they should be constantly applied to uncover, thwart or destroy VC ambushes. For example, a standard VC tactic is to attack a hamlet or small post as a bait, then ambush on the route which government reinforcements must take to relieve or reinforce the hamlet or small post. Since every relief column is a potential target it must take the proper security measures enroute and not rush headlong down the road. Where possible the relief column should move by two or more routes and avoid the most obvious and direct route.

One of the main problems in anti-guerrilla war is to bring the enemy to combat. When he ambushes, he volunteers to fight. Thus, the destruction of the ambush must become a main objective of RVNAF forces -- as important -- in some cases more important -- to the overall effect than the relief column itself.

Anticipate ambushes -- note potential ambush sites as a result of past experience and map reconnaissance -- make detailed fire support plans -- use reconnaissance by fire (artillery and small arms) against likely ambush areas -- use air cover -- adopt ultra-secure formations -- take unorthodox approaches and routes -- use multiple routes -- be dismounted and drive VC advance information -- be secure in planning troop movements -- screen actual movements with ground patrols operating to front and flank of the main body to discover ambush sites before the main body arrives. Be suspicious -- be practical -- be professional. Apply the fundamentals and avoid the -- AMBUSH

- 2 -

MISSION

1. Is the mission clearly understood by all?
2. Does the plan have flexibility? Is the enemy the objective, particularly after contact has been gained, rather than terrain which was assigned for control purposes?
3. Does the plan have a decisive, attainable objective?
4. Is the selection of the objective based on the means available, the enemy, and a reasonable size area of operations?
5. Is it planned to use all available means? Crew served weapons, artillery, air, ships and/or boats, armor, airborne?

OFFENSIVE

1. Is the commander imposing his will on the enemy rather than reacting to enemy action? Only offensive action can win and prevent the enemy from escaping, reorganizing, and resuming his attack.
2. Is the commander keeping contact and pursuing with all available means -- infantry, armor, artillery, airborne and or airborne forces, boats and air? If contact is lost is every effort made to reestablish it through the use of aerial surveillance, extended patrols, Eagle flights, and aggressive offensive action?
3. Are night operations used extensively to accomplish the mission and to keep the enemy on the defensive?
4. Does the plan block all VC escape routes?
5. Has the commander instilled in his troops a will to win?

- 3 -

FIRE AND MANEUVER

1. In an offensive situation, does the commander use fire and maneuver to close with and destroy the enemy? (Find, Fix, Fight, Finish).
2. Are mobility means being used to move RVNAF forces faster than VC? M 15's, helicopters, trucks, airplanes, riverboats?
3. Does the unit establish a base of fire and maneuver at the same time, taking advantage of direct and indirect fire support elements while maneuvering?
4. Has the commander tested his communications with supporting artillery, mortars, armed riverboats, and air to guarantee continuous fire support? Is the small unit commander controlling his fires?
5. Have plans been made for the pursuit and continuation of the attack?
6. Can the scheme of maneuver be changed to suit the situation? For example, when under fire, does the unit take immediate action to flank the enemy?

COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. How can the commander best control the operation? From where? What control measures? When will the components of fire support start? What signal or command will be used to start, shift, and stop it? How, when, and where should the attack order be issued?
2. Is there a clear-cut channel of command to promote unity of effort and the decisive application of full combat power?
3. Is there coordination at all forces toward a common goal? Coordination with Province (RF - PF - Rangers), Sector, Division, Air Force, Navy, Marines?

SECURITY ON THE MOVE

1. Is every possible measure being taken to prevent surprise by the full use of intelligence and counter-intelligence? Reconnaissance, searches, patrols, aerial observations, PW's, information from higher and lower units?
2. Does the formation adopted by the commander during approach to contact or on reconnaissance insure the main body against ambush?
3. Does the commander move the unit by bounds when he considers contact imminent?
4. Does the commander have knowledge of the civilians and friendly forces in the area?
5. Is the commander using deception to keep the VC off balance? For example, moving at night and the use of camouflage and concealment?
6. Is there security on moves and halts? Outposts, sentinels, scouts, searches, reconnaissance, and stealth in moving units?
7. What is the reaction of the villagers, are they friendly or have they disappeared?
8. After objectives are taken, is security continuous and is the area searched?

CIVIC ACTION

1. Has the commander required his soldiers to treat civilians property so that the citizens of RVN have a favorable impression of their Army?
2. Have the soldiers been properly briefed on respecting civilian property? Food, crops, dwellings and animals?

COMMAND AND CONTROL (CONT'D)

4. Is there a single commander of the operation?
5. Have communications with lower and higher echelons been established and checked to provide control?
6. Does the commander have continuous communications with other maneuver elements? Heliborne forces, armor elements, riverboats, airborne forces?
7. Has the commander made personal visits to follow-up his orders? Has he inspected his men and equipment before the operation?
8. Are the plans simple and are the orders clear? Have leaders and troops been briefed?
9. Has the commander checked food, water, medical supplies, medical evacuation, ammunition distribution, and tested essential equipment for the operation?

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SECTION II
GENERAL POLICY GUIDANCE

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PSYCHOLOGICAL

Recognize the basically political character of the war and the resulting necessity of winning the people.

Capitalize on the "Nine Rules" of behavior in relationships with the Vietnamese people.

Pursue a vigorous, imaginative and responsive psychological operations campaign in which each commander is his own psychological operations officer.

Conduct a comprehensive program of civic action entailing maximum utilization of MACV units and advisory resources.

Minimize non-combatant battle casualties through discreet, controlled application of firepower.

Stimulate within the RVNAF an offensive spirit and a close sense of identity with the people of Vietnam.

Exploit the unit association (Buddy) system to improve ARVN morale and tactical proficiency.

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FORCE DEVELOPMENT

Achieve and sustain an optimum balance between combat, combat support and combat service support forces within and between MACV components.

Promote development of suitably balanced RVNAF within realistic constraints imposed by manpower availability.

Exploit to the maximum practicable degree the use of materiel to conserve lives.

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PERSONNEL

Insure thorough and timely command indoctrination of all incoming personnel.

Sustain the initiative on proper treatment of prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva Convention.

Relocate military personnel from populated areas as a means of improving US-Vietnamese relations, contributing to control of inflation and enhancing mission effectiveness.

Exploit all means to enforce good order and military discipline.

Maintain a high state of morale through timely recognition of valorous acts and by establishment of a responsive recreational program.

Support vigorous and sustained efforts to improve leadership at all levels within the RVNAF.

Sustain optimum personnel quality at all echelons by working through component commands to achieve fully responsive replacement programs.

Promote maximum continuity in key command and staff assignments through a carefully supervised program of tour extensions.

Strive for attainment of viable, in-being capabilities for recovery of personnel from enemy controlled territory.

SUMMARIES OF POLICY GUIDANCE

Contained herein are discussions relating to matters of mutual and continuing interest to commanders both among and within the various Free World Forces. They may be considered as policy guidance toward an increased atmosphere of concerted and cooperative effort.

IMPACT UPON VIETNAMESE SOCIETY

Concern over the impact of the presence of Free World Military Assistance Forces upon the people, economic and social systems and the ultimate effect upon our mission has increased with the prospects of military victory. Understanding and solutions to problems arising from this impact must be derived from knowing and believing that the fight for the national survival of Vietnam requires more from our combined forces than just military effectiveness and success.

Our responsibilities include, therefore, "nation building", to use a popular phrase, as an integral part of the fight for Vietnamese national survival. This becomes more readily apparent when one realizes that neither military success nor "nation building" in a counter-insurgency environment has any meaning as separate concepts. If success is to be attained, the termination of actual fighting must find a nation with a well integrated society, reliable economic system and a stable and reasonably popular and effective government. Apparent or actual dominance by Free World Military Assistance Forces in events leading to victory can undermine the national pride and stability of government we are trying to foster. Ultimate and lasting success is a more reasonable expectation if the impact of this presence has been sufficiently subdued to lend credibility to the Free World Forces' role of willing assistants in an essentially Vietnamese venture.

Convinced that activities and sacrifices directed toward minimizing the total impact of Free World Military Assistance Forces' presence upon the Vietnamese cannot be viewed separately from those relating more directly to combat operations, all concerned are reminded of the heavy and all encompassing responsibilities in this matter. Any aspect of Free World Forces' presence which blatantly affects or overwhelms Vietnamese activities, economy, impressions or attitudes must be considered as a serious problem meriting immediate attention.

DISCIPLINE, LAW AND ORDER

The maintenance of high standards of discipline, law and order in every community in Vietnam is essential to the success of our combining mission. This is difficult even under the most ideal conditions. The problem is compounded in Vietnam by the nature of the conflict with its interrelated insurgent, terrorist and criminal activities and the large

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influx of refugees and multi-national military and civilian forces, each with their distinct native habits and customs. The presence of our forces in this environment focuses on the need for coordinated law enforcement programs integrating the efforts of the military forces with those of the Vietnamese authorities.

It is recognized that the basic responsibility for internal security, law and order is that of the Government of Vietnam. The discipline of the military forces is that of military commanders. When incidents occur which involve members of our forces and the Vietnamese people, it becomes a matter of utmost importance to resolve them quickly if the favorable national image which has been developed is to be maintained. This is best accomplished by joint cooperative efforts in the enforcement of law and order.

The Director General of National Police and the members of the police agencies he represents are working closely with our forces to improve the enforcement efforts wherever they are stationed. This has resulted in the development of joint military-civil police mobile and foot patrols in many areas of Vietnam. Criminal Investigations conducted jointly involving members of our forces facilitate the exchange of criminal information, development of evidence and identification of suspects and witnesses. Prompt disciplinary action against offenders contributes to an appreciation of the seriousness with which delinquency or bad behavior by the troops is regarded. Experience shows that integrated, coordinated police practices and procedures insure the full cooperation and support of Vietnamese authorities. This in turn can serve as a training and educational mechanism to develop mutual respect and understanding among those responsible for the enforcement of laws. It can build confidence and professionalism in the police organization and contribute to the strengthening of the internal security posture. From a military viewpoint, it facilitates the establishment of local mutually acceptable arrangements for the temporary detention of military personnel where distance or other factors preclude the immediate delivery to the offender's forces. It insures the maintenance of clear lines of jurisdiction over the personnel of our forces, thus preserving national integrity in support of our mutual objectives in Vietnam.

The discipline, conduct and behavior of the multi-national forces in Vietnam are under the constant, close scrutiny of the eyes of the world. The ability of the commanders of our forces to exercise control and maintain a high state of discipline will influence the degree of success of our

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combined mission here. The achievement of a high state of discipline is a matter of individual, unit and national pride which historically has been and continues to be one of the primary goals of every military commander. A closely knit, integrated program for effective law enforcement in full support of Vietnamese authorities is a highly desirable objective for each of the forces supporting the Government of Vietnam in its quest for peace and development as a free nation.

PRISONERS OF WAR

The continued success of our military operations can be expected to increase the number of captured enemy personnel. The handling and treatment of such personnel becomes more important and takes on greater significance in terms of our role and mission in Vietnam. The presence of such international organizations as the ICRC, the ICC and others dictates the need to insure that our forces are complying with the intent of our respective governments in adhering to the provisions of the Geneva Convention (GPW) relative to the treatment of detainees and prisoners of war (PW).

The Government of Vietnam has constructed PW Camps which are operated most efficiently in full compliance with the GPW. Additional camps are also being prepared. The favorable reports of the ICRC following their visits to such camps testifies to the success of these operations.

Under existing agreements, each of our forces is responsible for the transfer of captured detainees and PW's to GVN custody. Although the GVN assumes custody of such personnel, our forces, as capturing powers, retain ultimate responsibility for their treatment and disposition (Art 12). Under these conditions, the need for effective systems of control and accountability becomes paramount.

The systems now in effect while working efficiently, require constant supervision and command attention. These provide for the humane treatment at the point of capture and prompt evacuation of detainees and PW's from the combat areas. The need for medical care and attention is stressed. They provide for expeditious processing and proper classification into such categories as innocent civilians, returnees, civil

defendants and PW's. They insure accurate accountability by our forces throughout the processing channel to delivery to GVN custody. Refugee problems are avoided or reduced by releasing innocent civilians near their villages and hamlets or close to the point of capture. The delivery of PW's directly to the PW Camps located in each CTZ precludes diversion of such personnel into unauthorized channels and assures our commanders of their proper disposition on the basis of current agreements.

The key to success of the PW program rests in the need for our forces to classify all detainees into established categories before they are turned over to GVN custody. Without such classification, the best efforts of our forces and those of the GVN in developing an effective PW program would not succeed.

The handling and humane treatment of prisoners of war by our forces under the procedures established is the finest testimony of our will and intent to comply with international law. Continued emphasis on the proper handling of PW's will serve to encourage enemy defections and surrenders weaken his forces in the field and contribute materially to the success of our military operations in Vietnam.

COORDINATION AND CONTROL OF FIRE POWER

Guidance, procedures, and responsibilities for the coordination and control of fire support operations are contained in two MACV directives. MACV Directive 525-18 provides guidance concerning control of artillery/mortar and naval gunfire support provided by FWMA forces. MACV Directive 95-4 establishes procedures and responsibilities for the command, control, and coordination of FWMA force air operations. In addition to providing effective command and control for fire support means, these directives insure that (1) friendly forces and civilians are not endangered, (2) property of friendly forces, RVN, and friendly civilians is not destroyed or damaged, and (3) national and operational boundaries are not violated. Significant among the measures prescribed for the control of fire support operations are (1) the general requirement to obtain clearance/approval from appropriate GVN officials (Province/District Chief & Sector/Subsector Commander) prior to the attack of targets and (2) the requirement to warn inhabitants of hamlets and villages not associated with maneuver of ground forces by leaflets, speaker systems or other appropriate means prior to attack. Strict compliance with the provision of these directives is essential at all levels of command to insure that noncombatant battle casualties are held to a minimum.

COORDINATION AND CONTROL OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS

Command relationships among the various FW and RVN forces are founded on the principles of cooperation, coordination, and close partnership at all echelons. The key to success of combined operations rests in preliminary planning, mutual trust, and reciprocal support by the forces involved. When a FW or RVN commander desires assistance from another national force, it should be requested from counterpart headquarters. When forces of different nationalities are conducting closely interrelated operations, one force should be placed in either direct or general support, under terms mutually agreeable to both sides. The forces involved in reciprocal support are organizationally independent; and their efforts are coordinated through joint planning, close contact, and mutual agreement between the commanders concerned.

FW forces may be placed in direct or general support of RVN forces or the reverse may be true, depending on the situation existing at a

particular time. A FW force commander does not assume operational control of an RVN unit, nor does an RVN commander assume operational control of a FW unit. Commanders and staffs are requested to assist in promoting clear cut, effective, and readily understood relationships among FW and GVN forces by adopting and using with precision the terms "direct support" and "general support" in connection with planning and assignment of missions for combined operations. When a force is assigned the mission of supporting another force for a combined operation, the commander of the supported force will exercise general direction of the supporting force within the limits permitted by accepted tactical practices of the national service of the support force. Such direction includes designation of targets or objectives, timing, duration, and other instructions necessary for coordination and for efficiency. The commander of the supporting force will determine the requirements of the supported force and take necessary action to fulfill them within his capabilities.

(C) PRINCIPLES OF A TAOR

A TAOR is a prescribed area which has been assigned specifically to a Free World commander by the ARVN corps commander. Any changes in the TAOR boundaries require the decision of the ARVN corps commander after coordination with the Free World commander(s) concerned. The primary purpose of the TAOR is to delineate an area in which a commander is to focus the necessary effort to deny the area to the enemy. In the TAOR, the specified commander is responsible for, and has the authority to act on, the development and maintenance of installations and the conduct of tactical operations with troops under his control. Since there frequently are ARVN and RF/PF operations as well as Free World operations in a TAOR, commanders must work closely with local ARVN and RF/PF commanders to insure that Free World operations complement and supplement GVN efforts. It is emphasized that the area within a TAOR still belongs to GVN. The civil administration and GVN control are not relinquished. The area is in no sense under the martial law of the force commander and normal police functions continue to be exercised by the GVN.

FWMAF TAOR COMMANDERS' RELATIONS
WITH GVN OFFICIALS AND POPULATION

The tactical objective of the FWMAF TAOR commander is the neutralization of enemy influence in his area. This short-term objective must be considered in the perspective provided by the long range objective of the Free World allies in Vietnam, viz, the establishment of a free viable nation, representative of and responsive to its people.

Tactical operations conducted within TAOR must take cognizance of the fact that the FWMAF is functioning in a sovereign state whose people are the nucleus around which this new nation is being built. The Vietnamese populace must be presumed to be friendly until it demonstrates otherwise. Relations with the people must be conducted through the legitimately constituted provincial and district governments.

TAOR boundaries will not conform necessarily to Vietnamese political boundaries. To assure coordination of effort in tactical operations,

liaison must be established with all local officials exercising jurisdiction over any portion of the TAOR. Should the TAOR extend through more than one province, inter-provincial liaison is essential. Both province and district chiefs have a dual civil-military responsibility. In many cases they have military forces at their disposal. In all cases, they are responsible for security in their areas. Liaison with these officials must be effected through the MACV advisor, and where assigned, the FWMAF Liaison Officer.

TAOR commanders will have occasion to come into contact with local revolutionary development activities. Revolutionary development is a Vietnamese process which cannot be accomplished by Free World personnel. To be effective, revolutionary development activities require the participation of the individual Vietnamese. Free World units may support revolutionary development by providing the military security required for it to take place. Free World units also may be able to assist the local revolutionary development program through military civic action. Any support offered to revolutionary development must be channeled through local GVN officials.

Population control within TAOR must be effected through the appropriate GVN official. In tactical situations, the attachment of Vietnamese military or civilian officials to units will facilitate this control. Coordination with the GVN must be effected in planning operations so that population returned to government control can be transferred to GVN civilian control at the earliest possible time. In non-tactical situations, FWMAF commanders have no jurisdiction over Vietnamese personnel. In this circumstance, population control is the prerogative of the GVN. To usurp or weaken this control by effecting unilateral FWMAF control measures is counter-productive to our long-range objective in Vietnam.

Troop discipline and courtesy must receive command attention at all echelons. The recent history of Vietnam is replete with examples of mistreatment of the civilian populace by soldiers of many armies. The good will and sincere friendship of the Free World allies is best demonstrated to the individual Vietnamese by the courteous, disciplined conduct of our troops. Individual courtesy must extend to the operation of motor vehicles and other equipment. Consideration must be given the Vietnamese on roads and highways and on urban streets. Conduct both on and off duty always must show respect and consideration for Vietnamese customs and sensibilities.

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Because of the relative permanence of their association with the population of their area, TAOR commanders have an excellent opportunity to assist both the individual Vietnamese and local officials. Every opportunity should be taken to improve the prestige of the GVN. Assistance provided within a TAOR should be done so as to reflect maximum credit on the GVN rather than the Free World unit present.

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MACJ1

3 Sep 1966

SUBJECT: Handling and Accounting for Prisoners of War

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO 96307
Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam, APO 96243
Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, APO 96601
Commander, Seventh Air Force, APO 96307

1. Interest continues to mount at highest levels within the United States Government over the treatment of captives taken by the Free World and ARVN military forces in Vietnam. Of particular concern is that treatment accorded captives taken by US Forces does not create an international problem which could embarrass or complicate our efforts to obtain proper treatment for captured US personnel in North Vietnam.

2. One of the initial actions which must be taken is to establish a full accounting for those Prisoners of War turned over to the Vietnamese by the US Armed Forces to include the best reconstruction of past actions in this area that can be made. A related and equally important action, already initiated by this Headquarters, but requiring active command support, is the reclassification and transfer of those Prisoners of War now held in Vietnamese civilian jails to Prisoner of War camps as rapidly as space becomes available.

3. In order to develop unified policies and procedures for Prisoners of War as outlined in JCS Pub No 3, dated 1 September 1964, the following responsibilities are established:

a. The CG USARV is responsible for the administration and operational supervision of the US Forces Prisoner of War program under existing national policy in Vietnam. Such responsibility includes evacuation from Division/Separate Brigade Collecting Points and custodial accountability

MACJ1

SUBJECT: Handling and Accounting for Prisoners of War

for all US Force captured Prisoners of War from point of capture to delivery or turn-over to GVN control. Coordination will be effected with the US Component and III MAF Commanders in Vietnam in developing an integrated Prisoner of War program. Although Free World Forces, by agreement, are responsible for delivering captives to the GVN, US Force Commanders are authorized to accept custody of Prisoners of War taken in combined US - Free World Force operations when requested by the commander of the capturing force.

b. The COMNAVFORV, CG III MAF, and Cmdr 7th AF, are responsible for evacuation of Prisoners of War to the nearest USARV receiving or collection point and for establishing component service procedures as outlined in MACV Directive number 190-3, dated 24 May 1966. The Commander, Seventh Air Force is further responsible for providing airlift for evacuation of Prisoners of War as required.

4. This Headquarters will retain the responsibility for joint policy of the Prisoner of War program in Vietnam. MACV directives will be revised to delineate the responsibilities cited above.

5. CG USARV will take immediate action to implement the policies outlined and advise this Headquarters of the date necessary procedures are established.

s/W. C. Westmoreland
t/W. C. WESTMORELAND
General, United States Army
Commanding

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MACJ1**8 August 1966****SUBJECT: Standards of Conduct****TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION**

1. At a special meeting of the Mission Council on 5 August, Ambassador Lodge expressed his growing concern over the standards of conduct of US personnel in the greater Saigon area. I share his concern.

2. Particularly disturbing are recent incidents involving our personnel and members of the Vietnamese National Police. Commanders must continually stress the high standards of conduct expected of US military personnel, with special emphasis on the necessity for maintaining an attitude of respect towards Vietnamese Police officials.

3. The constant turnover of personnel is one of the difficulties confronting a commander in maintaining continuity of command policies with regard to standards of conduct. Commanders must insure that all of their personnel are impressed with the seriousness of this problem, not only by written directives and messages, but also by frequent and repeated briefings. The Nine Rules set forth our guidelines. Each individual must be made aware of these precepts. Those who ignore or violate them must be disciplined, promptly and appropriately.

4. Commanders will bring this matter to the attention of their personnel on a continuing basis. I expect positive results and will accept nothing less.

s/W. C. Westmoreland
t/W. C. WESTMORELAND
General, United States Army
Commanding

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Special

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MACJ1

8 January 1967

SUBJECT: US Advisor/VN Counterpart Relationship

TO: Each Officer Advisor, United States Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam

1. This letter is designed to emphasize the importance of US Advisor/VN Counterpart relationships and to highlight your role as the US Advisor and your contribution to the total spectrum of US-Free World Forces' efforts in support of the Government of Vietnam.

2. The unprecedented build-up of US-Free World Forces in South Vietnam beginning in August 1965, and the widely dispersed, large-scale commitment of these forces in their integrity against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army, have had the effect of taking the spot light off our advisory efforts. It is absolutely essential that this development not be construed as a constriction of your mission or as a lessening of the relative importance of your effort.

3. You are still the "heart and soul" of our total commitment in South Vietnam. The ultimate success of that commitment demands an effectual Vietnamese military establishment, not only for victory over the insurgent Viet Cong and the invading North Vietnamese Army, but also, and more important, for the assurance of a permanent peace. The armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam must be prepared to assume the responsibility for the post-war security of the Vietnamese people with a minimum of external assistance.

4. Your job is a most difficult and sometimes frustrating task. Under any circumstances, the relationship of advisor-to-advised is a testy and tenuous one. Here, that relationship is compounded by daily decisions with life or death consequences, and by communications problems complicated by language difficulties and different national origins.

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MACJ1

8 January 1967

SUBJECT: US Advisor/VN Counterpart Relationship

5. The training of the US military officer is characterized by conditioned traits of decisiveness and aggressiveness. The essence of your relationship with your counterpart is constituted by patience and restraint. As a threshold to development of a meaningful affiliation with your counterpart, you must succeed in the reconciliation of these contrasting qualities.

6. A natural tendency to be assertive in the rendering of advice and guidance must be tempered with a degree of diffidence. You should provide the ingredients necessary for your counterpart to make valid judgements, and then encourage his decision-making prerogatives; these are essential to his self-respect as well as his leadership image, and must not be compromised. Experience has proven that imparting the knowledge required for the decision is eminently more successful than attempting to provide the decision. The net result is a more qualified and confident counterpart and the establishment of a stronger basis of mutual trust and respect.

7. Once you have established a foundation of accord, it is to your advantage to use all means at your disposal to develop and maintain an attitude of comradeship with your counterpart. You will find him responsive to a sincere desire on your part to learn about and accommodate his language, customs, manners and religious beliefs. A working understanding of these essentials will facilitate a more tractable and resilient relationship.

8. Your challenge is indeed a great one. Your mandate charges you with a degree of responsibility unparalleled in other areas of military service. Your relationship with your counterpart is the key to the accomplishment of our mission.

s/W. C. Westmoreland
t/W. C. WESTMORELAND
General, United States Army
Commanding

MACJ1

8 January 1967

SUBJECT: US Advisor/VN Counterpart Relationships

DISTRIBUTION:

I - B

II - A

Plus 673 - I Corps
1052 - II Corps
1090 - III Corps
1362 - IV Corps
49 - SA, Abn Bde Adv Det
157 - SA, SMD
97 - SA, RF/PF
12 - SA, RW Scty Adv Det
275 - School & Tng Adv Det
133 - Area Log Comd Adv Det
5000 - AG-AOP

III, IV - C

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MACJ54

29 July 1966

SUBJECT: USMACV Psychological Operations Posture (U)

TO: See Distribution

1. (C) Our military progress has created conditions which are considered to be conducive to the successful conduct of psychological warfare operations. Specifically, our sustained military activities have created a condition in which the tactical exploitation of Psywar efforts may readily precipitate increased defections by the enemy. To capitalize on available opportunities we must have constant and intensive command emphasis on the military Psywar operations at all levels of command.

2. (C) Commanders are expected to direct personally the Psywar effort within their commands. In implementing this program, commanders will:

a. Assign to the Psywar effort the necessary personnel to advise and carry out the commanders' directions on this important task.

b. Ascertain that personnel assigned to or supporting Psywar operations are properly motivated.

c. Decentralize the reproduction and delivery means supporting Psywar operations to the lowest practical level.

3. (C) Research of background materiel, analysis of program weaknesses and samples of successes will be developed and disseminated by the MACV staff to aid in the development and execution of these psychological operations.

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MACJ54

29 July 1966

SUBJECT: USMACV Psychological Operations Posture (U)

4. (U) The wholehearted and active support of all commanders is essential to a dynamic, effective psychological warfare effort. It is expected that with these efforts the US MACV Psyops program will achieve greater results.

s/W. C. Westmoreland
t/W. C. WESTMORELAND
General, United States Army
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

- CG USARV
- CDR 7th Air Force
- COMNAVFORV
- CG III MAF
- CG I FFORCEV
- CG II FFORCEV
- SA IV CORPS
- CO 5th Special Forces Gp
- CO 6th PSYOPS BN
- J-1
- J-2
- J-3
- J-4
- J-5
- J-6
- POLWAR
- SOG

MACRDS

22 DEC 1966

SUBJECT: Mission of ARVN Advisors (U)

TO: Major Force Commanders

1. (C) The 1967 Combined Campaign Plan assigns ARVN the primary mission to support Revolutionary Development (RD). Success of the overall RD effort in 1967 will depend largely on how well ARVN performs this mission.
2. (C) The major tasks assigned ARVN in support of RD are to clear selected areas of enemy forces, provide security for the population and cadre elements in these areas, assist police forces to identify and eliminate the VC infrastructure, open and secure lines of communication necessary for economic development and conduct an active defense of political and economic centers. In addition, ARVN search and destroy operations are to be aimed at preventing the incursion of enemy main force units into areas undergoing RD and destroying enemy forces in areas where RD activities are planned for the future. These are operational tasks. ARVN commanders and key staff officers, especially the G2's and G3's, must devote adequate attention to the planning and supervision of these tasks if ARVN is to accomplish its primary mission successfully.
3. (U) Because support of RD is ARVN's primary mission, ARVN advisors are reminded that their primary mission is to provide advisory assistance in all matters pertaining to military support of RD. Accordingly, all advisors will focus their personal efforts, and those of their staffs, toward this vital area of responsibility. Revolutionary Development cannot be considered primarily a provincial matter with the responsibility for advisory assistance left to sector advisors. Instead, all ARVN advisors must know and understand every aspect of RD support and use this knowledge in every possible way to assist their counterparts.

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MACRDS

SUBJECT: Mission of ARVN Advisors (U)

4. (C) Support by GVN and US military forces of Revolutionary Development places emphasis on three matters:

a. Small unit operations. This puts a premium on small unit leadership.

b. Night operations. We must take the night away from the guerrilla.

c. Troop civic action projects participated in by the Vietnamese people. If US troops are available to pitch in and "get their hands dirty" an excellent example will be set for the Vietnamese troops who have been inclined in the past to look down on participation with the people in manual labor. The value of troop civic action is perhaps more psychological than material.

5. (U) I expect you to ensure that all advisors understand, accept, and execute their responsibilities with respect to support of Revolutionary Development. Increases in personnel and equipment authorizations are not considered necessary to accomplish the mission. What is required is understanding, patience, persistence, organization, and careful supervision.

s/W. C. Westmoreland
t/W. C. WESTMORELAND
General, United States Army
Commanding

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MACV Joint Messageform

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DTG: 031254Z Jul 66

FROM: COMUSMACV

TO: CG III MAF/SA I CORPS

CG I FFORCEV/SA II CORPS

CG II FFORCEV/SA III CORPS

SA IV CORPS

SA CMR (COURIER)

INFO: CG USARV (COURIER)

DSA I CORPS, DANANG

DSA II CORPS, PLEIKU

DSA III CORPS, BIEN HOA

UNCLAS 22787 FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

Subj: Aircraft Support for Sector and Subsector Advisory Teams.

1. The US effort in Vietnam is essentially twofold; one part the tactical effort to destroy the NVA and Main Force VC units, the other to assist the GVN in the development of a viable government demonstrated by its capacity to exercise effective control throughout the countryside. Our military forces are performing well in the tactical role. We must, however,

Drafter

JOEL M. HOLLIS
Colonel, GS
Ch, Revolutionary Dev Div
MACJ33 40796

Releaser

W. C. WESTMORELAND
General, United States Army
Commanding

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MACV Joint Messageform
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exploit the success of our tactical military operations through greater efforts towards the establishment of security in the villages and hamlets and extension of GVN influence and control. I regard the MACV and USASF sector and subsector advisory teams, working with GVN officials at the province and district level, as our primary resources in this effort. These teams, often the only US presence in an area, are responsible for providing advisory support to the GVN in establishing adequate local security and for the economic, political, psychological, and social programs which comprise revolutionary development.

2. The effectiveness of these teams in advising, influencing and supporting the GVN authorities is a direct function of their ability to work with those authorities on a programmed recurring basis. As a matter of policy, I desire that each sector advisor visit each district in his area of responsibility and each subsector advisor visit each village in his area at least once each two weeks, local conditions permitting. Further, that within the national priority areas these visits be conducted more frequently.

3. Helicopters or fixed wing aircraft will be provided for this purpose wherever the security situation or distances involved preclude use of regular ground transport. Aircraft will be allocated to satisfy this requirement on a special scheduled priority basis, not to be diverted to other

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purposes including support of US tactical operations except in case of emergency.

4. I request that corps senior advisors place continuing emphasis on support of the sector and subsector advisory program. I wish your initial efforts directed to providing aircraft necessary for the advisor support effort noted above. Advise me within the next 15 days how you plan to satisfy this requirement within your present resources.

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MACV Joint Messageform

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DTG: 180107Z Nov 66

FROM: COMUSMACV

TO: DEP CG, USARV RUMSVA

COM 7AF RUMSBJ

CG, III MAF RUMNMF

COMNAVFORV RUMSBB

CG, I FFORCEV RUMNVF

CG, II FFORCEV RUMSEF

SA, IV CORPS RUMSMT

CO, 5TH SFG RUMNAB

CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN 49911 FROM: MACJO2

SUBJECT: Relationship Between US Military and Vietnamese (U)

References: a. MACV Msg 41772, DTG 161813Z Sep 66.

b. Ltr, Hq USMACV, Subj: "Command Emphasis on Revolutionary Development/Civic Action Programs", 22 Oct 66.

c. MACV Directive 525-3, Subj: "Minimizing Non-combatant Battle Casualties."

Drafter

W. B. ROSSON
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff
40402

Releaser

W. B. ROSSON
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

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Continuation Sheet

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1. (C) In reference a COMUSMACV stressed need for sympathetic understanding of the Vietnamese people if we are to achieve success in our endeavor to assist and support this embattled nation. He went on to specify elimination of actions on the part of US military personnel that promote growth of distrust and disrespect between US Forces and the Vietnamese people. Reference b furnished guidance designed to inculcate in MACV ranks a solid appreciation of the role of Revolutionary Development and Civic Action, enthusiasm for contributing to these vital undertakings and the importance of "talking up" our efforts in these fields.

2. (C) The foregoing notwithstanding, reports available to this headquarters suggest that an attitude of disaffection toward the Vietnamese may be developing among our personnel. Manifestations include reference to excessive ARVN desertion, lack of aggressiveness on the part of RVNAF units, short duration of certain operations and absence of a sense of urgency. Without overlooking the possibility that the reports may be exaggerated, or that they reflect isolated cases, sufficient evidence is available to require firm and immediate command action through the medium of troop indoctrination to arrest the growth of a potentially dangerous development during the incipient stage.

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3. (C) Accordingly, addressees will institute without delay measures to impress upon all personnel the need for informed understanding of his Vietnamese comrade in arms. Emphasis should be placed on the fact that after twenty years of sustained effort, a degree of war weariness is inevitable. We, on the other hand, not only enjoy the motivational benefits associated with the one year tour, but produce a "surge" effort during that period. In terms of endurance the average Vietnamese serviceman is no match for his American counterpart. As a young and expanding nation, the Republic of Vietnam is hard-pressed to provide leadership comparable to that enjoyed by American forces. It will be recalled, in this regard, that Communist terrorism and military action have exacted a disproportionately heavy toll of casualties among Vietnamese personnel in positions of military and political leadership, particularly at the lower levels. Additionally, it must be pointed out that the Vietnamese mentality differs from that of the American in various respects, and that these differences must be reckoned with in assessing the Vietnamese attitude and outlook.

3. Another potentially serious trend reflected in recent reports pertains to disparaging comments concerning restraints on application of firepower. Comments such as "the only good village is a burned village," are indicative of the trend. Here again, renewed command emphasis on

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troop indoctrination is necessary to insure that newly arrive personnel in particular are thoroughly conversant with need for minimizing non-combatant battle casualties, and understand the rationale behind current instructions on this subject. Reference c applies.

GP 4.

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DISPOSITION FORM

(AR 340-13)

OFFICE SYMBOL OR FILE REFERENCE

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MACJ1

Guidance Letters to FVMAF Commanders

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
DATE 13 Mar 67

CMT 1

LTC Overton/11F/60273

1. Inclosed is a copy of correspondence which, in the interest of closer cooperation and unity of effort among the Free World Forces, has been addressed recently to each Free World Force commander. It is furnished here for your information and guidance as appropriate.

2. As a matter of staff interest you are advised that copies have been also furnished to Hq 7AF, III MAF, USARV, and USNAVPORV; Hq FFORCEV I and II; and SA IV Corps.



DONALD H. MCGOVERN
Brigadier General, USA
Assistant Chief of Staff, J-1

1 Incl
as

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H.W.W.

EXHIBIT D-46

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233

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222



MACJ1

8 MAR 1967

Lieutenant General Chae, Myung Shin
Commander, Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam
Saigon, Vietnam

Dear General Chae:

The Free World Forces in Vietnam, individually and collectively, have taken tremendous strides toward military victory over the past year. As a result we are now in a position from which the picture of ultimate military success may be viewed with increasingly greater clarity. Accordingly, we may wish to employ this closer perspective in reflecting upon our mutual concern for a purposeful and harmonious approach to the victory we seek.

As the commander of your country's forces here in Vietnam, I am certain that you have considered as I have the impact of our forces on the political, psychological and economic aspects of assistance to the Vietnamese. I am equally certain that you found the matter full of complexity, especially when considered within the framework of your own military operations. However, regardless of either complexity or the increasing tempo of our own operations, it seems we are now entering a phase wherein our presence and actions and their interface with the Vietnamese Government and people may be of even more long lasting importance than the day to day victories over the aggressors' forces.

As we approach victory, then, the task of assisting the Vietnamese in their struggle for freedom assuredly will become more demanding of our interest and energies. In this context, the requirement for a

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
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MACJ1

precise and discrete unity of purpose and effort among all the Free World Forces dedicated to that task becomes apparent. For this reason I have prepared a summary of selected policy statements that govern actions on the part of commanders of United States forces in the Republic of Vietnam. As inclosed herewith, these policy guidelines are intended for your use in promoting attainment of the unity of purpose and effort cited above. One overall theme threading through the statements is the thought that the coming elections, the formation of a democratic constitution and the flickering flame of a true spirit of nationalism now visible in Vietnamese endeavors, demand that we exert extreme care not to overshadow or, for that matter, appear to overshadow the Vietnamese people in their efforts to help themselves. Nor can we afford to act in such fashion as to reflect disregard for their sovereignty, traditions and customs.

As you can see, it is my deep conviction that all the Free World Forces must unit to the fullest extent at this critical time if we are to insure accomplishment of our objectives. It is with this thought in mind that I am writing to each Free World Force commander. I would appreciate particularly your ideas and comments on this subject, as well as an opportunity to discuss them with you personally.

Sincerely,



W. C. WESTMORELAND
General, United States Army
Commanding

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as

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SUMMARIES OF POLICY GUIDANCE

Contained herein are discussions relating to matters of mutual and continuing interest to commanders both among and within the various Free World Forces. They may be considered as policy guidance toward an increased atmosphere of concerted and cooperative effort.

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IMPACT UPON VIETNAMESE SOCIETY

Concern over the impact of the presence of Free World Military Assistance Forces upon the people, economic and social systems and the ultimate effect upon our mission has increased with the prospects of military victory. Understanding and solutions to problems arising from this impact must be derived from knowing and believing that the fight for the national survival of Vietnam requires more from our combined forces than just military effectiveness and success.

Our responsibilities include, therefore, "nation building", to use a popular phrase, as an integral part of the fight for Vietnamese national survival. This becomes more readily apparent when one realizes that neither military success nor "nation building" in a counter-insurgency environment has any meaning as separate concepts. If success is to be attained, the termination of actual fighting must find a nation with a well integrated society, reliable economic system and a stable and reasonably popular and effective government. Apparent or actual dominance by Free World Military Assistance Forces in events leading to victory can undermine the national pride and stability of government we are trying to foster. Ultimate and lasting success is a more reasonable expectation if the impact of this presence has been sufficiently subdued to lend credibility to the Free World Forces' role of willing assistants in an essentially Vietnamese venture.

Convinced that activities and sacrifices directed toward minimizing the total impact of Free World Military Assistance Forces' presence upon the Vietnamese cannot be viewed separately from those relating more directly to combat operations, all concerned are reminded of the heavy and all encompassing responsibilities in this matter. Any aspect of Free World Forces' presence which blatantly affects or overwhelms Vietnamese activities, economy, impressions or attitudes must be considered as a serious problem meriting immediate attention.

