

MR. CALHOUN'S LETTER ON THE  
PROJECTED CHANGE OF THE PRESIDENT'S  
ELECTION IN SOUTH CAROLINA

CATALOGUE

OF THE

TRUSTEES, FACULTY AND STUDENTS,

OF THE

SOUTH CAROLINA COLLEGE.

JANUARY MDCCLXIV.

Morgan's Press

Mr Calhoun's Letter  
on the projected  
Change of Presidential  
Election in S. Carolina

Constitution of S. C. and its prin-  
ciple of compromise.

General Tickets.

Numerical and Concurrent  
Majority

Democratic Abolitionism

Precedent in Politics, not  
only in Law &c.

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The whole seems to be abso-  
lutely conclusive

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Arthur, B. F.	Richland,	3 H
Belser, L. L.	Sumter,	8 H
Boone, J. S.	Colleton,	3 H
Boyce, Robert	Laurens,	10 G
Broyles, Augustus T.	Pendleton,	10 D
Carpenter, Thornton	Kershaw,	7 H
Chappell, H.	Richland,	6 G
Crawford, M. P.	Lancaster,	11 H
Crosland, James E.	Marlborough,	12 A
Deas, Robert H.	Charleston,	7 H
Dill, Thomas	Edisto Island,	4 H
Dubard, Jesse A.	Richland,	5 G
Fraser, Thomas B.	Sumter,	12 C
Gaillard, E.	Fairfield,	9 H
Garlington, R.	Laurens,	10 G
Goin, Wyatt J.	Fairfield,	11 H
Gourdin, Theodore S.	Charleston,	5 G
Griffin, Stanmore B.	Edgefield,	11 D
Henry, Charles	Richland,	6 G
Heyward, E. B.	Charleston,	12 H
Hume, Christopher G.	Charleston,	9 H
Kinsler, Henry	Richland,	5 F
Landrum, G. W.	Edgefield,	11 D

From the Pendleton Messenger

FORT HILL, NOV. 1846.

GENTLEMEN:—I am in the receipt of your note of the 14th ult., in which you express a desire to have my views in relation to the proposed change in our State Constitution, in reference to the election of the President and Vice President. In compliance with your request, I herewith enclose a communication, in which they are briefly sketched. To have done full justice, in reference to the many and important questions involved in the subject, would have made my communication too prolix.

I have given it the present shape, rather than that of a formal letter in reply to your note, because it left me at liberty to arrange my views in conformity to the order which the subject required.

With great respect,

I am, &c. &c. &c.,

J. C. CALHOUN.

Messrs. James L. Orr, William Sloan, A. Evins, and F. W. Symmes.

It would seem from the public prints, that a large majority of those, who are disposed to change the present mode of appointing electors of President and Vice President of the United States, are in favor of a general ticket, in lieu of the present mode of appointing them by the Legislature. They rest their opposition to the latter, and support of the former, on the broad principle, that all power belongs to the People; that they should exercise it directly, without the intervention of any intermediate agency, whenever they can properly do so, and that whenever they can so exercise it, it would be an act of usurpation on the part of the Government to withhold it.

From this, they conclude, that the power of appointing electors, should be given to the people directly; and that the mode of appointing should be, to elect them by a general ticket. Those, on the contrary, who are opposed to the proposed change, or the mode proposed to be substituted in lieu of the present, admit the principle; but deny, that it would give the appointment to the people to elect them by a general ticket; or that, if it would, they could properly exercise it in this case.

The difference then, between them, is reduced to two questions. Would the adoption of the general ticket give the power to the people in reality to appoint electors? And, if it would, is this a case in which it could be properly exercised? On their decision, it is manifest, the propriety of adopting the general ticket must depend. If it should appear on investigation, that it would not in form only, but in truth give the power directly to the people, and that they might exercise it, without disturbing or injuriously affecting the State, in its federal or interior relations, then it might with propriety be adopted. But if the contrary should appear, in either of the cases, then it could not. Thus far there can be no difference of opinion.