DISCIPLINE, LAW AND ORDER

The maintenance of high standards of discipline, law and order in every community in Vietnam is essential to the success of our combined mission. This is difficult even under the most ideal conditions. The problem is compounded in Vietnam by the nature of the conflict with its interrelated insurgent, terrorist and criminal activities and the large influx of refugees and multi-national military and civilian forces, each with their distinct native habits and customs. The presence of our forces in this environment focuses on the need for coordinated law enforcement programs integrating the efforts of the military forces with those of the Vietnamese authorities.

It is recognized that the basic responsibility for internal security, law and order is that of the Government of Vietnam. The discipline of the military forces is that of military commanders. When incidents occur which involve members of our forces and the Vietnamese people, it becomes a matter of utmost importance to resolve them quickly if the favorable national image which has been developed is to be maintained. This is best accomplished by joint cooperative efforts in the enforcement of law and order.

The Director General of National Police and the members of the police agencies he represents are working closely with our forces to improve the enforcement efforts wherever they are stationed. This has resulted in the development of joint military-civil police mobile and foot patrols in many areas of Vietnam. Criminal investigations conducted jointly involving members of our forces facilitate the exchange of criminal information, development of evidence and identification of suspects and witnesses. Prompt disciplinary action against offenders contributes to an appreciation of the seriousness with which delinquency or bad behavior by the troops is regarded. Experience shows that integrated, coordinated police practices and procedures insure the full cooperation and support of Vietnamese authorities. This in turn can serve as a training and educational mechanism to develop mutual respect and understanding among those responsible for the enforcement of laws. It can build confidence and professionalism in the police organization and contribute to the strengthening of the internal security posture. From a military viewpoint, it facilitates the establishment of local mutually acceptable arrangements for the temporary detention of military personnel where distance or other factors preclude the immediate delivery to the offender's forces. It insures the maintenance of clear lines of jurisdiction over the personnel of our forces, thus preserving national integrity in support of our mutual objectives in Vietnam.

The discipline, conduct and behavior of the multi-national forces in Vietnam are under the constant, close scrutiny of the eyes of the world. The ability of the commanders of our forces to exercise control and maintain a high state of discipline will influence the degree of success of our combined mission here. The achievement of a high state of discipline is a matter of individual, unit and national pride which historically has been and continues to be one of the primary goals of every military commander. A closely knit, integrated program for effective law enforcement in full support of Vietnamese authorities is a highly desirable objective for each of the forces supporting the Government of Vietnam in its quest for peace and development as a free nation.

PRISONERS OF WAR

The continued success of our military operations can be expected to increase the number of captured enemy personnel. The handling and treatment of such personnel becomes more important and takes on greater significance in terms of our role and mission in Vietnam. The presence of such international organizations as the ICRC, the ICC and others dictates the need to insure that our forces are complying with the intent of our respective governments in adhering to the provisions of the Geneva Convention (GPW) relative to the treatment of detainees and prisoners of war (PW).

The Government of Vietnam has constructed PW Camps which are operated most efficiently in full compliance with the GPW. Additional camps are also being prepared. The favorable reports of the ICRC following their visits to such camps testifies to the success of these operations.

Under existing agreements each of our forces is responsible for the transfer of captured detainees and PW's to GVN custody. Although the GVN assumes custody of such personnel, our forces, as capturing powers, retain ultimate responsibility for their treatment and disposition (Art 12). Under these conditions, the need for effective systems of control and accountability becomes paramount.

The systems now in effect while working efficiently, require constant supervision and command attention. These provide for the humane treatment at the point of capture and prompt evacuation of detainees and PW's from the combat areas. The need for medical care and attention is stressed. They provide for expeditious processing and proper classification into such categories as innocent civilians, returnees, civil defendants and PW's. They insure accurate accountability by our forces throughout the processing channel to delivery to GVN custody. Refugee problems are avoided or reduced by releasing innocent civilians near their villages and hamlets or close to the point of capture. The delivery of PW's directly to the PW Camps located in each CTZ precludes diversion of such personnel into unauthorized channels and assures our commanders of their proper disposition on the basis of current agreements.

The key to success of the PW program rests in the need for our forces to classify all detainees into established categories before they are turned over to GVN custody. Without such classification, the best efforts of our forces and those of the GVN in developing an effective PW program would not succeed.

The handling and humane treatment of prisoners of war by our forces under the procedures established is the finest testimony of our will and intent to comply with international law. Continued emphasis on the proper handling of PW's will serve to encourage enemy defections and surrenders weaken his forces in the field and contribute materially to the success of our military operations in Vietnam.

COORDINATION AND CONTROL OF FIREPOWER

Guidance, procedures, and responsibilities for the coordination and control of fire support operations are contained in two MACV directives. MACV Directive 525-18 provides guidance concerning control of artillery/mortar and naval gunfire support provided by FWMA forces. MACV Directive 95-4 establishes procedures and responsibilities for the command, control, and coordination of FWMA force air operations. In addition to providing effective command and control for fire support means, these directives insure that (1) friendly forces and civilians are not endangered, (2) property of friendly forces, RVN, and friendly civilians is not destroyed or damaged, and (3) national and operational boundaries are not violated. Significant among the measures prescribed for the control of fire support operations are (1) the general requirement to obtain clearance/approval from appropriate GVN officials (Province/District Chief & Sector/Subsector Commander) prior to the attack of targets and (2) the requirement to warn inhabitants of hamlets and villages not associated with maneuver of ground forces by leaflets, speaker systems or other appropriate means prior to attack. Strict compliance with the provision of these directives is essential at all levels of command to insure that noncombatant battle casualties are held to a minimum.

COORDINATION AND CONTROL OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS

Command relationships among the various FW and RVN forces are founded on the principles of cooperation, coordination, and close partnership at all echelons. The key to success of combined operations rests in preliminary planning, mutual trust, and reciprocal support by the forces involved. When a FW or RVN commander desires assistance from another national force, it should be requested from counterpart headquarters. When forces of different nationalities are conducting closely interrelated operations, one force should be placed in either direct or general support, under terms mutually agreeable to both sides. The forces involved in reciprocal support are organizationally independent; and their efforts are coordinated through joint planning, close contact, and mutual agreement between the commanders concerned.

FW forces may be placed in direct or general support of RVN forces or the reverse may be true, depending on the situation existing at a particular time. A FW force commander does not assume operational control of an RVN unit nor does an RVN commander assume operational control of a FW unit. Commanders and staffs are requested to assist in promoting clear cut, effective, and readily understood relationships among FW and RVN forces by adopting and using with precision the terms "direct support" and "general support" in connection with planning and assignment of missions for combined operations. When a force is assigned the mission of supporting another force for a combined operation, the commander of the supported force will exercise general direction of the supporting force within the limits permitted by accepted tactical practices of the national service of the supporting force. Such direction includes designation of targets or objectives, timing, duration, and other instructions necessary for coordination and for efficiency. The commander of the supporting force will determine the requirements of the supported force and take necessary action to fulfill them within his capabilities.

viability is dependent upon getting goods to the market place. The opening and securing of LOC's required for the free movement of such goods can be accomplished best by increased use of land and water LOC for military operations. While helicopters can assist in conduct of military operations every other means of movement must be examined continually to enable forces to conduct operations under all circumstances and without overdependence upon any one means of movement. In this connection senior commanders should force their subordinate units to make increased use of land and water LOC's by a policy of deliberately denying helicopter assets when the mission can be accomplished by overland movement.

(C) PRINCIPLES OF A TAOR

A TAOR is a prescribed area which has been assigned specifically to a Free World commander by the ARVN corps commander. Any changes in the TAOR boundaries require the decision of the ARVN corps commander after coordination with the Free World commander(s) concerned. The primary purpose of the TAOR is to delineate an area in which a commander is to focus the necessary effort to deny the area to the enemy. In the TAOR, the specified commander is responsible for, and has the authority to act on the development and maintenance of installations and the conduct of tactical operations with troops under his control. Since there frequently are ARVN and RF/PF operations as well as Free World operations in a TAOR, commanders must work closely with local ARVN and RF/PF commanders to insure that Free World operations complement and supplement GVN efforts. It is emphasized that the area within a TAOR still belongs to GVN. The civil administration and GVN control are not relinquished. The area is in no sense under the martial law of the force commander and normal police functions continue to be exercised by the GVN.

FWMAF TAOR COMMANDERS' RELATIONS WITH GVN OFFICIALS AND POPULATION

The tactical objective of the FWMAF TAOR commander is the neutralization of enemy influence in his area. This short-term objective must be considered in the perspective provided by the long range objective of the Free World allies in Vietnam, viz, the establishment of a free viable nation, representative of and responsive to its people.

Tactical operations conducted within TAOR must take cognizance of the fact that the FWMAF is functioning in a sovereign state whose people are the nucleus around which this new nation is being built. The Vietnamese populace must be presumed to be friendly until it demonstrates otherwise. Relations with the people must be conducted through the legitimately constituted provincial and district governments.

TAOR boundaries will not conform necessarily to Vietnamese political boundaries. To assure coordination of effort in tactical operations, liaison must be established with all local officials exercising jurisdiction over any portion of the TAOR. Should the TAOR extend through more than one province, inter-provincial liaison is essential. Both province and district chiefs have a dual civil-military responsibility. In many cases they have military forces at their disposal. In all cases they are responsible for security in their areas. Liaison with these officials must be effected through the MACV advisor, and where assigned, the FWMAF Liaison Officer.

TAOR commanders will have occasion to come into contact with local revolutionary development activities. Revolutionary development is a Vietnamese process which cannot be accomplished by Free World personnel. To be effective revolutionary development activities require the participation of the individual Vietnamese. Free World units may support revolutionary development by providing the military security required for it to take place. Free World units also may be able to assist the local revolutionary development program through military civic action. Any support offered to revolutionary development must be channeled through local GVN officials.

Population control within TAOR must be effected through the appropriate GVN official. In tactical situations, the attachment of Vietnamese military or civilian officials to units will facilitate this control. Coordination with the GVN must be effected in planning operations so that population returned to government control can be transferred to GVN civilian control at the earliest possible time. In non-tactical situations, FWMAF commanders have no jurisdiction over Vietnamese personnel. In this circumstance, population control is the prerogative of the GVN. To usurp or weaken this control by effecting unilateral FWMAF control measures is counter-productive to our long-range objective in Vietnam.

Troop discipline and courtesy must receive command attention at all echelons. The recent history of Vietnam is replete with examples of mistreatment of the civilian populace by soldiers of many armies. The good will and sincere friendship of the Free World allies is best demonstrated to the individual Vietnamese by the courteous, disciplined conduct of our troops. Individual courtesy must extend to the operation of motor vehicles and other equipment. Consideration must be given the Vietnamese on roads and highways and on urban streets. Conduct both on and off duty always must show respect and consideration for Vietnamese customs and sensibilities.

Because of the relative permanence of their association with the population of their area, TAOR commanders have an excellent opportunity to assist both the individual Vietnamese and local officials. Every opportunity should be taken to improve the prestige of the GVN. Assistance provided within a TAOR should be done so as to reflect maximum credit on the GVN rather than the Free World unit present.

SUMMARY OF REMARKS BY COMUSMACV
RELATING TO NONCOMBATANT CASUALTIES

The following comments were made by General Westmoreland at the MACV Commanders' Conference held at 5th Special Forces Headquarters, Nha Trang, at 0900 hours, 28 August 1966:

"I have five points to cover before we conclude. At your desks are rules of engagement and procedures on control of fires of all types. It is extremely important that we do all we can to use our fires with discrimination, and avoid noncombatant battle casualties. This is a very sensitive subject, both locally and among our own press corps. Unfortunately, we've had a rash of incidents caused by everything from mechanical failure to human error. I would appreciate your reviewing now, and your continued review, of your safety precautions and procedures on control of fires. Make sure your commanders are thoroughly familiar with the appropriate documents. Henceforth my staff will republish these quarterly, to counter loss of familiarity through turn-over of personnel. The percentage of incidents has been minuscule; nonetheless, every civilian killed is a calamity, and we must cut the percentage to the minimum possible."

The following commanders were present at this meeting:

GEN William C. Westmoreland	COMUSMACV
Mr. Henry L. T. Koren	Asst Deputy Ambassador
LTG Jean E. Engler	DCG, USARV
LTG William W. Momyer	Cdr, 7th AF
LTG John A. Heintges	DEPCOMUSMACV
MG Stanley R. Larsen	CG, I FFORCEV
MG Jonathan O. Seaman	CG, II FFORCEV
MG Frederick C. Weyand	CG, 25th Inf Div
MG Lewis J. Fields	CG, III MAF (Acting)
MG Lewis B. Robertshaw	CG, 1st MAW
MG William J. Crumm	Cdr, 3d AD
MG Wood B. Kyle	CG, 3d Mar Div
MG William E. DePuy	CG, 1st Inf Div
MG Charles W. Eifler	CG, 1st Log Cmd
MG John Norton	CG, 1st Cav Div (Airmobile)
MG Kenneth Mackay	COMAFV
BG David O. Byars, Jr.	CG, 4th Inf Div (Adv)
BG William K. Jones	Dir, MACV COC
BG Willard Pearson	CG, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div
BG Joseph A. McChristian	J2, MACV

RADM Norvell G. Ward
BG Glenn A. Walker
BG William A. Stiles
BG George P. Seneff
BG Robert R. Ploger
BG Edward H. de Saussure
BG Robert D. Terry
COL Lemuel E. Pope
COL William R. Desobry
COL Arndt L. Mueller
COL Richard M. Lee
COL Archelaus L. Hamblen, Jr.
COL Robert C. Shaw
COL Francis J. Kelly
LTC John Hinton, Jr.

COMNAVFORV
CG, 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
ADC, 1st Mar Div
CG, 1st Avn Bde
CG, 18th Engr Bde
CG, 196th Lt Inf Bde
CG, 1st Sig Bde
DSA, CMD
SA, IV Corps
DSA, III Corps
DSA, II Corps
DSA, I Corps
CG, 173d Abn Bde (Acting)
CG, 5th SF Gp
Recorder

The following comments were made by General Westmoreland at the MACV Commanders' Conference held at 5th Special Forces Headquarter's, Nha Trang, at 0930 hours, 3 December 1967:

"General Westmoreland was concerned over the high rate of firing and bombing accidents. Since US/FW forces have initiated operations in Vietnam, the rate of accidents has increased. In 1966 we had 103 accidents. In the first 10 months of 1967, we experienced 567, a more than five fold increase; an increase which cannot be accounted for by a corresponding increase in combat assets. This is a matter of concern to us all. GEN Westmoreland desired commanders to take a personal interest in this matter to reduce accidents to a minimum. Upon the occasion of an accident, the chain of command should indorse the report all the way to MACV level. Other means to consider include:

a. Appointment of safety officers at several command levels with these officers to check on the state of gunnery training and other measures designed to bring down the accident level.

b. Special training for replacements to make them more proficient and more cognizant of the hazards involved, safety procedures, and history of past accidents.

c. Stress on this subject at Commanders' meetings.

General Westmoreland requested J3 to keep monthly statistics on accidents which could direct attention to where accidents are occurring, where their emphasis on safety is strong, and where it is lax."

The following commanders were present at this meeting:

General Westmoreland
General Abrams
Ambassador Komer
LTG Chae
LTG Cushman
LTG Rosson
MG Darrow
MG Eckhardt
MG Murray
MG Peers
MG Tolson
MG Mearns
MG Hay
MG Worley
MG Anderson
MG Pearson
MG Yose
MG Vincent
MG Chung
MG Bak
MG Koster
BG Taber
BG Kim
BG Forhes
BG Metzger
BG Roseborough
BG Rasmussen
BG Desobry
BG Chaisson
BG Sidle
BG La Hue
COL Roberts
COL Peters
CPT Orme
COL Beeson
COL Barnes
COL Titterud
COL Ladd
LTC Nelson

COMUSMACV
DEPCOMUSMACV
DEP to COMUSMACV for CO
COMROKFV
CG, III MAF
CG, I FFORCEV
ACofS, J5, MACV
CG, II FFORCEV
DEP CG, III MAF
CG, 4th Inf Div
CG, 1st Cav Div (Airmobile)
CG, 25th Inf Div
CG, 1st Inf Div
Vice Cdr, 7th AF
CG, 1st MAW
ACofS, J3, MACV
COMRTFV
COMAFV
CG, ROK Capitol Div
CG, ROK 9th Div
CG, Americal Div
Asst DCG, USARV
CG, 2d ROK Mar Bde
CG, 199th Lt Inf Bde
ADC, 3d Mar Div
ADC, 9th Inf Div
ACofS, J4, MACV
SA, IV Corps
Director, COC, MACV
Chief, OI, MACV
ADC, 1st Mar Div
DEP ACofS, J2, MACV
DSA, III Corps
C/S, NAVFORV
DSA, I Corps
DSA, II Corps
Spec Asst, ACofS CORDS, M.
CO, 5th SFG (Abn)
COC Recorder

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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IG	11 FFVLN
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MACON	
MACPD	

RETAIN FOR HISTORICAL FILE

FROM: COMUSMACV
TO: VMAC

CONFIDENTIAL

43/68

From MACJL5

Subj: Mistreatment of Detainees and PW (U)

1. (C) Extensive press coverage of recent combat operations in Vietnam has afforded a fertile field for sensational photographs and war stories. Reports and photographs show flagrant disregard for human life, inhumane treatment and brutality in handling of detainees and PW. These press stories have served to focus unfavorable world attention on the treatment of detainees and prisoners of war by both ARVN and FwMAF.

2. (C) These actions will not be condoned.

3. (U) Vigorous and immediate command action is essential to insure that all personnel are familiar with and observe strictly:

- a. FM 27-10, Law of Land Warfare
- b. UCMJ, Article 93
- c. Geneva Convention relative to treatment of PW (Articles 12 through 20 and 121)
- d. Geneva Convention for Amelioration of Condition of

EXHIBIT M-48

DRAFT

TYPED NAME TITLE PHONE AND OFFICE SYMBOL
HENRY W. GIBSON
COL, USA
Chief, FM Division
2906/MACJL5

RELEASE

SIGNATURE


TYPED NAME AND TITLE
WALTER T. KERWIN, JR., MG, USA
Chief of Staff

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wounded and sick armed forces in the field, Articles 12, 17 and 50.

e. MACV Directives 20-4, 27-5 and 190-3

4. (C) In addition, US Advisors will themselves adhere strictly to these provisions and make every effort to influence their counterparts to observe humane principles and the Geneva Conventions. Advisors must not become involved with war crimes and atrocities and shall advise their counterparts that they are required to report these incidents to higher headquarters. Advisors will use all influence to stop and prevent any maltreatment, war crimes or atrocities and will inform the senior in the chain of command of all details surrounding such incidents as quickly as possible.

5. (C) All known, suspected or alleged war crimes or atrocities committed by or against US personnel will be investigated IAW MACV Directive 20-4.

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COC	SURC
COMB	TMA
STUDIES	
COMPT	TNG
DCD SPC	USATD
REP	
FIMAG	USARY
HC	IFFVLD
IG	IFFVL
JRATA	111 MAF
JUSPAD	5TH SF
MACUC	7TH AF
MACON	
MAFFS	

ACTION TO: **ROUTINE**

DTG 09 0200 Z Dec 67

FROM: COMUSMACV
 TO: CG, USARV LONG BINH *RUMSVA*
 CMDR, 7AF SAIGON *RUMSBT*
 COMNAVFOR V SAIGON *RUMSBB*
 CG, III MAF DA NANG *RUMWAA*
 CG, I FFORCEV NHA TRANG *RUMNVF*
 CG, II FFORCEV LONG BINH *RUMSFF*
 SA, IV CTZ CAN THO *RUMSMT*
 CO, 5TH SFGA NHA TRANG *RUMNGR*

UNCLASSIFIED 40898 FROM: MACCOC

WESTMORELAND SENDS:

1. A wallet-size card entitled "Guidance for Commanders in Vietnam" was prepared in 1966 for the use of our troop commanders. I review this card periodically and find the guidance it expresses is as pertinent today as when it was published. To assure that all troop leaders avail themselves consistently of this guidance sufficient stocks of the cards should be maintained in each major command and periodic checks should be made to

EXHIBIT M-91

TYPED NAME, TITLE, PHONE AND OFFICE SYMBOL
WILLIAM F. KAUFMAN
 Colonel, USA
 Deputy Director, COC
 MACCOC/3956

SIGNATURE
[Signature]
 TYPED NAME AND TITLE
W. C. WESTMORELAND
 General, USA, COMUSMACV

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	PAGE NO. 1	NO OF PAGES 2
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determine the awareness of the individual concerned in this regard. The initial issue of the card will be made to each incoming casual officer at reception points, and distribution will extend to units scheduled for deployment to RVN.

2. Similarly, the published card entitled "True Rules" contains essential guidance, and applies to all members of our armed forces in Vietnam. The principles of behavior established in the "Nine Rules" are unchanging and practicable. They will serve the individual in good stead in whatever status he or she enjoys. The "Nine Rules" should likewise be emphasized and assurances made that the card is in the possession of each military member.

253

20 January 1970


MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: MACV Replacement Orientation Packet

1. Each individual soldier attends an RVN orientation at the Replacement Battalion upon his arrival in RVN. During this orientation, the soldier is issued an information packet which contains several documents. In this packet are the items referred to in USARV Regulation 612-1.
2. Inclosed are the extracts (10) of the pertinent items and documents that were obtained from the 1969 information packet issued by MACV at the Replacement Battalion. The items inclosed are illustrative of the type of documents each soldier received during 1969.

10 Incl
as


JAMES H. PATTERSON
Lieutenant Colonel, Armor



Standing Orders Rogers Rangers

- 
- 
- 
- 
1. DON'T FORGET NOTHING.
 2. HAVE YOUR MUSKET CLEAN AS A WHISTLE, HATCHET SCURED, SIXTY ROUNDS POWDER AND BALL, AND BE READY TO MARCH AT A MINUTE'S WARNING.
 3. WHEN YOU'RE ON THE MARCH, ACT THE WAY YOU WOULD IF YOU WAS SNEAKING UP ON A DEER. SEE THE ENEMY FIRST.
 4. TELL THE TRUTH ABOUT WHAT YOU SEE AND WHAT YOU DO. THERE IS AN ARMY DEPENDING ON US FOR CORRECT INFORMATION. YOU CAN LIE ALL YOU PLEASE WHEN YOU TELL OTHER FOLKS ABOUT THE RANGERS, BUT DON'T NEVER LIE TO A RANGER OR OFFICER.
 5. DON'T NEVER TAKE A CHANCE YOU DON'T HAVE TO.
 6. WHEN WE'RE ON THE MARCH WE MARCH SINGLE FILE, FAR ENOUGH APART SO ONE SHOT CAN'T GO THROUGH TWO MEN.
 7. IF WE STRIKE SWAMPS, OR SOFT GROUND, WE SPREAD OUT ABREAST, SO IT'S HARD TO TRACK US.
 8. WHEN WE MARCH, WE KEEP MOVING TILL DARK, SO AS TO GIVE THE ENEMY THE LEAST POSSIBLE CHANCE AT US.
 9. WHEN WE CAMP, HALF THE PARTY STAYS AWAKE WHILE THE OTHER HALF SLEEPS.
 10. IF WE TAKE PRISONERS, WE KEEP 'EM SEPARATE TILL WE HAVE HAD TIME TO EXAMINE THEM, SO THEY CAN'T COOK UP A STORY BETWEEN 'EM.

CONTINUATION

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- 
- 
- 
11. DON'T EVER MARCH HOME THE SAME WAY. TAKE A DIFFERENT ROUTE SO YOU WON'T BE AMBUSHED.
 12. NO MATTER WHETHER WE TRAVEL IN BIG PARTIES OR LITTLE ONES, EACH PARTY HAS TO KEEP A SCOUT 20 YARDS AHEAD, TWENTY YARDS ON EACH FLANK AND TWENTY YARDS IN THE REAR, SO THE MAIN BODY CAN'T BE SURPRISED AND WIPED PUT.
 13. EVERY NIGHT YOU'LL BE TOLD WHERE TO MEET IF SURROUNDED BY A SUPERIOR FORCE.
 14. DON'T SIT DOWN TO EAT WITHOUT POSTING SENTRIES.
 15. DON'T SLEEP BEYOND DAWN. DAWN'S WHEN THE FRENCH AND INDIANS ATTACK.
 16. DON'T CROSS A RIVER BY A REGULAR FORD.
 17. IF SOMEBODY'S TRAILING YOU, MAKE A CIRCLE, COME BACK ONTO YOUR OWN TRACKS, AND AMBUSH THE FOLKS THAT AIM TO AMBUSH YOU.
 18. DON'T STAND UP WHEN THE ENEMY'S COMING AGAINST YOU. KNEEL DOWN, LIE DOWN, HIDE BEHIND A TREE.
 19. LET THE ENEMY COME TILL HE'S ALMOST CLOSE ENOUGH TO TOUCH. THEN LET HIM HAVE IT AND JUMP OUT AND FINISH HIM UP WITH YOUR HATCHET.

MAJ ROBERT ROGERS 1759

Inclosure 1



NINE RULES

FOR PERSONNEL OF US MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM

The Vietnamese have paid a heavy price in suffering for their long fight against the communists. We military men are in Vietnam now because their government has asked us to help its soldiers and people in winning their struggle. The Viet Cong will attempt to turn the Vietnamese people against you. You can defeat them at every turn by the strength, understanding, and generosity you display with the people. Here are nine simple rules:

DISTRIBUTION — 1 to each member of the United States Armed Forces in Vietnam

NINE RULES

- 1 Remember we are guests here: We make no demands and seek no special treatment.
- 2 Join with the people! Understand their life, use phrases from their language and honor their customs and laws.
- 3 Treat women with politeness and respect.
- 4 Make personal friends among the soldiers and common people.
- 5 Always give the Vietnamese the right of way.
- 6 Be alert to security and ready to react with your military skill.
- 7 Don't attract attention by loud, rude or unusual behavior.
- 8 Avoid separating yourself from the people by a display of wealth or privilege.
- 9 Above all else you are members of the U S Military Forces on a difficult mission, responsible for all your official and personal actions. Reflect honor upon yourself and the United States of America.

Inclosure 2



CODE OF CONDUCT

FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES

GTA 21-50 June 1958
DISTRIBUTION—ACTIVE ARMY, NG & USAR:
1 per each officer, warrant officer, and enlisted person.

CODE OF CONDUCT

For Members of the Armed Forces of the United States

- 1 I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.
- 2 I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command I will never surrender my men while they still have the means to resist.
- 3 If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.
- 4 If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information or take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way.
- 5 When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to give only name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.
- 6 I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.

Inclosure 3

KEY PHRASES.

<u>ENGLISH</u>	<u>VIETNAMESE</u>
Halt	Dừng lại
Lay down your gun	Buông súng xuống
Put up your hands	Đưa tay lên
Keep your hands on your head	Đưa tay lên đầu
I will search you	Tôi khám ông
Do not talk	Đừng nói chuyện
Walk there	Lại đây kia
Turn Right	Xay bên phải
Turn Left	Xay bên trái

"The courage and skill of our men in battle will be matched by their magnanimity when the battle ends. And all American military action in Vietnam will stop as soon as aggression by others is stopped"

21 August 1965

Lyndon B. Johnson



THE ENEMY IN YOUR HANDS
AS A MEMBER OF THE US MILITARY FORCES, YOU WILL COMPLY WITH THE GENEVA PRISONER OF WAR CONVENTIONS OF 1949 TO WHICH YOUR COUNTRY ADHERES. UNDER THESE CONVENTIONS :

YOU CAN AND WILL
DISARM YOUR PRISONER
IMMEDIATELY SEARCH HIM THOROUGHLY
REQUIRE HIM TO BE SILENT
SEGREGATE HIM FROM OTHER PRISONERS
GUARD HIM CAREFULLY
TAKE HIM TO THE PLACE DESIGNATED BY YOUR COMMANDER

YOU CANNOT AND MUST NOT
MISTREAT YOUR PRISONER
HUMILIATE OR DEGRADE HIM
TAKE ANY OF HIS PERSONAL EFFECTS WHICH DO NOT HAVE SIGNIFICANT MILITARY VALUE
REFUSE HIM MEDICAL TREATMENT IF REQUIRED AND AVAILABLE

ALWAYS TREAT YOUR PRISONER HUMANELY

THE ENEMY IN YOUR HANDS

1. HANDLE HIM FIRMLY, PROMPTLY, BUT HUMANELY.

The captive in your hands must be disarmed, searched, secured and watched. But he must also be treated at all times as a human being. He must not be tortured, killed, mutilated, or degraded, even if he refuses to talk. If the captive is a woman, treat her with all respect due her sex.

2. TAKE THE CAPTIVE QUICKLY TO SECURITY

As soon as possible evacuate the captive to a place of safety and interrogation designated by your commander. Military documents taken from the captive are also sent to the interrogators, but the captive will keep his personal equipment except weapons.

3. MISTREATMENT OF ANY CAPTIVE IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE. EVERY SOLDIER IS PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ENEMY IN HIS HANDS.

It is both dishonorable and foolish to mistreat a captive. It is also a punishable offense. Not even a beaten enemy will surrender if he knows his captors will torture or kill him. He will resist and make his capture more costly. Fair treatment of captives encourages the enemy to surrender.

4. TREAT THE SICK AND WOUNDED CAPTIVE AS BEST YOU CAN.

The captive saved may be an intelligence source. In any case he is a human being and must be treated like one. The soldier who ignores the sick and wounded degrades his uniform.

5. ALL PERSONS IN YOUR HANDS, WHETHER SUSPECTS, CIVILIANS, OR COMBAT CAPTIVES, MUST BE PROTECTED AGAINST VIOLENCE, INSULTS, CURIOSITY, AND REPRISALS OF ANY KIND.

Leave punishment to the courts and judges. The soldier shows his strength by his fairness, firmness, and humanity to the persons in his hands.

Inclosure 4



Inclousure 5

MINES AND BOOBYTRAPS

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The
M16A1
Rifle

OPERATION
AND
PREVENTIVE
MAINTENANCE



Inclosure 6



MACV PHRASE BOOK

General Conversation

English

Hello, good-bye
Mr.
Mrs.
Miss.
You (child).
How are you?

I'm fine.
Thank you.
Please say it again.
Excuse me. I don't understand.
Do you speak English?

Let's go.

Pronunciation

Chow.
Um.
Bah.
Ko.
Em.
Um mon yoy come?

Toy mon yoy.
Come on um.
Sin um nay lie.
Sin lay um, toy come hew.
Um noy tyen Ahn come?
Choong ta dee.

Vietnamese Spelling

Chào.
Ông.
Bà.
Cô.
Em.
Ông (bà, cô, em) mạnh giỏi không?
Tối mạnh giỏi.
Cảm ơn ông.
Xin ông nói lại.
Xin lỗi ông, tôi không hiểu.
Ông nói tiếng Anh không?
Chúng ta đi.

Military Terminology

English

Aid station.
Booby trap RPT.
Corpsman.
Doctor.
Explosives.
First aid.
Flare.
Grenade.
Guerrilla.
Helicopter.
Jeep.
Jet plane.
North Vietnamese.
Propeller plane.
Trap.
Truck.

Pronunciation

Trom cù thwong.
By No.
EE-tan.
Bac shee.
Tao-oc no.
Coo cup.
Wa cho.
Luu dan.
Kwun yoy kick.
Fee cah trook tong.
Say yip.
Fee ca fun luke.
Newy bac Viet.
Fee ca cun quot.
By.
Say com nyong.

Vietnamese Spelling

Trạm cứu thương.
Bẫy nổ.
Y-tá.
Bác Sĩ.
Thuốc nổ.
Cứu cấp.
Hỏa châu.
Lựu đạn.
Quân dù kích.
Phi cơ trực thăng.
Xe díp.
Phi cơ phản lực.
Người Bắc Việt.
Phi cơ canh quét.
Bẫy.
Xe cam-nhông.

Pilot.
Platoon leader.
Viet Cong.
Vietnamese.
Husband.
Wife.
Chinese.
Communist.

Fee come.
Trung doi trew-ong.
Viet Cong.
Newy Vietnam.
Chum.
Vyuh.
Newy trung wa.
Kong san.
Gow.
Con traw.
Bin shee.
Troong shee.
Shee kwun.

Phi công.
Trung đội Trưởng.
Việt cộng.
Người Việt Nam.
Chồng.
Vợ.
Người Trung Hoa.
Cộng sản.
Gạo.
Con trâu.
Binh Sĩ.
Trung sĩ.
Sĩ quan.

(Armed Forces of the RVN)

Regular Forces.
Regional forces.
Popular Forces.

Chew Luke kwun.
Dia foang dwun.
Nyah Kwun.

Chữ Lục Quân.
Địa Phương Quân.
Nghĩa Quân.

Army.
Navy.
Air force.
Marine corps.

(Branches of the Army)

Infantry.
Artillery.
Engineer.
Medical.

(Military Units)

Squad.
Platoon.
Company.
Battalion.
Regiment.

Luke kwun.
Hi kwun.
Come kwun.
Tooy kwun luke chyen.

Bo bin.
Fow bin.
Come bin.
Kwun ee.

Tyew doy.
Troong doy.
Die doy.
Tyew dwan.
Troong dwan.

Lục Quân.
Hải Quân.
Không Quân.
Thủy Quân Lục Chiến.

Bô binh.
Pháo binh.
Công binh.
Quân y.

Tiểu đội.
Trung đội.
Đội đội.
Tiểu đoàn.
Trung đoàn
or
Liên đội.

Weapons

English

Pistol.

Rifle.
Automatic Rifle.
Carbine.
Mortar.

Rec-Rifle.
Gun, cannon.
AA artillery gun.

Howitzer.

Pronunciation

Shoom luke.

Shoom trew-ong.
Troong leen-en.
Cock-bin.
Shoom coy.

Shoom come yaht.
Die bahc.
Die bahc fum come.

Die bahc ngahn nong.

Vietnamese Spelling

Súng lục.
or
Súng sáu.
Súng trường.
Trung liên.
Cạc-bin.
Súng cối
or
Mạc chê.
Súng không giật.
Đại bác.
Đại bác phong không
or
Súng cao-xa.
Đại bác ngắn nòng.

Entering a Village

English

This village is surrounded.
Bring the village chief.
You will not be harmed.
How many V.C. are there?

Where are the weapons hidden?
Where are the tunnels?

Where are the booby traps?
Come outside.
Enter first.
When was the attack?

Pronunciation

Long ni be bow vay.
Yan sa troo-ong.
Um come be buck die.
Caw bow nyew Viet Cong?
Nyoong shaong yoy uh dow?
Nyoong bwong hum uh dow?
Nyoong by no uh dow?
Rah noy.
Vow troo-oc.
Tun cung say rah bow yuh?

Vietnamese Spelling

Làng này bị bao vây.
Đã dẫn xã trưởng.
Ông không bị bực đời.
Có bao nhiêu Việt Cộng?
Những súng giấu ở đâu?
Những đường hầm ở đâu?
Những bẫy nổ ở đâu?
Ra ngoài.
Vào trước.
Tấn công về ra bao giờ?

I am an American.
Where is your unit?
Where is your village?
Where is your camp?
Where are the friendly troops?
Is this trail dangerous?
How many V.C. were killed?
How many villagers were killed?
How many people were wounded?
Draw a picture.
Take me there.

Toy la newy mee.
Done vee kwa um uh dow?
Lahn kwa um uh dow?
Try kwa um uh dow?
Bo doy nwoc uh dow?
Doong maw night caw ngooy he-em come?
Bow nyew Viet Cong be chet?
Bow nyew newy bang be chet?
Caw bow nyew be twong?
Sin vyeh hen.
Sin chee doo-ung den chow daw.

Tôi là người Mỹ.
Đơn vị của ông ở đâu?
Làng của ông ở đâu?
Trại của ông ở đâu?
Bộ đội nước bạn ở đâu?
Đường mòn này có nguy hiểm không?
Bao nhiêu Việt Cộng bị chết?
Bao nhiêu người làng bị chết?
Có bao nhiêu bị thương?
Xin vẽ hình.
Xin chỉ đường đến chỗ đó.

(Seasons of the year)

Planting time.
Harvest time.
Monsoon season.

Moo-uh yeho hut yome.
Moo-uh mung.
Moo-uh moo-uh.

Mùa gieo hạt giống.
Mùa màng.
Mùa mưa.

Psychological Operations

English

Vietnamese Spelling

Are you afraid of American soldiers?

Bạn có sợ lính Mỹ không?

Are you (all) afraid of the Viet Cong?

(Tất cả các) Bạn có sợ Việt-Cộng không?

Do you believe Viet Cong propaganda?

Bạn có tin ở lời tuyên truyền của Việt-Cộng không?

Do you believe GVN propaganda?

Bạn có tin ở lời tuyên truyền của Chính Phủ Quốc-Gia không?

Have you heard of the Open Arms Program?

Bạn đã nghe nói đến Chương Trình Chiêu Hồi chưa?

Do you understand the Open Arms Program?

Bạn có hiểu biết gì về Chương Trình Chiêu Hồi không?

Have you seen a Safe Conduct Pass?

Bạn đã thấy một tờ Giấy Thông Hành chưa?

Do you have a Safe Conduct Pass?

Bạn đã có một tờ Giấy Thông Hành chưa?

Do you want to rally?

Bạn có muốn quy chính không?

Do you know someone who would like to rally?

Bạn có biết người nào muốn quy chính không?

Will you help us write a leaflet?

Bạn có muốn giúp chúng tôi viết một tờ truyền đơn không?

Will you help us make a loudspeaker appeal?

Bạn có muốn giúp chúng tôi dùng loa phóng thanh để kêu gọi Việt-Cộng không?

Tell them not to resist.

Bạn hãy bảo họ đừng nên chống cự.

(Slogan) Republic of Vietnam for 10,000 years!

Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa muôn năm! (khẩu hiệu)

Numbers

English

Pronunciation

Vietnamese Spelling

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Moat.
High.
Bah.
Bone.
Nom.
Shao.
By.
Tam.
Chin.
Mooy.

Một.
Hai.
Ba.
Bốn.
Năm.
Sáu.
Bảy.
Tám.
Chín.
Mười.

11
12
13
15
20
21
25
30
35
40
45
100
500
1000

Mooy moat.
Mooy high.
Mooy bah.
Mooy lom.
High mooy.
High mooy moat.
High mooy lom.
Bah mooy.
Bah mooy lom.
Bone mooy.
Bone mooy lom.
Moat trom.
Nom trom.
Moat ngon.

Mười một.
Mười hai.
Mười ba.
Mười lăm.
Hai mươi.
Hai mươi mốt.
Hai mươi lăm.
Ba mươi.
Ba mươi lăm.
Bốn mươi.
Bốn mươi lăm.
Một trăm.
Năm trăm.
Một ngàn.

In forming numbers above ten in Vietnamese, you say "ten-one" for eleven, "ten-two" for twelve, "two-ten-three" for twenty-three, "three-hundred-three-ten-five" for three hundred thirty-five, etc. (Except in 15, 25, 35, etc., where 5 becomes Lăm instead of Năm).