As one of the people, taking the profoundest interest in whatever may touch the liberty or prosperity of the State, I have investigated these important questions with the greatest care and deliberation, for the guidance of my own course, and have come to the conclusion adverse to the general ticket in reference to both questions. The investigation has made a deep impression on me, that so far from giving the power to the people, it would be the most effectual way that could be devised of divesting them of it, and transferring it to party managers and cliques, and that if it were possible to over-

come that objection, it ought not still to be adopted, because it would deeply disturb and injuriously affect the State in its federal and interior relations.— It now remains, in compliance with your request, to state the reasons, which have brought me to these conclusions, which I shall next proceed to do without further remarks.

The first and radical objection to a general ticket is, that where many are to elect many, especially over a large extent of country, it does not in fact, constitute an election, but is a mere delusion, underserving the name. The reason is, in the first place, that it is impossible for the great body of the voters to be guided by their individual knowledge in selecting the candidates, either from personal acquaintance or reputation, which is indispensable to that exercise of judgment in making a selection necessary to constitute an election. And in the next, admitting it to be possible, and that the mass of voters could be guided by their individual choice in making the selection, the scattering of the votes would be so great, that the result, as to who would have the plurality of votes, would be a mere accident, and no indication of the voice of the State. Take our own State for illustration. It is entitled at present to appoint nine electors; and its present number of legal voters may be estimated, without pretending to precision, at 50,000, scattered over a surface say of 150,000 square miles. In our election by a general ticket, each voter votes for the whole number to be elected. Now, I hold it to be impossible with all the intelligence of our people, for the great mass of them to form a ticket from their own knowledge, either personally or by reputation, of nine persons, to be electors, duly distributed over its various parts, who may be fairly considered separately as representing the voice of the several portions in which they may reside, or jointly, the voice of the whole State. Indeed, I might take a far more restricted position, and affirm with truth, not only that the great mass of the voters have not the knowledge to make out such a ticket for themselves, but that even the most intelligent and best informed, would be at a loss to do it.

But waiving this difficulty, and admitting that they have sufficient intelligence to make out each a satisfactory ticket for himself, the other objection, not less difficult, would remain to be surmounted; that is, the scattering would be so great, that the result, as to who might receive a plurality of votes and be elected, would be a mere accident, and no indication of the voice of the State. The diversity of opinion, as to the qualification and suitableness, would be as great, almost, as the number of voters. Few tickets would have the same names on them, and the great body of the State, would be disappointed and dissatisfied with the result.

It would be impossible for such a state of things long to continue. The first consequence would be for a few prominent and influential individuals to enter into a secret concert to control the election, which need not be very extensive, when the scattering would be so great. The next would be, for others to enter into like concert to defeat them; and finally, there would grow out of this state of things two parties, with all, the usual party machinery, of caucus, conventions, cliques, managers to control the election. The whole would be put into active operation every four years, on the approach of the Presidential election, and each party would make out a full ticket by what would be called a State Convention, and any voter, whether he approve of it or not, would have to vote for one or the other, or to throw away his vote on a ticket formed without concert, and which would have no chance of success.

It is thus, by the operation of causes growing out of the very nature of a general ticket, it would, if it should be adopted, end in delusion. Instead of giving the election, directly to the people, as its supporters assume, it would divest them of it, and place it under the control of intermediate and irresponsible cliques and political managers, as certainly as it is adopted. That ever has and must be its result, and that by laws, as uniform and certain in the moral world, as gravitation is in the physical.

But setting aside this objection, and assuming that the great mass of the voters of the State are sufficiently intelligent and well informed, each to form a ticket for himself, and that their votes could always be sufficiently concentrated, without the intervention of party machinery, to secure a majority of the votes for the nine electors, there would still remain an insuperable reason against adopting it; because, as stated, it would disturb and injuriously affect the State, both in its federal and interior relations. To be more explicit, it would not be just or fair regarding the State in its federal relations, between its two great divisions, the upper and the lower country; and that regarded in its interior relations, it would be calculated to disturb and endanger the compromise, as established by the constitution between them, as I shall next proceed to show.

Before entering on the discussion of this portion of the subject, it will be proper to premise, that our State is divided by a well defined line, into two great portions or divisions, which are strongly distinguished by their geographical features; the character of their productions and population, and the origin of their inhabitants and manner of settlement.

Of these, one extends from the seacoast to the falls of the great rivers, and is called the lower

country; and the other extends thence to the mountains, and is called the upper country.

They constitute not only the two great geographical, but also the two great political divisions of the State, on which its political fabric rests.