Handling Prisoners

English

Pronunciation

Vietnamese Spelling

Drop your weapon.
Hands up.
Come here.
Don't move.
Silence.
Stand up.
Lie face down.
Undress.
Dress.
Turn around.
Move out.
Hurry up.
Turn right.
Turn left.
Halt.
Walk ahead.

Day shoom swong.
Yuh tie len.
Lie day.
Doong yen.
Doong nay.
Doong yay.
Nom swong.
Cay ow.
Mock.
Quay lie.
Dee dee.
Hurry up.
Ray tay fie.
Ray tay try.
Doong lie.
Dee trock.

Đề súng xuống.
Giơ tay lên.
Lại đây.
Đứng yên.
Đứng nói.
Đứng đây.
Nằm xuống.
Cởi áo.
Mặc.
Quay lại.
Đi đi.
Mau lên.
Rẽ tay phải.
Rẽ tay trái.
Đứng lại.
Đi trước.

Time

English

Pronunciation

Vietnamese Spelling

Time.
What time?
This week.

Tea yuh.
May yuh.
Twan high.
Twan shao.
Twan troo-oc.

Thị giờ.
Mấy giờ.
Tuần này.
Tuần sau.
Tuần troo-oc.

Last week.

(Days of the week)

Today.
Tomorrow.
Yesterday.
Sunday.
Monday.
Tuesday.
Wednesday.
Thursday.
Friday.
Saturday.

Home nigh.
Nigh my.
Home kwa.
Nigh choo nyut.
Nigh two high.
Nigh two bah.
Nigh two two.
Nigh two num.
Nigh two shao.
Nigh two by.

Hôm nay.
Ngày mai.
Hôm qua.
Ngày Chủ Nhật.
Ngày thứ hai.
Ngày thứ ba.
Ngày thứ tư.
Ngày thứ năm.
Ngày thứ sáu.
Ngày thứ bảy.

A GRATEFUL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

to the



for the inspiration for
and the majority of the phrases contained in
this Phrase Book

MACV 1720/1 (1-68)

FIRE AND MANEUVER

1. In an offensive situation, does the commander use fire and maneuver to close with and destroy the enemy? (FInd, FE, Fight, Finish).
2. Are mobility means being used to move RVNAF faster than VC? M13's, helicopters, trucks, airplanes, riverboats?
3. Does the unit establish a base of fire and maneuver at the same time, taking advantage of direct and indirect fire support elements while maneuvering?
4. Has the commander tested his communications with supporting artillery, mortars, armed riverboats, and air to guarantee immediate support? In the small unit commander controlling his fires?
5. Have plans been made for the pursuit and continuation of the attack?
6. Can the scheme of maneuver be changed to suit the situation? For example, when under fire, does the unit take immediate action to flank the enemy?

COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. How can the commander best control the operation? From where? What control measures? When will the components of fire support start? What signal or command will be used to start, shift, and stop it? How, when, and where should the attack order be issued?
2. Is there a clear-cut channel of command to promote unity of effort and the decisive application of full combat power?
3. Is there coordination of all forces toward a common goal? Coordination with Province (RF - FF - Rangers), Sector, Division, Air Force, Navy, Marines?

MAY 1967 (10-48)

6

COMMAND AND CONTROL (CONT'D)

4. Is there a single commander of the operation?
5. Have communications with lower and higher echelons been established and checked to provide control?
6. Does the commander have continuous communications with other maneuver elements? Heliborne forces, armor elements, riverboats, airborne forces?
7. Has the commander made personal visits to follow-up his orders? Has he inspected his men and equipment before the operation?
8. Are the plans simple and are the orders clear? Have leaders and troops been briefed?
9. Has the commander checked food, water, medical supplies, medical evacuation, ammunition distribution, and tested essential equipment for the operation?

HEADQUARTERS
 UNITED STATES MILITARY COMMAND, VIETNAM
 ADVISOR
 1

COMBAT FUNDAMENTALS FOR ADVISORS

The goal of the United States Government in Vietnam is to assist the Government of the Republic of Vietnam in the struggle for freedom. Together we will win the struggle against the Viet Cong.

In the prosecution of the war, American advisors are called upon to appraise the situation and to give sound advice. This advice must be based on an objective analysis grounded on fundamental military knowledge. Attached are combat precepts as they apply to the war in Vietnam, which are commended for your study and use. The achievement of your advisory efforts will be in direct proportion to the application of these combat fundamentals, knowledge, past experience and common sense.

MISSION

1. Is the mission clearly understood by all?
2. Does the plan have flexibility? Is the enemy the objective, particularly after contact has been gained, rather than terrain which was assigned for control purposes?
3. Does the plan have a decisive, attainable objective?
4. Is the selection of the objective based on the means available, the enemy, and a reasonable size area of operations?
5. Is it planned to use all available means? Crew served weapons, artillery, air, ships and/or boats, armor, airborne?

OFFENSIVE

1. Is the commander imposing his will on the enemy rather than reacting to enemy action? Only offensive action can win and prevent the enemy from escaping, reorganizing, and resuming his attack.
2. Is the commander keeping contact and pursuing with all available means - infantry, armor, artillery, heliborne and/or air-landed? Is the commander using every effort to maintain contact with the enemy? Are the means used? Heliborne, armor, patrole, Eagle Flights, and aggressive offensive action?
3. Are night operations used extensively to accomplish the mission and to keep the enemy on the defensive?
4. Does the plan block all VC escape routes?
5. Has the commander instilled in his troops a will to win?

SECURITY ON THE MOVE

1. Is every possible measure being taken to prevent surprise by the full use of intelligence and counterintelligence? Reconnaissance, searches, patrols, aerial observations, PW's, information from higher and lower units?
2. Does the formation adopted by the commander during approach to contact or on reconnaissance insure the main body against ambush?
3. Does the commander move the unit by bounds when he considers contact imminent?
4. Does the commander have knowledge of the civilians and friendly forces in the area?
5. Is the commander using deception to keep the VC off-balance? For example, moving at night and the use of camouflage and concealment?
6. Is there security on moves and halts? Outposts, sentinels, scouts, searches, reconnaissance, and stealth in moving units?
7. What is the reaction of the villagers, are they friendly or have they disappeared?
8. After objectives are taken, is security continuous and is the area searched?

CIVIL ACTION

1. Has the commander required his soldiers to treat civilians properly so that the citizens of RVN have a favorable impression of their Army?
2. Have the soldiers been properly briefed on respecting civilian property? Food, crops, dwellings and animals?

Inclosure 8

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2

3




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CHIEU HOI

MACV COMMAND INFORMATION PAMPHLET

6-69, MARCH 1969

GIẤY THÔNG-HÀNH




SAFE-CONDUCT PASS TO BE HONORED BY ALL VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND ALLIED FORCES

이 안전보장패스는 월남정부와 모든 연합군에 의해 인정된 것입니다.

รัฐบาลเวียดนามและหน่วยพันธมิตร ยินดีให้เกียรติแก่ผู้ถือบัตรผ่านปลอดภัยนี้.

THE WINNING TICKET

Inclosure 9



IF YOU ARE AWARE OF OR BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY OF THE FOLLOWING SITUATIONS REPORT ALL PERTINENT FACTS IMMEDIATELY TO YOUR SECURITY OFFICER OR IMMEDIATE SUPERIOR

1. ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIED DEFENSE INFORMATION THROUGH OBSERVATION COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS, OR PERSONAL CONTACT WITH US MILITARY, CIVILIAN, AND DEPENDENT PERSONNEL.
2. ATTEMPTS BY INDIVIDUALS WITH KNOWN OR SUSPECTED ESPIONAGE, SUBVERSIVE, OR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BACKGROUNDS OR ASSOCIATIONS TO CULTIVATE FRIENDSHIP WITH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL OR TO PLACE THEM UNDER OBLIGATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING INFORMATION.
3. ATTEMPTS BY INDIVIDUALS TO COERCE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL TO OBTAIN MILITARY INFORMATION FOR ESPIONAGE PURPOSES.
4. EXPLOITATION OF U.S. PERSONNEL HAVING ANY TENDENCY TOWARD DISAFFECTION OR HAVING PERSONAL DIFFICULTIES.
5. THREATS OF EXPOSURE OF PAST OR PRESENT MISDEEDS.

SECURITY BRANCH COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIV
J-2, MACV

RM 2209A

MACV 2810
2910

Inclosure 10

HEADQUARTERS
 UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
 APO San Francisco 96307

REGULATION
 NUMBER 335-6

24 June 1967

REPORTS

Serious Incident Reports (SIR)(FCS: FHE-22(F2))

1. PURPOSE: To establish uniform reporting procedures on all serious crimes or incidents occurring within RVN involving personnel and equipment of this command. To insure that the CG and DCG, this headquarters, are informed immediately of all serious criminal offenses or serious disciplinary incidents in which personnel of this command are involved.

2. DEFINITIONS: a. Personnel of this command: Military personnel on active duty with the US Army, Vietnam; US civilians who are assigned, attached, or are on temporary duty with this headquarters or a subordinate command or unit; US civilian employees of contractors who are under contract with the US Army in Vietnam; dependents of such personnel; and local national employees of this command when on duty status.

b. Serious incident: Any incident involving personnel of this command, property, or equipment which may be reasonably expected to arouse local public interest; cause continued or widespread publicity; embarrass the US Government or military command or which, for other important considerations, may warrant the personal attention of the CG or DCG, this headquarters. Crimes, offenses, and incidents to be reported include, but are not limited to:

(1) Nonbattle deaths from other than natural causes, to include the deaths of foreign national personnel when US personnel or equipment are involved.

(2) Voluntary or involuntary manslaughter or assault with intent to commit manslaughter.

(3) Rape or assault with the intent to commit rape or other serious sex offenses.

(4) Aggravated assaults, unlawful or unauthorized discharge of firearms, or hit and run accidents resulting in serious injury or involving circumstances likely to cause unfavorable publicity.

(5) Burglary, robbery, arson, and misappropriation, fraud, or extortion of major significance.

(6) Blackmarketing, smuggling, currency manipulation, postal violations, and offenses involving narcotics.

(7) Riot or mutiny.

(8) Instances involving apprehension or use of force by US Army personnel against US civilian personnel, or military or civilian personnel of a foreign power, or other incidents of immediate or potentially serious significance from a political, military, or public relations standpoint.

(9) Terrorist activities involving US personnel or US Government property.

(10) Aircraft crashes not involved in or resulting from tactical operations.

(11) Fatal traffic accidents.

(12) Acts involving moral turpitude considered of sufficient importance to warrant the attention of the CG, this headquarters.

(13) Serious incidents involving prisoners of war, detainees captured or in custody of US forces, or other persons for which the US has responsibility under the Geneva Convention, including deaths or serious injury, maltreatment, riot, and escape (including attempts).

This regulation supersedes USA V Reg 335-6, 22 Dec 66.

EXHIBIT D-10

(14) Suicides, attempted suicides, and self-inflicted gunshot wounds.

(15) All burglaries, robberies, and aggravated assaults, when committed against a foreign national.

c. Blue Bell Reports. Serious occurrences which may result in damaging public confidence in the Army and are of sufficient importance to be brought to the immediate attention of the DA staff. Additional guidance in determining whether or not an incident should be reported as a "Blue Bell" is provided in USARV Reg 1-55.

3. RESPONSIBILITIES: a. Any agency or person having knowledge of a serious incident is responsible for reporting the fact to the immediate commanding officer or nearest provost marshal.

b. Major subordinate commanders are responsible for reporting serious crimes or incidents to this headquarters, ATTN: AVHPM, in accordance with this regulation.

c. The Provost Marshal, this headquarters, is responsible for the preparation and submission of serious incident reports to higher headquarters.

4. REPORTING PROCEDURES: a. Blue Bell Reports will be submitted in accordance with USARV Reg 1-55. Incidents reported as "Blue Bells" will not be reported as serious incidents.

b. Serious incident reports will be submitted by the most expeditious means possible. Reports will not be delayed pending the receipt of additional information and immediate transmission will be stressed in all cases.

c. Local provost marshals will submit serious incident reports to the SIR Section, 18th MP Brigade, telephone Long Binh 3763/3769, which will be operational 24 hours a day, seven days a week. In addition, reports will be rendered to CG, I FFORCEV, or CG, II FFORCEV, and other major subordinate commanders, as appropriate, ATTN: Provost Marshal.

d. Appendix I is furnished as a format and Appendix II as a guide in reporting serious incidents.

e. Three phases of the serious incident report will be submitted: Initial, supplemental, and Terminal.

(1) Initial reports.

(a) Initial reports will be submitted by local provost marshals immediately on receipt of information that an incident of a nature described in para 2b, above, has occurred. Additional information in clarification or substantiation will be forwarded as it becomes available.

(b) In those cases in which foul play is not probable, such as suicides or accidental deaths, and in all cases when sufficient information is available to ascertain that any corrective action indicated has been accomplished, the initial and terminal reports may be combined. In such cases, the combined report will contain a statement to the effect that no further report will be submitted on this incident unless later investigation warrants.

(2) Supplementary reports.

(a) Supplementary reports, addressed to this headquarters, ATTN: AVHPM, will be submitted each 30 days until final action has been accomplished and a terminal report is submitted.

(b) Supplementary reports will reflect the current status of the incident, personnel involved, and in applicable cases, changes in local public reaction or attitudes.

(3) Terminal reports.

(a) Terminal reports will be submitted immediately upon completion of the appropriate action.

(b) Terminal reports will include any disciplinary action taken against personnel involved and corrective administrative action taken to preclude a similar incident. All incidents will remain open cases at this headquarters until a terminal report is received.

5. SECURITY IMPLICATIONS: Reports submitted under the provisions of this regulation will be classified according to the nature of the incident; however, as a minimum, written reports will be marked "TOP OFFICIAL USE ONLY."

6. REFERENCES: a. USAFPAC Reg 1-55.

b. MACV Air 335-1.

c. USAFV Reg 1-55.

(AVHPM)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

**C-1 REFERENCE LIBRARY
DO NOT REMOVE**



FRANK D. MILLER
Major General, US Army
Chief of Staff

S. A. MacKENZIE
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

2 Appendices

- I. USAFV Form 214-F, Format for SIR.
- II. Instructions for Completing USAFV Form 214-R.

DISTRIBUTION:

- A Plus
- 50 AVHPM
- 3 AVHAG-A
- 350 AVHAG-AP
- 6 CINCUSAFAC
- 1 USAFAC Hist Unit

1. SERIOUS INCIDENT/BLUE BELL REPORT (USARV Reg 1-55 and 335-6)		2. HCS: CSOCS-62/PPE-22 (R2) (Blue Bell)/(SIR)	
3. SECURITY CLAS:	4. REPORT NO:	5. DATE, TIME RECEIVED:	6. TYPE:
7. DATE/TIME OF INCIDENT:		8. LOCATION:	
9. PERSONNEL INVOLVED: (S) SUBJECT, (V) VICTIM, (W) WITNESS, (*) DECEASED			
10. SYNOPSIS:			
11. CONTINUING ACTION:			
12. SECURITY INTEREST:			
13. PUBLICITY EXPECTED:		14. REPORTING AGENCY:	

REMARKS:

5. DISTRIBUTION:

17. REPORTED BY:

18. RECEIVED BY:

APPENDIX IIINSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING USAFV FORM 214-R

1. Strike out SERIOUS INCIDENT or BLUE BELL, as appropriate, and identify type of incident: e.g., fatal traffic accident, murder, etc. Criminal offenses should be listed as classified in the MCM. Do not make numerical references to the UCMJ article(s) alleged to have been violated.

2. Indicate proper Reports Control Symbol by crossing out inapplicable reference: RCS CSOCS-62 for "Blue Bell" reports and RCS PFE-22 (P2) for Serious Incident Reports.

3. Indicate the degree of security classification assigned to the report. As a minimum, written reports will be marked "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY."

4. Show sequence number for each report. Example: 9-2 (Second report received in September).

5. Show the day of the month and time the information was received. Example: 072330 Jun 67.

6. Indicate whether this is an Initial, Initial/Terminal, Supplemental, or Terminal report.

7. Show the date and time at which the incident occurred in the same manner as para 5.

8. Report the exact location using identifiable landmarks, miles to nearest town, city or village.

9. Personnel involved. Indicate parenthetically before each identification whether subject (S), victim (V), or witness (W). Show deceased personnel with asterisk (*) after (S) or (V).

a. List all military personnel by name, grade, SN, race, DOB or age, organization, and APO. Example: (S) JONES, John P., PFC, RA 36789211, Cau, DOB 3 May 48, 534th TC Co, APO 96421.

b. For US civilian personnel, indicate status in place of grade; e.g., DAC, dependent, merchant seaman, etc. If female, indicate with (F) after status. Show sponsor's identification for all dependents. Example: (V) BROWN, Louis W., DAC, Cau, DOB 2 Jun 25, 1st Log Comd, APO 96307.

c. Foreign national civilians will be recorded to show nationality, sex and age, and address. Example: (V) Nguyen Tam Phan, VN/F/24, 33 Vinh Thanh Cay, Bien Hoa, Vietnam.

10. A synopsis of factual data available at time of reporting, to include the answers to the questions of what, how, and why. Where applicable, include the following:

a. Type of vehicle involved (if $\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck, specify type).

b. Speed of vehicle and authorized speed.

c. Statement about whether or not alcohol was involved.

d. Indicate whether vehicle use was authorized or not.

e. For arms and ammunition:

(1) Serial or lot numbers.

(2) Type of weapon.

(3) Security measures in effect.

(4) In accidental shootings, indicate whether unit policies were violated and why weapon was loaded.

- f. Extent of injuries or estimated value of damages.
- g. Identify medical facilities used.
- h. In fatalities, identify the doctor pronouncing death and the time of death.
Give disposition of remains.
- i. Give disposition of the subject and if confined, the location of confinement.
- j. For incidents involving PW's or detainees, report:
 - (1) Status (PW, civil defendant, returnee, detainee, innocent civilian).
 - (2) Date and place of capture.
 - (3) Capturing unit.
 - (4) Conditions under which captured.
 - (5) Facility to which admitted.
 - (6) Time and date admitted.
 - (7) Hospital registration.
 - (8) Condition when captured.
 - (9) Cause of death.
 - (10) Location of remains.
- 11. Identify agency or commander who is conducting further investigation of the incident and any disciplinary, administrative, or corrective action which may have been initiated or is anticipated. Show any other action taken or contemplated which is intended to reduce impact on US/VN relations.
- 12. Indicate intelligence agency which has been notified of the incident when appropriate and show degree of access to classified information by those involved when relevant to the incident.
- 13. Indicate the opinion of the reporting agency as to whether publicity of a derogatory nature is expected and whether it is to be minor, normal, local, widespread, or continuing.
- 14. List the duty and major command of the reporting agency. Normally, this should be the local provost marshal.
- 15. List any information continued from the first page and identify by showing item number and title. For terminal or combined initial/terminal reports, a sentence will be included as follows: "No further report will be submitted on this incident unless later investigation warrants."
- 16. Indicate each addressee who has been furnished a copy of the report or otherwise informed of the incident.
- 17. List name, rank, duty position, and organization of person rendering the report.
- 18. List name, rank, duty position, and organization of person recording the information.

HEADQUARTERS
 UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
 APO San Francisco 96375

REGULATION
 NUMBER 350-1

10 November 1967

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

USARV Training

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*This regulation supersedes USARV Reg 350-1, 28 Jul 66; USARV Tng Cir 3, 23 Nov 66; USARV Tng Cir 4, 30 Aug 66; USARV Tng Cir 5, 20 Nov 66; USARV Tng Cir 350-6, 9 May 67; USARV Tng Cir 350-7, 1 Jun 67; and USARV Tng Cir 350-8, 6 Jul 67.

SECTION I GENERAL

1. PURPOSE: To prescribe policy and provide guidance for all echelons of command in planning, conducting, and supervising the military training of individuals and units assigned or attached to this command.

2. APPLICABILITY: This regulation is applicable to all units of this command and establishes requirements for the conduct of operational readiness training. Operational requirements will, at times, limit the available training time. All units will, as a minimum, schedule orientation and refresher training for all replacements and strive to achieve the completion of DA mandatory training requirements.

3. MISSION: The training mission of this command is:

a. To attain and maintain a state of operational readiness which will insure the effective performance of combat operations in a mid-intensity conflict environment.

b. To maintain a state of operational readiness which will insure the effective achievement of operational and contingency missions in a high intensity conflict.

4. TRAINING POLICIES: a. Training within the command will be based on the broad principles and policies outlined in AR 350-1 and appropriate ATP's, with emphasis on lessons learned in Vietnam as published by DA, Headquarters MACV, this headquarters, and major subordinate commands.

b. Individual replacements arriving in RVN (directly from CONUS) will receive transition training prior to participation in combat operations.

c. Major unit commanders are afforded wide latitude in determining the training requirements which will result in developing and maintaining a high state of unit readiness and operational training.

d. Authority and responsibility for planning, conducting, and supervising training will be delegated to the lowest element that has the ability to conduct effective training.

e. Training programs developed at each level of command will:

(1) Emphasize the development and maintenance of individual combat proficiency of all personnel.

(2) Recognize the squad as the basic combat unit which must develop teamwork and fire and movement proficiency.

(3) Stress combined arms concepts to insure employment of all available combat power.

(4) Allow training time for major subordinate commanders to include subjects they consider essential.

(5) Provide sufficient prime military man-hours for the performance and training of preventive and corrective maintenance. Such performance and training will receive maximum command attention and supervision.

(6) Stress on-the-job training to provide retraining, updating, and conversion of individual skills when required, and to develop individual proficiency and maintain unit readiness.

(7) Stress materiel readiness during all phases of training.

SECTION II TRAINING GUIDANCE

5. MANDATORY TRAINING: Mandatory and recurring training subjects are listed in Appendix I. Major unit commanders are authorized to deviate from these requirements only when, in their judgement, the operational missions of their units necessitate and justify such deviation.

6. SPECIAL SUBJECTS: Special attention will be given to:

- a. Personnel, document, and information security.
- b. Communications security.
- c. Supply economy and conservation of materiel.
- d. Maintenance of high standards of physical conditioning.
- e. Personal hygiene and field sanitation.
- f. Safety, to include weapons safety. ✓
- g. Training in night operations.
- h. Small unit tactics.
- i. Weapons proficiency.
- j. Sentry duty.
- k. Hostile intelligence exploitation of US Army personnel.
- l. Vietnam and relations with the Vietnamese.
- m. Military courtesy and discipline.

7. INTELLIGENCE TRAINING: a. Each individual soldier must attain a high degree of proficiency in passive counterintelligence measures and reporting of information. Training programs will stress the need for high standards in security, light and noise discipline; proper authentication procedures; accuracy and promptness in the observation, collection and reporting of information; and evasion and escape training.

b. The importance of intelligence and the development of its application will be continuously stressed through proper integration of intelligence into other training as outlined in Appendix II. Additionally, special emphasis will be placed on those subjects listed in Appendix I by means of annual orientation.

8. MEDICAL TRAINING: Training in personal hygiene and sanitation will be stressed at all times. This training should include:

- a. Prevention of heat injury.
- b. Field sanitation procedures to prevent the spread of disease.
- c. Training in self-aid, first aid to others, and treatment of mass casualties which will stress the importance of individual measures that can be taken to minimize the effect of enemy nuclear or CER weapons.
- d. Preventive medicine aspects of insect-borne diseases with special emphasis on malaria.
- e. Care of the feet.
- f. Rabies hazards associated with pets.

9. TRAINING IN PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS: The objective of PSYOP training is to develop an understanding of the value of PSYOP to the Army and the need for individuals and units to participate effectively in support of these operations. Emphasis will be on the following:

- a. The employment of leaflets, loudspeakers, and radios in tactical PSYOP.
- b. The employment of PSYOP techniques to encourage enemy malingering, defection, and surrender.

- c. The purpose of safe conduct passes and action to be taken by the individual soldier with regard to US or allied "surrender leaflets."
- d. Individual defense measures against enemy propaganda and other PSYOP activities.
- e. The role of PSYOP in controlling enemy and friendly civilians in the combat area.
- f. The effect which successful PSYOP can have on the collection of intelligence.

10. CIVIL AFFAIRS TRAINING: Training will be conducted on a recurring basis to familiarize all Army personnel with civil affairs matters. Instruction will include the following subjects:

- a. The definition, purpose, necessity, and scope of civil affairs and revolutionary development activities.
- b. The individual soldier's role in civil affairs with emphasis on stability operations and community relations.
- c. Civil affairs capabilities of non-civil affairs units.
- d. Organization and functions of civil affairs staffs and units.
- e. Rules of land warfare and the Geneva Convention, with emphasis on the enforcement of law; preservation of order; and the prevention of wanton destruction of civilian property, communications, records, and other items of value which are a part of the civilian economy or civilian institutions.

11. CODE OF CONDUCT TRAINING: a. The primary objectives of Code of Conduct training are to increase unit fighting strength and the individual's will to resist under varying degrees of hostile interrogation.

b. The principles of the Code of Conduct will be integrated to the maximum extent possible into other subject matter and training such as military justice, survival, escape and evasion, military discipline, intelligence training, patrolling, and leadership. In addition, it will be supported by and closely coordinated with command information and character guidance programs.

12. COMMAND INFORMATION: a. Command information (CI) programs and activities will be closely supervised at all levels of command.

b. A continuing program of orientation for newly assigned personnel will be conducted to improve the individual soldier's understanding of his presence in the area and the need for respect for customs and traditions of foreign nations. Objectives of the CI programs will be in consonance with para 3, USARV Reg 360-81.

13. SAFETY: a. Training in defensive driving and public safety measures will be conducted concurrently with other training.

b. Training in fire prevention and protection will be stressed.

c. Frequent checks will be made to insure local SOP's are enforced with regard to carrying of weapons in secure areas.

14. CBR AND NUCLEAR TRAINING: Continuing command emphasis will be given to readiness of units to execute sustained operations with maximum individual and unit effectiveness under conditions produced by friendly or enemy employment of CBR/nuclear weapons. CBR/nuclear training will be conducted in accordance with Appendix III.

15. ^{Stability Operations} COUNTERINSURGENCY AND COUNTERGUERRILLA TRAINING: Training in ^{stability operations} counterinsurgency and counter guerrilla operations will be conducted in accordance with Appendix IV.

16. CHARACTER GUIDANCE: a. All members of each command will be instilled with an understanding of the objectives of the character guidance program.

b. All officers and enlisted personnel will receive the scheduled character guidance instruction or orientation as prescribed in USARV Reg 600-30.

17. RIOT CONTROL: Riot control training will be conducted in accordance with FM 19-15. All combat and combat support units will undergo specified training in this subject to assure an adequate command capability.

18. ARMY AVIATION: Aviation proficiency will be maintained in accordance with aviation directives.

19. MINE AND BOOBY TRAP WARFARE: a. Training will be conducted in the principles, methods, and techniques of land mine and booby trap warfare, to include functioning and types of mines and minefield siting, installation, marking, reporting, and breaching.

b. To insure that all personnel are adequately trained in the employment and recognition of VC/NVA mines and booby traps, major subordinate combat unit commanders will establish VC/NVA mine and booby trap confidence courses at that level of command which is best suited to the construction and administration of these facilities. These courses will provide the following:

(1) An opportunity for all personnel subjected to VC/NVA mines and booby traps to negotiate terrain containing replicas of enemy devices.

(2) The requirement that all appropriate personnel successfully pass this course during the training.

(3) Concurrent training on recognition, marking, clearing and reporting of VC/NVA mines and booby traps.

(4) As a minimum, confidence courses will be utilized as follows:

(a) For all replacements as a part of their individual replacement training program. (See Appendix VI.)

(b) Conducted in conjunction with unit proficiency training. (See Appendix X.)

20. COMMUNICATIONS TRAINING: The objective of communications training is to insure that each unit is capable of installing, operating, and maintaining its organic communication equipment under conditions experienced in RVN. This training must be realistic and continuous to insure the unit's ability to perform its communications mission at all times.

a. On-the-job training (OJT) will assist in preventing shortages of trained communications personnel when known losses exceed known gains. This training will also familiarize newly assigned personnel with local operating procedures and conditions.

b. Cross training of personnel will be conducted for critical communications positions.

c. Training will be conducted to assure that a sufficient number of CW radio operators is available to provide a capability of continued operation of critical radio circuits by CW mode in the event of deliberate jamming of radio teletypewriter circuits or their loss by other means.

d. A vigorous and continuous unit training program in proper preventive maintenance of signal equipment must be in effect at all times.

e. Training will be conducted on a continuous basis to ⁱⁿ assure and maintain secure communications proficiency of all radio operators in the handling and use of codes, authentication systems, cipher devices, and in proper radio telephone procedures utilized during normal operations.

f. When conditions permit, consolidated unit schools will be established for the training of selected communications specialists, e.g., division school training courses for switchboard operators from units within the division.

21. AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS TRAINING: a. The training of aviation and ground combat units for airmobile operations is the responsibility of commanders at all echelons. The objective is to familiarize units with all aspects of airmobile operations and enable them to develop a standing operating procedure which will insure that effective airmobile operations are conducted with maximum speed, flexibility, and timeliness.

b. Troop training should include familiarization with Army aircraft, flight safety procedures, preparation of equipment for internal and external transport, techniques of assembly and reorganization, and conduct of airmobile operations.

c. Aviation unit training must stress familiarization with operational planning, low level navigation, formation flying at night and other periods of reduced visibility, air traffic control, confined area operations, and maximum load handling.

*See Ch 4
259-1768* d. ~~Particular emphasis will be given to training ground troops in the techniques of loading, lashing and unloading of internal and external loads.~~

22. PHYSICAL SECURITY TRAINING: a. Security is a command responsibility. Commanders responsible for operational management and control of installations and activities have a direct responsibility to provide adequate security to insure the safeguarding of the installation or activity.

Added b. The threat to the security of US personnel, installations, and activities in RVN is continuous. It may be in the form of terrorist activities and sabotage or mortar, rocket or ground attack. This threat can be reduced only through constant vigilance on the part of all concerned combined with proper training and adequate security measures. The increasing number of incidents of sabotage and terrorist activity dictates that all units of this command be properly trained to permit the most effective use of resources to safeguard personnel and property.

c. All commanders will take positive action to insure that each individual assigned security duties is properly oriented on his responsibilities within the first ten days of his assignment. As a part of this orientation, the training program in Appendix V will be used as a basis for the presentation of a minimum of four hours of instruction for each individual before he is assigned duties involving physical security. In addition, each individual performing such duties will be reoriented at least once each quarter.

23. REPLACEMENT TRAINING: Training for replacements will be conducted in accordance with Appendix VI.

24. PHYSICAL TRAINING: a. As outlined in Appendix I, physical training is a part of the mandatory training program. Local commanders are granted the authority to conduct this training to the extent they deem necessary.

b. Major subordinate commanders will submit a consolidated report on the physical training programs for all units under their operational control. This report will be prepared in accordance with the format in Appendix VII and will reflect the latest test results obtained during each calendar year. This report will be prepared as of 1 January and forwarded to arrive at this headquarters, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, not later than 10 January. Negative reports are required. Reports control symbol DD-M(A) 491.

c. The requirement for this report will not be construed as a requirement for extensive physical training and testing programs.

25. SMALL ARMS FAMILIARIZATION FIRING PROGRAM: a. Units will establish a training program to insure that each individual becomes thoroughly familiar with his assigned weapon. This program will stress preliminary marksmanship instruction prior to the conduct of live fire exercises. Range operations will be conducted in accordance with the procedures outlined in Appendix VIII.

b. All units will make necessary arrangements with local ARVN authorities for the use of suitable ranges in their immediate area.

c. Familiarization will be conducted as required; however, all personnel will take fire familiarization training at least semi-annually. Annual arms qualification is authorized as a substitute for one semi-annual familiarization firing.

26. CARE AND CLEANING OF THE M16A1 RIFLE: Due to the high turnover of personnel in this command and the limited availability of this weapon outside of RVN, a training program will be established by all units who have personnel armed with this rifle. Training will include a minimum of two hours of instruction on care and cleaning of the weapon and will be presented as often as required to insure that all personnel are thoroughly familiar with the weapon. The checklist for preventive maintenance indicators at Appendix IX will be used to assist in the conduct of this training.

27. OUT-OF-COUNTRY TRAINING: a. The training of units and individuals out-of-country will be considered only in cases where adequate training cannot be conducted in RVN and where training is required to meet operational requirements of this command.

b. Unit training out-of-country will be scheduled to avoid interference with the operational activities of the unit. Where practical, this training will be limited to cadre training of selected personnel who will then provide additional training in-country to unit members.

c. Individual training out-of-country will be conducted only in cases required by operational necessity.

d. MOS producing or MOS prefix/suffix producing schools out-of-country will be attended by personnel of this command only when critical shortages exist in those MOS's within the command.

e. Personnel attending out-of-country individual training will meet minimum standards established by appropriate directives and will have a minimum of six months remaining in the command upon completion of the training.

f. Requests by individuals for out-of-country training will be accepted by this headquarters only when scheduled courses or special allocations have been announced by this headquarters.

g. Any level of command which has determined a need for special individual or unit out-of-country training will forward a request through command channels to this headquarters. As a minimum, the request will include the following:

- (1) Type and scope of training.
- (2) Number of personnel to be trained.
- (3) The reason(s) subject training cannot be conducted in-country at that level of command.
- (4) Complete justification for subject training to include the operational requirement.

h. Preparation of orders and funding for approved out-of-country training will be accomplished at the lowest possible level of command.

i. The ACofS, G3, this headquarters, has staff responsibility for all out-of-country unit and individual military training with the exception of automatic data processing training over which the Comptroller, this headquarters, has staff supervision.

28. NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT: a. The rotation policies in RVN and the subsequent loss of experienced personnel in key positions reflect the need for a continuing training program for the development of junior leaders.

b. Major subordinate commanders are encouraged to establish formal and scheduled NCO leadership schools at the division, separate brigade or similar level of command.

c. Standards of training.

(1) Schools will emphasize development of leadership. Selection of subject matter including technical and tactical subjects will be made only as teaching vehicles for leadership training. A goal of increasing individual technical and tactical proficiency should be secondary to developing leadership traits. Units will establish programs of instruction which best fit the mission of the unit and the occupational specialties of the personnel to be trained.

(2) Emphasis will be placed on night training and realistic practical work providing frequent rotation of students in leadership positions.

(3) Maximum emphasis will be placed on Vietnam lessons learned.

d. Although operational requirements will periodically limit the training time available, commanders will give their personal attention to the implementation and conduct of this training. Special attention will be given to the selection of a well qualified cadre and the development of a comprehensive program of instruction between one and four weeks in length.

e. Training should be designed for presentation to junior noncommissioned officers who have not received similar training or who have displayed a need for such training, and to other enlisted personnel who have demonstrated unusual leadership potential.

29. UTILIZATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA AIRLIFT: a. To insure that each unit subject to participation in combat operations perfects and rehearses loading plans for air movement, pre-planning and training of loading and tiedown teams will be stressed. Reduction of aircraft ground time is the goal of this training effort.

b. The following are deficiencies which have been noted during past airlift movements:

(1) Lack of pre-planning, to include determination and dissemination of loading priorities and preparation of loading plans.

(2) Utilization of untrained drivers and loading and tiedown teams who were not familiar with their duties.

(3) Lack of proper supervision.

30. UNIT PROFICIENCY TRAINING: a. To maintain adequate unit proficiency, commanders must devise means to overcome the degradation of effectiveness occasioned by current rotation policies and subsequent loss of experienced personnel in key positions. Commanders at all echelons will give their personal attention to determining the status of proficiency and implementing necessary remedial training programs. These include, but are not limited to, on-the-job training, cross training, unit and organizational schools and refresher training.

b. Operational commitments permitting, major subordinate commanders will schedule each maneuver battalion and reconnaissance unit to receive one week of refresher training every three months. In any event, this training will be accomplished at least every six months. Refresher training should be oriented to the needs of the individual unit. This refresher training will include, as a minimum, the subjects outlined in Appendix X.

c. Additionally, each new platoon leader, platoon sergeant and squad leader assigned to a maneuver battalion or reconnaissance unit will receive, as a minimum, a three-day course of instruction covering troop leading, tactics in jungle warfare and care and cleaning, inspection, and maintenance of the M16 RIFLE. For those forces operating in the Delta area of III and IV Corps Tactical Zones, this course can be modified to suit the peculiar aspects of fighting in such terrain in or near populated areas. This course should emphasize tactical formations, movement to contact, ambushes and counterambushes, meeting engagements, perimeter defense, and tactical tips and techniques learned from combat experience in the environment of the unit concerned.

d. Commanders should avoid postponing unit training until their scheduled periods of refresher training. Even during extended tactical operations, units experience periods of relative inactivity when training can be conducted concurrently with tactical operations. An alert commander will use these periods to conduct refresher training in fire and maneuver, acquisition and reporting of enemy information, communications, troop leading procedures and other areas in which a training need has been demonstrated.

31. PW AND DETAINEE HANDLING: All personnel will be instructed in the established procedures for the evacuation and processing of and custodial accounting for prisoners of war and detainees captured by or delivered to US Military Forces.

32. SUPPLY TRAINING: Appropriate training periods will be devoted to supply economy and supply discipline. Special emphasis will be placed in on-the-job training in the proper maintenance of PLL's and ASL's for those personnel who are associated with these areas.

*See Ch 1
10 Jan 68
See Ch 1
10 Jan 68*

the subjects outlined in Appendix

SECTION III TRAINING ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPORT

33. TRAINING INSPECTIONS: Training inspections will be conducted by subordinate commanders as they deem appropriate to ascertain the state of training of their commands. Staff visits by members of this headquarters normally will be conducted in accordance with the provisions of AR 1-200.

34. IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS: Two copies of all training directives issued by subordinate commanders will be furnished this headquarters.

35. TRAINING AND AUDIO-VISUAL AIDS: a. Training aids support is provided by the Training Aids Center, Fort Buckner, Okinawa.

b. Audio-visual support is provided by the 69th Signal Bn, RVN.

c. All requests for training and audio-visual aids will be submitted in accordance with instructions contained in Appendix XI.

36. ADMINISTRATION: Additions or revisions to this regulation will be effected by the issuance of separate page changes for the basic regulation and each appendix.

37. TRAINING RECORDS: Adequate training records will be maintained to reflect the completion of mandatory and recurring training. It is recommended that guidance contained in FM 21-5 "Military Training Management" be utilized to establish necessary records.

38. REFERENCES: a. AR 11-8.

b. AR 11-14.

c. AR 40-3.

d. AR 40-5.

e. AR 95-1.

f. AR 95-4.

g. AR 220-1.

h. AR 220-58.

i. AR 350-1.

j. AR 350-25.

k. AR 350-30.

l. AR 350-212.

m. AR 350-216.

n. AR 350-225.

o. AR 360-5.

p. AR 360-45.

q. AR 360-81.

r. AR 380-5.

s. AR 380-200.

- t. AR 385-10.
- u. AR 385-55.
- v. AR 600-9.
- w. AR 600-30.
- x. AR 622-5.
- y. AR 750-10.
- z. DA Cir 380-1.
- aa. DA Pam 16-5 through 16-12.
- ab. DA Pam 21-81
- ac. DA Pam 350-9.
- ad. FM 5-20.
- ae. FM 5-22.
- af. FM 16-100.
- ag. FM 19-15.
- ah. FM 19-30.
- ai. FM 19-40.
- aj. FM 21-20.
- ak. FM 21-40.
- al. FM 21-41.
- am. FM 21-48.
- an. FM 30-5.
- ao. FM 31-12.
- ap. FM 31-15.
- aq. FM 31-16.
- ar. FM 31-40 (C).
- as. FM 33-5.
- at. FM 57-35.
- au. TM 21-200.
- av. TM 38-750.
- aw. USARV Reg 95-1.
- ax. USARV Reg 95-6.
- ay. USARV Reg 105-3.
- az. USARV Reg 108-2.

FM 31-23
FM 31-70

ADD -

APPENDIX I

MANDATORY TRAINING

1. GENERAL: Training in required subjects listed below will be conducted in accordance with the frequency prescribed and authority and guidance contained in references, as indicated. Except where hours are prescribed by DA, achievement of training objectives will be the governing factor in determining the amount of time devoted to these subjects.

2. ONE-TIME REQUIREMENTS: All individuals are required to receive training in the following subjects. Make-up training will be scheduled as required.

<u>SUBJECT:</u>	<u>REFERENCES</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Geneva Convention <i>Deleted</i>	<i>See</i> AR 350-216, DA Pam 20-151, <i>CH3</i> DA Pam 27-1, FM 21-77, FM 27-10	For all personnel
Military Justice	AR 350-212, ASubjSed 21-10, UCMJ Art 137	For all enlisted personnel
Psychological Warfare	FM 33-5	For Off and WO
Safety	USARV Reg 385-6	For all personnel

3. RECURRING REQUIREMENTS: a. Training in the following subjects is considered essential and is required Army-wide by pertinent DA directives:

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>REFERENCES</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Armed Forces Censorship	AR 380-200, USARV Reg 380-200	For all military personnel. Training may be in conjunction with periodic security indoctrination or incorporated into regular training programs.
CBR Refresher	AR 220-58, AR 612-35, FM 21-40	As indicated in Appendix III.
Character Guidance	AR 600-30, USARV Reg 600-30, DA Pam 16 series, DA TC 16-1, 16-2, 16-3, FM 16-100	Monthly
Clandestine Surveillance and Listening Devices	AR 380-42, USARV Reg 380-42	All personnel, in conjunction with other security orientations.
Code of Conduct	AR 350-30	Annually
Command Information	AR 360-81	Weekly
Civil Affairs	AR 350-25, DA Cir 525-1, DA Pam 27-1, FM 41-5, FM 41-10, FM 41-15, MACV Dir 37-15, MACV Dir 515-1, MACV Dir 525-17, USARV Reg 1-100, USARV Reg 230-6, USARV Reg 515-1, USARV Reg 515-2, USARV Reg 525-1, USARV Pam 515-1	Annually
Defense Against Subversion and Espionage	AR 381-12, USARV Reg 381-12, DA Cir 380-1	Annually; to be given in conjunction with other security orientations.

a added see CH3

*Geneva Convention AR 350-216, DAPAM 20-151
DAPAM 27-1, FM 21-77, FM 27-10 For all personnel,
Annually*

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>REFERENCES</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Physical Fitness Program	AR 600-9, DA Pam 21-1, DA Pam 21-2 FM 21-20, FM 35-20, TM 21-200 ASubjSed 21-37	
Qualifications in Arms	AR 622-5, FM 23-71	Annually
Safeguarding Defense Information	AR 380-5, USARPAC Reg 380-5, USARV Reg 380-5	Annually; may be given with other security orientations
Survival, Evasion and Escape	AR 350-225, FM 21-75, FM 21-76, FM 21-77, FM 21-77A	Annually

b. Other requirements. The following subjects are considered of sufficient importance to be integrated into all appropriate phases of training in accordance with the guidance contained in the listed references.

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>REFERENCES</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Counterinsurgency and Counter-guerrilla Training	FM 31-15, FM 31-21, AR 40-3	See Appendix IV
First Aid and Emergency Medical Care	AR 40-58, DA Pam 39-3, DA Pam 350-9, FM 8-10, FM 8-35, FM 8-50 FM 21-10, FM 21-11, FM 21-13, FM 21-40, FM 21-41, FM 21-48, FM 21-76 FM 31-30, FM 31-72, TM 3-230, TM 8-285, Med TB 81, Med TB 175, Med TB 234, Med TB 246, ATP 8-2000, ASubjSed 8-12, ASubjSed 8-13	
Field Sanitation	AR 40-15, USARV Reg 40-22, USARV Reg 40-33, USARV Reg 40-29, FM 21-10, ASubjSed 21-3	
Material Readiness	AR 11-14, AR 750-10, TM 38-750	
Physical Security	FM 19-40, USARV Reg 190-2	Also see Appendix V
Prevention of Heat Injury	DA Cir 40-16, FM 21-10, Med TB 175 USARV Reg 40-28	
Supply Economy	AR 11-8	
Sentry Duty	FM 21-6	
Vietnam and Relations With the Vietnamese	USARV Troop Topic No 4-66 DA Pam 20-198, DA Pam 550-40	

APPENDIX IIINTELLIGENCE SUBJECTS FOR INTEGRATION INTO OTHER TRAINING

The following is a guide for integrating intelligence subjects with various other subjects in individual and unit training. Status of individual and unit training will dictate the amount of integrated intelligence required. The imagination of the commander and his intelligence officer will determine the success of this training. Intelligence subjects to be integrated will actually be written into lesson plans.

<u>PRINCIPAL SUBJECT</u>	<u>SUBJECTS TO BE INTEGRATED</u>	<u>HOW TO INTEGRATE</u>
Antiguerrilla and Infiltration Training	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Counterintelligence 2. Collecting and reporting information 3. Handling of PW's. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Require guards and sentries in forward and rear areas to practice camouflage and concealment at all times. b. Emphasize increased vigilance to obtain advantages over guerrillas. c. Use the challenge and password as a security measure. d. Practice sound and light discipline for added concealment. 2. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Capture guerrillas to practice evacuation and interrogation procedures. b. Emphasize reporting of information about guerrilla activities to provide intelligence for counter guerrilla operations.
Bayonet and Unarmed Combat	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Collecting information 2. Counterintelligence 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Explain that the bayonet and ability in unarmed defense psychologically aid by inducing surrender, thus assisting the intelligence effort from resultant interrogations. 2. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Dull the surfaces of bayonets so light doesn't reflect. b. Use proper camouflage and concealment to obtain surprise essential for unarmed attacks.
Character Guidance	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. SAEDA 2. Personal behavior traits 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Stress the personal contribution individuals can make to the security of the military establishment. b. Stress obligation of reporting known or suspected SAEDA incidents. 2. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Point out how personal difficulties can lead to approach by hostile intelligence. b. Explain basic cause in defection cases not ideological

<u>PRINCIPAL SUBJECT</u>	<u>SUBJECTS TO BE INTEGRATED</u>	<u>HOW TO INTEGRATE</u>
		but usually an attempt to escape from personal problems or indiscretion.
		c. Summarize contents of DA Cir 380-1.
Commander's Time	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Use this time to give additional training to correct deficiencies in intelligence subjects. 2. Use this time for make-up intelligence training. 3. SAEDA 4. Personal behavior traits affecting personnel security 	Same as above.
Concealment and Camouflage	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Counterintelligence 2. Patrolling 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. a. Explain that good concealment and camouflage limit the ability of an enemy to obtain military information. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> b. Include sound and light discipline. 2. Require camouflage and concealment essential for successful patrolling.
Crew-Served Weapons Training	Range estimation and direction, compass and grid azimuths	Utilize concurrent training in intelligence subjects where practicable. The station method is recommended where more than one subject is being taught concurrently.
Evasion and Escape	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Collection and reporting information 2. Camouflage and concealment 3. Scouting and patrolling 4. Observation posts 5. Cross-country movement 6. Security 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Stress the value of military information to intelligence and the need to report it. 2. Practice camouflage and concealment techniques during evasion for success. Use weather as cover. Stress that individual soldier is a primary source of intelligence and scouting and patrolling operations are conducted primarily to collect information. 3. Select and establish observation posts and require remembering of items seen and heard. Stress accurate and timely reporting and proper channels for intelligence reporting. 4. Use the sun and stars as substitutes for maps to keep direction.

<u>PRINCIPAL SUBJECT</u>	<u>SUBJECTS TO BE INTEGRATED</u>	<u>HOW TO INTEGRATE</u>
		5. Stress importance of not discussing escape/evasion route with anyone until properly debriefed and authorized to do so.
First Aid	Patrolling	Use patrolling as a setting for practical work in first aid.
Field Sanitation	Counterintelligence	Police bivouac areas and front line positions to prevent enemy from obtaining information.
Grenades	1. Orientation on enemy equipment 2. Deception measures 3. Counterintelligence 4. The enemy	Stress the importance of collecting enemy equipment and evacuating it to technical intelligence teams. Deceive the enemy as to your exact position by using grenades instead of individual weapons. 1. a. Use a challenge and password in the field as well as in garrison. b. Guard against subversion, infiltration and guerrilla activities. c. Require guards and sentries in forward and rear areas to practice camouflage and concealment at all times. 2. Use aggressors to add realism to demonstrations and practical exercises.
Hasty Fortifications	1. Observation 2. Counterintelligence 3. Surveillance radar	1. Select a position that affords good observation. 2. a. Practice camouflage principles. b. Practice sound and light discipline. 3. Plan use of ground surveillance radar in the overall security plan.
Individual Day Training	1. Observation 2. Counterintelligence 3. Evasion and escape	1. Require continuous observation. 2. a. Practice camouflage and concealment. b. Use cover when available. 3. Avoid capture by following the simple rules taught in scouting and patrolling and use of cover and concealment.

<u>PRINCIPLE SUBJECT</u>	<u>SUBJECTS TO BE INTEGRATED</u>	<u>HOW TO INTEGRATE</u>
Individual Night Training	1. Counterintelligence	1. Practice sound light discipline.
	2. Map and compass reading	2. Use compass and the stars to determine direction.
	3. Collecting and reporting.	3. Use night observation and listening techniques to collect information. Report all information collected.
Individual Protective Measures Against CB Attack	1. Collection of information	1. a. Watch for enemy carrying protective masks or clothing.
	2. Speed in reporting information	b. Report the exact location and time of attack.
		c. Report color, smell and other characteristics of CB agents used by the enemy.
		2. Report information collected by the most expeditious means to the nearest unit intelligence officer or unit commander.
Individual Proficiency Testing	Intelligence subjects and subjects related to intelligence should be adequately covered in the tests.	
Mines and Booby Traps	Collecting and reporting information.	1. Report location immediately of enemy mines and booby traps.
		2. Teach patrol to detect and by-pass mine and booby trap areas.
Maintenance, Supply Economy, and Supply Procedures Observation Posts	Counterintelligence	Require clean bivouac areas to deny enemy information.
	1. Cover, concealment, and camouflage	1. Teach that cover, concealment, camouflage are necessary in the establishment of a good observation post.
	2. Use of maps, aerial photos, compass and binoculars	2. Compare ground formation with a map or aerial photograph to identify objects and personnel.
	3. Range estimation	3. Require continuous practice at range estimation to attain accuracy.
	4. Area search	4. Use a systematic method to cover a given area.
	5. Recognition of vehicles, aircraft, enemy uniforms, insignia and markings.	5. Require observers to recognize and identify objects seen. Include WHAT, WHERE, and WHEN.
	6. Reporting information a. Use of brevity codes and authenticators	

PRINCIPLE SUBJECT

SUBJECTS TO BE INTEGRATED

HOW TO INTEGRATE

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> b. Message writing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 6. Information must be reported immediately and accurately by the fastest means available. Brevity codes are a means of speeding up the reporting of information. Authenticators are necessary to identify communicators. Written messages must be clear, concise, and complete.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 7. Conduct and adjustment of artillery fire 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 7. Require observers to call for and adjust artillery fire.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 8. Ground surveillance devices 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 8. Teach the capability of ground surveillance radars.
Rules of Land Warfare	Exploitation of enemy prisoners of war	Require correct treatment of enemy PWs to obtain information through interrogation.
Signal Communications, Elementary	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Collecting and reporting 2. Security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. a. Write clear messages which include WHAT, WHERE, and WHEN. b. Dispatch messages to provide timely information. c. Select the most efficient means of communications. 2. a. Use authenticators and codes correctly. b. Avoid disclosure of classified information when transmitting messages in the clear.
Squad and Platoon Patrolling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Collecting and reporting information 2. Counterintelligence 3. Map, air photo and compass 4. The enemy 5. Exploitation of enemy PW's, documents and material. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. a. Give every patrol an intelligence mission, either primary or secondary, to collect enemy information. b. Require patrol members to detect enemy locations through observations and listening. c. Protect the next patrol by reporting all information collected. d. Prior to departure, brief patrol on the current enemy situation, the terrain, and the weather. e. Stress importance of reporting everything seen or heard no matter how seemingly insignificant. 2. a. Use camouflage and concealment. b. Practice sound and light discipline.

PRINCIPLE SUBJECT

SUBJECTS TO BE INTEGRATED . HOW TO INTEGRATE

Techniques of Fire and Combat Firing	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Counterintelligence 2. Miscellaneous 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> c. Know the correct usage of the challenge and password d. Practice communications security at all times. 3. Use a map, air photo, and compass correctly to locate routes, objectives, and items to report. 4. Use aggressor to add realism to problems and stimulate intelligence play. 5. Have patrol capture documents and items of enemy equipment and return them to the intelligence office.
Troop Information Program	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Orientation on foreign armies 2. Evasion and escape 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Use camouflage and concealment during exercises. 2. a. Practice estimation of distance. b. Practice area observation to locate targets. 1. Use information available on foreign armies. Treat as a subject if possible, otherwise, integrate such information as is applicable to the primary subject. 2. Develop the will to fight and to evade capture as a soldier's first responsibility.
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Effects of weather on terrain, equipment, and personnel 2. Maps and aerial photos. 3. Patrolling 4. Range estimation 5. Collecting and reporting 6. Evasion and escape 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Variations in weather produce variations in terrain, which may affect operations. Equipment is affected by major changes in temperature and climate. Personnel are adversely affected by extremes of weather. 2. Extremes of weather may change data as represented on maps, and may limit aerial photo coverage. 3. Weather conditions must be taken into consideration when planning patrols. 4. Weather affects the limits of visibility. 5. General data concerning weather must be included in reports. 6. Weather may be used to cover evasion and escape. Weather may also hinder evasion and escape operations.

APPENDIX VI
REPLACEMENT TRAINING

1. PURPOSE: To prescribe policy and provide guidance for commanders in establishing a training program for replacements.

2. OBJECTIVES: To insure that each individual replacement assigned to a unit of this command receives an in-country orientation and instruction on general subjects at a replacement battalion/company, and proficiency training at his unit of assignment. This training is designed to develop increased understanding between US forces and the people of RVN and members of other FWMAF, and to develop proficiency by instilling individual confidence and expediting integration into the unit.

3. GENERAL: a. The ~~counterinsurgency~~^{stability operation} effort in RVN imposes many new responsibilities and unique relationships on the individual soldier. An essential ingredient of our ability to "Win in Vietnam" is the development of an understanding of the Vietnamese people based on mutual respect and the application of high standards of deportment by US personnel.

b. Individual replacements arriving in RVN directly from CONUS training centers are well trained, but lack unit experience. This shortcoming requires transition training to emphasize teamwork, comprehension of the combined arms team concept, and adjustment to a new environment.

c. The training program outlined in para 4, below, contains the minimum training requirements for replacements assigned to units of this command. Each commander will analyze the individual requirements of his unit based mission, operational conditions, and tasks assigned to determine and provide necessary additional training, e.g., riot control instruction for military police units.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES: a. Commanders of replacement units at Long Binh, Pleiku and Cam Ranh Bay will provide the following orientation and training for all replacements processing through their respective locations:

(1) Two-hour orientation based on USARV Command Information Troop Topic, Issue No. 4-66, MACV "Nine Rules to Remember," and the Chieu Hoa Program.

(2) Command orientation film, "Unique War."

(3) Military courtesy, dress and appearance (to include recognition of and courtesy due non-US members of FWMAF.)

(4) Personal hygiene and field sanitation.

(5) Tropical diseases.

(6) First and self-aid.

(7) Currency conversion and piaster control.

b. Commanders of medical facilities furnishing primary medical care to replacement units will provide medical orientation for arriving personnel in conjunction with other training mentioned in 4a, above. Medical orientation will cover health hazards encountered in RVN, measures that the individual must take to avoid hazards, first aid and self-aid.

c. Major subordinate commanders of combat, combat support and combat service support units will establish training programs for replacements. The training programs will provide for training of replacements within seven days of their assignment and, as a minimum, will cover the following subjects:

(1) Familiarization firing and zero of assigned weapon and other weapons as appropriate.

- (2) Weapons safety.
- (3) Security and sentry duty.
- (4) Mines and booby traps. ✓
- (5) Convoy procedures and driver safety.
- (6) Immediate action drill.
- (7) Orientation on Viet Cong tactics and techniques.
- (8) Gas chamber exercise. ✓
- (9) PW and detainee handling.

*See ch 4
25 Jul 68*
 d. Upon request of major combat service support commanders, commanders of combat organisations will provide assistance in the form of instructional material and training of instructional cadre.

e. In addition to subjects listed above, commanders of combat organizations will provide refresher training in the following subjects to enhance combat proficiency prior to participation in combat operations:

- (1) Small unit tactics. ✓
- (2) Crew-served weapons.
- (3) Ambush and counter-ambush. ✓
- (4) Land navigation. ✓
- (5) Patrol techniques and planning. ✓
- (6) Reporting of enemy information.
- (7) Battlefield police.
- (8) Air mobility. ✓
- (9) Adjustment of artillery and mortar fire.
- (10) Conduct of VC/NVA mine and booby trap confidence course.

f. During all training, emphasis will be placed on practical work and training will be oriented to the local mission, terrain, SOP's and operational conditions of the individual units. Lessons learned, tactical tips, do's and don't's, and need-to-know operational data will be integrated into training subjects as appropriate.

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96375

REGULATION
NUMBER 525-7

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5 January 1968

Reporting and Investigation of Accidents Involving Misdirected Artillery/Mortar Fire,
Naval Gunfire or Air-Delivered Ordnance

1. PURPOSE: To establish procedures to be followed when US artillery/mortar fire, naval gunfire, or air-delivered ordnance causes death, injury, or significant property damage to friendly military or civilian personnel.

2. GENERAL: The provisions of this regulation will be followed when death, injury, or significant property damage occurs to friendly military or civilian personnel. Serious Incident Reports, other than those involving misdirected ordnance, will continue to be submitted IAW USARV Reg 335-6.

3. RESPONSIBILITIES: CG's, I and II FFV; CG, Americal Division; and CC, 108th FA Group will:

a. Immediately submit an initial spot report of all known facts concerning an accident to this headquarters by electrical means. Telephonic spot reports will continue to be rendered to MACV COC as prescribed in MACV Dir 335-12.

b. Cause an immediate investigation to be performed of all accidents occurring within their area of responsibility. The investigation may be informal, or may be formal UF AR 15-6, dependent upon the circumstances surrounding the accident.

c. Submit a final report to this headquarters within 15 days. If this suspense cannot be met, submit an interim report by electrical means. The final report will include, but is not limited to, the following information pertaining to the accident:

- (1) Date and time.
- (2) Coordinates.
- (3) Casualties and/or property damage. If US personnel were casualties, include unit designation(s).
- (4) Unit(s) involved.
- (5) Brief description of cause.
- (6) Disciplinary and/or corrective action taken to preclude recurrence.
- (7) Status of solatium payments if Vietnamese civilians were involved.

d. CG, II FFV, will report and investigate accidents occurring in III CTZ and those involving units under his control in IV CTZ.

4. REFERENCES: a. AR 15-6.

b. MACV Dir 335-12.

c. USARV Reg 335-6.

(AVHGC-C)

EXHIBIT D-II

FOR THE COMMANDER:



ROBERT C. TAMM
Brigadier General, US Army
Chief of Staff

WILLIAM H. JAMES
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96375

REGULATION
NUMBER 612-

8 January 1968

PERSONNEL PROCESSING

Issue and Possession of Information Cards

1. PURPOSE: To establish policy concerning the issue and possession of information cards by military personnel assigned to this command.
2. SCOPE: This regulation is applicable to all officer and enlisted personnel assigned to the United States Army, Vietnam.
3. ISSUE: a. Upon arrival at either of the replacement battalions, all incoming officer and enlisted personnel will receive the following information cards:
 - (1) "The Enemy in Your Hands."
 - (2) "Tips on VC Mines and Booby Traps."
 - (3) "Nine Rules".
 - (4) "Standing Orders, Rogers Rangers."
 - (5) "Tips on the M-16 Rifle."
 - (6) "Code of Conduct."
 - (7) "Geneva Convention."

b. All commissioned officers will receive a "Guidance for Commanders in Vietnam" card in addition to those listed in para 3a, above.
4. POSSESSION: These cards contain information useful in the performance of the duties assigned to personnel of this command. Therefore, each individual will keep these cards in his possession at all times.
5. RESUPPLY: a. The AG Publications Branch, this headquarters, will be responsible for maintaining adequate stocks of cards.

b. The cards may be requisitioned by submitting DA Form 17 to the AG Publications Branch, this headquarters.

(AVHAG-A)

FOR THE COMMANDER:



ROBERT C. TABER
Brigadier General, US Army
Chief of Staff

WILLIAM H. JAMES
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

EXHIBIT D-18

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96375

REGULATION
NUMBER 870-2

11 March 1968

HISTORICAL ACTIVITIES

Daily Journal Files

1. PURPOSE: To prescribe responsibilities and provide guidance pertaining to the maintenance of daily journal files.

2. SCOPE: This regulation is applicable to this headquarters and to all US Army organizations, to include their subordinate elements, assigned or reporting to this headquarters.

3. DEFINITIONS: a. Daily journal. An official, permanent, chronological record of the activities, and events affecting an organization or a staff office during a 24-hour period.

b. Daily journal file. A file in which daily journals and the materials cited or paraphrased in the daily journal entries are filed. These materials are preserved as permanent records in the daily journal file together with the daily journals. They include, but are not limited to, such items as messages, memoranda, briefing notes, special and periodic reports (including SITREP's, INTSUM's or PERINTREP's, personnel summaries, civil affairs/civic actions summaries and LOGSUM's), artillery survey and fire direction computer records, ammunition expenditure records, annotated maps, sketches and photographs. In addition, similar items that are not preserved in another authorized permanent file maintained by the originating organization or staff office will be kept in this file.

4. GENERAL: a. Properly maintained daily journal files preserve the information necessary for comprehensive review and analysis of events and activities for both immediate and future use. These records are among the most valuable management tools available to commanders and chiefs of staff offices, and are invaluable sources of information required for periodic reports, current operations research, system analysis, training and development of doctrine.

b. Professional historians consider daily journals to be original source documents. In writing the official history of US Army operations in RVN, the Office of the Chief of Military History, DA, will rely heavily on daily journals. Consequently, the adequacy of unit and staff daily journals will largely determine the extent to which the reported activities of a unit or staff office can be confirmed in original source documents and covered in official histories.

5. RESPONSIBILITIES: a. Commanders will insure that daily journal files are properly maintained in accordance with the provisions of this regulation. Daily journal files will be maintained by:

(1) Each staff office of all group headquarters and higher level organizations. Large staff offices organized with subsections will maintain consolidated daily journal files as indicated in para 6p, below.

(2) Battalions and squadrons; separate companies (units, operating independently, that do not form a part of a battalion); separate troops and separate batteries; Special Forces "B" and "C" Detachments; and provisional units.

EXHIBIT D-19

*This regulation supersedes USARV Reg 870-2, 25 Sep 67.

(3) All company, troop and battery level elements, of any type, when operating under command or operational control of any headquarters other than the parent headquarters for a period of more than 24 hours.

b. Battalion-level units may maintain consolidated daily journal files or require that the executive officer and each staff section maintain separate daily journal files. Commanders of battalion-level units maintaining consolidated files will insure that daily input from all staff sections and the executive officer is incorporated.

c. Organizations below company level are not required to maintain daily journal files, but should do so when in the opinion of the commander a detailed record of events and activities will be of significant value to the Army in manning, equipping, training, employing, evaluating or determining requirements for similar organizations at any time in the future.

6. PREPARATION AND MAINTENANCE: a. Format. Daily journals will be prepared on DA Form 1594 in the format illustrated at Appendix I. The journals should be typed but may be handwritten when typing is not feasible. Handwritten journals must be fully legible and written in permanent black or blue-black ink. When feasible, documents placed in the daily journal file will be original copies; if these are not available, fully legible carbons or certified true copies may be used. Thermofax or other special-process copies will not be placed in the daily journal file due to their relatively rapid deterioration. To facilitate filing and reference, supporting documents will be attached to the appropriate daily journal.

b. Security classification. When feasible, the daily journal should be kept unclassified to facilitate general use. When supporting classified documents or other classified materials are attached to the daily journal, each page and each entry of the daily journal will bear the appropriate security markings; the classifications will be kept as low as possible and downgrading instructions will be included on the first page of the daily journal. Top secret information should not be included in the daily journal file. The journal entry referring to a top secret document must include a reference showing where the document is filed. The reference should include location of the file, the document title and the issuing headquarters. If the title is classified top secret, it will be omitted and an unclassified short title substituted with notation as to the title classification.

c. Heading. The heading will include the complete unit/staff office title, the geographic location, and the time period. The time period for daily journals will be 0001 to 2400 hours.

d. Item number. Each daily journal entry will be numbered to facilitate cross referencing. Each supporting document attached to the daily journal will be given the same item number as the daily journal entry. If a supporting reference item consists of more than one document, the documents should be given the journal item number followed by A, B, C, etc., as necessary.

e. Entries. There is no preferred style for daily journal entries, but cryptic phrasing and meaningless statements such as "routine activities" will be avoided. Brevity is desirable, but clarity and completeness are essential. The amount of detail required in a journal entry is that necessary to explain to future users the WHO, WHAT, WHERE, WHEN, HOW and WHY of the activity or event indicated or described; and indicate by name, rank and duty assignment the individual(s) providing, receiving or acting on the information entered in the journal. If a complete identification is included in a previous entry, subsequent identification on the same day may be limited to the name or duty title. When a document cited in a journal entry is to be preserved in a permanent file other than the daily journal file (e.g., an operation order, operation plan, contingency plan or a study), the entry should include the unit or staff office file number, the document title and the issuing headquarters. All documents that will be required to reconstruct the activities or events relating to the journal entry will be attached to the daily journal unless they are to be preserved in another permanent file. Standard techniques for referencing are shown at Appendix I.

f. Action taken. If all the actions taken are indicated in the body of an entry or no action is taken, the "action taken" column is left blank. Use of the letter "M" to indicate posting on a map is acceptable. It is redundant to use "L" to indicate that the item has been logged. Items 2, 25 and 128 of Appendix I illustrate proper notations. "F" is not adequate; the specific file must be indicated.

g. Initials. Since initials are usually meaningful to local, current users of the journal, the initials of the individual who drafted a journal entry may be noted in the initials column, but individuals providing, receiving or acting on the information in an entry must be identified by name, rank and duty assignment in journal entries.

h. Abbreviations and slang. Abbreviations not found in AR 320-50 or a standard dictionary will not be used without explanation in the journal itself. Slang expressions and code words of all types will be explained each day they are used.

i. Timeliness and accuracy. To minimize errors in recording times or other matters of fact, daily journal entries should be made at the time the events or activities occur. It is especially important that the contents of oral messages and orders be fully recorded at the time received or given.

j. Summary. The next-to-last entry in the daily journal should be a summary written by the commander or staff office chief. This summary will describe the overall pattern of activities for the day and include comments necessary to place in perspective any important events not fully covered in journal entries or in the supporting documents attached. If the reasoning leading to decisions, including the principal considerations, is not provided elsewhere, it would be given in the summary. Plans for the following day will be provided when it is considered desirable to have them recorded for current or future study.

k. Corrections. Once made, journal entries will not be altered except to correct typographical or similar errors. Corrections will be initialed by the officer authenticating the journal. If the substance of an entry is incorrect or significantly incomplete, the necessary correction or addition will be made in a subsequent entry referencing the original entry. The source of information on which a significant correction or addition is based should be cited.

l. Authentication. The daily journal is an official record and will be authenticated by the signature of the commander, chief of the staff office, or an appropriate authorized representative.

m. File size. Daily journal file items should be filed in standard folders as prescribed in AR 345-200. Large documents should be folded to the size of journal pages. Small items should be secured to blank sheets of letter-size bond paper.

n. File numbers and titles. Units managing records under AR 345-210 will file daily journals and supporting documents under file number 206-07. Units managing records under AR 345-215 will file daily journals and supporting documents under file number 2-06. The file title for file numbers 206-07 and 2-06 will be "Daily Journal Files."

o. File labels. Daily journal files will be labeled as shown at Appendix II.

p. Consolidated daily journal files. Battalion-level units using a single journal file system, and large staff offices with several subsections, will consolidate daily journal files. Each staff section or subsection should prepare complete daily journal files and submit the original, authenticated copies to the office maintaining the unit or staff section journal. The daily journals will be assembled in a set sequence in one folder, and the supporting source documents will be attached to the appropriate daily journal. In the case of bulky journals, separate folders for each day or week, or a system of dividers may be used to facilitate prompt reference.

q. Special requirements. Various types of messages, written records of oral orders, memoranda on decisions or conferences and similar items may be properly preserved in daily journal files of more than one unit/staff office. In the case of such documents as SITREP's that must be preserved in daily journal files by the originating US Army unit/staff

office, retention by other than the originator is not required. However, significant documents, including SITREP's and PERINTREP's, originated by non-US Army elements should be preserved in the daily journal files of the receiving unit or staff office.

7. INSPECTIONS: Commanders will require frequent inspections to insure the adequacy of daily journal files maintained by staff offices and subordinate units. Records management officers, IG teams, unit and staff historians, and personnel of military history detachments will coordinate to insure comprehensive inspection coverage and consistency in technical guidance. The contents of para 4, above, should be considered in evaluating the substance of journal files. Technical adequacy should be measured in terms of compliance with guidance provided in para 6, above, and at Appendices I and II.

8. REFERENCES: a. AR 220-15.

b. AR 345-210.

c. AR 345-215.

d. AR 380-5.

e. USARV Reg 345-200.

f. USARV Reg 870-1.

g. Message, unclassified, USARV AVHAG-AR 08760, subject: Protection of Records with Historical Value, DTD 200516Z Jan 67.

(AVHCS-MH)

FOR THE COMMANDER:



ROBERT C. TABER
Brigadier General, US Army
Chief of Staff

R. N. DALLAM
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

2 Appendices

- I. Sample Daily Journal
- II. File Titles

DISTRIBUTION:

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3 AVHAG-A

800 AVHAG-AP

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5 OCMH, DA

3 CINCUSARPAC

ATTN: GPOP-MH

6 CINCUSARPAC

1 USARPAC Hist Unit

1 MACV AG M&D Br, APO 96222

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG <small>(AR 220-346)</small>				PAGE NO 1	NO OF PAGES 6	
ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION		LOCATION	PERIOD COVERED			
S-3 Section 1st Bde, 20th Inf Div		AP VINH PHUOC XS 738781	FROM		TO	
			HOUR	DATE	HOUR	DATE
			0001	5 Jan 67	2400	5 Jan 67
ITEM NO	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INITIALS	
	IN	OUT				
1	0001		(U) Journal opened.			
2	0015		(S) Tel msg fr MAJ Jackson, S-3 1-53 Inf, rec by CPT Jones, Asst S-3: at 042230 Jan squad ambush set by 3/A/1-53 Inf vic XS 77517550 engaged est 18 en in 3 sampans. Results: FRD: 2 slightly WHA; EN: 2 KIA (BC), 1 sampan sunk; 1 sampan, 1 AK-47 w/20-rd mag, 1 MAS-36, 5 frag gren (US), 2 claymore (US), est 1 lb documents and approx 100 lb rice cptr. One mtr sampan w/est 7 en aboard escaped downstream. Cptr sampan was recovered near N bank w/1 KIA aboard. Other KIA found during search along N bank. Search term 0105 hrs. Amush being reset vic XS 77997547.	3M, copy to S2	RLJ	
3		0021	4(U) New loc of squad ambush (Item 2) rept by CPT Jones to 3-63 Arty FDC (CPT Lewis, ASST S-3).	DJF	RLJ	
4		0025	5(U) CPT Jones relayed msg fr S3 1-53 Inf (Item 2) by tel to MAJ Jordan, Asst G3 at DTOC.		RLJ	
	*	*	* * * * *	* *		
25	0639		6(U) ARVN 11th Regt Opn Summary for 4 Jan rec fr CPT Anh, 11th Regt LNO, by OP SGT (SSG Green).	DJF; copies to S4 and S5	DLG	
			1 Stamped at top and bottom of each page.			
			2 Omit when unclassified.			
			3 Information posted on map.			
			4 Text of telephone msg is not given in entry; a copy must be attached to the daily journal. (DJF) (2-06)			
			5 Complete text is in item 2; copy not reqd in DJF.			
			6 Non-US Army unit; copy must be placed in DJF.			
			WHEN CLASSIFIED			
			INCLUDE DOWNGRADING INSTRUCTIONS			
			Classification			
TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY				SIGNATURE		

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG

(AR 220-346)

PAGE NO

2

NO OF PAGES

6

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION		LOCATION		PERIOD COVERED			
S-3 Section 1st Bde, 20th Inf Div		AP VINH PHUOC XS 738781		FROM		TO	
				HOUR	DATE	HOUR	DATE
				0001	5 Jan 67	2400	5 Jan 67

ITEM NO	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INITIALS
	IN	OUT			
26	0735		(S) Bde OPLAN COMANCHE (U) for op in Rung Sat Sp Zone signed by COL Santini, Bde Cmdr.	S3 File 2-08, cy to LNO 1-53 Inf (1LT Groat), 2 cys to DTOC by courier (1LT Akins - dprt 0751 hrs by OH-23)	TDS
27	0753		(C) CPT Jones rec 2 cys 20th Inf Div OPOrd 31-67 (OP PINEAPPLE) fr CPT Riley, Bde LNO to div.	S3 (MAJ Smith) notified. CPT Jones called DTOC and ack receipt.	RLG
28	0810		(U) MAJ Jordan of DTOC ack receipt of 2 cys OPLAN COMANCHE. Msg rec by SSG Green.		RLG
29	0825		(C) MAJ Smith recm changes in bde warning orders for OP PINEAPPLE. COL Santini appr.	MRF in DJF	TDS
30	0845		(C) CPT Jones called coded msg to MAJ Lewis, S3 2-38th Inf. Msg is Frag 0 changing 4 Jan warning order for OP PINEAPPLE (see DJF Item 18, 4 Jan).	S3 File 2-01	RLJ
	*	*	* * * * *	* *	
63	1147		(C) Bde OPOrd 39-67 (OP VICKSBURG) appr by COL Santini.	S3 File 2-01; cys to Bn LNOs 3-37 Inf (1LT Reimer) and 1-53 Inf; 2 cys to DTOC thru msg gen.	
*Combat orders, incl fragmentary, admin and operation orders, and SOPs go in permanent file 2-01; when this is done, cy in DJF is not required.					

Classification

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY	SIGNATURE
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DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG
(AR 220-346)

PAGE NO 3 NO OF PAGES 6

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION J-3 Section 1st Bde, 20th Inf Div	LOCATION AP VINH PHUOC XS 738781	PERIOD COVERED			
		FROM		TO	
		HOUR	DATE	HOUR	DATE
		0001	5 Jan 67	2400	5 Jan 67

ITEM NO	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INITIALS
	IN	OUT			
64	1201		(C) SITREP fr 3-37th Inf rec fr OP SGT (SGT Williams) by SSG Green: no changes since 1100 hours.	M, S2 notified	DLG
65	1202		⁸ (U) SITREP fr 1-53 Inf rec fr LT Baker Asst S3, by SSG Green.	M, DJF, cy to S2	DLG
66	1204		⁹ (U) SITREP fr 2-38 Inf dlvr by CPT Rakosi, Bn LNO. Rec by SSG Green.	M, cy to S2	DLG
67		1221	(U) Bde SITREP called to MSG Jansen (OP SGT) DTOC, by SSG Green.	DJF	DLG
68	1251		(U) 1LT Reimer, Bn LNO, dlvr 3-37th Inf After Action Report on OP BEACHCOMBER. Rec by SSG Green.	To MAJ Smith	DLG
69	1310		(U) Bde After Action Report on OP WESTFIELD signed by LTC Franklin, Bde XO.	S3 File S-12 cys to msg cen for distr	TDS
70		1315	¹⁰ (U) Proposed MTOE 7-42G appr by COL Santini for submission to Div HQ.	S3 File 2-07, 3 cys to msg cen for courier delivery to Div HQ.	TDS
⁸ Tel msg text not given; copy must be placed in DJF. ⁹ Written SITREP not originated by bde; 2-38 Inf must place copy in DJF, but bde not required to do so. ¹⁰ Organizational planning document; filed in different permanent file (2-07) than operation plan files (2-08).					