Passing over the other features, which distinguish them, there are two which, from their important bearing on the points under consideration, require particular notice; I refer to the great excess of the slave population of the one compared with the other, and the difference in the origin of their inhabitants and manner of settlement. They both have had great influence in forming and modifying its constitution and laws, and placing the two divisions in the political relations, to which they stand to each other, as will appear in the sequel. With these remarks, I shall now proceed to make good the position, that the adoption of a general ticket would not be fair or just between them, regarding the State in its federal relations.

The federal constitution in reference to Presidential electors provides, that "each State shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives, to which the State may be entitled in Congress;" It also provides that the "Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States of the Union according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to serve for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons."

It follows from these provisions, that the federal numbers of the slave holding States, and consequently their relative weight in the House of Representatives and the electoral College, and through them, in the federal Government, depends more or less, on their respective slave population. That of

this State, depends more on it than any other; because she has the greatest number in proportion of that description of population. Its federal number by the present census is 463,582, of which the free population makes 267,360; and its slave population 196,222. Its aggregate federal number, divided between the lower and upper country, would give to the 246,180, and to the latter 217,402, an excess to the lower over the upper in the weight of the State in the federal government. But their respective weight is very unequally affected by their slave population in consequence of its very unequal distribution between the two divisions. Of the 196,222, which the slave population adds to the federal weight of the State, the lower divisions adds but 66,408, being more than two to one on the part of the former. The case is the reverse in reference to the number (246,180) which the free population adds. Of that the lower division adds but 116,366, against 150,994, which the upper adds. These estimates are throughout based on districts; all lying in the portion of the State below the falls of the rivers, wholly or principally are included in the lower division, and those above, in like manner, in the upper.

Now, as the voters consist entirely of the free population, and as the number of voters in the respective divisions, is probably very nearly in proportion to their respective free population, it is manifest, should the general ticket be adopted, that the upper division, which gives the State less weight in the federal government than the lower, would have decidedly the power of controlling the appointment of electors, in consequence of having a decided majority of voters.

That a mode of appointing, which would lead to such a result, would be neither fair nor just towards the lower division, no one who has any regard to equity or justice will deny. If I do not greatly mistake, the upper country has too deep a sense of both to wish it, even if it had the power; and if it had, and should attempt to exercise it, the lower has too much spirit to acquiesce in it. But thanks to the justice and wisdom of our State Convention, neither of the divisions has the power to encroach on the just rights of the other. It has secured to each the power to protect itself; so that neither can oppress or injure the other, should it desire it. If, then, one or the other should suffer by the acts of the government of the State, the fault will be its own—its want of sufficient intelligence to understand its rights and its interest, or sufficient spirit to defend them. To show how this has been done, and how the adoption of the general ticket would disturb and endanger the compromise, by which it has been effected, remains next to be discussed. Its discussion will require a brief preliminary sketch of the origin and settlement of the State, as far as they have a bearing on establishing the compromise between the two divisions, with the causes which led to it, and its character and the effect on the politics of the State.

Our State was first settled on the coast by emigrants principally from England, but with no inconsiderable intermixture of Huguenots from France. As the former were, for the most part, of the Church of England, the tier of counties (now called districts) settled by them along the coast, were divided into Parishes; and they were made the foundation of the political organization of the colony, and, since the Revolution, of that portion of the State.

The portion of the State along the falls of the rivers, and back to the mountains, had a very different origin and settlement. Its settlement commenced long after, at a period but little anterior to the war of the Revolution, and consisted principally of emigrants who followed the course of the mountains, from Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia and North Carolina. They had very little connection or intercourse for a long time with the old settlement on the coast; and the whole region they occupied, remained almost without any political division or organization until but a short period before the revolution. It was, indeed, very imperfectly or

ganized and slightly connected with the original settlement, and possessed very little political power, until the adoption of the present Constitution, in 1790; although its white population, even then, outnumbered the original settlement on the coast. Its adoption greatly enlarged its political power, and much more intimately united the two divisions; but it still left every department of the government under the control of the lower country, by retaining a decided majority in both branches of the Legislature; which, as that had the power of appointing the Governor and Judges, gave it a control over the Executive and Judiciary, and, of course, the whole Government.