Classification

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY	SIGNATURE
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DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG <small>(AR 20-346)</small>				PAGE NO 4	NO OF PAGES 6	
ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION		LOCATION	PERIOD COVERED			
S-3 Section 1st Bde, 20th Inf Div		AP VINH PHUOC XS 738781	FROM		TO	
			HOUR	DATE	HOUR	DATE
	0001	5 Jan 67	2400	5 Jan 67		
ITEM NO	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC	ACTION TAKEN		INITIALS
	IN	OUT				
71	1320	1350	(C) COL Santini held conference w/XO, S2, S3, IO, 6-13 Arty CO and LNO to bde, and CPT Link, USAF ALO. Purpose was discussion of changes in SOP to comply with new rules of engagement for arty and air-delivered fires. MFR will serve as guidance until formal SOP change is published.	MFR in S3 File 2-01; cy to all attendees	HAF	
72	1405	1425	(U) Bde ORLL for period ending 31 Oct signed by COL Santini.	S3 File 2-12 1S-1 File 2-05, cy to msg cen for distr	DLG	
DELAYED ENTRY - 4 Jan						
73			(U) CPT Miller of USAWECOM Study Team (see Item 48, 3 Jan) dlvr 3 cy of team inspection report on visit to 2-38 Inf. Report rec approx 1820 hrs by CPT Jones.	DJF: cy to S3 and S4	TDS	
	*	*	* * * * *	* * *		
128	2204	2211	(C) CPT Mahan, Asst S3, 2-38 Inf reported by tel to MAJ Smith that a Hoi Chanh who came in about 1910 hrs today said two Main Force bns will atk A&B/6-13 Arty at mid-night tonight. Hoi Chanh had detailed info on atk plans.	DJF 128A; MAJ Smith notified COL Santini and S2 and sent an alert notice to 6-13th and DTOC (DJF 128B)		
	¹¹ Unit historical document file.					
Classification						
TYPE NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY				SIGNATURE		

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SJA
G3

LRN 51V-0535
TOR 08 08 22 H

Key
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED			
TYPE ASS	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE S
PRECEDENCE			
ACTION COURIER			
INFO			

DTG

FROM: CG USARV LONG BINH RVN

TO: CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG

CG II FFORCEV LONG BINH

CG 1ST CAV DIV AN KHE

CG 1ST INF DIV DI AN

CG 1ST LOG COMD SGN

CG 1ST SIG BDE LONG BINH

CG 4TH INF DIV PLEIKU

CG 5TH SFG NHA TRANG

CG 9TH INF DIV BEAR CAT

CG 25TH INF DIV CU CHI

CG 101ST ABN BDE CHU LAI

CG 173D ABN BDE TUY HOA

CG 198TH INF BDE CHU LAI

CG 198TH INF BDE CHU LAI

CG 199TH INF BDE LONG BINH

CG 525TH MI CP SGN


CG ENGINEER COMD LONG BINH

CG AMERICAL DIV CHU LAI

CG SAIGON SUPPORT COMD LONG BINH

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS	
DISTRIBUTION	
C/S	G1
G2	G3 2
G4	G5
COMPT	AG
CHAP	CA
EMGR	IC
IS	PM
JA	SSO 2
SIGC	SURE
COORDINATION	
G3	787
CLEARED FOR DISPATCH <i>WAC</i>	
GARNE, COL, LBN, 21	
DATE	TIME
02	1355Z
MONTH	YEAR
Nov	67
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	3

81980

NAME AND TITLE

 ROBERT C. FORTMEYER
 MAJ, JAGC
 Chief, Military Affairs

PHONE
 LB 4824

SIGNATURE

 W.S. Adams, 2LT, AGC
 (Typed (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE)
 G.L. HUNSARER, MAJ, AGC, ASST AG

EXHIBIT D-48

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
 UNCLASSIFIED

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED

PRECEDENCE ACTION COURIER INFO	RELEASED BY C.I. HUNSAKER, MAJ, AGC, ASST AG	DRAFTED BY ROBERT S. FOYDASHOFF, MAJ, JAGC, C, MIL Affairs	PHONE DB 4824
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CG SUPPORT COMMAND QUI NHON

CG SUPPORT COM AND CAM RANH BAY
GO 29TH CIVIL AFFAIRS COMPANY DA NANG

UNCLAS ENTO AVINJA 81982 FOR JA

Subj: Geneva Conventions

1. AR 350-216, dated 28 September 1967, requires all Army personnel be instructed in the principles and provisions of The Hague, and Geneva Convention, respecting the laws of war on land, and for the protection of war victims.
2. It is requested that implementation of this regulation, commensurate with existing priorities, be effected as soon as possible. It is recommended that consideration be given to establishing courses of instruction for all personnel reporting into your units at the time that they receive initial indoctrination courses.
3. Your suggestions and comments, together with any material that you may have, on the means deemed most practical to further implement the above-stated regulation by this headquarters, are solicited.
4. Judge Advocates are encouraged to provide instruction to units, who are physically located within a close geographical proximity, although not of their commands. In this regard arrangements

CONTROL NO. 81982	FOR/TCP	PAGE NO. 2	NO. OF PAGES 3	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS <i>uw</i>
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REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

PRECEDENCE

RELEASED BY

DRAFTED BY

PHONE

ACTION COURIER

G. L. HUNSAKER, MAJ, AGC,
ASST AG

ROBERT S. LOYDASHEFF, MAJ,
JAGC, C, MIL Affairs

LB 4024

INFO

Should be effected between the Judge advocates and commanders
concerned.

CONTROL NO

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PAGE
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3

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PAGES

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MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION

INDEXED

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REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS

315

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

316

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SJA
DSJA
Admin Off
SGM



UNCLAS 354 1741133

ZEN HUUEN

R 23122Z JUN 68

ROUTINE

VN COM USARV LANG BINH VIETNAM

TO ALL COMMANDS

ZEN/CO 1ST SIG BDN

INFO ZEN/COMSMAOV TAI SON NHUT.

BT

UNCLAS AWHGC-DST 16547

*A/03
X/SJA
C/S*

LRN 195-2375

SUBJECT: ~~REDACTED~~

OR 23-1809

REFS: A. USARV REG 350-1, DATED 10 NOV 67, AS CHANGED.

B. USARV UNCLAS EFTC MSG AVYJA 3193 DTG 031255Z NOV 67,

SUBJECT: GENEVA CONVENTIONS.

C. AR 350-216, DATED 28 SEP 67.

1. INSPECTION TEAMS CONDUCTING ANNUAL GENERAL INSPECTIONS, DURING MAY AND JUNE 1968 HAVE NOTED THAT OF THE RECORDS CHECKED, INDICATIONS ARE, THAT APPROXIMATELY 50 PERCENT OF THE PERSONNEL HAD NOT RECEIVED THE ANNUAL GENEVA AND HAGUE CONVENTION TRAINING AS REQUIRED IN AR 350-216.

2. UNITS ARE REMINDED THAT AR 350-216 REQUIRES THAT THIS INSTRUCTION BE PRESENTED TO EACH MEMBER OF THE COMMAND ANNUALLY AND THAT SCHEDULED ENTRIES BE MADE IN INDIVIDUAL PERSONNEL RECORDS.

25)

[See clear copy on following page]

EXHIBIT D-49

File
317

REFS: A. USARV RE: 350-1, DATED 10 NOV 67, AS CHANGED.

B. USARV UNCLAS EFTO MSG AVHJA 8193D DTG 031255Z NOV 67,

SUBJECT: GENEVA CONVENTIONS.

C. AR 350-216, DATED 28 SEP 67.

1. INSPECTION TEAMS CONDUCTING ANNUAL GENERAL INSPECTIONS, DURING MAY AND JUNE 1968 HAVE NOTED THAT OF THE RECORDS CHECKED, INDICATIONS ARE, THAT APPROXIMATELY 50 PERCENT OF THE PERSONNEL HAD NOT RECEIVED THE ANNUAL GENEVA AND HAGUE CONVENTION TRAINING AS REQUIRED AR 390-216.

2. UNITS ARE REMINDED THAT AR 350-216 REQUIRES THAT THIS INSTRUCTION BE PRESENTED TO EACH MEMBER OF THE COMMAND ANNUALLY AND THAT SUITABLE ENTRIES BE MADE IN INDIVIDUAL PERSONNEL RECORDS FORM

(20)

090853Z Sep 68

FM GG USARV LBN RVN

TO CG AMERICAL DIV CHU LAI

071031Z SEP 68

FM CG 1ST LOG COMD LBN RVN

TO CG USARV LBN

INFO ZEN/CG USASUPCOM DNG RVN

C O N F I D E N T I A L 09-045 FROM AVCA GP-P FOR AVHG-PO

SUBJECT: Reorganization of the Americal Division (U)

REFERENCE:

A. Conf MSG 68177 from AVHG-PO, DTG 5 Sep 68. (NOTA)

B. USARV G-3 DF, AVHGC-FDD, CONF, UNDTD, SUBJECT:
same as above.

1. (U) Reference Alfa requests this headquarters forward plans to assume logistical and administrative support of corps type units presently being supported by the Americal Division. This headquarters was represented in the initial presentation of the reorganization plan to the Americal Division on 21 July 1968. Planning for eventualities resulting from the reorganization has continued from that date and involved personal coordination between staff sections of the Division, USASUPCOM a NANG and this HEADQUUWZO WTM KVR) CG, USASUPCOM, DA NANG HAS coordinated directly with CG, Americal Division for the purpose of adjusting support agreements required by the division reorganization. Latest information from CG, USASUPCOM Da Nang and absence of comments in reference BRAVO indicate that all requirements will be satisfie. Specifically:

AM ammunition: Capability provided by ODCO (AMMO) DS/GS and OD DET EOD. These units will provide support to all divisional and non-divisional units.

B. MAINTENANCE: Capability provided by; Maint Co (DS) (DIV), ENGR DET MAINT, and SC DET RDR MAINT. These units are already providing direct support maintenance for all non-divisional units and normal backup support to the division.

C. POL: Capability provided by portion of QM CO POL SUP and transportation assets listed in E below. Retail distribution will be provided to non-divisional and divisional units per mutual support agreement between the Americal Division and 1ST LOG COMD.

D. Supply and service: Capability provided by; CS CO SUP;: \$, class I plat, fort & cost sup plat, laundry plat, and bakery plat. These units will provide supply support to all non-divisional units and services to all units in the area.

E. TRANSPORTATION: Capability provided by TC plat MED TRK (CARGO), TC plat MED TRK, (POL), and TC plat term SVC. These units will provide transport and airhead terminal service support to non-divisional units and back-up support to the division permutual support agreement between the Americal Division and 1ST LOG COMD.

3. (C) Administrative support to include personnel service and finance is provided all non-divisional unit on an area basis and will not be affected by this reorganization.

4. (U) Through personal liaison and daily DS contact, the require-Q

ENTF of the Americal Division and CORP type units will be supported to the maximum extent

HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

ICCI 5370.1A
17/VAP/hrg
13 February 1966

I CORPS COORDINATOR INSTRUCTION 5370.1A w/ch 1

From: Area Coordinator
To: Distribution List

Subj: Respect for the law, property, institutions, traditions and customs of the Republic of Vietnam

Ref: (a) Uniform Code of Military Justice
(b) U. S. Navy Regulations, art. 1214 and 1215
(c) FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (1956)

Encl: (1) Copy of NINE RULES for MACV Personnel

1. Purpose. This instruction is designed both to prevent and to prescribe certain conduct which is inimical to the accomplishment of the mission of the U. S. Forces in Vietnam.

2. Cancellation. I Corps Coordinator Instruction 5370.1.

3. Discussion

a. Enclosure (1), a copy of the NINE RULES for personnel of the U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, states in concise terms the standard of conduct required of all U. S. personnel in the Republic of Vietnam. References (a) through (c) contain additional information pertaining to basic standards of required conduct.

b. It is incumbent on each member of the Military Assistance Command to conduct himself in a manner which reflects favorably on himself and the United States of America. In furtherance of this goal, U. S. personnel must be familiar with, and avoid conduct which infringes upon, the local customs, practices, institutions and traditions of the Vietnamese people.

c. The punitive provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice are applicable in Vietnam and must be enforced to protect the interests of both the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and of the United States in order to establish and maintain law and order in the Republic of Vietnam.

EXHIBIT D-27

d. The proscriptions enumerated below are derived from the principles of international law applicable to the conduct of hostilities. The listing is not exhaustive, and references (a) through (c) should be consulted for further information. It is the policy of the United States government that U. S. personnel shall adhere to these principles. Past experience has demonstrated the wisdom of that policy. It is particularly important for personnel to conform to the proper standard of conduct as a means of winning the trust and confidence of the populace which is a measure essential to the accomplishment of our mission in Vietnam.

4. Action

a. U. S. personnel within the I Corps Area--

(1) Shall obey Vietnamese law, the orders of local and national police, traffic regulations and shall operate vehicles in a prudent and defensive manner at all times.

(2) Shall respect the customs, practices, institutions, traditions structures, symbols and property of the populace of the Republic of Vietnam, especially, those devoted to such purposes as religion, government, medicine, care of the sick and wounded, art, science, history, refugee aid, orphanages, education, shrines, consecrated places, and graves, tombs, places of burial or places otherwise dedicated to the dead,

(3) Shall respect the human rights, family rights, dignity, honor and property rights of all persons, particularly those accorded special consideration under international law, i.e., civilians, noncombatants, prisoners, detainees, the sick, wounded, aged or infirm, children under 15 years of age, orphans, women, expectant mothers and mothers of young children,

(4) Shall not use their position, power or status, as a U. S. person in the Republic of Vietnam, for any private gain and shall not engage in any private commercial transaction without approval of their Battalion, Squadron, comparable or superior Commanding Officer or Supervisor, even though such a transaction otherwise is a legitimate venture, and

(5) Shall not engage in debates, arguments or boisterous conduct in places accessible to the public; use derogatory, provoking or reproachful words or gestures toward other persons; give money to beggars or children; enter private property except at the express invitation or with the express permission of the owner or resident; enter the enclosed, screened or other private areas of business or commercial establishments (including cafes, bars and restuarants); enter any Vietnamese area or building except as authorized [redacted] or required in the performance of duty; attend or remain in the vicinity of gatherings of local citizens which manifest indications of disorder, tension, turbulence or violence; tamper with religious or national symbols; carry weapons or "switch blade" knives

(as defined by federal law) or item designed to be used principally as weapons (short lengths of pipe, blackjacks, brass knuckles, etc) while off-duty in public places (Danang, China Beach, etc.); leave military vehicles unattended except when parked in a secure U. S. or GVN area.

(6) Personnel violating this general order shall be subject to punishment in accordance with the procedures and provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

b. Commanding Officers and supervisory personnel at all echelons shall ensure that---

(1) Personnel are instructed on the provisions of this order, the customs, practices, traditions and institutions of Vietnam, and the standard of conduct required,

(2) Disciplinary action is taken, according to the facts and applicable law, in each case in which an offense may have been committed, and

(3) Personnel whose conduct demonstrates a need for additional instruction are provided that instruction during [REDACTED] off-duty hours for such period of time as is necessary to attain proper conduct [REDACTED]

Ch

KEITH B. MCCUTCHEON

DISTRIBUTION:

Case 2
Case 3

AUTHENTICATED:



D. E. SHELTON
Major USMC
Force Adjutant

NINE RULES

FOR PERSONNEL OF US MILITARY
ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM

The Vietnamese have paid a heavy price in suffering for their long fight against the communists. We military men are in Vietnam now because their government has asked us to help its soldiers and people in winning their struggle. The Viet Cong will attempt to turn the Vietnamese people against you. You can defeat them at every turn by the strength, understanding, and generosity you display with the people. Here are nine simple rules:

1. Remember we are guests here: We make no demands and seek no special treatment.
2. Join with the people! Understand their life, use phrases from their language and honor their customs and laws.
3. Treat women with politeness and respect.
4. Make personal friends among the soldiers and common people.
5. Always give the Vietnamese the right of way.
6. Be alert to security and ready to react with your military skill.
7. Don't attract attention by loud, rude or unusual behavior.
8. Avoid separating yourself from the people by a display of wealth or privilege.
9. Above all else you are members of the U. S. Military Forces on a difficult mission, responsible for all your official and personal actions. Reflect honor upon yourself and the United States of America.

HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
FPO San Francisco 96602

ICCI 5370.1A Ch 1
17/jnd
29 OCT 1969

I CORPS COORDINATOR INSTRUCTION 5370.1A Ch 1 **ch made**

From: Area Coordinator
To: Distribution List

Subj: Respect for the Law, Property, Institutions, Traditions and Customs of the Republic of Vietnam

1. Purpose. To direct a pen change to the basic instruction of 13 February 1966.

2. Action

a. Delete the words "for liberty" in line 8 of subparagraph 4a(5).

b. Delete the words "liberty or" in line 2 of subparagraph 4b(3).

c. Delete the words "while on liberty" in lines 3 and 4 of subparagraph 4b(3).


L.E. POGGENMEYER
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

DISTRIBUTION:

Case 2
Case 3

U.S. MARINE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS
3rd MAF
PO BOX 2300
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94133

7:42
2 Mar 1967

I CORPS COORDINATOR INSTRUCTION 5830.1A w/ch 1

From: Area Coordinator
To: Distribution List

Subj: Spot/Serious Incident Reports

- Ref: (a) MCO 05740.2
(b) MACV Directive 335-1
(c) MACV Directive 335-12
(d) FMFPac Order 5740.1
(e) Force Order 5700.1A

- Encl: (1) Format for Spot Incident Report
(2) Format for Serious Incident Report (SIR)

1. Purpose. To prescribe policy and procedure for reporting of significant information to the CG, III MAF/I Corps Coordinator.

2. Cancellation. I Corps Coordinator Instruction 5830.1 and Force Order 3480.1A.

3. Background. References (a), (b) and (c) require immediate reports to higher headquarters of any incident that results in death or serious injury to friendly forces or noncombatants; any incident that may reflect adversely upon U. S. Forces and their mission in Vietnam; and any incident that may receive widespread adverse publicity. The requirement to report all types of serious incidents serves many purposes: (1) It permits sound command supervision of all related matters, so that appropriate corrective measures may be taken. For example, the cause of misdirected ordnance should always be determined and corrective action applied. (2) The appropriateness of existing procedures, orders, and instructions are tested by every incident. (3) Reports may indicate inadequate efforts to assist innocent victims of operational or administrative mishaps in every way possible. The aim of these procedures is to ensure timely and accurate reporting to higher authorities in order that they may meet their obligations to their superiors and to permit commanders at all levels to fulfill their command responsibilities. The Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, has been directed to report all such incidents occurring within units under his operational control.

a. The Commanding Generals, 1st Marine Division, 3d Marine Division, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Force Logistic Command, Commanding Officer I Corps Advisory Group/Deputy Senior Advisor, I Corps, and Commanding Officers of units under operational control of III Marine Amphibious Force are responsible for the reporting of all incidents required to be reported hereunder arising out of operations conducted by their commands, or otherwise related to personnel and units under their operational control, and will take such action as is deemed necessary to implement these instructions. Such action will include designation of a single point of contact on their staffs to whom inquiries can be addressed to determine the status of a particular investigation or to secure such other information as may be necessary.

b. Commanders of other U. S. Armed Forces Commands, I Corps should provide the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force a copy of the report required by their respective service instructions. In this connection a timely wire or telephone report to III MAF Combat Operations Center (Parchment COC) may be in order depending on the seriousness of the situation. The telephone call should be followed by submission of a copy of the written report.

c. The Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company, III Marine Amphibious Force is responsible to report all incidents, required to be reported hereunder arising out of the operations of, or otherwise related to, personnel of his command.

5. Reportable Incidents

a. Operational incidents to be reported utilizing the Spot Report Format (enclosure (1)) include, but are not limited to the following:

- (1) Initiation and results of US or friendly tactical operations.
- (2) US casualties, regardless of cause.
- (3) Downed or missing friendly aircraft.
- (4) Relocation of major friendly combat/combat support units (company or larger).
- (5) Enemy initiated attacks on US or friendly forces and facilities.
- (6) Terrorist attacks on friendly localities or personnel.
- (7) Discovery of significant arms or supply caches and detection of infiltration operations.

- (8) VC atrocities or war crimes.
- (9) Evidence of the VC use of new type of military equipment or VC adoption of new tactics.
- (10) Capture of senior enemy officers or VC cadre.
- (11) Sparrowhawk: Launch, retrieve and results.
- (12) Other reaction forces: When launched, why, results.
- (13) Launch of significant helilift, completion of lift.
- (14) Significant visual reconnaissance sightings.
- (15) Air to air contact, ground to air AA sightings.
- (16) Motor vehicle convoys departing and arriving in TAORs; delays.
- (17) Change in status of main LOC.
- (18) Change in alert forces (units, times).
- (19) Company or larger troop lifts.
- (20) Suspected or alleged border violations of RVN or contiguous nations.
- (21) Serious incidents involving prisoners of war for which the U. S. has responsibility under the Geneva Conventions, including death, serious injury, riots and successful escapes. ✓
- (22) Injury or death of noncombatants during tactical operations due to U. S. ordnance. ✓
- (23) Incidents, attacks, civil disturbances and natural disasters which physically or psychologically affect the people of Vietnam or the image of the central government. Of particular interest are incidents which have a direct impact on the revolutionary development program or the ability of the government to carry out the program.

B. Administratively processed incidents involving moral turpitude which may result in damaging public confidence in the U. S. Armed Forces and which, because of the nature or personnel involved, may be reasonably expected to arouse public interest and cause continuous or widespread adverse publicity, will be reported utilizing the Serious Incident Format (enclosure (2)). The following are illustrative of reportable incidents in this category:

(1) Misreatment of noncombatants in the course of tactical operations.

(2) Death from other than natural causes.

(3) Rape or an assault with intent to commit rape or other serious sex offenses.

(4) Significant damage to Vietnamese property brought about by actions of Americans.

(5) Burglary, robbery, arson, misappropriation, fraud or extortion of major significance.

(6) Riots or other disorders resulting from an incident caused by Americans.

(7) Blackmarketing, smuggling, and currency manipulations.

(8) Involvement with military or civilian personnel of a foreign power in a criminal incident of immediate or potentially serious significance from a political, military or public relations standpoint.

c. Reporting Procedures

(1) Initial Spot Reports will be made immediately by wire or telephone to the III Marine Amphibious Force Combat Operations Center (Parchment COC) at the earliest time that the significant facts can be determined and by the most expeditious means available, subject to security requirements. Normally, unclassified reports will be made telephonically.

(2) Initial Serious Incident Reports may require more detailed information to be meaningful and this information should be included even at the cost of some delay in the report. Initial reports should be made not more than twenty-four hours from the time the event was known to military authorities. Such reports will be made by wire or telephone to the III Marine Amphibious Force Combat Operations Center (Parchment COC).

(3) Both spot and serious incident interim follow-up reports will be made by wire or telephone to the III Marine Amphibious Force Combat Operations Center as soon as information required is available, but no later than 72 hours after the incident was known to military authorities.

(4) A terminal written report, to the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force will be submitted (original and two copies) consolidating the initial and interim reports together with any additional information obtained. The final entry shall state "No fur-

their report will be submitted unless investigation or developments warrant."

(5) Information Service Reports. A copy of the written report submitted hereunder is forwarded to the Combat Information Bureau obviating the necessity of submitting written reports required by paragraph 4007 of reference (e), unless specifically requested.

~~(6) Spot or Serious Incident Reports will include a recommendation from the general officer in command expressing his views on whether the incident should be reported to higher authority and the reasons therefor.~~

6(7) Reports of serious injury or death of individual Marines need not normally be reported as serious incidents, since the details are reported to higher authority in the Casualty Report.



H. M. ELWOOD
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

Case 2

Case 3; C & D

Case 4; A, G, K, L, P, S, T

Area Exchange Office I Corps (25)

~~OFFICIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

TCOI 5830.1A Ch 1
7/rja
19 Apr 1967

I CORPS COORDINATOR INSTRUCTION 5830.1A Ch 1

From: Area Coordinator
To: Distribution List

Subj: Spot/Serious Incident Report

1. Purpose. To direct a pen change to the basic order.
2. Action. Delete present subparagraph 5.c(6) in its entirety and renumber subparagraph 5.c(7) as 5.c(6).

R. B. Neville

R. B. NEVILLE
Deputy Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

Case 2
Case 3; A,C,D
Case 4; A,G,K,L,P,S,T
Area Exchange Officer, I Corps (25)

SPOT REPORT

(Initial) (Follow on) (Final)

- Alpha - (UNIT SENDING REPORT)
- Bravo - DTG of Activity/Incident occurred
- Charlie - Location by Coordinates
- Delta - (WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, HOW)
- Echo - (RESULTS OR ACTION TAKEN)
- Foxtrot - (FRIENDLY KIA)
- Golf - (FRIENDLY WIA)
- Hotel - (FRIENDLY MIA)
- India - (ENEMY KIA) (CONFIRMED)
- Juliet - (ENEMY KIA) (PROBABLE)
- Kilo - (ENEMY CAPTURED)
- Lima - (ENEMY SUSPECTS)
- Mike - (WEAPONS CAPTURED)
- November - (EQUIPMENT/DOCUMENTS)

ENCLOSURE (1)

REPORT OF INCIDENT

1. Type of incident.
2. Time and date of incident.
3. Location of incident. Report the exact location, using identifiable landmarks, miles to the nearest town, city or village. Map grid coordinates will be used only when other means of identifying the location are impracticable, and then only when the map is completely identified.
4. Name, grade, and organization of individual rendering report.
5. Name of person(s) involved, to include victims, alleged offender(s) and witnesses, including information as to their:
 - a. Grade or title.
 - b. First name, middle initial, last name.
 - c. Service number.
 - d. Organization or address.
 - e. Sex and date of birth.
 - f. If civilian, indicate their status, i.e., DAC, dependent, etc., in place of service number.
6. A complete narrative summary of factual information concerning the incident. When indicated because of the nature of the incident, the extent of injuries to personnel and estimated dollar value of damages or loss will be included.
7. Status and location of personnel involved.
8. Designation of the organization or offices, military and civilian, conducting the investigation.
9. Statement as to actual or anticipated reaction, by the civil populace, to the incident and news items relative to the incident.
10. Include a statement that the local G-2 or Intelligence Officer (has) (has not) been notified of this incident.

ENCLOSURE (2)

13. Terminal Report: (This is final report; no further report will be submitted unless subsequent investigation or developments warrant.)

ENCLOSURE (2)


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AB-143-1968-QDI/VICT/III MAF

KẾ-HOẠCH HỖN-HỢP QUÂN SỰ
COMBINED CAMPAIGN PLAN
1-68



Regraded Confidential
by authority of Message
MACV 14683-280208Z Mar
70, DA-IN 382224

BẢN SỞ ____ CỦA ____ BẢN
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EXHIBIT D-52

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KẾ-hoạch Hồn-hợp Quân-sự I-68

Phân Căn bản

Combined Campaign Plan I-68

Basic Plan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Copy of _____ Copies
HQ, I ARVN Corps/HQ 111 MAF
DANANG, VIETNAM

SEC FILES
HEADQUARTERS I MAF

Combined Campaign Plan 1-68

Ref: (a) Maps: Indochina and Thailand, Series L509,
1:250,000 Sheets NE 484, NE 488, NE
4816, ND 491, ND 495, NE 4913.

(b) RVNAF, JGS/USMACV Combined Campaign Plan 1968,
AB 143

00412167

1. (S) SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence)

b. Friendly Forces

(1) CINCPAC supports military operations in ICTZ with Naval and Air and ground force reserve as required.

(2) US Agency for International Development (USAID), Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), and Office of the Special Assistant (OSA) provide civil assistance to GVN civil agencies and to US/FWMAF through the CORDS staff.

(3) Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) conduct military, psychological, and civic action operations in coordination with RVNAF and US forces.

(4) Naval Forces

(a) NAVFORV, in coordination with VNR, and I ARVN Corps provides naval forces for the prevention of waterborne infiltration of the RVN (Market Time Operations)

GROUP-4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals:
Declassified after 12 years.

1

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and for the conduct of river/inland waterways patrols to deny the enemy use of inland water LOC's and adjacent shore areas (Game Warden Operations), and in coordination with III MAF provides naval construction forces for the construction, maintenance, and upgrading of major roads, MILCON projects, and air fields as required.

(b) 7th Fleet provides shorefire bombardment and naval gunfire support of ground forces in I CTZ and maintains an amphibious force prepared to conduct unilateral or supporting operations ashore.

(5) Air Forces. 7th AF in coordination with VNAF provides air defense for the RVN and supports ground forces in I CTZ as requested, through air-lift, detection and interdiction of infiltration routes, and close air support.

c. Attachments

(1) ARVN General Support units and Special Forces (LLDB) reinforce, support and assist I ARVN Corps.

d. Assumption

(1) North Vietnam will continue material aid, major reinforcements, and command direction of the VC in ICTZ.

(2) There will be no major political disturbances in the major cities of ICTZ.

(3) RVNAF and US/ARAF in I CTZ remain at present

levels or will be increased in accordance with existing programs and programs revised or developed to support this campaign plan.

(4) VNAF and 7th AF will continue to maintain air supremacy over ICTZ.

(5) JGS will continue to maintain General Reserve attachments to I ARVN Corps of at least three battalions and that this number may be increased if required.

(6) VC activity in ICTZ may increase or decrease in accordance with the rate of infiltration from North Vietnam.

(7) Republic of Korea forces in ICTZ, although not a signatory to this plan, will continue to coordinate and cooperate with I ARVN Corps and III MAF forces toward the accomplishment of the common military/pacification mission and agree to the provisions of this plan.

2. (S) MISSION

The mission of I ARVN Corps, III MAF, and other FVNAF is to defeat the VC/NVA forces and assist the GVN to extend control throughout ICTZ.

3. (S) EXECUTION

a. Concept. Continue to exploit successes that have been achieved during 1967 both in terms of pacification progress and operations against enemy forces, bases, and infiltration routes. Annex B (Concept of Employment of

Military Forces).

(1) Pacification

(a) Maintain the 1967 RD rate of expansion and upgrade the level of those villages and hamlets now undergoing RD, except in Quang Ngai Province where there will be an increase of 50% in the RD effort.

(b) Reinforce the RD support forces with at least three ARVN battalions for each province, in addition to the programmed increases to province Regional and Popular Forces.

(2) Offensive and Anti-Infiltration Operations

(a) Complete Strong Point/Obstacle System (Dye Marker) from the sea to Strong Point/Patrol Base A-5, and on order extend the system as far westward as possible toward the Laotian border.

(b) Establish control over the infiltration corridors in the areas:

1. Western and southwestern Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces.

2. Western Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai Provinces.

(c) Increase measures to prevent VC/NVA rocket and mortar attacks against cities and military installations.

(d) Increase the tempo of offensive operations

against enemy forces and bases, especially against those NVA forces which have infiltrated and continue to infiltrate into the piedmont areas of southern Quang Tri and northern Thua Thien and into the area of Quang Tin bounded by Thang Binh, Hiep Duc, Hau Duc, and Tam Ky

(e) Maintain surveillance over and destroy the 68th and 368th NVA Rocket Regiments.

b. I ARVN Corps

(1) CG, 1st ARVN Division/11th DTA in coordination with appropriate US/ARVN commanders:

(a) On a priority basis support RD activities in those selected and approved areas in the provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien.

(b) Conduct unilateral, joint, and combined operations inside and outside of RD areas to locate and destroy VC/NVA main forces and their bases within assigned area.

(c) On order of this headquarters, conduct operations in the vicinity of the DTA boundary with Quang Da Special Zone.

(d) Defend cities and operational and logistics bases in assigned area in accordance with Annex E (Concept of Employment of Military Forces).

(e) Execute the Dye Marker plan and maintain surveillance and interdiction along the Loatian border,

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especially infiltration routes in the area of Aa Shan, the A Shau and A Luoi valleys and the Nam Dong Area.

(f) Conduct resources denial operations to assist sectors in the protection of crops and foodstuffs and to deny them to the enemy in accordance with Annex D (Resources Denial).

(g) Conduct operations to open, keep open, and secure LOCs which most effect military, economic and political activity in accordance with Annex E (Restoration and Protection of LOCs).

(h) Conduct an active campaign of psychological operations and civic action aimed especially at enemy cadre and population remaining in areas under enemy influence in order to increase the number of Hoi Chan in accordance with Annex C (Military Support of RD) and Annex H (Psychological Operations).

(i) Conduct active intelligence and counter-intelligence campaigns in accordance with Annex A (Intelligence) and Appendix 2 (Attack of the VC Infrastructure) to Annex C (Military Support of RD).

(j) Exercise operational control over the activities of CIDG camps through the B-Detachment, Hue; when established, and assist C-1 Headquarters, LLDB, and the B-Detachment to open new CIDG camps in accordance with Annex F (Employment of CIDG). Prior to establishment of

6

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B-Detachment, Hue, coordinate operational control of CIDG camps through C-1 Headquarters, LLDB.

(2) CG, 2nd ARVN Division/12th DTA in coordination with appropriate US/FWMAF commanders:

(a) On a priority basis support RD activities in those selected and approved areas in the provinces of Quang Tin and Quang Ngai

(b) Conduct unilateral, joint, and combined operations inside and outside of RD areas to locate and destroy VC/NVA main forces and their bases within assigned area.

(c) On order of this headquarters, conduct operations in the vicinity of the DTA boundary with Quang Da Special Zone.

(d) Defend cities and operational and logistical bases in assigned area in accordance with Annex B (Concept of Employment of Military Forces).

(e) Exercise operational control over the activities of CIDG camps through B-Detachment, Quang Ngai, when established, in order to establish and maintain control of infiltration routes crossing the Laotian border, and especially those routes into Quang Tin from Quang Nam, and assist C-1 Headquarters, LLDB and the B-Detachment to move and open CIDG camps in accordance with Annex F (Employment of CIDG). Prior to establish-

ment of B-Detachment, Quang Nam, coordinate operational control of CIDG camps through C-1 Headquarters, LLDB.

(f) Conduct resources denial operations to assist sectors in the protection of crops and foodstuffs and to deny them to the enemy in accordance with Annex D (Resources Denial).

(g) Conduct operations to open, keep open, and secure LOCs which most effect military, economic, and political activity in accordance with Annex E (Restoration and Protection of LOCs).

(h) Conduct an active campaign of psychological operations and civic action aimed especially at enemy cadre and population remaining in areas under enemy influence in order to increase the number of Hoi Chan in accordance with Annex C (Military Support of RD) and Annex H (Psychological Operations).

(i) Conduct active intelligence and counter-intelligence campaigns in accordance with Annex A (Intelligence) and Appendix 2 (Attack of the VC Infrastructure) to Annex C (Military Support of RD).

(3) Commander, Quang-Da Special Zone in coordination with appropriate US/PWMAF commanders:

(a) On a priority basis support RD activities in those selected and approved areas in Quang Nam Province.

(b) Conduct unilateral, joint, and combined

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operations inside and outside of RD areas to locate and destroy VC/NVA main forces and their bases within assigned area.

(c) On order of this headquarters, conduct operations in the vicinity of the boundaries with 11th DTA and 12th DTA.

(d) Defend cities and operational and logistical bases in assigned area in accordance with Annex B (Concept of Employment of Military Forces).

(e) Exercise operational control over the activities of CIDG camps in coordination with CI, Headquarters, LLDB in order to establish and maintain control of infiltration routes crossing the Laotian border, and assist C-1 Headquarters, LLDB to move and open CIDG camps in accordance with Annex F (Employment of CIDG).

(f) Conduct resources denial operations to assist sectors in the protection of crops and foodstuffs and to deny them to the enemy in accordance with Annex D (Resources Denial).

(g) Conduct operations to open, keep open, and secure LOCs which must effect military, economic and political activity in accordance with Annex E (Restoration and Protection of LOCs).

(h) Conduct an active campaign of psychological operations and civic action aimed especially at enemy

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cadre and population remaining in areas under enemy influence in order to increase the number of Ho Chi Chan in accordance with Annex C (Military Support of RD) and Annex H (Psychological Operations).

(1) Conduct active intelligence and counter-intelligence campaigns in accordance with Annex A (Intelligence) and Appendix 2 (Attack of the VC Infrastructure) to Annex C (Military Support of RD).

(4) 10th Engineer Group in addition to missions assigned by the Engineer Directorate and in coordination with DTAs, Special Zone Quang-Da, Sectors, Special Sector Da Nang and US/FWMAF engineer units in I CTZ:

(a) On a priority basis construct the Strong Point/Obstacle System.

(b) Improve the effectiveness of the outpost system within I CTZ. Prepare plans for Calendar Year 1968 for construction of a minimum of 25% of well selected new outposts and repair a minimum of 50% of the existing outposts identified by the MACV/JGS Combined Outpost Study Group, and accomplish at least half of the required construction and repairs by 30 June 1968.

(c) Improve and restore those main LOCs which most effect the military, economic, and political activities of I CTZ in accordance with Annex E (Restoration and

Protection of LOCs).

(d) Provide active engineer assistance and reinforcement for RD operations.

(e) Be prepared, on order, to evacuate the population from threatened areas of the flood plain.

(5) Company I, LLDB in coordination with DTAs, Special Zone Quang-Da, Sectors, Special Sector Da Nang, US Special Forces, and US/FWNAF and in accordance with Annex F (Employment of CIDG):

(a) Direct and control CIDG camps within I CTZ to assist in establishing a system of border surveillance and in extending GVN control throughout I CTZ.

(b) Prepare and execute mutually supporting plans and operations with appropriate friendly forces commanders for the timely detection and prevention of infiltration especially in the areas of Khe Sanh, the A Shau/A Luci valleys, and the western areas of Quang Tin, Quang Nam, and Quang Ngai.

(c) Conduct ambushes, raids and other unilateral and joint operations to destroy or neutralize enemy forces, bases and caches in accordance with Appendix 2 (Neutralization of VC/NVA Base Areas) to Annex B (Concept of Employment of Military Forces).

(d) Increase reconnaissance operations in order to collect tactical and strategic intelligence.

(e) Plan and prepare recommendations for:

1. Extending the activities of the present CIDG camps.

2. Closing, opening, and moving CIDG camps in accordance with the plan for 1968 reflected in Annex F (Employment of CIDG).

3. Logistic support for CIDG camps.

(6) 1st Coastal District in addition to tasks directed by Commander, VNN and in coordination with appropriate NAVFORV elements:

(a) Defend the national coastal area, Da Nang harbor, and the off-shore islands and provide logistic support for Hoang Sa Islands.

(b) Carry out plans for blockade of coastal areas and on inland waterways of I CTZ.

(c) Conduct river operations, especially on Bo Dien River, Tam Gang River, Cau Hai Bay, Thu Bon River (from Cua Dai River mouth to An Hoa), Truong Giang River, and Tra Khuc River.

(d) Organize and conduct Market Time operations along the coastal areas of I CTZ.

(e) Provide naval gunfire support for operations ashore.

(f) Organize and conduct naval escort and search and rescue operations.

(g) Conduct psychological operations and civic action in accordance with Annex C (Military Support of RD) and Annex H (Psychological Operations).

(7) 41st Tactical Wing in addition to missions assigned by Commander, VNAF and in coordination with 7th AF:

(a) Provide air defense and maintain air supremacy over I CTZ.

(b) Provide close air support foreground and waterborne operations.

(c) Provide air transport for troop-lift, materials, and medical evacuation.

(d) Provide air reconnaissance and observation.

(e) Conduct psychological operations and civic action activities.

(f) On order conduct air strikes to destroy enemy forces and bases and to harass and interdict the enemy logistical system in I CTZ.

(g) Conduct air-sea rescue operations in I CTZ.

(8) 1st Ranger Group.

(a) Corps reserve.

(b) Be prepared to conduct operations on orders of this Headquarters:

1. Unilateral, joint, or combined to destroy the VC/NVA inside and outside of RD areas

2. Reconnaissance in force to collect strategic and tactical intelligence.

(9) Sectors and Special Sectors

(a) Conduct operations to destroy VC and to clear and secure the selected and approved areas for RD in accordance with 1968 Sector RD Plans.

(b) Assure continued security in previously cleared and pacified areas from which RD Teams have departed to prevent return of the VC.

(c) Provide security and assistance for NP and other agencies in the uncovering and destruction of VC infrastructure.

(d) Provide security along LOC in the province.

(e) Carry out the Resources Denial Plan in accordance with Annex D (Resources Denial).

(f) Plan and conduct crop protection operations for the Spring and Fall harvests.

(g) Carry out plans for blockade of coastal areas and inland waterways of the sector.

(h) Prepare and execute security plans for defense of cities, province military installations, and logistics and storage facilities in accordance with Annex B (Concept of Employment of Military Forces).

(i) Assist province and district authorities, if they are non-military, in organizing, equipping and

training popular Self-Defense Forces for hamlet and village security.

(j) Accelerate recruiting and formation of RF/PF units.

(k) Coordinate with appropriate agencies for the conduct of psychological operations and civic action activities aimed especially at enemy cadre and population remaining under enemy influence in order to increase the number of Hoi Chan in accordance with Annex C (Military Support of Pacification) and Annex H (Psychological Operations).

(l) In coordination with DTA, III MAF/PWMAF and CCFDS as appropriate, prepare in detail 1968 Sector RD Plans in accordance with Annex C (Military Support of RD).

(m) Conduct vigorous intelligence and counter-intelligence activities in accordance with Annex A (Intelligence).

(n) With the assistance of local USAID agencies prepare plans for resettlement support and control of anti-communist refugees in accordance with Annex C (Military Support of RD)

(o) Continue to carry out the Combined Action Plan between PF and US Forces.

c. III MAF and other FWMAF

(1) CGs, 1st Mar Div, 3rd Mar Div, and Americal Div, in coordination with appropriate ARVN commanders, and in addition to those tasks assigned in current LOIs and in other competent directives:

(a) In assigned AOs defend RVN border areas along the DMZ (Dye Marker project) and along the border with Laos.

(b) Conduct sustained, coordinated, combined, ground and air operations to destroy the VC/NVA main and guerrilla forces and neutralize bases and supply distribution points within the area designated for priority of military offensive operations, on a priority basis, and against enemy forces located outside the priority area based on hard intelligence. Neutralization of base areas will be in accordance with Appendix 3 (Neutralization of Enemy Base Areas) to Annex B (Concept of Employment of Military Forces).

(c) Maintain active air and ground surveillance of the border of the RVN within AOs and known land and sea infiltration routes into the RVN.

(d) Maintain an active reconnaissance program, particularly long range patrols to locate VC/NVA main forces, their base areas, and supplies positively located.

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(e) Maintain liaison with adjacent III MAF/FWMAF Commanders for the purpose of coordinating operations in the vicinity of political/military boundaries.

(f) Provide combat support of I ARVN Corps forces as required and as available.

(g) Assist I ARVN Corps to provide security, as required and available, for those special security areas located in established TAOEs and assigned AOs in accordance with Appendix 2 (Areas Requiring Special Security) to Annex B (Concept of Employment of Military Forces).

(h) Coordinate with and provide support as required to CIDG camps within assigned AOs or as otherwise assigned.

(i) In coordination with NAVFORV Construction Elements, assist CG, I ARVN Corps to open, keep open, and secure lines of communications in accordance with Annex E (Restoration and Protection of LOCs).

(j) Support pacification activities as appropriate in established TAOEs and assigned AOs in accordance with Annex C (Military Support of RD) and as follows:

1. Assist RVNAF in providing territorial security in pacification areas in accordance with Annex C (Military Support of RD)

2. Assist and/or reinforce I ARVN Corps forces and National Police as required to identify and

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eliminate the VC infrastructure in accordance with Appendix 2 (Attack on the VC Infrastructure) to Annex C (Military Support of RD) to include assistance, support and participation in civil/military intelligence collection and dissemination.

3. Assist I AFVN Corps forces in the conduct of operations to protect and control population and resources, to deny the enemy free use of land and water LOCs and to disrupt VC tax collection efforts in accordance with Annex D (Resources Denial).

4. Conduct military civic action in support of pacification goals, in coordination with province and district officials and in accordance with Appendix 3 (Civic Action) to Annex C (Military Support of RD).

5. Conduct refugee control measures in accordance with Appendix 4 (Refugee Support) to Annex C (Military Support of RD).

6. Advise, assist, and support the Chieu Hoi program in accordance with Appendix 5 (Chieu Hoi) to Annex C (Military Support of RD).

(k) Provide for prompt, thorough, and effective screening and disposition of civilian detainees in accordance with Appendix 6 (Civilian Detainees) to Annex A (Intelligence).

(l) Conduct psychological operations in

accordance with Annex H (Psychological Operations).

(m) Conduct other operations as directed by CG, III MAF.

(2) CG, 1st MAW in coordination with appropriate ARVN and RVNAF commanders, and in addition to those tasks assigned in current LOI's and other competent directives:

(a) Provide air surveillance and interdiction to detect and to deter NVA infiltration over the Laos border and through the DMZ into ICLZ.

(b) Provide tactical and logistic airlift as requested.

(c) Conduct close air support as requested.

(d) Conduct a continuous harrassing and destructive air offensive against enemy forces, bases, logistics systems and LOC.

(e) Provide other support as required.

(3) CG 2nd FCKMC Brigade in coordination with appropriate ARVN and III MAF commanders, and in addition to those tasks elsewhere agreed upon and formalized, is requested to accomplish the following tasks:

(a) Conduct operations to support Revolutionary Development in assigned areas.

(b) Destroy VC main and local force units in assigned area.

(c) Assist and reinforce I ARVN Corps in

opening and securing LOC's, in conducting operations to protect and control national resources, and to establish an active program to disrupt VC tax collection efforts.

(d) Conduct psychological operations and civic actions within assigned TACR.

(4) CG, FLC provide support as required.

(5) 1st MP Bn provide support as required.

(6) 3rd MP Bn provide support as required.

(7) 7th Engr Bn provide support as required.

(8) 9th Engr Bn provide support as required.

(9) 11th Engr Bn provide support as required.

(10) 244th Psy Ops Co, USA

(a) Provide equipment and technical support as required for the conduct of psychological operations in ICTZ.

(b) Conduct special psy opns within ICTZ as directed by CG III MAF.

(11) 29th Civil Affairs Co provide support for civil affairs activities as required within ICTZ.

d. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Goals. The following goals are established to be utilized as a measure of progress in the accomplishment of the objectives stated in Annex B (Concept). More detailed treatment of individual goals will be found in the appropriate annexes. Goals, as listed below

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are required in accordance with the varying degree of responsibility of III MAF/FWMAF and RVNAF for their accomplishment within ICTZ.

(a) Primary III MAF/FWMAF, Secondary ARVN:

1. Render ineffective all enemy main and local force units. See Annex B (Concept of Employment of Military Forces).

2. Inflict losses on the VC/NVA forces at a rate greater than the enemy can replace. See Annex B (Concept of Employment of Military Forces)

3. Neutralize by end CY 1965 60% of the identified enemy base areas in RVN in accordance with Appendix B (Neutralization VC/NVA Base Areas) to Annex B and capture or destroy his installations and caches. Ultimate goal is neutralization or destruction of 100% of the enemy base areas, installations and caches in RVN at the earliest practicable date. Priority of effort must be directed against those targets which will most effectively reduce VC/NVA offensive capability against the selected priority areas, key population and economic centers and vital communication arteries.

(b) ARVN and III MAF/FWMAF.

1. Increase the effectiveness of measures to deny the enemy use of coastal and inland waterways for the movement of men and material.

2. Increase surveillance and operations along province boundaries.

3. Increase by 50% over 1967 the number of individual and crew served enemy weapons turned in or recovered by RVNAF, US and other FWMAF. See Annex B (Concept of Employment of Military Forces).

4. Triple the number of voluntary informers reporting accurately on enemy and enemy activities.

5. Improve utilization and integration of ARVN, US, FWMAF, and US Agency collection assets.

6. Improve the processing and exploitation of PWs, detainees, and Hoi Chanhs.

7. Intensify intelligence collection through extensive use of surface reconnaissance patrols.

8. Assist civil authorities to improve handling and care of refugees from reception until return to normal life.

9. Increase the number of Hoi Chanhs to rally in CY68 in each corps area.

10. Provide for greater military and civilian use, both day and night, of LOCs by opening and securing an increased number of rail, road and water LOC's. See Annex E (Restoration and Protection of LOCs).

(c) Primary I ARVN Corps with assistance of III MAF/FWMAF as required and as available:

1. Increase the number of ARVN battalions in support of RD.
2. Increase the number of RD campaign areas.
3. Increase the number of pacified hamlets and the percentage of the population in secure areas.
4. Neutralize the VC Infrastructure in all pacification priority areas.
5. Relieve all NPPF units of security or guard missions by 31 March 1968: retarget these units on anti-infrastructure activities.
6. Meet established FY68 RVNAF force goals at the earliest practicable date.
7. Improve morale, welfare, and patriotic sentiment of RVNAF personnel.
8. Develop within RVNAF a balanced logistical system capable of responsive support to all of the requirements of extended combat operations.
9. Enhance effectiveness of RVNAF with emphasis on RF/FF.
10. Improve effectiveness of outpost system within each CTZ by constructing a minimum of 25% of well selected new outposts and repair a minimum of 50% of the existing outposts identified by the MACV/JGS Combined Outpost Study Group.

11. Meet the approved requirements for organizing, equipping, and training the hamlet and village self-defense forces.

12. Increase rice and salt protection activities to deny the maximum amount of rice and salt to the enemy, while increasing the flow of foodstuffs to open markets to stimulate commerce in secure areas.

(2) This campaign will be characterized by a spirit of cooperation and coordination, and a free exchange of assistance, support, advice and information between all RVNAF and US/PVNAF. Coordination procedures are outlined in Annex E, (Procedures for Coordination of RVNAF and US/PVNAF Operations).

(3) To preclude misunderstanding of terms, Annex G (Definitions), provides standardized definitions of terms used in this plan.

(4) Employment of military forces in support of RD will be in accordance with Annex C (Military Support for RD).

(5) This Combined Campaign Plan is effective for planning on receipt and for execution on 1 January 1968 through 30 June 1968. Recommended changes to this plan will be submitted through RVNAF channels to CG, I ARVN Corps or through US/PVNAF channels to CG, III MAF as appropriate.


(6) Subordinate commanders and commanding officers addressed herein will submit quarterly summaries in accordance with Annex N (Quarterly Review) covering the status of implementation of this plan, progress made, problems encountered, and recommendations for improvement. Summaries are to be rendered as of 31 March, 30 June, 30 September, and 31 December and submitted to arrive at I ARVN Corps/III MAF, as appropriate, not later than the fifth day following the as of date.

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. See Annex K (Logistics)

5. (U) COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

a. Command remains vested within the chain of command of each national military force represented, with combined operations conducted on the basis of cooperation and coordination and in accordance with Annex G (Procedures for Coordination).

b. Communications-Electronics. See Annex L (Communications-Electronics).


HOANG XUAN LAM
Lieutenant General, ARVN
CG, I ARVN Corps


R. E. CUSHMAN, JR.
Lieutenant General, USMC
CG, III MAF

Annexes:

- A - Intelligence
- B - Concept of Employment of Military Forces
- C - Military Support of RD
- D - Resources Denial
- E - Restoration and Protection of LOC
- F - Employment of CIDG (To be published)
- G - Procedures for Coordination of RVNAF and III
MAF/FWIAF Operations
- H - Psychological Operations
- I - Troop Morale (To be published)
- J - Public Affairs (To be published)
- K - Logistics
- L - Communications - Electronics
- M - Inspector - General (To be published)
- N - Quarterly Review (To be published)
- O - Definitions
- P - Distribution

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Phụ bản A (Tình báo) của Kế-Hoạch
Hỗn-hợp Quân-sự I-68.

Annex A (Intelligence) to Combined
Campaign Plan I-68.

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Annex A (Intelligence) to Combined Campaign Plan, 1-68
REFERENCE: Maps, Joint Operations Graphia, Series 1501,
1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-16, NE 49-13, ND 48-8, ND 49-1,
and ND 49-5.

1. (S) SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION.

a. General Situation.

During 1967, the level and intensity of enemy activity was double that of 1966. This activity was most evident in the coastal plains where the enemy deployed the majority of his forces to attack and destroy selected targets, and disrupt the Revolutionary Development Program. Throughout the territory, towns and administrative and military installations were repeatedly attacked by indirect fire weapons or by enemy infantry employing forces of company to regimental size. The apparent purpose of the enemy was to create a permanently unstable situation within allied rear areas, dissipate allied war potential and at the same time foster a favorable psychological influence over the populace. In addition, the enemy greatly intensified sabotage and harassment directed at major lines of communication.

The enemy experienced increased losses during the past year, as well as recruiting difficulties. This forced the enemy to recruit greater numbers of women and youths as young as 14 years old. Problems in the replace-

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ment of personnel in existing units and the activation of new units may explain the increase of infiltration during 1967 of more than sixty infiltration groups totaling approximately 19,000 men as compared to approximately 17,000 during 1966.

Despite a decline in enemy strength, his armament and firepower has increased with the introduction of rockets and augmentation of conventional artillery in the DMZ. There are an estimated five rocket battalions armed with 140 and 122mm rockets located in central ICTZ.

The enemy possesses significant offensive capabilities and will continue a protracted war of attrition as his strategy for eventual victory, with emphasis against the Revolutionary Development Program.

b. Characteristics of the Area.

See current terrain analysis and Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV) studies.

c. Enemy Situation.

(1) Strength and Dispositions-See current Monthly Summary or Periodic Intelligence Reports.

(2) Enemy Tactics.

During 1967, the enemy has placed greater reliance on conducting coordinated small and medium scale attacks, particularly against strong points, utilizing sapper forces or combined sapper - infantry forces. To accomplish this, the enemy has activated new sapper units and concentrated on sapper training and the

equipping of local force infantry units up to battalion size. In 1968, the enemy will place high priority on the use of sapper forces for attacks on secure areas, cities and towns.

(3) Strategy and Strategic Plans.

(a) Strategy.

The enemy is not strong enough to defeat friendly forces militarily, and cannot launch his Phase III General Counteroffensive; therefore, the enemy strategy is based on the concept of "mobile strategy." Strategic mobility is attained by the deployment of combat forces throughout the area of operations, posing threats in many separate areas and attempting to hold our forces in static defensive roles, inhibiting their employment in mutual reinforcement, and permitting the enemy to attack selected targets only under favorable conditions. Within this concept, the enemy effectively coordinates the military and political activities of his three types of forces: political infrastructure, irregular forces, and main and local force VC and NVA units. The principal employment of these forces will be along the coastal plains designed to intensify pressure on allied and ARVN forces, to attack and destroy selected targets and to disrupt the Revolutionary Development Program. The enemy's principal tactic for accomplishing strategic mobility is the utilization of well

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h. Determine if the enemy will conduct NBC warfare.

If so, when, where and what type?

3. (S) INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS AND REQUESTS.

a. III MAF/FWMAF

(1) General. See current Other Intelligence Requirements (OIR's), Collection Tasks, and Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICR's).

(2) Surveillance.

(a) See I Corps Coordinator Instruction 03310.1 (Visual Aerial Surveillance).

(b) See III MAF Order 03310.1A (Photographic/Visual Reconnaissance and Surveillance).

(c) See Current CG III MAF Letter of Instruction (Area Surveillance within ICTZ).

b. ARVN Forces. See Appendixes 1 (Intelligence Acquisition Tasks and Requests-ARVN) and 2 (Aerial Surveillance and Ground Reconnaissance-ARVN).

4. (S) MEASURES FOR INTELLIGENCE EXPLOITATION OF HUMAN SOURCES, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND MATERIEL.

a. Human sources and captured documents will be exploited in accordance with MACV directives 381-11, 190-3, 20-5, III MAF Order 3461.2A and appropriate ARVN directives. See Appendix 3 for document exploitation procedures and Appendix 6 (Civilian Detainees).

b. Captured materiel will be processed in accordance

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with MACV Directive 381-24 and appropriate ARVN directives. Evacuation after intelligence examination will be through supply channels.

5. (S) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

a. Military Security. Commanders will take necessary measures in accordance with MACV Directive 380-5 and the appropriate ARVN directives to insure the security of military information, installations, and troop movements and concentrations. Marine Corps commands: attention is invited to the provisions of OPNAVINST 5510.1 and MCC 3850.2.

b. Civil Security. Necessary measures in support of the Revolutionary Development mission will be taken to screen, and support GVN registration of inhabitants of newly cleared or secured areas. Commanders will prevent entry, and when possible, observation of troop areas and installations by unidentified persons. GVN civil security measures in secure areas, such as curfew, will be supported.

c. Port, Frontier, Travel and Physical Security.

(1) Port Security. Commanders will insure coordinated efforts to detect and prevent enemy activity in port or harbor areas.

(2) Frontier Security. Commanders responsible for the security of areas or installations which could be used for hostile entry by land, water, to include embarkation

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and debarkation, or air will take appropriate action in coordination with civil authorities to insure surveillance and reporting of suspect persons or materiel.

(3) Travel Security: Commanders will take measures, in coordination with civil authorities, to insure screening of travelers in their area of responsibility and to assist in the screening of civilians returning to their homes after forced evacuation during combat phases.

(4) Physical Security: The responsibility for the internal security of the command, including the security of personnel, materiel, buildings and areas occupied, rests with the respective commanders. In order to achieve maximum security for units in a tenancy status, agreements will be reached between the base commanders and the tenant unit commanders in regards to the delineation of areas of responsibility, jurisdiction, and employment and control of security personnel.

d. Special Operations. Counterintelligence organizations will continue to accomplish the following tasks:

(1) Development of current counterintelligence target lists and dissemination of personality lists to identify and eliminate the VC infrastructure, with emphasis on enhancing local security in support of the Revolutionary Development mission.

(2) Penetration and neutralization of enemy

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espionage, sabotage, subversion and terrorist organizations.

(3) Assist in initiating deceptive measures designed to enhance the security of military operations.

(4) Commands which receive Communist propaganda should forward it to the nearest Counterintelligence Representative for further dissemination to the nearest Naval Investigative Service. It is desirable that a report of the circumstances involved be included when forwarding the material.

6. (S) MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Communications Security. (COMSEC).

See Annex L, Communications-Electronics and III MAF Order 02230.1B.

b. Censorship. Commanders will plan for and upon direction implement censorship plans in accordance with MACV Directive 380-2, III MAF Order 05530.1 and appropriate ARVN directives.

c. Maps and Charts.

See MACV Directive 117-1 and ARVN directives.

USMC Commands within III MAF will procure maps and charts in accordance with instructions contained in III MAF Order 3800.1.

7. (S) REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION.

a. Reports will be submitted in accordance with MACV Directives 381-11, 381-21, 381-26, III MAF Order 3820.2 and

the appropriate ARVN directives. It is imperative that the reports be disseminated, particularly to CIOV, by the fastest means possible, consistent with operational situation. Local commanders should be apprised, immediately, of information of a perishable nature.

b. The following items must be reported with overlays or charts and must be made on a monthly basis in the form of an annex to the monthly and quarterly reports.

- (1) Enemy Order of Battle.
- (2) Infrastructure and Guerilla Order of Battle.
- (3) Infrastructure and Guerilla elimination situation.
- (4) Population control situation:
 - (a) Total number of hamlets controlled and newly built.
 - (b) Total number of people under GVN control, people newly controlled or out of GVN control. The population must be classified in categories of 14-45 years old and from 45 years and older, both male and female.
- (5) Land control situation:
 - (a) Number of hamlets, outposts and/or base areas built in VC controlled areas.
 - (b) Number of hamlets, outposts and/or base areas adjacent to VC controlled area which have been lost or abandoned.

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(c) All specific studies aimed at supporting this Combined Campaign Plan must be disseminated to all concerned staffs and commands at the earliest convenience.

Appendixes: 1--Intelligence Acquisition, Tasks and Requests-ARVN.

2--Aerial Surveillance and Ground Reconnaissance-ARVN.

3--Document Exploitation

4--C.I. Estimate

5--Prisoners of War (to be published)

6--Civilian Detainees

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Appendix 6 (Civilian Detainees) to Annex A (Intelligence) to Combined Campaign Plan 1-68

1. (C) SITUATION:

a. Enemy Situation. Annex A (Intelligence)

b. Large numbers of civilians suspected of aiding or abetting the enemy are picked up in military and combined military/civil operations. Some are members of the VC infrastructure. Processing and accounting for these detainees is a growing burden on RVNAF, III MAF/FWMAF, GVN and U.S. civilian authorities. As the war has intensified, the number of detainees has increased at a rapid rate. This increase has caused serious overcrowding at collection points, temporary detention camps, and GVN police compounds. Screening and classification of detainees is slow; and often, due to overcrowded conditions, personnel are released without appropriate identification or determination of status.

2. (U) MISSION: To provide prompt, thorough, and effective screening, segregation, and disposition of suspected enemy civilian personnel captured or detained by RVNAF and III MAF/FWMAF.

3. (U) EXECUTION:

a. Concept. Screening of captured or detained suspected enemy civilian personnel will be accomplished to gain maximum intelligence and to minimize the detention of innocent

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civilians. Screening procedures must be thorough and effective to preclude rescreening once detainees are confirmed as PW and interned in a PW camp. Detainees are persons who have been detained but whose final status as to PW, returnee (Hoi Chanh), civil defendant or innocent, has not been determined. Procedures for handling refugees are contained in Annex C (Military Support of RD) and U.S. and GVN directives previously issued; procedures for handling returnees are contained in Appendix 5 (Chieu Hoi) to Annex C (Military Support of Pacification) and U.S. and GVN directives previously issued; and instructions on processing PW are contained in detailed MACV and JGS directives previously issued. It is important that enemy combat effectives, returnees, and refugees are processed in accordance with appropriate procedures; that civil defendants are referred to proper judicial agencies for trial; and that doubtful cases are turned over to the Provincial Security Committee (which is headed by the Province Chief) for appropriate disposition. Screening procedures should be designed to:

- (1) Classify personnel rapidly so that interrogation of selected individuals can commence as soon after capture or detention as possible.
- (2) Provide a means for tactical units rapidly to extract exploitable information from detainees.
- (3) Preclude the introduction of innocent people

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into the already saturated judicial and penal system of RVN.

(4) Insure that only those detainees who are eligible for PW status are interned in PW camps.

(5) Conduct screening of captured personnel and detainees at the lowest echelon of command practicable.

(6) Locate screening points, where practicable, near sector or subsector headquarters to take maximum advantage of National Police, MSS, and other intelligence files at those headquarters.

(7) Make maximum use of the Combined III MAF/FWMAF Interrogation System.

b. III MAF/FWMAF and RVNAF commanders, in coordination with the National Police and local GVN security officials, will insure that:

(1) Tactical screening centers are established whenever there is an operation conducted by RVNAF units. Combined tactical screening centers will be established whenever there is an operation conducted by III MAF/FWMAF units or by RVNAF/III MAF/FWMAF units. Establishment of tactical or combined tactical screening centers will be included in advance operational planning. The mission of the tactical or combined tactical screening center is to provide integration of RVNAF and/or III MAF/FWMAF and appropriate GVN civil security personnel for screening of all

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persons detained by RVNAF/III MAF/FWMAF. Interrogator augmentation for support of tactical or combined tactical screening centers will be requested through the command channels of the RVNAF/III MAF/FWMAF unit controlling the operation. A tactical or combined tactical screening center will have joint representation from participating units and civil authorities. The commander of the RVNAF/III MAF/FWMAF unit controlling the operation will request civil participation from the Province Chief. The Province Chief is responsible for insuring civil participation. Ideally, the Deputy Province Chief for Security and a representative from the operational unit will function as co-chairmen. In addition to participation by various staff elements of the operational units, the MCS, Provincial/District National Police, including the Special Branch, and the Sector/Sub-sector S2, will have representation in the center.

(2) Military intelligence interrogators screen all civilians apprehended by military units. Detailed screening procedures are contained in Tab A (Detailed Screening Procedures). Detailed registration, accounting and disposition procedures are contained in Tab B (Detailed Accounting Procedures). Province/District officials are responsible for returning innocent civilians to their villages or transferring them to refugee camps, as appropriate. Innocent civilians will be positively identified,

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photographed, and fingerprinted by the National Police prior to release to facilitate identification and processing if they are again detained.

(3) Adequate temporary facilities are constructed to effect complete segregation of PWs, innocent civilians, and civilian detainees as soon as their status is determined.

(4) All doubtful cases, suspected members of the VC infrastructure, or other civilians suspected of aiding the enemy, but who do not qualify as prisoners of war, are transferred to civilian authorities for ultimate determination of status and further processing.

(5) All military units effect the physical transfer of civilian detainees to civilian detention facilities at the province and district according to specific instructions provided by the GVN Province or District Chief. The province and district chiefs will provide transportation, within their capabilities, for civilian detainees to detention centers. Transportation required beyond province/district capability will be provided by RVNAF/I. I MAF/PWMAF.

(6) Military intelligence interrogators transfer to the Police Special Branch all information appropriate or pertinent to the case of each detainee transferred to civilian authority.

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(7) The GVN Province Chief provides adequate detention facilities for civilian detainees, security of these facilities, further screening, and ultimate determination of status, including legal proceedings.

(8) Unit commanders in the field provide additional support upon request of the Province Chief, within individual unit capabilities. Such support will include commodities as well as temporary deployment of joint civil/military interrogation teams to screen and determine status of suspects.

c. III MAF/FWMAF commanders, in coordinations with RVNAF Commanders, and proper civilian authorities, where appropriate, will insure that those tasks outlined in paragraph b. above are accomplished and/or supported to the maximum extent possible. III MAF units will utilize the combined tactical screening of detainees concept outlined in this Annex and appropriate MACV directives.

4. (U) LOGISTICS

a. Care and feeding of detainees while in custody of military forces is the responsibility of such military forces.

b. Logistic support of detainees while in military custody will be provided in accordance with Annex K (Logistics).

c. Care and feeding of detainees in custody of civil

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authority is the responsibility of that authority, normally the Province or District Chief. Districts will submit costs of such care and feeding to Province for reimbursement. In an emergency, U.S. Province or district advisors may be able to provide assistance in the form of foodstuffs to the province or districts.

Tabs: A-Detailed Screening Procedures
E-Detailed Accounting Procedures

Tab A (Detailed Screening Procedures) to Appendix 6 (Civilian Detainees) to Annex A (Intelligence) to Combined Campaign Plan 1-68

1. At the time of capture, each detainee will be tagged, and a Detainee Card (USARV Form 365 for U.S. units) filled out as completely as possible. Of extreme importance are data reflecting circumstance of capture, and information as to whether documents or weapons are found on the detainee.

2. A Detainee Report Form (USARV 364 for U.S. units) will be completed to reflect facts concerning the activities performed by the detainee. This is important because a major factor for determination of status is the act being performed by the detainee at the time of capture.

3. A blacklist furnished by counterintelligence elements, DOJICC, PIC, PSB, etc., supplemented by the provincial and district police knowledge of the area and its inhabitants, is essential for confirming the identity of individuals, and for determining the veracity of source statements. The name of the detainee will be checked against the blacklist. If it appears on the list, a notation to that effect will be entered on the Detainee Report Form (Item 15, Remarks, USARV Form 364 for U.S. units). The fact that a suspect was picked up in a VC-controlled area does not in itself justify the classification of a detainee as a PW. Therefore, every bit of information that tends to substantiate the correct

status of the detainee must be entered on the forms.

4. Trace metal detector kits should be used as appropriate. Positive readings will be recorded on the Detainee Report Form.

5. Returnees and informants will be used to identify detainees.

6. Military Intelligence (MI) interrogators will be alert at all times to detect detainees who possess immediately exploitable information concerning enemy plans, positions and supply caches. It is vital that such information be obtained as a matter of priority as soon as possible after capture.

7. Upon completion of MI interrogation, the normal processes of population control are initiated. Biographic data is recorded, and fingerprints are taken and compared with those on the individuals's ID card. The detainee is then photographed. A copy of the photograph should be placed on file in the PSB, and in the PIC and DOICC, when present. If there is no reason to suspect the detainee as a VC, he is interviewed by the National Police Special Branch. Using the blacklist and the results of the MI interrogation, information is solicited pertaining to the detainee's knowledge of VC activities and personalities in his village or hamlet. This endeavor must be conducted in such a manner as to gain the confidence and good will of

the individual; thus he or she must be treated with politeness and dignity.

8. If the detainee is still suspect after the completion of the above, National Police interrogators continue attempts either to obtain additional incriminating evidence or conclude that there is insufficient cause to hold the detainee further. An individual dossier will be prepared for everyone who is interrogated as suspect. When time/distance factors permit, district police files will be checked to determine any previous record of apprehension. The dossiers, or at least a copy of all information contained therein, will be transferred to the district police when the screening center is relocated. In the case of a detainee classified as PW, a copy of the Preliminary Interrogation Report (PIR) will be sent with the PW to the Corp PW Camp where he is to be interned.

9. Segregation of detainees is an important aspect of the operation. Detainees are to be grouped in holding areas as follows:

- a. Apparent PWs.
- b. Known VC identified by blacklists.
- c. Suspected civil defendants,
- d. Innocents.

10. Dispersion of these holding areas should be sufficient to preclude normal voice communication between areas.

The holding areas should be screened by canvas or matting to deny visual observation of one area from another.

11. To forestall rejection by PW Camp Commanders of PW of questionable status, every attempt will be made to substantiate any evidence leading to the judgement by the interrogator that the detainee is entitled to PW status.

Factors to be considered are: membership in Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Armed Forces; capture while performing an overt hostile act in combat; capture while carrying weapons, documents or individual papers that provide clues as to the PW status of the individual; wearing of uniforms and distinctive insignia; admission by the detainee himself, confirmatory statements by witnesses and colleagues of the detainee; and positive readings through the use of metal detector kits, or other scientific devices.

12. Compassion will be shown to the aged, women and young. Every attempt will be made early in the screening process to segregate the obviously innocent individuals and to release them locally as soon as practicable.

13. Consideration will be given to detainees who have cooperated in providing information concerning the enemy so that they may be accorded returnee status.

14. Intermediate commands will consistently review and monitor the classification procedures of subordinate units and take timely action to minimize arbitrary classifications

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or miscarriages of justice.

15. Improperly documented PW will not be evacuated to PW camps. Every effort will be made to resolve conflicting views between U.S. and RVN interrogators prior to the transfer to and internment of PW in the Corps PW camp.

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Tab B (Detailed Accounting Procedures) to Appendix 6
(Civilian Detainees) to Annex A (Intelligence) to Com-
bined Campaign Plan 1-68.

1. (U) III MAF/FWMAF Forces.

a. All detainees taken by III MAF/FWMAF will be ac-
counted for on a standard form Enclosure 1, (Detainee
Account Record).

b. USMC Regiments, U.S.A. Brigades, and ROK Brigades
are responsible for accomplishment of this registration.

c. III MAF/FWMAF units below Regiment/Brigade level
are not authorized to release detainees to civil authori-
ties.

d. If the detainee is adjudged to be a PW, one copy
of the form will be forwarded to division and two
copies to I Corps Advisory Group, Attn: SIA, APO SF
96337.

e. If the detainee is adjudged to be a non-PW, one
copy of the form will be passed, with the detainee, to the

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civil authority receiving the detainee; one copy will be passed to the Permanent Office/DOICC at Province/District depending upon the level at which the detainee is passed; two copies will be forwarded to I Corps Advisory Group, Attn: G-2, APO SF 96337.

f. This report will be forwarded on a weekly basis.

2. (U) RVNAF Forces.

a. All detainees taken by RVNAF will be accounted for on a standard form (Inclosure 1, Detainee Account Record).

b. ARVN Regiments are responsible for accomplishment of this registration.

c. ARVN Units below regimental level are NOT authorized to release detainees to civil authorities.

d. If the detainee is adjudged to be a PW, one copy of the form will be forwarded to division and two copies to G-2, I Corps.

e. If the detainee is adjudged to be a non-PW, one copy of the form will be passed, with the detainee, to the civil authority receiving the detainee; one copy will be passed to the Permanent Office/DOICC at Province/District depending upon the level at which the detainee is passed; and two copies will be passed to G2, I Corps.

f. This report will be forwarded on a weekly basis.

3. (U) Province/District Chiefs.

a. It is the responsibility of the Province/District

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Chiefs to insure that any GVN civil authority having custody of civil detainees forward an accounting of those detainees on a standard form Enclosure 1, (Detainee Account Record).

b. One copy of the report will be filed at the Permanent Office/DOICC; two copies will be forwarded to G2, I Corps.

4. (U) Administration.

a. Each agency of the GVN and each unit of RVNAF/U.S./FWMAF force above regimental/brigade level which receives or passes a detainee will complete the Detainee Account Record and distribute it laterally or upward, always forwarding two copies to G2, I Corps (GVN and RVNAF agencies and units) or I Corps Advisory Group, Attn: SIA (U.S./FWMAF units).

b. G2, I Corps, will pass one copy of Detainee Account Record to I Corps Interrogation Center and one copy to SIA, I Corps.

c. SIA, I Corps Advisory Group, will pass one copy of Detainee Account Record to ICIC; The remaining copies from U.S./FWMAF units and the RVNAF will be passed to the I Corps Collation Point.

5. (U) I Corps Collation Point.

a. ROIC, Region I, will establish a collation point for detainee registration.

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b. This collation point is responsible for receiving all data furnished under the Detainee Account Record system; carding of all information by name and by present location; revising and updating these cards on a timely basis; and to expeditiously reply to requests for information from GVN agencies and RVNAF/U.S./PWMAF units and other interested and eligible agencies.

Enclosures: 1 Detainee Account Record.

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	Báo cáo số Report Number
	Họ và tên Full Name
	Tuổi / Age
	Quê quán Residence
	Bị bắt hoặc hồi chánh ngày Date of Capture or Return
	Tọa độ / Place (Coordinates)
	(P) Tù Phiện Cộng / PW. (N) Không phải tù PC/NON-PW (H) Hồi chánh / Hoi chanh
	(E) Bằng cứ sự / Evidence (C) Thủ nhận / Confession
	Đơn vị vị trí Unit or Position
	Đơn vị bắt Capturing Unit
	Cơ quan giam giữ Location/Disposition

Phụ lục I (Số kê-toán Những người bị tạm giữ)
 Enclosure I (Detainees Account Record).

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Phụ bản B (Quan niệm sử dụng lực lượng)
của Kế-hoạch Hồn-hợp Quân-sự I-68.

Annex B (Concept of Employment of Military
Forces) to Combined Campaign Plan I-68.

Annex B (Concept of Employment of Military Forces) to
Combined Campaign Plan 1-68

1. (U) SITUATION

a. General. This annex outlines the employment of ARVN and US/FWMAF in support of the basic objectives of the campaign as expressed in the mission.

b. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence)

c. Friendly Forces. Paragraph 1, Basic Plan.

d. Assumptions. Paragraph 1, Basic Plan.

2. (S) MISSION AND TASKS TO ACCOMPLISH BASIC OBJECTIVES

a. Mission. Defeat the VC/NVA forces in I CTZ, and assist GVN to extend control throughout ICTZ.

b. Objective: To defeat VC/NVA forces. The related tasks are:

(1) Defend the borders of the RVN.

(2) Conduct sustained, coordinated, and combined offensive operations against VC/NVA forces, base areas and logistical systems.

(3) Conduct a continuous harassing and destructive air offensive against enemy forces, base areas, and logistical systems in ICTZ and in authorized contiguous areas.

(4) Execute ground, sea and air operations to interdict VC/NVA land and water LOC's.

(5) Deny the enemy rice and other supplies.

(6) Maintain air supremacy.

(7) Conduct psychological operations against VC/NVA personnel and civilians under the influence of the enemy.

(8) Conduct intelligence and counterintelligence operations.

(9) Conduct border surveillance, cross border operations as authorized, and counter-infiltration operation.

c. Objectives: To extend GVN control throughout ICTZ.

The related tasks are:

(1) Secure the major political, economic, food producing and populated centers.

(2) Establish, maintain, and secure military installations.

(3) Conduct military clearing and securing operations to establish and maintain security for areas undergoing pacification.

(4) Provide security for forces engaged in, and participate in, the identification and elimination of the VC infrastructure.

(5) Assist civilian authorities to organize, equip and train the hamlet and village self-defense forces.

(6) Maintain security of areas in which pacifica-

tion teams have moved; sustain security of cleared areas.

(7) Open and secure LOC's supporting military, economic and political efforts.

(8) Participate in population and resources control programs.

(9) Conduct military civic action to win the support of the people to the GVN.

(10) Conduct refugee control and support measures until assumed by responsible civilian agencies.

3. (S) EXECUTION

a. Concept

(1) The military offensive power and related resources of the RVNAF, US and FWMAF are to be applied to priority areas considered critical to successful accomplishment of the overall mission. RVNAF, US and FWMAF accomplish this mission in accordance with established objectives and assigned tasks. Within this context, forces are employed in three inter-dependent roles:

(a) Containment or anti-invasion operations along the DMZ and opposite the enemy's Laotian sanctuary to prevent major incursions into South Vietnam.

(b) Offensive operations maintain sustained and unrelenting pressure on VC/NVA forces and main base areas in ICTZ.

(c) Forces are committed behind the protec-

tive shield of the containment and offensive operations to support the GVN pacification program. Throughout the campaign, the military effort provides territorial security in pacification areas at a level adequate to permit the destruction of the VC infrastructure and the uninterrupted and accelerated progress of political, sociological and psychological programs of the GVN.

(2) Military forces in ICTZ are primarily committed in the anti-main force war to contain the enemy along the DMZ and the Laotian border and to destroy the 2nd NVA Div and other enemy forces and bases in ICTZ. GVN pacification activities continue at about the same level as in 1967, except in Quang Ngai Province where they are to be increased by roughly 50%.

(3) Offensive operations are planned and conducted to enhance territorial security of past and present pacification areas and of those key areas requiring special security. The majority of the population and major food producing centers and other resources are within the area designated by this plan as the area for priority of military offensive operations. The enemy is to be destroyed or driven from this area into sparsely populated, food scarce areas so as to permit the GVN to protect the population, control resources, and provide unrestricted use of the major lines of communications.

See Appendix 1. (Area for priority of Military Offensive Operations) and appendix 2 (Areas Requiring Special Security).

(4) Systematic neutralization of base areas and capture or destruction of his installations, supplies, and caches is to be pursued aggressively. Priority of effort is to be directed towards the neutralization of those base areas directly affecting key population and economic centers and vital communications arteries, particularly those areas newly marked for pacification activity, thus supporting the overall pacification effort. ✓

b. Employment

(1) RVNAF have the primary responsibility for participating in and supporting pacification with priority of effort to providing territorial security for the selected priority areas.

(a) PF provide local security for hamlets and villages and as retraining occurs participate actively in pacification. PF are to be targeted primarily against the VC guerrilla units.

(b) RF support and reinforce PF to provide security for hamlets and villages and are targeted principally against the regional units of the VC, including the province companies.

(c) I ARVN Corps regular units on territorial security missions support and reinforce RF units in their responsibility for supporting pacification. They extend area security where necessary by conducting provincial search and destroy operations against VC local forces (including the provincial battalions) and against VC/NVA main force units where required.

(d) I ARVN Corps regular forces not assigned to RD support or territorial security missions are assigned to division mobile strike forces and to containment operations along the DMZ as part of Project Dye Marker. The division mobile strike forces conduct coordinated and combined operations against VC/NVA main forces, reaction operation support of pacification and other missions as directed by CG I Corps.

(e) Ranger battalions are normally the Corps reaction force, but they may be attached to a division as a strike force for a particular mission.

(f) RVNAF General Reserve may be committed to both coordinated and combined search and destroy operations with the division mobile strike force, Corps Reserve units, and III MAF or other US/FWMAF.

(2) I ARVN Corps also has the primary responsibility for providing territorial security for LOC's that support priority economic and political efforts

national resources, government centers, and areas that have undergone prior pacification.

(3) III MAF with other US/FWMAF has had the primary responsibility for:


(a) Containment operations along the DMZ and adjacent border sanctuary areas to deny the enemy use of infiltration and invasion routes. Priority of effort to Project Dye Marker for units assigned responsibility for the DMZ or portions thereof.

(b) Destroying the VC/NVA main forces, base areas and resources. Appendix 3 (Neutralization of VC/NVA Base Areas.

(c) Assisting and reinforcing I ARVN Corps as necessary in opening and securing LOC's, providing security for selected priority areas and protecting national resources.