It was impossible, with the increasing population, wealth and intelligence of the other portion of the State, that such a state of things should long continue without leading to discontent and conflict.

The former soon shewed itself, and a conflict commenced within a few years after the adoption of the Constitution, which continued with increasing violence, until 1807, when the agitation and disorder had so increased, that sensible and patriotic men on both sides, became satisfied that the conflict must be closed. It was accordingly terminated, not by a surrender on either side, but by a compromise, which placed the two parties on grounds of perfect political equality; the only way by which such conflicts ever can be satisfactorily and permanently adjusted. The composition of the Senate, as it stood, consisting of one from each election district, remained undisturbed, which left the old original settlement on the coast in possession of the control of that branch of the Legislature, by reason of its Parish representation. To give an equal control in the House of Representatives to the more newly settled portion in the interior, was a more difficult task. It was accomplished by allotting to that branch of the Legislature 124 members, of which 62 were assigned to the white population, and 62 to taxation. A census was directed to be taken every ten years, and an estimate to be made of the aggregate amount of taxes paid by each election District for the period of ten preceding years. The number of Representatives allowed to each district to be apportioned to the two with the proviso that each district should have at least one, and if there should be a deficiency in the number, one to be added to the districts having the greatest fractions, until the whole should make 124. By this complex arrangement, not only an equal weight was secured to the more recently settled portions of the State in the House of Representatives, but an effectual provision made against unequal and oppressive taxes, by making taxation an element in the Representation of the House. Its effect is to increase the number of Representatives from the portion of the State unduly taxed, just in proportion to the excess of its taxes, and thereby increase in the same proportion its weight in the House, under the next apportionment. These just and wise provisions, by requiring the concert and joint consent of the two portions of the State in enacting laws, placed them on grounds of perfect equality in the Legislature; and as it retained the power of electing the Governor and Judges, in every department of the government. Each having thus a negative on the other, on all the acts of the government, possesses the power of protecting itself against the injustice and oppression of the other. Thus the government ceased to be the exclusive organ of one portion of the State, not by becoming the like organ of the other, but the concurrent and joint organ of both, and thereby the

true and faithful Representative of the whole State.

This fortunate compromise terminated the conflict which had so long divided and agitated the State. So completely did it close it, that from its adoption until this time, a period of almost forty years, all local divisions and parties growing out of them, have entirely ceased. The upper and lower country are no longer named for political discord and agitation, and the State has been blessed with an unanimity of sentiment and freedom from parties, altogether without example in any other member of the Union. Nor has its effect been less happy, in reference to her federal, than her internal relations. To it, she owes, in a great measure, her weight and high character and standing in the Union, which, as considerable as she is in extent of territory and population, places her on a level in influence, with the largest and most populous of its members.

Destroy this just and wise compromise, by giving to either an undue preponderance in the government of the State, and all this would be reversed. Discord, distraction, parties and factions, with all their machinery and demoralizing consequences, would follow, and sink her far below the level she now occupies. That the general ticket would give such undue preponderance and in the end destroy this happy compromise, I shall next proceed to show.

I have already shown, that it would give an undue and unfair preponderance to the upper division of the State, in its federal relations. But it has been said, it would be restricted to them, without extending its influence to the government of the State, and giving either of its great political divisions undue preponderance in it. Those who make this assertion overlook, I must think, the absorbing character of power. Nothing is more so. Whenever it acquires a preponderance, be it ever so small, it will slowly and imperceptibly commence the process of absorption, and continue it until it absorbs the whole power, unless efficient measures be taken in time to counteract it. In this case, there are several circumstances, which would greatly increase and accelerate this process, which I shall now proceed to show.

Its adoption would introduce the principle of taking the sense of the State, as a whole, by the mere numerical majority, without regard to its two great natural and political divisions, and the conflicting interests growing out of them,—a principle heretofore utterly unknown to the State, either in its federal or interior relations, or in any of the political changes through which it has passed. But, of all the forms of power in a popular government, it is by far the most absorbing in its character and difficult to counteract. It is indeed but the absolute and despotic form of popular government, just as much as the absolute and despotic power of one man or a few, is of the monarchical and aristocratical. Now, all experience shows, that there is a constant and strong tendency in all constitutional governments to their absolute and despotic form, and in none more so, than in popular constitutional governments like that of this State, resting on the principle of the concurrent majority, as all such governments must. Indeed, nothing short of a high degree of intelligence and constant vigilance can counteract this tendency, as the history of all such governments proves. Our own, both federal and State, already give strong indications of it, so much so, that it has become a fixed opinion in a large portion of the union, that the mere numerical majority of the whole, has the absolute and indefeasible right to govern.

But, as absorbing as this power is of itself, the nature of the election, in connection with which, it would be introduced, would greatly increase its force. Of all our elections, whether of the federal or State governments, the Presidential excites by far the greatest interest, and exerts the greatest influence over the public mind, because it greatly exceeds all others in importance. Such being the case, the place of electors is sought by citizens of influence

and distinction, both on account of its prominence and the influence it is calculated to give with the President and his administration, in the distribution of the honors and emoluments of the federal government, should the candidate voted for succeed in being elected.

These considerations could not fail to induce those, who aspire to so prominent and desirable a station, to court popular favor, and especially that of the division of the State which might have the greatest number of votes and control of the election, and that, in too many cases, even at the sacrifice of their own, should they happen to reside in the other. This would increase the preponderance of that division to a degree, that would be strongly felt in the Legislation of the State and the election of the governor and other prominent officers to the increase of its influence, and decrease of the influence of the other, in the same proportion.

But as strong as is the tendency of the numerical majority of itself to absorb power, without reference to the form of taking it, and as much as it would be increased, in consequence of its connection with the Presidential election, its increase from the form of that election, should it be by general ticket, would exceed both of the others combined. Its vast increase from this source would be derived from a consequence, which, as already shown, would follow its adoption, that is, that it would introduce the caucus system, with all its train of party divisions and party managers, with their cliques and machinery. The system once introduced, although for the particular purpose of nominating electors, would not be slow in extending its jurisdiction far beyond, by bringing under it the nomination of the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Senators in Congress, Judges and all other officers, elected by the Legislature. But just in the same proportion, that it might extend its jurisdiction, would the power of the numerical majority, of which it is but the exponent, be extended. When to this it is added, that the reasons assigned for appointing electors by a general ticket, equally apply to the election of the Governor and Lieutenant Governor, and Judges, in the same manner, it is not to be doubted, that, if it should be adopted for the one, it would be ultimately for the others. Indeed, it is already urged, that the two first should be so elected. By the time that is done, the compromise which places the two divisions of the State in the relation of perfect political equality, will have been utterly destroyed, and the powers of the State and government concentrated in that, which has the greatest number of voters. It would be an entire and disastrous political revolution. Instead of the present excellent constitutional government, which makes ours, in its true meaning, a Republic, or Commonwealth, that is, the Government of the whole, we would have an absolute and despotic democracy;—the government of one portion of the State over the other—the one that has the greatest number of votes, over that which has the fewest. No greater curse could befall the State, including both divisions—the one which would acquire the power, and the other which would lose it. It would corrupt the one and debase the other.

But we are told, in order to induce us to take a step so fatal, that all other States of the Union have adopted the general ticket for the appointment of electors. It is true that such is the case; but it is equally so, that its adoption was not the result of unbiassed and deliberate preference. It was not so originally. I have not at hand the means of ascertaining the mode adopted at first by the several States, but unless I greatly mistake, I do not err in asserting that the great majority appointed their electors, either by Districts or their Legislatures, and few indeed by general ticket. That all since, except this State, have adopted it, is attributable, partly, to the violent party struggles, growing out of the Presidential election, and partly to that tenden-

cy of all popular governments to concentrate power in the hands of the mere numerical majority, already explained. In these struggles, one State after another, of those that had adopted the district system, resorted, in their eager desire for victory, to the general ticket, in order to concentrate their power; while the States which, at first, appointed by their Legislatures, gradually yielded to the tendency towards the numerical majority. That this State has been able to resist successfully the operation of such powerful causes, is attributable to the superiority of her Constitution. Long may it enable her to continue her successful resistance, and, instead of following the evil example of others, may it be her patriotism and pride to be an example to them, even if it should remain, to be as it now is, a solitary one.

With these weighty, and to my mind overwhelming reasons against the adoption of the general ticket, I would here close the discussion, as far as regards it, as being wholly out of the question, were it not for the deep conviction I have, as to the disastrous consequences to the State, which would follow, should it be unfortunately adopted. Under its influence, I feel it to be a duty, in replying to your note, to omit no material reason against it. There still remains one such, with which I shall close this portion of the discussion of the subject.