(4) Although I ARVN Corps is assigned the primary responsibility for supporting pacification and the III MAF with other FWMAF has the primary responsibility for destroying the main VC/NVA forces and bases, this is only a general division of responsibilities. Overlaps or shifts, depending on the situation, contingencies, or opportunities to exploit enemy intelligence, will occur.

Phụ đính I (Vùng Nỗ-lực quân-sự) của Phụ bản B (Quan-niệm Xứ dụng lực-lượng) của Kế-hoạch Hồn-hợp Quân-sự I-68.
Appendix I (Areas for Priority of Military Offensive Operations) to Annex B (Concept of Employment of Military Forces) to Combined Campaign Plan I-68.



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Phụ bản C (Yểm trợ Quân sự XDNT) của Kế
hoạch Hồn-hợp Quân-sự I-68.

Annex C (Military Support for ED) to
Combined Campaign Plan I-68.

Annex C (Military Support of RD) to Combined Campaign Plan
1-68

1. (U) SITUATION:

a. General. This annex outlines the role of the military in support of RD, the concept for pacification, and defines the functions of RVNAF and III MAF/FWMAF commanders in pacification activities.

b. Enemy Forces, Annex A - Intelligence.

c. Friendly Forces. Paragraph 1, Basic Plan.

d. Assumptions. Paragraph 1, Basic Plan.

2. (C) MISSION: RVNAF and III MAF/FWMAF, in conjunction with civil elements, conduct military operations to support RD activities in selected populated areas throughout ICTZ.

3. (C) CONCEPTS:

a. Pacification

(1) Behind the shield provided by the containment and offensive operations of III MAF/FWMAF and ARVN forces, a GVN pacification program of systematic and accelerated activities in military, political, economic, and sociological programs is being conducted with the assistance of the US. It is supported by and provides the foundation for nation-building activities. Pacification has three objectives:

(a) To provide sustained territorial and internal security against VC local forces, guerrillas, terrorists, subversives and VC infrastructure of a level

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adequate to permit the uninterrupted and accelerated conduct of economic, social and political program.

(b) To establish an effective political structure at the local level capable of responding to and eliciting the participation of the people.

(c) To stimulate self-sustaining economic activity capable of expansion.

(2) The pacification campaign provides sustained territorial security in the countryside and concurrently to introduce political, economic and social reforms which will establish conditions favorable for further growth and stability. Operations to annihilate the enemy are by themselves inadequate. The people must be separated and won over from the enemy, and this can only be done with the active cooperation of the people themselves.

(3) The essential first step toward pacification is to create a secure environment in which activities designed to elicit the participation of the people in the elimination of injustice, fear, and misery can begin with some promise of success. The requisite degree of security is to be applied by the RVNAF, the National Police, and the Revolutionary Development Cadre themselves, in closely coordinated combinations that will vary depending upon the threat and the importance of the area. Ultimately, the people themselves participate in their own defense.

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(4) Concurrent with the provision of territorial security, efforts to identify and eliminate or neutralize the VC infrastructure are intensified. The National Police Field Forces, acting as the exploitation arm of the combined intelligence community, conduct aggressive operations against key members of the infrastructure.

(5) Integral to pacification is revolutionary development. RD covers those specific endeavors in the hamlets and villages. It includes all organized efforts to extend GVN presence and control throughout the country, through the use of the RD Cadre groups, and, Civil-Military RD teams, as well as hamlet and village sponsored self-help projects.

(6) Economic and sociological programs designed to develop local government and gain the participation of the people are called New Life Development programs. Introduced by the Revolutionary Development Cadre or other means, these programs provide for the stimulation of and support for self-sustaining economic and political activity, which is strengthened and continued through community development follow-on programs.

b. Security

(1) The key to pacification is the provision of sustained territorial security. Territorial security is defined as security from VC local forces and guerrilla units and VC/NVA main force units. It also includes the

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protection of the people within a hamlet from the VC infrastructure and bullies.

(2) The principal RVNAF for territorial security are Popular Forces (PF) and Regional Forces (RF). ARVN battalions will be assigned to the territorial security force where the PF and the RF strengths are inadequate. The two parts to territorial security are:

- (a) Security for areas undergoing FD; and
- (b) Security for other important areas including previously pacified areas, LOC, resources, and government centers.

(3) The roles of the different forces in providing territorial security are contained in Annex B (Concept of Employment of Military Force).

(4) The National Police (NP) have the primary responsibility for internal security and for operations against the VC infrastructure, with support from all military and civil intelligence agencies; and for normal law and order. The NP Field Forces (NPPF) should be retargeted as the exploitation arm of the intelligence community against the VC infrastructure. Based primarily at the province and district level, and operating closely with the NP Special Branch, the NPPF conduct aggressive operations against key members of the infrastructure in accordance with the same priorities established for pacification. As the pacification process proceeds, the NP assume responsi-

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bility for law and order. The security element of the RD Cadre Groups and the people themselves, once organized into self-defense groups, also provide internal security in varying degrees depending on the local situation.

(5) Security for RD, as stated above is provided by territorial security forces in the following manner:

(a) The organized hamlet self-defense forces provide active and passive defense for the hamlet to include shelters, intelligence for military forces, warning to the population of attack, and similar actions. When these forces are armed, they will provide for internal security of the hamlet and may establish guard posts, listening posts, and patrols, depending upon their capability and the situation. The National Police establish police posts, and patrols, and conduct operations to attack the VC infrastructure.

(b) The Popular Force (PF) units operate in a contiguous zone outside the hamlet by conduction night saturation patrols, ambushes, establishing outposts and using other anti-guerilla tactics, conducting only limited day time operations such as attacking VC tax collection points.

(c) Using these same tactics, the Regional Force (RF) units will operate throughout another area contiguous to that of the PF, but farther distant from the hamlet or village.

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(d) Still at a greater distance and encompassing hamlets and villages in another belt, ARVN regular units will conduct operations to eliminate the VC by using search and destroy tactics as well as anti-guerrilla tactics.

c. Revolution Development

(1) The RD policy for 1968 is to expand GVN controlled areas by focusing RD efforts on the development of new life hamlets (Ap Doi Moi) and pacified hamlets (Ap Binh Dinh) and the strengthening of regressed hamlets (Ap Tanh Sinh) and to implement, in previously pacified areas, a program of maintaining the security and continuing the development. It is a continuation of the RD program of 1967 with an unchanged basic policy. The hamlets will be selected on the basis of their population density, the prosperity of their economy, their strategic position, and the ability of the security forces to protect them. The selected hamlets must be grouped within villages and all planned activities must be completed in one village before moving on to another village.

(2) Because RD is an integrated military and civil undertaking, joint planning and supervision must be exercised at all echelons.

d. RD campaigns.

(1) RD campaigns, launched in 1967 will be expanded in 1968 to encompass a certain number of new hamlets, or organized in the areas newly planned for pacification.

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(2) Campaigns will be organized at province or district level, or at the level of any appropriate military unit according to the degree of importance. Campaigns can be organized in the areas operated by three or more cadre groups. The limits of the campaign encompass the RD area and the necessary contiguous territory to provide security for the RD area.

(3) Participation in the campaign is required for the ARVN units attached in support of the RD campaign; RF, PF, National Police, RD Cadre Groups, Hamlet Self-Defense Forces, personnel of regional military agencies, and administrative, police and technical personnel belonging to the services and offices in the province.

(4) ARVN units employed in support of RD will operate normally under the operational control of province/sector. The authority that exercises control will designate an area of responsibility for the unit; this area must be approved by Corps. Units may be withdrawn from their area when recommended by the Province Chief and approved by Corps. In an emergency, e.g., when the unit is required to assist a friendly force that comes under attack suddenly, the unit may be used outside the area for a period not to exceed six hours provided other local resources already are committed and a minimum security force remains in the area while the unit is away.

(5) Military activities are administered through

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the JGS and subordinate RVNAF echelons to province and district levels. Regional, provincial, and district RD activities and insure that the military and civil aspects are coordinated.

4. (S) TASKS.

a. ARVN

(1) CG I Corps coordinate, through the regional RD council, pacification plans and activities of adjacent provinces within the CTZ to insure that they are coordinated, and allocate military resources, including authority to recruit RF and PF, to provinces for conduct of pacification.

(2) ARVN Division/Special Zone Commanders are responsible for planning and execution of mobile strike operations against enemy units and bases to support provincial pacification efforts. With respect to pacification, specific functions of these commanders are:

(a) Coordinate planning and execution of mobile strike operations with territorial security plans and activities.

(b) Recommend to I Corps the appropriate allocation of forces within the TAOI of the division between mobile strike operations and pacification.

(c) In accordance with guidance from I Corps, assist provinces in preparing territorial security plans.

(d) Support administratively and logistically division units assigned by CTZ to operational control of

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Appendix 2 (Attack on VC Infrastructure) to Annex C (Military Support of pacification) to Combined Campaign Plan 1-68.

1. (C) SITUATION: Despite progress in pacification programs and in the military effort, the VC infrastructure remains largely intact throughout Vietnam. Although many agencies are engaged in the effort, a more effective, sustained attack on the infrastructure can be waged. This can be accomplished by specific delineation of responsibility, improved coordination, and more concentrated employment of existing US and GVN programs and resources for collection, collation and timely exploitation of intelligence on the VC infrastructure.

Techniques, procedures and functions as related to screening, processing and handling VC civilian detainees, as well as the controls and guidelines designed to insure timely dissemination and exploitation of intelligence and operational information, need to be systematically standardized and improved. In addition, it is essential that centralized reporting systems, keyed to support intelligence collection, operational planning, management and evaluation, be developed.

2. (C) MISSION: Identify, locate, harass, disrupt, neutralize and eliminate the VC infrastructure.

3. (C) EXECUTION

a. Concept. The Province Chief is responsible for the attack against the infrastructure at Province level; the

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District Chief is responsible for the attack against the infrastructure at District level.

(1) Collection Effort

(a) The Province Intelligence Coordinating Committee (PICC) provides a suitable base for coordinating the attack against the VC infrastructure. Membership should be expanded to include representatives of agencies having responsibilities for exploitation and detection aspects of the attack against the infrastructure. PICC should include: Deputy Chief for Security (Chairman), Senior Commander of military units assigned to Province, Province Police Chief, Chief of Police Special Branch, Chief of MSS, CO of National Police Field Force, and Sector S2 and S3.

(b) The Permanent Office of the PICC conducts the daily operations involved in the collection, collation and analysis of intelligence concerning the VC infrastructure at Province level. The Permanent Office, supervised by the Sector S2 for the PICC Chairman, will include full-time representation from all GVN agencies and all RVNAF/US/FWMAF units and agencies tasked with the collection of intelligence.

(c) District Operations and Intelligence Coordinating Centers (DOICCs) will be established in every district where significant pacification activities are being conducted. These district centers will operate under the general direction of the GVN district chief with US advice, guidance and participation. DOICCs will be organ-

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ized from personnel available at district including representatives from the subsector S-2, National Police Special Branch, and Census Grievance. Other membership should include representation from Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU), National Police Field Force (NPFF), Revolutionary Development Cadre, and subsector S-3. In insecure areas where military operations predominate, the subsector S-2 should head the DOICC. In other more secure districts, the chief of the District Police Special Branch may be in charge.

(d) Individual intelligence organizations targeted against the VC infrastructure will ensure that collection requirements are geared toward increasing the quality and quantity of intelligence. Collection efforts should reflect detailed sketches and information that will help identify and locate individual VC or VC suspects.

(2) Collation Effort

(a) The province level of the GVN is the focal point for all detailed planning and coordination of US/FWMAF and GVN pacification activities. District and RD Campaign areas are primary levels of execution.

(b) The Provincial Interrogation Center collation section will be the central repository of all provincial infrastructure intelligence.

(c) Each DOICC will organize a collation section which will serve as a central repository for all

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infrastructure intelligence received at district. Individual VC infrastructure dossiers and file cards should be maintained to facilitate rapid recovery of information. All information obtained on individual VC will be filed in the subjects dossier and include copies of intelligence reports, interrogation reports, VC documents, photographs, and any other documents confirming information about the individual.

(d) Card files on VC and suspect VC will be maintained at DOICCs by area. Area Blacklists can be made from card files which contain all information that will assist in the identification and location of individual VC or VC suspect.

(e) DOICCs will maintain charts that diagram the VC political organization in districts and villages.

(3) Dissemination of Intelligence

(a) Infrastructure intelligence will flow both vertically and laterally to ensure that all appropriate agencies and units are receiving intelligence information necessary for action against the VC infrastructure.

(b) Infrastructure intelligence will flow vertically between district, province, and corps, while tactical intelligence will flow from district, province, division, then corps.

(c) Where DOICCs are functioning, district level intelligence coverage will not depend solely upon

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the intelligence collected locally. Continuous input will be required from province and higher levels in the form of agent reports, PIC interrogation reports, captured documents, and village and hamlet folders periodically updated.

(d) In Districts without DOICCs the Permanent Office of the PICC will be responsible for insuring timely dissemination to appropriate district personnel of all pertinent province-produced information. The PICC will stimulate and encourage its fullest utilization. In such districts where the District Chief has developed a coordinating mechanism similar to the DOICC, the objective will be to ensure adequate attention to the attack on VC infrastructure and to provide guidance and assistance to achieve this goal.

(4) Exploitation of Intelligence

(a) The center of gravity of intelligence operations against the VC infrastructure and irregular forces must necessarily rest at the province level. Coordination and division of labor is required to ensure that maximum use is made of professional/technical intelligence skills available and that close coordination is maintained with subordinate intelligence and operating elements at the district level where the bulk of the attacks on low-level infrastructure and local irregular forces must be generated and carried out.

(b) DOICCs will pull together current intell-

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intelligence locally procured and determine the best course of action to be pursued as a consequence of current intelligence, to include: intelligence follow-up and rapid reaction operations with local forces under district control; proposing to Province specific reaction operations or specific targets for reaction operations; periodically assessing, on the basis of intelligence acquired, the adequacy of available intelligence collection efforts in the District.

(c) District level intelligence elements will be prepared to provide intelligence support in the form of human assets with knowledge of the area and of VC personalities (guides, Hoi Chanh, local police, etc.), to tactical units when they are operating in the District. When available, carefully selected, qualified Hoi Chanh will be trained as interrogators to support the DOICC or its participating elements.

(5) Disposition of Detainees

(a) Prompt and controlled screening, interrogation, judicial processing, detention, or other appropriate disposition of detainees. See Appendix 6 (Civilian Detainees) to Annex A (Intelligence)

(6) Psychological Operations

(a) Optimum utilization of propaganda and psychological operational resources and techniques will be applied to integrate anti-infrastructure operations with

appropriate pacification and military operations.

(b) U. S. psychological operations advisors will recommend operations based upon exploitable material available as events occur. If assistance is needed to print psychological material, the U.S. 244th psychological operations company at Corps level is available.

(c) DOICCs are encourage to propose psychological operations based upon readily exploitable events taking place in districts. Districts should relay proposals to province for action.

(7) Coordination

(a) The Province Chief and Province Senior Advisor will insure that appropriate coordination is affected between operational units attacking the VC infrastructure and that targeting for infrastructure operations are developed both at the Permanent Office of the PICC and DOICC.

(b) The PICC will convene on a timely basis and reflect participation and representation from all action elements concerned with the attack against the VC infrastructure.

(8) Reports

(a) Periodic reports are required to measure progress in elimination of the infrastructure and to evaluate the enemy's success in recruiting guerrillas.

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(b) The Sector S2 is responsible for ensuring that the collection effort includes the following information and that the results are made available to the Sector Senior Intelligence Advisor on the 25th of each month.

(1) Number of males between 16-45 years old recruited by the VC in each District.

(2) Number of guerrillas, self-defense and secret self-defense force personnel in the Province.

(3) Name, location, and organizational position of all persons who are newly identified as infrastructure.

(4) Name, location, organizational position and method of elimination of all infrastructure, e.g., killed, captured, rallied, or natural death, during a given month.

b. RVNAF and III MAF/III MAF

(1) Units will participate in operations in direct support of provincial RD activities, and operations against the VC infrastructure as defined in Annex R (Definitions). Operations will be of a combined nature coordinated where practicable with those GVN units, such as Police Special Branch (PSB), Province Reconnaissance Units (PRU), and National Police Field Force (NPF), who are assigned the specific mission eliminating the VC infrastructure. Coordination will take place at the province/district level.

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Military units will, for example, secure and cordon a target area, and provide protection to PSB, Military Security Service (MSS), or NPPP screening and search teams. Operations of this nature will be supported to the maximum extent by collated intelligence on the VC infrastructure previously acquired by all agencies.

(2) Information and intelligence pertaining to the VC infrastructure collected by intelligence agencies or acquired through action or reaction operations will be immediately disseminated to interested agencies and will be forwarded without delay to DOICCs for information and possible further action, to the Permanent Office of the PICC, and to the Provincial Interrogation Center (PIC).

(3) Provincial Reconnaissance Units will conduct special operations to collect or exploit intelligence against the VC infrastructure. Intelligence collected will be provided to the DOICCs, the Permanent Office of the PICC and to the PIC. Where appropriate, PRUs will participate in or support coordinated operations of other forces against the infrastructure.

c. FVN National Police.

(1) The Police Special Branch, supported by the Province Interrogation Center (PIC), is responsible to the Chief of Police for collecting, collating, and evaluating intelligence pertaining to the VC infrastructure.

Such intelligence will be disseminated through appropriate channels including the DOICC and Permanent Office of the PICC.

(2) The NPPF, acting as the action arm of the National Police Special Branch, is responsible for elimination of the VC infrastructure in districts, villages and hamlets through overt police operations. NPPF will participate in operations mounted by RVNAF and III MAF/FWMAF units and operations generated by province and district coordinating centers. Once this main task has been discharged, the NPPF has the primary responsibility of preventing VC resurgence and the ultimate mission of safeguarding the extension of other NP presence into the rural area. The NPPF operates with military forces in support of the pacification program by acting as the search and arrest element during cordon and search missions; performing resources control duties and suppressing any riots or civil disturbances. The assumption of uniform police duties for short periods of time during the transition period between pure, military operations and the establishment of local governments, is a function of NPPF. Reinforcing of III MAF/RVNAF/FWMAF units in a police support role in order to perform primary interrogation and assisting in the control of refugees; thus ferreting out VC infrastructure elements using refugee cover to infiltrate pacified areas. Exploiting

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information by conducting ambushes and raids is a further mission of NFFF. At regional level it may reinforce province NFFF units or carry out operations which require crossing of province boundaries by employing the Regional Reserve NFFF Battalion.

d. Hoi Chanh capabilities will be used to the maximum extent in support of the attack on infrastructure, both to induce VC to return to the GVN side and to support intelligence and reaction activities. The National Police are responsible for the establishment of Bona Fides of Chieu Hois. Personnel of military intelligence, national police and other agencies who are concerned with the exploitation of Hoi Chanh, are cautioned that such actions will not be prosecuted in such a manner as to compromise the spirit or intent of the National (GVN) Open Arms Program. The status of Hoi Chanh as a distinct and separate category, unlike PW, will be carefully upheld. Selected Hoi Chanh will be used as interrogators, guides and in other suitable roles for which they are individually qualified, such as interrogation of refugees from their own general area to obtain information on the VC infrastructure in that area.

e. All units, agencies and activities engaged in the attack on the VC infrastructure will, as appropriate and in accordance with prescribed procedures, insure rapid

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and effective screening of detainees, identification of VC suspects, and early release of innocent persons. See Appendix G (Civilian Detainees) to Annex H (Intelligence). VC suspects will be transported promptly to the appropriate interrogation activity for timely intelligence exploitation and further processing and/or detention. Before release, civilians will be fingerprinted and photographed by the National Police, or supporting elements, in order to provide positive identification of individuals and to establish their presence at a known time and location.

4. (C) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:

a. Logistics. The PSB, NPF and PRU forces will be furnished required logistical support (to include transportation which is beyond their own capability) by RVNAF/III MAF/FWMAF when operating with such forces.

b. Personnel.

(1) In addition to employing all available resources, special emphasis will be placed on interrogation of PW, civil detainees, and Hoi Chanh for the acquisition of intelligence on the VC infrastructure and the identification of VC infrastructure personnel.

(2) Intelligence coordination centers will develop techniques and procedures to categorize information on all PW, civil detainees, and Hoi Chanh.

5. (C) COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

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- a. Military command relations remain as currently established.
- b. Command of police forces will remain in the police chain of command.
- c. Overall coordinating authority within USMACV for the direction of the infrastructure attack is retained by Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS.
- d. Signal. See Annex L (Communications and Electronics).

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Phụ bản D (Bảo vệ tái nguyên) của
Kế-hoạch Hồn hợp Quân-sự I-68.

Annex D (Resources Denial) to
Combined Campaign Plan I-68.

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Annex D (Resources Denial) to Combined Campaign Plan 1-68

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence)
- b. Friendly Forces. Paragraph 1, basic plan.
- c. Background

(1) In 1967, resources denial measures achieved few significant results. Many authorities did not know how to apply selective denial measures so as to assist economic development in the country-side, raise the living standards of the people and destroy the enemy's logistic self-sufficiency which has prolonged the war and undermined the national economy.

(2) During 1968 the program for Resources Denial will be improved, so that the enemy exploitation of national resources can be effectively frustrated without hindering development of the economy.

2. (U) MISSION. To protect the manpower and material resources of ICTZ and to deny vital resources to the enemy.

3. (C) EXECUTION

a. Concept

(1) Resources denial is an element of economic warfare undertaken to deny enemy access to and exploitation of manpower and material resources. As such, the preservation of national resources should be regarded as an essential effort in pacification and planning in ICTZ. The principal resources denial activities are as follows:

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(a) Preventing the VC from stealing and exploiting farmer's crops in order to carry on the war.

(b) Controlling the movement of military use supplies, medicines foodstuffs, etc. to the VC from government controlled areas.

(c) Destroying VC finance and economy and other organizations and ventures which contribute to VC self-sufficiency.

(2) The scope of this program is limited to those measures undertaken within ICTZ including its rivers and coastal waters.

(3) Intelligence efforts should be directed to collecting and exploiting information which identifies items critical to the enemy war effort, strong and weak points of the enemy financial and logistic structures, and enemy plans and operations designed to destroy the national economy.

(4) A Resources Control Committee will be established at Corps Tactical Zone, DTA, Sector, and Special Sector levels. Composition and mission are set forth in the coordinating instruction.

b. Planning and Execution

(1) Planning Phase, Planning must be based on a careful assessment of the local situation by the province and district chiefs to include enemy operations and capabilities and friendly resources and capabilities in each village and district. Province and district authorities

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must personally develop and execute the plan in order to exploit their knowledge of the local situation.

(2) Execution Phase. Province and local chiefs must continually evaluate their local areas to determine boundaries of secure and insecure areas so as to implement selective denial measures.

(a) Secure Areas. Emphasis should be on protection on rice movement to towns and cities. Check points (mostly mobile) will be operated to check cargo on vehicles enroute to insecure areas in order to apply population control and to intercept military use medical and chemical supplies.

(b) Insecure Areas. Within insecure areas, the sale, purchase and movement of military use supplies and foodstuffs will be controlled. Plans should be made to protect commodities against VC capture during shipment.

c. DIA/Special Zone

(1) Guide and assist Sectors and Special Sectors in preparing appropriate resources denial plans; monitor and evaluate execution of the plans.

(2) Focus intelligence efforts on the collection and exploitation of information which identifies items critical to the enemy war effort, his finance and logistic structure and plans to disrupt the national economy.

(3) Conduct operations to destroy enemy storage, logistics and manufacturing sites.

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(4) Provide assistance to Sectors and Special Sectors for the conduct of operations against the VC Tax Collection System.

(5) Provide assistance as required to Sectors and Special Sectors to organize and execute a system of road and waterways checkpoints in secure and insecure areas with emphasis on the use of mobile checkpoints.

d. Sectors and Special Sectors in coordination with III MAF/FWMAF, National Police, and appropriate civilian agencies.

(1) Prepare and execute resources denial plans to protect the resources of Sectors/Special Sectors.

(2) Assist the NP in establishing road and waterways checkpoints in secure areas.

(3) Control resources in insecure areas with the assistance of the NP.

(4) Conduct and/or assist in operations to eliminate VC Tax Collection System.

(5) Increase psychological operations and civic actions to obtain cooperation from the people in conservation of natural resources and denial to the enemy.

(6) In coordination with province administrative headquarters establish secure communal storage for safeguarding the produce of villages and for holding foodstuffs captured from the enemy.

(7) Conduct herbicide operations to destroy enemy

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crops and to uncover enemy LOCs, safe havens, and storage sites. Losses to friendly villages caused by these operations must be indemnified in accordance with the procedures in RVNA Directive No. 2713/TTM/TC/CTCT/TLC of 6 May 1967.

e. 1st ARVN MP Battalion in coordination with DTAs Special Zone, Sectors, Special Sectors and the III MAF/FWMAF:

(1) Provide personnel and equipment as required to participate in joint and combined checkpoints, fixed and mobile.

(2) Assist NP operations in secure areas.

(3) Assist NP in the maintenance of security and order in towns and in provincial territories.

(4) Advise NP forces on judicial matters in the performance of their police duties.

f. Naval Command, 1st Coastal Zone in coordination with US Naval forces assigned and tasked by COMNAVFORV:

(1) Provide naval forces as required to assist in the basic tasks of resources denial.

(2) Pay particular attention to the detection, interdiction, and destruction of sea and river borne shipment and transshipment of VC resources.

(3) Provide assistance as required to DTAs, Special Zone, Sectors, and Special Sector to establish mobile checkpoints on coastal and inland waterways.

(4) Establish and control checkpoints to control waterborne traffic in Danang Harbor.

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g. III MAF/FWMAF assist I ARVN Corps Forces and GVN and US civilian agencies as required and as available in the conduct of resources denial activities.

4. (C) COORDINATION INSTRUCTIONS

a. Priority of resources denial activities should be directed to the selected RD areas.

b. Primary responsibility for resources denial in secure areas rests with the GVN civilian agencies with the assistance of ARVN, III MAF/FWMAF, and US Civilian agencies.

(1) Coordinating responsibilities for execution of the resources denial plan in secure areas rests with the NP.

(2) Compliance with curfew orders and population control measures for the apprehension of deserters and draft evaders will be in accordance with current laws and establish procedures.

(3) Accounting for and handling of duly apprehended deserters and draft evaders will be in accordance with current regulations and orders.

c. The property of civilians will be used only in the event of operational necessity in order to minimize destruction thereof.

d. Sectors and Special Sectors submit quantity reports of resources denial activities in accordance with Annex N (Quarterly Review).

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- Appendixes: 1. Checkpoints
2. Rice Protection
3. Use of Herbicides
4. Control of Water Routes
5. Control, Disposition and Safeguarding of
Vietnamese Property, Captured Material and Food Supplies.

Appendix 2 (Rice Protection) to Annex D (Resources Denial)
to Combined Campaign Plan 1-68

1. (U) PURPOSE. This appendix outlines tasks to be accomplished and techniques to be used in protecting rice.

2. (C) TASKS

a. CGs of DTAs and Commander Special Zone:

(1) Assist sectors as required in the preparation and execution of plans for protection of rice during the harvest and during movement to towns.

(2) Review requests for defoliation and forward requests to ICTZ for destruction of crops that cannot be protected.

(3) Supervise district rice accounting and storage procedures.

b. Sector Commanders:

(1) Maintain accountability for the rice from each harvest, especially for the period between harvests.

(2) Prepare and submit to the DTA or Special Zone for approval, plans for protection each rice harvest, movement of rice to and between secure areas, and storing and marketing of rice.

(3) Submit defoliation plans to DTA or Special Zone for approval, for destruction of crops that cannot be protected.

(4) Coordinate with the province chief (if civilian)

to set up rice storage in secure areas.

3. (C) PROTECTION PROCEDURES

- a. Conduct psychological operations prior to, during and after harvests to encourage villagers to participate in the rice control plan.
- b. Prepare a plan for the protection of the rice harvest.
- c. Prepare a program with inclusive dates, priority of effort, and a movement system to include the necessary transportation, schedules and security for the estimated maximum harvest.
- d. Establish storage facilities in secure areas for the estimated maximum harvest.
- e. Make provisions for the necessary funds to purchase the villagers' harvested rice and to resell it to them when necessary.
- f. Maintain close accountability, control and security for the rice stored.
- g. Prepare plans to transport surplus rice to other secure areas as required.
- h. Prepare plans for herbicide operations to destroy crops which cannot be protected.

4. (C) ESTIMATED RICE HARVESTS.

<u>Province</u>	<u>Annual Output</u>	<u>Months</u>
Quang-Nam	111,000 Tons	Jan, Mar, Apr, Sept Oct, Nov, Dec

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Quang-Ngai	141,000 Tons	Jan, Mar, Apr, Sept Oct, Nov, Dec
Quang-Tin	66,000 Tons	Jan, Mar, Apr, Sept
Quang-Tri	43,000 Tons	Apr, Jun, Sept
Thua-Thien	<u>109,000 Tons</u>	Mar, Apr, Aug Oct, Nov
Total	470,000 Tons	

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Appendix 5 (Control, Disposition and Safeguarding of Vietnamese Property, Captured Material and Food Supplies) to Annex D (Resources Denial) to Combined Campaign Plan 1-68

1. (U) PURPOSE: This appendix outlines policy and procedures for:

a. Control, disposition, and safeguarding of private property and food supplies during combat operations.

b. Control and disposition of captured material and supplies.

2. (C) GENERAL:

a. Food Supplies and private property.

(1) In VC controlled areas, RVNAF, US and other FWMAF must take all practicable measures to minimize the destruction of both public and private property and take appropriate measures as feasible to protect such property. It must be remembered that civilians who live in VC controlled areas may be under VC control against their will and may not be sympathetic to the enemy. Treating such persons like enemies, destroying their property or depriving them of their goods is incompatible with long range objectives of expanding the influence of the GVN throughout RVN.

(2) Special attention must be given to the protection of private property and of legitimate food supplies,

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especially warehouses, to avoid harming the individual's livelihood and the village economy, thus causing unnecessary discontent. Such discontent is easily exploited by the enemy and makes attainment of GVN objectives more difficult.

b. Captured Material and supplies. Seizure and destruction of enemy material and supplies is a separate measure for the specific purpose of depriving the enemy of their use and of improving the relative position of RVNAF and III MAF/FWMAF.

3. TASKS

a. DTA, Special Zone, Sector and Special Sector commanders in respective areas of responsibility and in coordination with appropriate III MAF/FWMAF commanders will:

- (1) Insure that all units minimize destruction of property.
- (2) Develop procedures, in coordination with III MAF/FWMAF commanders, to include security, transportation and labor for the extraction of captured supplies to preclude their further use by the enemy.
- (3) Establish procedures for distributing captured rice to refugees, war victims and other needy people.
- (4) Insure that operations are planned and conducted with proper regard for psychological considerations. (Annex H, Psychological Operations).

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(5) Comply with the procedures listed in paragraph 5 below before destroying captured enemy supplies.

(6) Prepare an inventory of captured supplies and a report of the circumstances of capture in accordance with paragraph 5c below.

b. III MAF/FWMAF Commanders in coordination with appropriate RVNAF commanders, will:

(1) Insure that all units minimize destruction of property.

(2) Extract and dispose of captured supplies in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5 below.

(3) Insure that operations are planned and conducted with proper regard for psychological considerations. (Annex H, Psychological Operations)

4. Policy

a. Private property and goods

(1) Disposition of private property and supplies is the responsibility of GVN officials.

(2) Destruction of private property, homes, live stock, and goods is forbidden except in cases of overriding operational necessity.

(3) The destruction of dwellings and livestock as a denial measure, is the responsibility of GVN authorities or RVNAF units. Requests by Vietnamese authorities for employment of US forces in the deliberate destruction of non-combatants' property as a denial measure will be

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referred to Headquarters MACV for the personal decision of COMUSMACV.

b. Captured material and supplies are to be considered a valuable asset that will be extracted if at all possible. Newly introduced items or items with unusual modifications will be evacuated through intelligence channels. US tactical commanders will include in operation plans provisions for security and immediate release to RVNAF of all captured food supplies. RVNAF will use captured rice to supplement their food rations, if required, and distribute the excess to needy people to promote their support for RVNAF and the GVN. Among needy people, refugees and war victims must be given first priority in receiving captured rice in accordance with RVNAF, JCS Directives. Captured food caches will be extracted and distributed using RVNAF resources and transportation to the maximum extent practicable. Major US tactical commanders will make the final decision to destroy significant food caches captured by US forces only after determining that extraction is not feasible.

c. Captured medical supplies may not be destroyed or used by III MAF/PWMAF medical personnel except in an emergency due to non-availability of US medical items of the type required. Release of captured medical supplies to local GVN officials or other relief agencies in the field is expressly prohibited except in cases of urgent

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humanitarian need. If not required for treatment of enemy personnel, all captured medical supplies will be extracted by capturing units through component command established channels or left intact and in place.

5. Procedures

a. When the recovery of captured equipment and supplies requires facilities beyond those available to the tactical commander, a request with the following information will be forwarded to the next higher headquarters for the recovery and disposition of the items:

- (1) Type and quantity of material/supplies.
- (2) Location.
- (3) Labor and transportation required.
- (4) Tactical situation including any requirements for security forces.
- (5) Other related data such as the situation and attitude of local populace and GVN authorities.

b. A report of captured material/supplies must be prepared as follows:

- (1) Type and quantity of items captured.
- (2) Date and location of capture.
- (3) Place of origin.
- (4) Type of pack or container.
- (5) Labels or other identifying marks.

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Phụ bản H (Chiến-tranh Chính-trị) của
Kế-hoạch Hồn-hợp Quân sự I-68.

Annex H (Psychological Operations) to
Combined Campaign Plan I-68.

Annex H (Psychological Operations) To Combined Campaign Plan 1-68

Ref: (a) MACV/JCS Combined Campaign Plan 1-68, AB 143
(b) III MAF Order 3410.1 (PSYOP SOP)
(c) I Corps PSYOP SOP (To be issued)

1. (C) SITUATION

a. General.

(1) Guidance contained herein is applicable to all psychological operations in support of RVMAF/III MAF and appropriate GVN/US/FW agencies directly or indirectly engaged in combating enemy forces in ICTZ. It supports priority tasks assigned by higher authority, and organizes these tasks into specific campaigns:

- (a) Chieu Hoi Campaign (Appendix 4)
- (b) Anti VC Campaign (Appendix 5)
- (c) Anti NVA Campaign (Appendix 6)
- (d) Support NVA Campaign (Appendix 7)
- (e) Rewards Campaign (Appendix 8)

(2) This Annex also includes instructions for the conduct of psychological operations in support of:

- (a) Civic Action
- (b) Refugee Operations
- (c) Resources Denial
- (d) Pacification
- (e) Attack on VC Infrastructure
- (f) National PSYOP Plan

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- (1) Annex A (Intelligence) to Combined Campaign Plan 1-58.
- (2) Appendix 1 (PSYOP Intelligence) to this Annex.

c. Friendly Forces.

- (1) MACV/JGS/JUSPAO/VIS provides:

- (a) Policy guidance concerning national aims and policies and strategical operations.

- (b) Media planning and production support for leaflets, posters, and aerial broadcast tapes.

- (2) 7th PSYOP Group provides backup PSYOP support requested through MACV.

- (3) 4th PSYOP Group provides backup PSYOP support to III MAF.

- (4) Flight "A", 9th Air Commando Squadron, U.S. Air Force and elements of the VNAF provides aerial support within IOTZ for leaflet dissemination and aerial broadcasts.

- (5) Appendix 2 (PSYOP Asset Inventory).

d. Assumptions. See basic plan.

2. (C) MISSION

III MAF/I Corps, in coordination with JORDF, POC/VIS, conduct psychological warfare operations against VC/NVA personnel and civilians under Viet Cong influence; psychological operations in conjunction with military offensives and in support of pacification and nation building objectives. Assist F MAF in conducting psychological operations as requested with resources available.

3. (C) EXECUTION

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a. Concept of Operations.

(1) Psychological operations will be conducted in accordance with Appendix 3 (National Psychological Operations Plan).

(2) Strategic psychological operations will be conducted as directed by higher headquarters.

(3) Tactical psychological operations will be conducted by RVNAF/III MAF Commanders utilizing organic, attached and supporting PSYOP assets operating within the frame work of objectives and campaigns outlined in this Annex.

(4) Psychological operations are directed at the people in the area as well as at the enemy. Whether the people be initially friendly, uncommitted or hostile toward the government, the objective of PSYOP, as of all RD, is to persuade the people to support the GVN. To this end, disciplined, well-behaved troops showing a friendly, sincere interest in the people and a respect for individual rights and property will have the most favorable impact upon the local people. PSYOP themes will include explanations of why troops are in the area and what RD can do for the people by their cooperating with the GVN. Against the enemy, the PSYOP objective is to persuade the individual soldier to stop supporting the enemy cause and to rally to the GVN through the Chieu Hoi and Sai Doan Ket programs. Hence, PSYOP themes will stress the positive benefits of RD and sow doubt about the justice of an enemy cause that opposes RD.

b. ARVN Regular Forces.

(1) Conduct tactical psychological operations in support of ARVN/US combat operations in IRTZ with military psychological operations assets available.

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(2) Conduct psychological operations with emphasis upon Revolutionary Development and Chieu Hoi.

(3) Conduct psychological operations in support of resources denial operations on a high priority basis.

(4) Conduct psychological operations designed to nullify enemy propaganda and to gain popular understanding of and support of the herbicide program.

c. Major III MAF Ground Forces.

(1) Conduct tactical psychological operations in support of RVNAF/III MAF combat operations in ICTZ with military psychological operations assets available.

(2) Conduct psychological operations with emphasis upon Revolutionary Development and Chieu Hoi.

(3) Conduct psychological operations designed to nullify enemy propaganda and to gain popular understanding and support of the herbicide program.

d. First Marine Air Wing.

(1) Be prepared on order to provide aerial leaflet dissemination by both transport and high performance delivery means.

(2) Provide priority transportation to REYOP Teams on request Headquarters, III MAF.

(3) Within capability conduct special psychological operations aimed at the accomplishment of priority tasks listed in Appendix 3 (National REYOP Plan) to this Annex.

e. Force Logistics Command.

Within capability conduct special psychological operations

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aimed at the accomplishment of priority tasks listed in Appendix 3 (National PSYOP Plan) to this Annex.

f. 2nd Brigade ROKMC.

(1) Conduct psychological operations in coordination with GVN and US Forces, with support provided by this Headquarters.

(2) Within capability conduct special psychological operations aimed at the accomplishment of priority tasks listed in Appendix 3 (National PSYOP Plan) to this Annex.

g. US Naval Forces, Northern Surveillance Group/VN Navy.

(1) Conduct river and coastal waterborne psychological operations throughout ICTZ with emphasis on Revolutionary Development and Chieu Hoi.

(2) Ensure psychological operations in support of the resources denial program are coordinated with I Corps, DTA's and sectors.

h. Province Chiefs.

(1) Conduct psychological operations with emphasis on Revolutionary Development and Chieu Hoi.

(2) Ensure continued establishment of Provincial Psychological Operations Committees.