Those who support a general ticket, seem to me, with all due deference, to rest its adoption on a series of unfounded assumptions. They assume, in the first place, that the federal Constitution vests the appointment of electors in the people. But such is not the fact. On the contrary, it expressly provides, that each State shall appoint its electors,

with no other restrictions, except that the manner shall be as directed by its Legislature, and that no Senator or Representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be an elector. It is then clear, the assumption, that the federal Constitution gives the appointment to the people, rests on another assumption, that the people are the State. It is indeed true, they are, regarded in their organic character, as constituting a body politic. In that sense, the people are the State, and the State the people, but no other. It is not, however, in that sense, but a very different one, that the advocates of the general ticket use it. On the contrary, they evidently apply it to the people, in their unorganized character as mere individuals—a sense, in which the people are never called the State, nor the State the people. I say evidently, because the effect of adopting it would be to give the appointment to a mere majority, regarded as so many individuals, without the slightest reference to the peculiar political organization of our State, or even an attempt to adjust the power of appointing the electors, so as to conform to it. But the assumption, that the people are the State in that sense, is as unfounded, as the first on which it rests, that the Constitution gives the appointment to them. But even this unfounded assumption, rests on another equally so; that the numerical majority of the people is the State, and on that rests the conclusion, that the adoption of the general ticket, which would give the power to it, would be the same as giving it to the people. And this brings us to the final and radical assumption, which lies at the bottom of the whole series, that the majority has the natural, inherent, and indefeasible right of governing—an assumption not only utterly unfounded, but of the most dangerous character, and in direct conflict with the Constitution of this State and that of the Union.

All natural rights are individual rights, and belongs to them as such. They appertain neither to majorities nor minorities. On the contrary, all political rights are conventional. Neither majorities nor minorities can rightfully exercise any such, but by compact or agreement, expressed or implied. Some of the States of the Union, it would seem, have based their Constitutions on the assumption, that the mere numerical majority has the right to govern. In such, it would, indeed, be the State by implication, and the adoption of the general ticket by them, for the appointment of electors, would be in conformity with the provisions of the federal Constitution, which vests it in the State. But such is not our case. Our State is organized on the far broader and more solid and durable foundation, of the concurrent majority, to the entire exclusion of the numerical. To adopt, then, the general ticket, would not be with us to give the appointment to the State. On the contrary, it would be to introduce a new element, calculated to subvert and destroy the very foundation on which its organization rests, as has been shown.

Setting, then, aside the general ticket, for these numerous and insurmountable objections, as utterly inadmissible, no other alternative is left, but to retain the present mode of appointment, or adopt the District system, by dividing the State into a number of Districts equal to the number of its electors, and lot the appointment of one to each. If it should be thought preferable to give the appointment direct to the people, without any intermediate agency, then, the latter should be adopted, as the only way by which it can be truly given to them, and that too, with strict justice to the two great divisions of the State, and without the hazard of destroying or disturbing the compromise between them. The strongest objection to it is, that it might diminish the relative weight of the State in the Presidential election, by exposing its vote to the hazard of a division. — It is certainly desirable to avoid that, so long as the other States shall continue to concentrate theirs by a general ticket. But, I must say, even setting this objection aside, that I can see no adequate reason for changing the present mode. Under our well constructed and just Constitution, the Legislature may, with strict regard to truth, be said to be the true representative of the State. It has heretofore proved to be so, in the appointment of electors. In no instance has it deceived or betrayed the State in reference to it.

Nor am I aware of any formidable objection against continuing the present mode, growing out of the late act of Congress, which may not be met by an amendment of our State Constitution, fixing an earlier day for the meeting of the Legislature every fourth year, so that it may be in session to comply with its provisions, and in having a call session for that purpose until the amendment can be made. But whether that should be done, or the District system adopted, notwithstanding the hazard of dividing the vote of the State, are questions to be decided, not so much by reference to principle, as considerations of expediency in reference to which the Legislature is the most competent to decide.