(3) Ensure Armed Propaganda Teams are organized, trained, equipped and armed to conduct psychological operations missions in support of military operations as well as Provincial objectives.

i. Regional and Popular Forces.

Assist other GVN elements conducting PSYOP with emphasis on revolutionary Development and Chieu Hoi themes.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~j. 10th POLMAR Battalion and 7th PSYOP Battalion.

- (1) Provide design, production and dissemination of local printed materials and tapes based upon submitted requests.
- (2) Ensure adequate stockpiles of high usage standard media is maintained at all times.
- (3) Priority of local printing is to quick reaction Chieu Hoi and tactical situations.

k. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Target Audiences, Themes and Campaign Objectives are listed in the attached Appendixes for the following Campaigns:
 - (a) Chieu Hoi Inducement Campaign (Appendix 4)
 - (b) Anti VC Campaign (Appendix 5)
 - (c) Anti NVA Campaign (Appendix 6)
 - (d) Support GVN Campaign (Appendix 7)
 - (e) Civilian Rewards Program (Appendix 8)
- (2) Psychological operations support will be rendered in the following priority:
 - (a) Strategic psychological warfare, including Chieu Hoi.
 - (b) Psychological warfare in support of tactical operations.
 - (c) Psychological operations in support of pacification.
- (3) Psychological operations will be coordinated with Provincial Psychological Operations Committees, where feasible, in order to achieve common goals and ensure maximum coordination.
- (4) Psychological operations plans within each sector,

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subsector or autonomous city, except in unusual circumstances will be coordinated with appropriate GVN/III MAF Commanders and agencies.

(5) Standard media will be utilized to the maximum to conserve our quick reaction capability for true targets of opportunity.

(6) Psychological operations support beyond organic resources will be requested in accordance with references (b) and (c).

(7) Planning for the conduct of psychological operations must be conducted concurrently and closely coordinated with combat operational planning. Special emphasis will be directed toward early identification of PSYOP asset support required. See Appendix 2 (PSYOP Asset Inventory) to this Annex. All commanders will include PSYOP annexes in operational plans which involve contact with enemy forces and/or civilian population.

4. (C) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. Logistics.

ARVN/III MAF psychological operations units are responsible for support of subordinate units for mission type equipment and expendable supplies.

b. Personnel.

(1) Local Vietnamese will be employed as required to provide or supplement linguistic capabilities and sociological knowledge. Submit requests to this Headquarters (Attn: J-1/PSYOP) with justification, for approval.

(2) Hoi Chanhs will be used in psychological operations as required to exploit their knowledge of the situation or special aptitudes.

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c. Reports.

To be submitted in accordance with references (b) and (c).

5. (U) COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS

- a. Execution will be under the joint supervision of III MAF and I Corps.
- b. See current command COMSOP and SOI.
- c. Annex L (Comm-Elect).

APPENDICES:

- 1 PSYOP Intelligence
- 2 PSYOP Asset Inventory
- 3 National PSYOP Plan
- 4 Chieu Hoi Inducement Campaign
- 5 Anti VC Campaign
- 6 Anti NVA Campaign
- 7 Support GVN Campaign
- 8 Civilian Rewards Program

Phụ bản O (Định-nghĩa) của Kế-Hoạch
Hỗn-hợp Quân-sự I-68.

Annex O (Definitions) to Combined
Campaign Plan I-68.

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contains installations, defensive fortifications, and physical structures used for the following purposes: for basic or advanced training of personnel and units; as a permanent or temporary location for political, military or logistical headquarters; for storage and distribution of medicine, ordnance, food, POL, and other war material; as a site used by combat units to rest, regroup, retrain, evade friendly operations and/or initiate preparatory phase of offensive operations.

(c) Neutralized VC/NVA Base Area: A base area which the enemy is not able to use for its intended purpose. Temporary neutralization can be accomplished by extensive destruction of facilities found within the area, or by the presence in or around the area of friendly forces sufficient to deny the enemy free and unrestricted access to the area for use as a safe haven. Neutralization is not necessarily permanent and must be reevaluated each month.

b. VC/NVA Losses:

(1) Killed in Action (KIA). Personnel killed in action as determined by body count.

(2) Wounded in Action (WIA). Personnel wounded in action as determined by the ratio of 1.5 WIA for each 1 KIA.

(3) Died of Wounds (DOW). A figure estimated as 35% of these KIA, and including those personnel who are

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permanently disabled.

(4) Permanently Disabled. Personnel who cannot return to their units because of severe disability.

Estimated as a portion of the DOW figures.

(5) Returnees (Hoi Chanh). VC/NVA political and military cadre who are induced to return or come over to GVN control under the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program.

(a) Military Hoi Chanh. The military returnee under the Chieu Hoi program.

(b) Political Hoi Chanh. The political returnee under the Chieu Hoi program.

(6) Prisoners of War (PW). Persons who qualify under the Geneva Convention, Part I, Article 4 on Prisoners of War. In addition, the following persons will be extended the protection of this Prisoner of War article in Vietnam.

(a) Persons who are captured while actually engaging in combat or a belligerent act other than an act of terrorism, sabotage or spying against the Republic of Vietnam, the U. S. or other Free World Military Armed Forces.

(b) Any captive member of the North Vietnamese Armed Forces or of the Viet Cong, whether captured in combat or not, except a terrorist, saboteur, or spy.

(7) Detainees. Persons who have been detained but whose final status, i.e., innocent civilian, returnee,

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civil defendant, or prisoner of war, and not yet been determined.

(8) Deserter. Any individual absent from his unit with no apparent intention of returning.

(9) Civil Defendant. Persons who are suspected of being spies, saboteurs, terrorists, or criminals and who do not qualify as prisoners of war under paragraph 3.b.(6) above.

c. Enemy Actions.

(1) Attacks. An incident in which the enemy attempts to inflict casualties and/or property damage. Attacks are identified by type and size. The broader term Large Scale Attack may be used to encompass attacks made by a battalion or larger force. The term Small Scale Attack will include those attacks by forces of less than battalion size. There are three types of attack: ambush, assault, and fire.

(a) Ambush. A surprise attack, usually conducted from planned positions, against a moving or temporarily halted troop unit, or convoy.

(b) Assault. An attack in which the enemy used both fire and maneuver in an attempt to seize or damage his objective.

(c) Fire. An attack in which the enemy uses fire alone in an attempt to inflict casualties and

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or property damage.

(2) Harassment. An incident in which the primary objective is to disrupt temporarily the activities of a unit, installation, village, hamlet, or activity rather than to inflict serious casualties or damage. Harassment will be classed as either harassment against civilian or military targets.

(a) Harassment of Civilians. All incidents of harassment directed against targets that are predominantly of a civilian nature. Examples are burning of crops or hamlet harassment.

(b) Harassment of Military. Incidents of harassment against military targets. Examples include sniping at a patrol, harassing fire, booby traps for military personnel, mining incidents against military targets that are not acts of sabotage.

(3) Terrorism. An incident directed against civilians, public officials, or military personnel not engaged in military duties in which the primary objective is to intimidate. Assassination, kidnapping, mining or bombing of public facilities, buildings, BOC's, and civilian transportation constitute terrorism.

4. (C) OPERATIONS:

a. Area for priority of military offensive operations.

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That area in the RVN that is considered to be of such importance as to warrant the principal effort and weight of offensive power.

b. Area of Operations (AO). An area where US/FWMAF conduct operations during a specific period of time. These operations will be coordinated with, and advance agreement obtained from, appropriate GVN representative. An AO is assigned normally for a specific operation which may be within or outside of a tactical area of responsibility.

c. Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR). A prescribed area which has been assigned specifically to a commander who is responsible for, and has the authority to act on, the development and maintenance of installations, the control of movement, and the conduct of tactical operations with troops under his control. All fire and maneuver conducted within the TAOR, or whose effects impinge upon it, must be coordinated with the commander of the force assigned the TAOR.

d. Tactical Areas of Interest (TAOI). An area including, but not necessarily limited to, the Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR) in which the designated US/FWMAF commander is knowledgeable of the location, activities and operations of all RVN forces and installations, CIDG camps and RD areas in order to achieve, through mutual coopera-

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tion coordination, the maximum effect of the combined friendly forces and fire power. The TAOI differs from the TAOR in that, US/FWMAF commanders are not charged with primary tactical responsibility nor are they expected to conduct tactical operations on a continuing basis in the TAOI.

e. Combined Operation. An operation conducted by elements of two or more nations operating together or in close coordination.

f. Clearing Operations. An operation to clear an area permanently of organized VC/NVA main forces, including the provincial battalions, in order to eliminate the immediate threat of overt enemy interference with revolutionary development activities that are to follow.

g. Search and Destroy Operation. An offensive operation conducted for the purpose of seeking out and destroying enemy forces, installations, resources and base areas. These operations are oriented on the enemy inside or outside a TAOR.

h. Security Operation. Operations whose purpose is to protect friendly political, economic, and military resources and installations, such as district capitals or populated areas, to include previously pacified areas, lines of communications, food stores and production areas; and depots and base areas.

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i. Cordon and search operations. An operation in which regular, paramilitary, and/or National Police forces encircle a village, hamlet or area to prevent entrance to or exit from the area and to provide security to forces, including regular, paramilitary, and military Security Service, Police Special Branch, Provincial Reconnaissance Units, and National Police Field Forces inside the encircled area while they perform searches for VC, VC infrastructure, draft dodgers, illegal residents, contraband, etc.

j. Paul Bunyan Operations. These are forest clearing operations using Rome plows and other specialized equipment. These operations will be used primarily in conjunction with base area neutralization to render the area unsuitable for further use by the enemy. However, these operations may also be employed to clear areas along key LOC's and other sensitive areas.

k. Road Runner. The name assigned to the program to restore progressively the main and secondary road nets to GVN control. The concept of Road Runner is a specially tailored force traversing main and secondary roads to demonstrate our intention and ability to use and keep open existing roads.

l. Bushmaster. The name assigned to a night ambush program designed to complicate and harass the movement of VC/NVA forces in and outside of tactical areas of

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responsibility (TAOR) where heretofore they have been able to move with relative impunity.

m. Combat Support Coordination Center (CSCC). The CSCC is a facility within which are grouped representatives of artillery, air, naval gunfire, and other agencies as deemed necessary by the commander(s). These representatives assist the commander(s) through the G2/G3 in planning, coordinating, and controlling all means of combat support available in an operation.

n. Reserve Reaction Forces. Reserve reaction forces are all uncommitted forces available to the commander. They may be any size unit and include reaction forces anywhere, forces in training, forces undergoing rehabilitation, and newly arrived forces undergoing combat readiness preparations.

o. Missions.

(1) Search and Destroy (Regional). Operations to destroy or neutralize NVA/VC main and guerrilla forces, base areas and supply points. Search and Destroy (Regional) operations are not in support of pacification.

(2) Search and Destroy (Provincial). Operations in indirect support of pacification which are conducted adjacent to populated areas under GVN control or to areas in which PD is in progress to provide a secure environment by destroying or neutralizing VC district or provincial

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forces.

(3) Search and Destroy (Local). Operations in direct support of pacification which are conducted in or adjacent to RD area for the purpose of destroying VC local forces, guerrilla forces and infrastructure.

(4) Security Operations. Operations whose purpose is to protect political, economic and military resources and installations, such as district capitals or populated areas, lines of communication, food stores and production areas, and depots and base areas. For reporting purposes, operations in defense of military areas and installations, e.g., military air bases and logistic complexes, are not considered in support of pacification.

(5) Reserve Mission. A mission in which forces are involved in training or undergoing rehabilitation. It applies also to newly arrived forces undergoing combat readiness preparation and/or alerted reaction forces.

5. (U) PACIFICATION:

a. Pacification is the military, political, economic and social process of establishing or reestablishing local government responsive to and involving the participation of the people. It includes the provision of sustained, credible territorial security, the destruction of the enemy's underground government, the assertion or re-assertion of political control and involvement of the people in

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government, and the initiation of economic and social activity capable of self-sustenance and expansion. The economic element of pacification includes the opening of roads and waterways and the maintenance of lines of communication important to economic and military activity.

b. Revolutionary development, the leading edge of pacification, is the formalized Government of Vietnam program, under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Revolutionary Development, in specified hamlets located generally within RD campaign areas. It includes the local security for those hamlets and the political, economic, and social activities at that level.

c. Nation building is the economic, political, and social activity having an impact nationwide and/or in urban centers. It is related to pacification in that it builds on the results of pacification and contributes to the establishment of a viable economic and social community.

d. Military Support of Pacification. The primary role of military forces during the pacification process is to establish territorial security for the conduct of pacification activities and to maintain this security until such time as civil authority and public security are assured.

e. Secured Area. An area is secured when:

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(1) All hamlets within the area have been secured to GVN control as completed Ap Tan Sinh or Ap Binh Dinh or developing Ap Doi Moi to the extent that cadre no longer are required on a permanent basis and there is an on-going program to continue the development of these hamlets.

(2) VC guerrilla and known VC infrastructure elements based in the area have been destroyed and available military and police forces have an organized on-going program to prevent the re-emergence of these elements.

(3) Hamlets in the area have adequate day and night security forces and GVN cadre elements are able to remain overnight in these hamlets without threat from the VC.

(4) Roads connecting hamlets and villages in the area are safe from VC attack during daylight hours with minimum security required.

(5) The area is free of VC incidents except for sporadic individual acts of terrorism and sabotage.

(6) RVNAF and/or US/FWNAF are available to prevent the incursion of an organized enemy force into the area.

f. Area Undergoing Securing. An area is undergoing securing when:

(1) The area has been cleared of organized resistance. As a guide, a platoon size or larger unit can offer organized resistance. However, any enemy force that is organized and equipped to remain in the area and

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and fight as a cohesive unit and exhibits the capability and intent to do so, should be considered capable of offering organized resistance.

(2) RVNAF and/or US/FWMAF are able to prevent the incursion of an organized enemy force into the area.

(3) RVNAF and/or US/FWMAF are operating in the area as necessary to destroy VC guerrilla and infrastructure element and establish local area security and security for the population and cadre elements.

(4) Revolutionary Development Cadre, or other officially recognized cadre, are working in the area or are programmed to be available when the requisite local security has been established.

g. Contested Area. An area is contested when:

(1) The area has been selected for the introduction of revolutionary development activities and/or is required for the conduct of operations to provide a defense in depth against the incursion of enemy forces into nearby areas where revolutionary development activities are taking place.

(2) RVNAF and/or US/FWMAF are conducting operations in the area with the task to clear the area permanently of organized VC/NVA main force and guerrilla units.

h. Uninhabitable Area. An area is uninhabitable when:

(1) The area virtually is uninhabitable and

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does not contain officially recognized symbols.

(2) Neither side is attempting to exert political or military influence over the area except for the conduct of transient type operations.

i. VC Controlled Area. An area is under VC control when:

(1) VC/NVA forces are present in or near the area and are able to exert political and/or military influence over the area.

(2) RVNAF and/or US/FWMAF, if present in the area, are conducting only transient search and destroy type operations with no intent to gain permanent area control.

j. Ap Doi Moi (Real New Life Hamlet). A hamlet designated in a provincial RD plan for a program of development under the supervision of RD cadre to achieve the eleven objectives (aspirations). The eleven objectives are:

(1) Eliminate the VC infrastructure.

(2) Eliminate corrupt practices and discharge corrupt officials.

(3) Develop a new spirit.

(4) Establish popular government and social operations.

(5) Organize the people for self-defense.

(6) Eliminate illiteracy.

(7) Eliminate disease and unsanitary conditions.

(8) Implement land reform.

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(9) Develop agriculture and handicraft industries.

(10) Improve lines of communication.

(11) Reward deserving soldiers, public servants and citizens who have contributed to FD programs.

k. Ap Tan Sinh (New Life Hamlet). A hamlet that was completed before 31 December 1966 and has the following 6 criteria:

(1) Census completed, VC infrastructure destroyed or neutralized.

(2) Selected and trained self-defense forces, equipped as appropriate.

(3) Effective hamlet defense system.

(4) Organized liaison and logistic system.

(5) Established social organization.

(6) Popular government elected.

(These hamlets are developed and improved by the village and hamlet officials.)

l. Ap Binh Dinh (Pacification Hamlet). A hamlet designated in a provincial ID plan for a program of construction to achieve the first two of the eleven objectives (aspirations) of an Ap Doi moi. Construction activities may be accomplished under the supervision of RD cadre or other authorized SVN personnel. Ap Binh Dinh may have more objectives, depending on the capabilities of the social organization. Recruiting and training self-

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defense forces, organizing a defense system against guerrilla forces and electing the hamlet government council, an Ap Binh Dinh should be ready for conversion to an Ap Doi Moi in the following year.

m. Civil - Military RD Team. An RD group, organized on the 59-man basis, formed from one PF or RF platoon and provincial administrative and technical cadre, whose purpose is to perform tasks similar to those performed by RD cadre.

n. Truong Son RD Team. A 70-man RD group, generally all of highlander ethnic origin, employed in the highland areas of South Vietnam to perform tasks similar to those performed by RD cadre, except that these tasks are modified to suit the highlander tribal population.

o. Territorial Security. Security from VC local forces and guerrilla units and VC/NVA main forces units in or threatening that area.

p. Local Security. That part of territorial security which provides security from VC local forces and guerrilla units.

q. RD Campaign. The military organization established by inter-ministerial directive #032/XD/31/HSCB and #1958/QP/QS/3 dated 6 Mar 67. That directive establishes procedures for control, coordination and integration

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of military, RDC groups and administrative elements in support of RD in province priority RD areas. In those areas, an RD campaign must be organized where three or more RDC groups operate. The limits of the campaign will encompass the RD area and the necessary territory to provide security for the RD area.

6. (U) LOGISTICS

a. Common Item (RVN). Equipment or material used by two or more services.

b. Common Item (US). Class I, III and those Class II and IV items currently specified for Common Supply System Support, plus any additional items of supply mutually agreed upon between the services involved.

c. Service Peculiar Item (RVN). Equipment or material used by only one of the military services.

d. Service Peculiar Item (US). All items not included in the definition for Common Item (US).

e. Designated Item. Equipment or material identified by nomenclature, group or category for a specific purpose.

f. Supply Support. The furnishing of items of supply as defined herein.

g. Cross Service Support. That function performed by one military service in support of another military service for which reimbursement is required from the service receiving support unless agreed otherwise.

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h. Cross National Force Support. The same as Cross Service Support except that support is rendered by forces of one nation for forces of another nation.

i. Line(s) of Communication (Logistics) (LOC). All of the routes, land, water, and air which connect an operating military force with a base of operations, and along which supplies and reinforcements move. Also designated routes that support economic and political efforts.

j. LOC Security Goals

(1) GREEN: Segment of the LOC between two points is physically open. RVN/US/FWMAF control of the surrounding area is such that traffic can move during daylight hours with relative freedom from VC sabotage, attacks or harassment. Armed escort is not required. Isolated incidents may occur.

(2) AMBER: Segment of the LOC between two points is physically open. Security of surrounding area is such that thorough security measures, including armed escorts, are required. Frequent incidents may occur.

(3) RED: LOC between two points is closed by VC/NVA military control of the area or by extensive physical interdiction. Requires tactical operations and/or engineering efforts to open and/or restore for traffic.

k. Military Assistance Program (MAP). The United States program for providing military assistance under the Foreign

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Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended, as distinct from Economic Aid and other programs authorized. (In RVN, the functions of MAP are now covered by the Military Assistance Service Fund (MASF) Plan which provides for individual US military department (service) programming, budgeting and funding of military assistance.)

1. Military Construction (MILCON). Construction programmed and funded under the US military departments' military construction programs, and which require Congressional approval.

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Phụ bản P (Phổ - biến) của
Kế-hoạch Hồn-hợp Quân sự I-68

Annex P (Distribution) to
Combined Campaign Plan I-68.

BCH/Pháo binh/QU	I	25
Sư đoàn 1/Khu II CT	5	26 - 30
Sư đoàn 2/Khu I2 CT	5	31 - 35
BK/Quảng-Đã	2	36- 37
Trung đoàn 51 Bộ binh	I	38
Tỉnh/TK/Quảng-Tri	I	39
Tỉnh/TK/Thừa-Thiên	I	40
Tỉnh/TK/Quảng Tín	I	41
Tỉnh/TK/Quảng Nam	I	42
Tỉnh/TK/Quảng Ngãi	I	43
Tòa Thị chính Đà Nẵng	I	44
Đặc khu Đà Nẵng	I	45
Bộ Xây dựng (VP/Tổng trưởng)	2	46 - 47
Lưu - hồ sơ	13	48 - 60
CMC	5	
CINCPAC	5	
COMUSMACV	15	
CG FMFPAC	5	
CG USARV	5	
COMNAVFORV	5	
COMSEVENTHAF	5	
COMNAVSUPPACT, DANANG	5	
COMTHIRDNCB	5	
CG 1st MarDiv	10	
CG 3d MarDiv	10	

CG Americal Div	10
CG 1st MAW	5
CG FLC	5
CG Ninth MAB	2
CG 2nd ROKMC Brigade	5
DSA, I ARVN Corps	10
5th SFG (ABN)	3
1st MP Bn	2
3d MP Bn	2
7th Engr Bn	2
9th Engr Bn	2
11th Engr Bn	2
5th Comm Bn	2
244th PsyOpnsCo	2
29th Civil Affairs Co	2
File	29
Total	220

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contains installations, defensive installations, and physical structures used for the following purposes: for basic or advanced training of personnel and units; as a permanent or temporary location for political, military or logistical headquarters; for storage and distribution of medicine, ordnance, food, POL, and other war material; as a site used by combat units to rest, regroup, retrain, evade friendly operations and/or initiate preparatory phase of offensive operations.

(c) Neutralized VC/NVA Base Area: A base area which the enemy is not able to use for its intended purpose. Temporary neutralization can be accomplished by extensive destruction of facilities found within the area, or by the presence in or around the area of friendly forces sufficient to deny the enemy free and unrestricted access to the area for use as a safe haven. Neutralization is not necessarily permanent and must be reevaluated each month.

b. VC/NVA Losses:

(1) Killed in Action (KIA). Personnel killed in action as determined by body count.

(2) Wounded in Action (WIA). Personnel wounded in action as determined by the ratio of 1.5 WIA for each 1 KIA.

(3) Died of Wounds (DOW). A figure estimated as 35% of these KIA, and including those personnel who are

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permanently disabled.

(4) Permanently Disabled. Personnel who cannot return to their units because of severe disability.

Estimated as a portion of the DOW figures.

(5) Returnees (Hoi Chanh). VC/NVA political and military cadre who are induced to return or come over to GVN control under the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program.

(a) Military Hoi Chanh. The military returnee under the Chieu Hoi program.

(b) Political Hoi Chanh. The political returnee under the Chieu Hoi program.

(6) Prisoners of War (PW). Persons who qualify under the Geneva Convention, Part I, Article 4 on Prisoners of War. In addition, the following persons will be extended the protection of this Prisoner of War article in Vietnam.

(a) Persons who are captured while actually engaging in combat or a belligerent act other than an act of terrorism, sabotage or spying against the Republic of Vietnam, the U. S. or other Free World Military Armed Forces.

(b) Any captive member of the North Vietnamese Armed Forces or of the Viet Cong, whether captured in combat or not, except a terrorist, saboteur, or spy.

(7) Detainees. Persons who have been detained but whose final status, i.e., innocent civilian, returnee,

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civil defendant, or prisoner of war, and has not been determined.

(8) Deserter. Any individual absent from his unit with no apparent intention of returning.

(9) Civil Defendant. Persons who are suspected of being spies, saboteurs, terrorists, or criminals and who do not qualify as prisoners of war under paragraph 3.b.(6) above.

c. Enemy Actions.

(1) Attacks. An incident in which the enemy attempts to inflict casualties and/or property damage. Attacks are identified by type and size. The broader term Large Scale Attack may be used to encompass attacks made by a battalion or larger force. The term Small Scale Attack will include those attacks by forces of less than battalion size. There are three types of attack: ambush, assault, and fire.

(a) Ambush. A surprise attack, usually conducted from planned positions, against a moving or temporarily halted troop unit, or convoy.

(b) Assault. An attack in which the enemy used both fire and maneuver in an attempt to seize or damage his objective.

(c) Fire. An attack in which the enemy uses fire alone in an attempt to inflict casualties and

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or property damage.

(2) Harassment. An incident in which the primary objective is to disrupt temporarily the activities of a unit, installation, village, hamlet, or activity rather than to inflict serious casualties or damage. Harassment will be classed as either harassment against civilian or military targets.

(a) Harassment of Civilians. All incidents of harassment directed against targets that are predominantly of a civilian nature. Examples are burning of crops or hamlet harassment.

(b) Harassment of Military. Incidents of harassment against military targets. Examples include sniping at a patrol, harassing fire, booby traps for military personnel, mining incidents against military targets that are not acts of sabotage.

(3) Terrorism. An incident directed against civilians, public officials, or military personnel not engaged in military duties in which the primary objective is to intimidate. Assassination, kidnapping, mining or bombing of public facilities, buildings, BQ's, and civilian transportation constitute terrorism.

4. (C) OPERATIONS:

a. Area for priority of military offensive operations.

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That area in the RVN that is considered to be of such importance as to warrant the principal effort and weight of offensive power.

b. Area of Operations (AO). An area where US/FWMAF conduct operations during a specific period of time. These operations will be coordinated with, and advance agreement obtained from, appropriate GVN representative. An AO is assigned normally for a specific operation which may be within or outside of a tactical area of responsibility.

c. Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR). A prescribed area which has been assigned specifically to a commander who is responsible for, and has the authority to act on, the development and maintenance of installations, the control of movement, and the conduct of tactical operations with troops under his control. All fire and maneuver conducted within the TAOR, or whose effects impinge upon it, must be coordinated with the commander of the force assigned the TAOR.

d. Tactical Areas of Interest (TAOI). An area including, but not necessarily limited to, the Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR) in which the designated US/FWMAF commander is knowledgeable of the location, activities and operations of all RVN forces and installations, CIDG camps and RD areas in order to achieve, through mutual coopera-

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tion coordination, the maximum effect of the combined friendly forces and fire power. The TAOI differs from the TAOR in that, US/FWMAF commanders are not charged with primary tactical responsibility nor are they expected to conduct tactical operations on a continuing basis in the TAOI.

e. Combined Operation. An operation conducted by elements of two or more nations operating together or in close coordination.

f. Clearing Operations. An operation to clear an area permanently of organized VC/NVA main forces, including the provincial battalions, in order to eliminate the immediate threat of overt enemy interference with revolutionary development activities that are to follow.

g. Search and Destroy Operation. An offensive operation conducted for the purpose of seeking out and destroying enemy forces, installations, resources and base areas. These operations are oriented on the enemy inside or outside a TAOR.

h. Security Operation. Operations whose purpose is to protect friendly political, economic, and military resources and installations, such as district capitals or populated areas, to include previously pacified areas, lines of communications, food stores and production areas; and depots and base areas.

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i. Cordon and search operations. An operation in which regular, paramilitary, and/or National Police forces encircle a village, hamlet or area to prevent entrance to or exit from the area and to provide security to forces, including regular, paramilitary, and Military Security Service, Police Special Branch, Provincial Reconnaissance Units, and National Police Field Forces inside the encircled area while they perform searches for VC, VC infrastructure, draft dodgers, illegal residents, contraband, etc.

j. Paul Bunyan Operations. These are forest clearing operations using Rome plows and other specialized equipment. These operations will be used primarily in conjunction with base area neutralization to render the area unsuitable for further use by the enemy. However, these operations may also be employed to clear areas along key LOC's and other sensitive areas.

k. Road Runner. The name assigned to the program to restore progressively the main and secondary road nets to GVN control. The concept of Road Runner is a specially tailored force traversing main and secondary roads to demonstrate our intention and ability to use and keep open existing roads.

l. Bushraster. The name assigned to a night ambush program designed to complicate and harass the movement of VC/NVA forces in areas outside of tactical areas of

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responsibility (TAOR) where heretofore they have been able to move with relative impunity.

m. Combat Support Coordination Center (CSCC). The CSCC is a facility within which are grouped representatives of artillery, air, naval gunfire, and other agencies as deemed necessary by the commander(s). These representatives assist the commander(s) through the G2/G3 in planning, coordinating, and controlling all means of combat support available in an operation.

n. Reserve Reaction Forces. Reserve reaction forces are all uncommitted forces available to the commander. They may be any size unit and include reaction forces anywhere, forces in training, forces undergoing rehabilitation, and newly arrived forces undergoing combat readiness preparations.

o. Missions.

(1) Search and Destroy (Regional). Operations to destroy or neutralize NVA/VC main and guerrilla forces, base areas and supply points. Search and Destroy (Regional) operations are not in support of pacification.

(2) Search and Destroy (Provincial). Operations in indirect support of pacification which are conducted adjacent to populated areas under SVN control or to areas in which PD is in progress to provide a secure environment by destroying or neutralizing VC district or provincial

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forces.

(3) Search and Destroy (Local). Operations in direct support of pacification which are conducted in or adjacent to RD area for the purpose of destroying VC local forces, guerrilla forces and infrastructure.

(4) Security Operations. Operations whose purpose is to protect political, economic and military resources and installations, such as district capitals or populated areas, lines of communication, food stores and production areas, and depots and base areas. For reporting purposes, operations in defense of military areas and installations, e.g., military air bases and logistic complexes, are not considered in support of pacification.

(5) Reserve Mission. A mission in which forces are involved in training or undergoing rehabilitation. It applies also to newly arrived forces undergoing combat readiness preparation and/or alerted reaction forces.

5. (U) PACIFICATION:

a. Pacification is the military, political, economic and social process of establishing or reestablishing local government responsive to and involving the participation of the people. It includes the provision of sustained, credible territorial security, the destruction of the enemy's underground government, the assertion or re-assertion of political control and involvement of the people in

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government, and the initiation of economic and social activity capable of self-sustenance and expansion. The economic element of pacification includes the opening of roads and waterways and the maintenance of lines of communication important to economic and military activity.

b. Revolutionary development, the leading edge of pacification, is the formalized Government of Vietnam program, under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Revolutionary Development, in specified hamlets located generally within RD campaign areas. It includes the local security for those hamlets and the political, economic, and social activities at that level.

c. Nation building is the economic, political, and social activity having an impact nationwide and/or in urban centers. It is related to pacification in that it builds on the results of pacification and contributes to the establishment of a viable economic and social community.

d. Military Support of Pacification. The primary role of military forces during the pacification process is to establish territorial security for the conduct of pacification activities and to maintain this security until such time as civil authority and public security are assured.

e. Secured Area. An area is secured when:

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(1) All hamlets within the area have been secured to GVN control as completed Ap Tan Sinh or Ap Binh Dinh or developing Ap Doi Moi to the extent that cadre no longer are required on a permanent basis and there is an on-going program to continue the development of these hamlets.

(2) VC guerrilla and known VC infrastructure elements based in the area have been destroyed and available military and police forces have an organized on-going program to prevent the re-emergence of these elements.

(3) Hamlets in the area have adequate day and night security forces and GVN cadre elements are able to remain overnight in these hamlets without threat from the VC.

(4) Roads connecting hamlets and villages in the area are safe from VC attack during daylight hours with minimum security required.

(5) The area is free of VC incidents except for sporadic individual acts of terrorism and sabotage.

(6) RVNAF and/or US/FWNAF are available to prevent the incursion of an organized enemy force into the area.

f. Area Undergoing Securing. An area is undergoing securing when:

(1) The area has been cleared of organized resistance. As a guide, a platoon size or larger unit can offer organized resistance. However, any enemy force that is organized and equipped to remain in the area and

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and fight as a cohesive unit and exhibits the capability and intent to do so, should be considered capable of offering organized resistance.

(2) RVNAF and/or US/FWMAF are able to prevent the incursion of an organized enemy force into the area.

(3) RVNAF and/or US/FWMAF are operating in the area as necessary to destroy VC guerrilla and infrastructure element and establish local area security and security for the population and cadre elements.

(4) Revolutionary Development Cadre, or other officially recognized cadre, are working in the area or are programmed to be available when the requisite local security has been established.

g. Contested Area. An area is contested when:

(1) The area has been selected for the introduction of revolutionary development activities and/or is required for the conduct of operations to provide a defense in depth against the incursion of enemy forces into nearby areas where revolutionary development activities are taking place.

(2) RVNAF and/or US/FWMAF are conducting operations in the area with the task to clear the area permanently of organized VC/NVA main force and guerrilla units.

h. Uninhabitable Area. An area is uninhabitable when:

(1) The area virtually is uninhabitable and

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does not contain officially recognized hamlets.

(2) Neither side is attempting to exert political or military influence over the area except for the conduct of transient type operations.

i. VC Controlled Area. An area is under VC control when:

(1) VC/NVA forces are present in or near the area and are able to exert political and/or military influence over the area.

(2) RVNAF and/or US/FWMAF, if present in the area, are conducting only transient search and destroy type operations with no intent to gain permanent area control.

j. Ap Doi Moi (Real New Life Hamlet). A hamlet designated in a provincial RD plan for a program of development under the supervision of RD cadre to achieve the eleven objectives (aspirations). The eleven objectives are:

(1) Eliminate the VC infrastructure.

(2) Eliminate corrupt practices and discharge corrupt officials.

(3) Develop a new spirit.

(4) Establish popular government and social operations.

(5) Organize the people for self-defense.

(6) Eliminate illiteracy.

(7) Eliminate disease and unsanitary conditions.

(8) Implement land reform.

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- (9) Develop agriculture and handicraft industries.
- (10) Improve lines of communication.
- (11) Reward deserving soldiers, public servants and citizens who have contributed to FD programs.

k. Ap Tan Sinh (New Life Hamlet). A hamlet that was completed before 31 December 1966 and has the following 6 criteria:

- (1) Census completed, VC infrastructure destroyed or neutralized.
- (2) Selected and trained self-defense forces, equipped as appropriate.
- (3) Effective hamlet defense system.
- (4) Organized liaison and logistic system.
- (5) Established social organization.
- (6) Popular government elected.

(These hamlets are developed and improved by the village and hamlet officials.)

l. Ap Binh Dinh (Pacification Hamlet). A hamlet designated in a provincial FD plan for a program of construction to achieve the first two of the eleven objectives (aspirations) of an Ap Dei Loi. Construction activities may be accomplished under the supervision of FD cadre or other authorized SVN personnel. Ap Binh Dinh may have more objectives, depending on the capabilities of the social organization. Recruiting and training self-

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defense forces, organizing a defense system against guerrilla forces and electing the hamlet government council, an Ap Binh Dinh should be ready for conversion to an Ap Doi Moi in the following year.

m. Civil - Military RD Team. An RD group, organized on the 59-man basis, formed from one PF or RF platoon and provincial administrative and technical cadre, whose purpose is to perform tasks similar to those performed by RD cadre.

n. Truong Son RD Team. A 70-man RD group, generally all of highlander ethnic origin, employed in the highland areas of South Vietnam to perform tasks similar to those performed by RD cadre, except that these tasks are modified to suit the highlander tribal population.

o. Territorial Security. Security from VC local forces and guerrilla units and VC/NVA main forces units in or threatening that area.

p. Local Security. That part of territorial security which provides security from VC local forces and guerrilla units.

q. RD Campaign. The military organization established by inter-ministerial directive #032/XD/31/HSCB and #1958/QP/QS/3 dated 6 Mar 67. That directive establishes procedures for control, coordination and integration

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of military, RDC groups and administrative elements in support of RD in province priority RD areas. In those areas, an RD campaign must be organized where three or more RDC groups operate. The limits of the campaign will encompass the RD area and the necessary territory to provide security for the RD area.

6. (U) LOGISTICS

a. Common Item (RVN). Equipment or material used by two or more services.

b. Common Item (US). Class I, III and those Class II and IV items currently specified for Common Supply System Support, plus any additional items of supply mutually agreed upon between the services involved.

c. Service Peculiar Item (RVN). Equipment or material used by only one of the military services.

d. Service Peculiar Item (US). All items not included in the definition for Common Item (US).

e. Designated Item. Equipment or material identified by nomenclature, group or category for a specific purpose.

f. Supply Support. The furnishing of items of supply as defined herein.

g. Cross Service Support. That function performed by one military service in support of another military service for which reimbursement is required from the service receiving support unless agreed otherwise.

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h. Cross National Force Support. The same as Cross Service Support except that support is rendered by forces of one nation for forces of another nation.

i. Line(s) of Communication (Logistics) (LOC). All of the routes, land, water, and air which connect an operating military force with a base of operations, and along which supplies and reinforcements move. Also designated routes that support economic and political efforts.

j. LOC Security Goals

(1) GREEN: Segment of the LOC between two points is physically open. RVN/US/SWMAF control of the surrounding area is such that traffic can move during daylight hours with relative freedom from VC sabotage, attacks or harassment. Armed escort is not required. Isolated incidents may occur.

(2) AMBER: Segment of the LOC between two points is physically open. Security of surrounding area is such that thorough security measures, including armed escorts, are required. Frequent incidents may occur.

(3) RED: LOC between two points is closed by VC/NVA military control of the area or by extensive physical interdiction. Requires tactical operations and/or engineering efforts to open and/or restore for traffic.

k. Military Assistance Program (MAP). The United States program for providing military assistance under the Foreign

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Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended, as distinct from Economic Aid and other programs authorized. (In RVN, the functions of MAP are now covered by the Military Assistance Service Fund (MASF) Plan which provides for individual US military department (service) programming, budgeting and funding of military assistance.)

1. Military Construction (MILCON). Construction programmed and funded under the US military departments' military construction programs, and which require Congressional approval.

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Phụ bản P (Phổ - biến) của
Kế-hoạch Hồn-hợp Quân sự I-68

Annex P (Distribution) to
Combined Campaign Plan I-68.

BOE/Pháo binh/QĐI	I	25
Sư đoàn 1/Khu II CT	5	28 - 30
Sư đoàn 2/Khu I2 CT	5	31 - 35
BK/Quảng-Đà	2	36- 37
Trung đoàn 51 Bộ binh	I	38
Tỉnh/TK/Quảng-Trị	I	39
Tỉnh/TK/Thừa-Thiên	I	40
Tỉnh/TK/Quảng Tín	I	41
Tỉnh/TK/Quảng Nam	I	42
Tỉnh/TK/Quảng Ngãi	I	43
Tòa Thi chính Đà Nẵng	I	44
Đặc khu Đà Nẵng	I	45
Bộ Xây dựng (VP/Tổng trưởng)	2	46 - 47
Lưu - hồ sơ	I3	48 - 60
CMC	5	
CINCPAC	5	
COMUSMACV	15	
CG FMFPAC	5	
CG USARV	5	
COMNAVFORV	5	
COMSEVENTHAF	5	
COMNAVSUPACT, DANANG	5	
COMTHIRDNCB	5	
CG 1st MarDiv	10	
CG 3d MarDiv	10	

CG Americal Div	10
CG 1st MAW	5
CG FLC	5
CG Ninth MAB	2
CG 2nd ROKMC Brigade	5
DSA, I ARVN Corps	10
5th SFG (ABN)	3
1st MP Bn	2
3d MP Bn	2
7th Engr Bn	2
9th Engr Bn	2
11th Engr Bn	2
5th Comm Bn	2
244th PsyOpnsCo	2
29th Civil Affairs Co	2
File	29
Total	220

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