But it is urged, that a change must be made, because the Legislature has no right to appoint the electors. To this may be fairly answered, that the objection comes too late. The federal government has been in operation more than half a century, during which time, there have been fifteen Presidential elections, at each of which one or more States have appointed their electors by the Legislature; and in not a single instance have the two houses of Congress, in counting the votes, objected to receive the vote of a State, because it was cast by electors appointed by its Legislature.

But waiving this answer, I cannot perceive any solid ground for the objection. The federal constitution expressly vests the power of appointing the electors in the States; that is, as has been shown, in their organized character as constituting a body politic, and the power of directing the manner of

appointing in their Legislatures, without qualification. It is left to their discretion to decide, whether it shall be done directly by the people of the State, or indirectly through intermediate agents, provided the manner directed, shall be such as to be fairly the act of the State, that is, of the people in the character above stated. The more perfectly and fully it would be theirs in that character, the more perfectly and fully will the intention of the Constitution be complied with, whether done through the direct vote of the people, or any intermediate agency, including the Legislature. But it is certain, that with us, whatever may be the case in other States, no other agency could be constituted or any other mode of appointment adopted, that would more perfectly and fully represent the State, or make the appointment more truly its act, than that by its Legislature.

I have now complied with your request, with as much brevity as possible, considering the importance and complex character of the question involved. I have, indeed experienced no inconsiderable difficulty, in discussing some of the points; to express myself with sufficient clearness to be well understood, without going into a discussion of some of the fundamental principles of political science, if it may be so called; and, thereby, increasing unreasonably the length of my answer to your request. As it is, I fear, in attempting to avoid prolixity, I have not sufficiently explained my meaning, on some of the points, to escape obscurity.

In conclusion permit me to say, if what I have written should shed an additional ray of light on the nature and character of our excellent State Constitution, or contribute in any degree, to guard against the adoption of any measure calculated to impair, or weaken it, I shall feel myself amply compensated for the time and reflection I have bestowed on this communication.

I am with great respect,  
Yours, &c. &c.

J. C. CALHOUN.

Messrs. James L. Orr, William Sloan, A. Evins, and F. W. Symmes.

35  
Winn, John S.  
Wilson, L. E.  
Wideman, James H.  
Whaley, Edward C.  
Waller, P. A.  
Thomson, Charles R.  
Taylor, Thomas  
Pope, J. I.  
Neil, Thomas B.  
Martin, E. H.  
Manning, Brown

Græca Majora, (the Historians and Orators.)  
 Plane and Spherical Trigonometry,  
 Davies' Mensuration and Surveying.  
 Analytical and Descriptive Geometry.  
 History.  
 Whately's Logic; Whately's Rhetoric.  
 Heat, Light, and Electricity, as taught in the Library of Useful  
 Knowledge.

#### JUNIOR YEAR.

Cicero's Rhetorical Works, (select parts of)  
 Horace's Art of Poetry.  
 Juvenal and Persius, (select satires.)  
 Græca Majora, (the Orators, Philosophers and Critics.)  
 Exercises in Latin Composition.  
 Davies' Differential and Integral Calculus.  
 Mechanical Philosophy.  
 Chemistry.  
 History.  
 Elements of Criticism.  
 Moral Philosophy and Politics.  
 Sacred Literature, and Evidences of Christianity.

#### SENIOR YEAR.

Cicero's Ethical Works, (select parts of)  
 Greek Dramatists, (select Plays of the)  
 Exercises in Latin or Greek Composition.  
 Astronomy.  
 Political Economy.  
 Metaphysics; Locke's Essay. Also, a course of Lectures.  
 Chemistry, Geology and Mineralogy.  
 Sacred Literature, and Evidences of Christianity.

There shall be three Recitations of each Class, daily; one after morning prayers; one at 11 o'clock, A. M.; one at 4 o'clock, P. M. On Saturday morning, there shall be one Recitation. There shall be Lectures, Rhetorical Exercises and Compositions, English and Latin, at such times as the Faculty may appoint.

## REFERENCES.

- A. denotes the West Wing of North College
- B. " " Centre Building " "
- C. " " East Wing " "
- D. " " East Wing of South College.
- E. " " Centre Building " "
- F. " " West Wing " "
- G. " " South New College.
- H. " " North New College.

☞ The numbers commence in the new Colleges, at the West end. In the old Colleges, at the end of each wing, and proceed towards the centre building.





